

Second Edition

# COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEMS

An Analysis of Parliamentary  
Elections Since 1945

Alan Siaroff



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# COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEMS

*Comparative European Party Systems*, Second Edition, provides a comprehensive analysis across 48 party systems of party competition, electoral systems and their effects, and the classification of party systems and governments from 1945 through late-2018.

The book consists of three parts. Part I provides a comparative and quantitative overview of party systems according to party families, patterns of party competition, electoral systems and their effects, and classification of party systems and governments. Part II consists of 38 detailed country profiles of longstanding democracies and of the European Union (plus nine profiles on regions such as in Spain and the UK), providing essential detail on the electoral systems, parties, party patterns and systems, dimensions of political competition, and governments. Part III provides an analysis of 10 additional country profiles of oscillating regimes such as Russia, Ukraine, and Balkan and Transcaucasus states.

*Comparative European Party Systems* provides an excellent overview of topical issues in comparative election and party system research and presents a wealth of information and quantitative data. It is a crucial reference for scholars and students of European and comparative politics, elections, electoral systems, and parties and party systems.

**Alan Siaroff** is Professor of Political Science at the University of Lethbridge, Canada.



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An Analysis of Parliamentary  
Elections Since 1945

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*Alan Siaroff*

Second edition published 2019  
by Routledge  
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge  
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*

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First edition published by Routledge 2000

*British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data*

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

Names: Siaroff, Alan, author.

Title: Comparative European party systems : an analysis of parliamentary elections since 1945 / Alan Siaroff.

Description: Second edition. | New York : Routledge, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018035916 | ISBN 9781138888050 (hardback) | ISBN 9781138888098 (paperback) | ISBN 9781315713694 (master ebook) | ISBN 9781317498773 (web pdf) | ISBN 9781317498766 (ePub) | ISBN 9781317498759 (mobipocket/kindle)

Subjects: LCSH: Political parties—Europe. | Europe—Politics and government—1945–

Classification: LCC JN50 .S57 2019 | DDC 324.2094—dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2018035916>

ISBN: 978-1-138-88805-0 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-138-88809-8 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-71369-4 (ebk)

Typeset in Bembo

by Apex CoVantage, LLC

*In memory of my parents, whose lives covered  
almost all of the years under analysis here.*



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# NON-PARTY ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

#C	number of (European) commissioners
#D	number of (subnational) electoral districts
#M	number of (cabinet) ministers
#S	number of seats
%V	percentage of the vote (that is, of valid votes)
1PSS	one-party seat share
2PSS	two-party seat share
2PVS	two-party vote share
DISP	disproportionality
ED	electoral decisiveness
EFRG	electoral fragmentation
EM	earned majority
ENEP	effective number of electoral parties
ENPP	effective number of parliamentary parties
EP	European Parliament
F(+I)P	formation (and investiture) period
GC	grand coalition
HP	hung parliament
(I)	independents (in a cabinet)
ICD	index of coalition difficulty
Ind.	Independent (designating a prime minister)
MAJ	majority
MIN	minority
MM	manufactured majority
MMP	mixed-member proportional
MP	multi-party
MPs	members of parliament

MWC	minimal-winning coalition
MWGC	minimal-winning grand coalition
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ngf	no government formed
NI	Non-Inscrits (Non-attached members of the European Parliament)
$N_{\infty}P$	inverse of the seat share of the largest party
$N_bP$	mean of ENPP and $N_{\infty}P$
OVC	oversized coalition
OVGC	oversized grand coalition
P2%S	number of parties with 2 percent of the seats
P15%V	number of parties with 15 percent of the vote
pe	post-election
PF	party family
PG	party groups (in the European Parliament)
PR	proportional representation
PRFG	parliamentary fragmentation
SBLP	seat bias in favour of the largest party
SB2P	seat bias in favour of the two largest parties
SMP	single-member plurality
SP	single-party
SR1:2	seat ratio first to second party
SR2:3	seat ratio second to third party
STV	single transferable vote
TO	turnout
TVOL	total volatility
WV	wasted votes



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## **PART I**

# Comparative analysis



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# 1

## INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

### Where is Europe?

This work seeks to be a comprehensive analysis of European party systems. In terms of what and where Europe is, however, debate persists. Geographers would tend to define it broadly, up to the Ural Mountains at the start of Siberia. In contrast, historically such areas as Russia and Spain have at times not been included (Wallace 1990). In the current context one may be tempted to begin with the European Union; however, this only contains 28 members (including still in 2018 the United Kingdom pending its ‘Brexit’). A better place to start is in fact with the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe.

The Council of Europe was established in 1949 by 10 European countries. Its stated purpose is to promote democracy and human rights throughout the continent. It also is involved in social, cultural, and legal matters – loosely, everything but defence and economics. However, it did not turn out to be the incipient European government desired by some of its founders. Nevertheless, compared to the European Union or NATO, the Council of Europe is ‘easy’ to join, in that no barriers are placed or vetoes made on worthy applicants. Membership in the Council of Europe thus serves as confirmation of at least modest human rights, and also implicitly of one’s “Europeanness”. Although this latter point may be of relevance for would-be members of the European Union, it also gives a sense of Europe to this analysis.

From its original 10 members, the Council of Europe spread into the rest of Western (and Mediterranean) Europe. From 1990 onwards, various Central and Eastern European countries joined – as did Monaco in 2004 – bringing the membership up to 47. The newest member is Montenegro. It is worth noting that the three Transcaucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) are all members, having joined from 1999 to 2001. Table 1.1 gives the dates (month and year) when

**TABLE 1.1** Membership of the Council of Europe and the European Union

	<i>Joined the Council of Europe (month/year)</i>	<i>Joined the European Union (month/year)</i>
Albania	07/1995	never
Andorra	11/1994	never
Armenia	01/2001	never
Austria	04/1956	01/1995
Azerbaijan	01/2001	never
Belarus	never	never
Belgium	05/1949	01/1958
Bosnia and Herzegovina	04/2002	never
Bulgaria	05/1992	01/2007
Croatia	11/1996	07/2013
Cyprus	05/1961	01/2004
Czech Republic	06/1993	01/2004
Denmark	05/1949	01/1973
Estonia	05/1993	01/2004
Finland	05/1989	01/1995
France	05/1949	01/1958
Georgia	04/1999	never
Germany	07/1950	01/1958
Greece	08/1949★	01/1981
Hungary	11/1990	01/2004
Iceland	03/1950	never
Ireland	05/1949	01/1973
Italy	05/1949	01/1958
Kosovo	never	never
Latvia	02/1995	01/2004
Liechtenstein	11/1978	never
Lithuania	05/1993	01/2004
Luxembourg	05/1949	01/1958
Macedonia	11/1995	never
Malta	04/1965	01/2004
Moldova	07/1995	never
Monaco	10/2004	never
Montenegro	05/2007	never
Netherlands	05/1949	01/1958
Norway	05/1949	never
Poland	11/1991	01/2004
Portugal	09/1976	01/1986
Romania	10/1993	01/2007
Russia	02/1996	never
San Marino	11/1988	never
Serbia	04/2003★★	never
Slovakia	06/1993	01/2004
Slovenia	05/1993	01/2004
Spain	11/1977	01/1986

	<i>Joined the Council of Europe (month/year)</i>	<i>Joined the European Union (month/year)</i>
Sweden	05/1949	01/1995
Switzerland	05/1963	never
Turkey	08/1949	never
Ukraine	11/1995	never
United Kingdom	05/1949	01/1973

\* withdrew from the Council of Europe from 1967 to 1974.

\*\* joined the Council of Europe as Serbia and Montenegro.

countries joined the Council of Europe, as well as when they joined the European Union.

Thus it seems that Europe goes as far east as the Urals/Russia, and as far southeast as Turkey and the Transcaucasus. Europe also contain several micro-states – Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City. Of these, Vatican City lacks polity-based elections but the other four have party systems which can be analyzed. Finally, for simplicity's sake, the Russian Federation will be referred to as Russia, and the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” simply as Macedonia (as of writing an agreement has been reached with Greece on a compromise name of North Macedonia; however, this agreement still requires final steps of approval).

What of subnational governments and regions? There are many of these, as several European states are either federal or have entrenched regional/subnational governments – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Of these many regions, eight particularly distinctive and autonomous ones have been included for separate analysis: Flanders in Belgium; the Faroe Islands as one of the constituent countries of Denmark (the other being Greenland, but geographically that is in North America); Corsica in France; the Basque Country and Catalonia in Spain; and Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales in the United Kingdom. The party systems in these regions will thus be analysed essentially like any national one (however, individual parties will not be classified into party families), although of course the key regional parties also contribute respectively to the overall national party systems, at least in Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The opposite phenomenon is the European Union, which has had parliamentary elections since 1979. It will be analysed ultimately like any European polity, with its party groups being treated like parties. Lastly, the government of Northern Cyprus will be analysed in an analogous way to the regional governments, though in a practical sense it is more a *de facto* state than an actual region of Cyprus.

Although being part of Europe is a necessary condition for this analysis, for a complete analysis it is not a sufficient one. A polity must also be reasonably



competitive and democratic, as the notion of a party system normally implies two or more parties and the differences and relations amongst these. In other words, a polity should have free and fair elections and thus be an electoral democracy. As the New York-based Freedom House notes, electoral democracies are defined “as countries in which there are reasonably free and fair elections characterized by significant choices for voters in a context of free political organization, reasonable access to the media and secret ballot elections” (Karatnycky 1998: 7–8).

It seems reasonable that, at a minimum, a polity must be or have been an electoral democracy and indeed moreover one of some duration for its party politics to have relevance, and for its party system to be comparable to other electoral democracies. For the purposes of this analysis the threshold of electorally democratic party politics is *four* free and fair elections in a row, in the context of responsible government. These criteria can be met even if they do not hold for the most recent election(s), as in the case in Turkey. Table 1.2 provides some relevant data here. The first column provides the date of the first relevant multi-party parliamentary election. Relevant has varying meanings here: For most longstanding (West) European democracies it is the first postwar election. For other countries it is the first election post-independence (or post the creation of an elected subnational regional government), post-democratization, or at least post-communist. In any case, said election may be for a constituent assembly. For Corsica the focus is just the current context of a single territorial collectivity, though there have been regional elections there since 1986. For Monaco the first relevant election is the first one after the 1962 constitution which granted the National Council actual legislative powers. Czechoslovakia as a whole is not included, but the analyses of the Czech Republic and Slovakia each starts with its 1990 election when each was still part of Czechoslovakia. Likewise, Kosovo starts with its 2001 election when it was de facto detached from Serbia. The second column of Table 1.2 gives the total number of elections from the first relevant election through October 2018. The third and final column lists any and all elections that were not properly free and fair.

TABLE 1.2 Parliamentary elections in Europe

	<i>First relevant multi-party parliamentary election</i>	<i>Number of parliamentary elections through October 2018</i>	<i>Of these, those not meeting democratic standards of freedom and fairness</i>
Albania	1992	8	1996 and 2009 elections
Andorra	1993	7	
Armenia	1995	6	all elections★
Austria	1945	22	
Azerbaijan	1995	5	all elections
Belarus	1995	6	all elections
Belgium	1946	22	
Flanders	1995	5	

	<i>First relevant multi-party parliamentary election</i>	<i>Number of parliamentary elections through October 2018</i>	<i>Of these, those not meeting democratic standards of freedom and fairness</i>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1996	8	2018 election
Bulgaria	1990	10	
Croatia	1992	8	1992 and 1995 elections
Cyprus	1976	9	
Northern Cyprus	1976	11	1990 election
Czech Republic	1990	9	
Denmark	1945	27	
Faroe Islands	1945	21	
Estonia	1992	7	
Finland	1945	20	
France Fourth Republic	1946	5	
France Fifth Republic	1958	15	
Corsica	2015	2	
Georgia	1992	8	1999, 2003, and 2008 elections
Germany	1949	19	
Greece	1974	17	
Hungary	1990	8	
Iceland	1946	23	
Ireland	1948	20	
Italy	1946	19	
Kosovo	2001	6	2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010 elections
Latvia	1993	9	
Liechtenstein	1945	22	
Lithuania	1992	7	
Luxembourg	1945	16	
Macedonia	1994	8	1994, 2008, and 2014 elections
Malta	1966	12	
Moldova	1994	8	2005 and April 2009 elections
Monaco	1963	12	
Montenegro	2002	5	
Netherlands	1946	22	
Norway	1945	19	
Poland	1991	8	
Portugal	1975	15	
Romania	1990	8	1990 and 1992 elections
Russia	1993	7	all elections since 2003
San Marino	1945	18	
Serbia	2003	6	
Slovakia	1990	9	

(Continued)

TABLE 1.2 (Continued)

	<i>First relevant multi-party parliamentary election</i>	<i>Number of parliamentary elections through October 2018</i>	<i>Of these, those not meeting democratic standards of freedom and fairness</i>
Slovenia	1992	8	
Spain	1977	13	
Basque Country	1980	11	
Catalonia	1980	12	
Sweden	1948	22	
Switzerland	1947	18	
Turkey	1950	19	1954, 1957, November 2015, and 2018 elections
Ukraine	1994	7	2002 and 2012 elections
United Kingdom	1945	20	
Northern Ireland	1945	17	
Scotland	1999	5	
Wales	1999	5	
European Union	1979–1981	8	

★ However, the political opposition which came to power in May 2018 has pledged to hold a new election.

In terms of the total number of elections, Denmark has had the most with 27 since 1945. Yet it has not had the most frequent elections. Denmark’s 27 elections from October 1945 to June 2015 (836 months) is one election every 31 months – though these averaged every two years from 1971 to 1981. Overall, the most frequent elections have been in Greece: with 17 elections from November 1974 to September 2015 (490 months), this works out to one election every 29 months. At the other extreme, elections are fixed in Norway and Switzerland at every four years, and fixed for the European Parliament at every five years. Of the polities without fixed elections, the least frequent elections have been in Luxembourg at every 52 months (or every 55 months if the partial elections of 1951 and 1954 are combined), and Malta at every 51 months.

A short-term way in which elections have often been quite frequent are the various cases where two elections have been held within 12 months. These have been as follows:

- Albania in March/April 1991 and March 1992;
- Croatia in November 2015 and September 2016;
- Denmark in April 1953 and September 1953;
- the French Fourth Republic in October 1945, June 1946, and then November 1946 (so three elections within 13 months);
- Georgia in November 2003 and March 2004 (due to the Rose Revolution);

Greece in June 1989, November 1989, and then April 1990 (so three elections within 10 months);  
 Greece in May 2012 and June 2012;  
 Greece in January 2015 and September 2015;  
 Iceland in June 1959 and October 1959 (the latter following a change to the electoral system);  
 Iceland in October 2016 and October 2017;  
 Ireland in June 1981, February 1982, and then November 1982 (so three elections within a year-and-a-half);  
 Latvia in October 2010 and September 2011;  
 Liechtenstein in February 1953 and June 1953;  
 Liechtenstein in September 1957 and March 1958;  
 Liechtenstein in February 1993 and October 1993;  
 the Netherlands in May 2002 and January 2003;  
 Portugal in April 1975 and April 1976;  
 Portugal in December 1979 and October 1980;  
 Spain in December 2015 and June 2016;  
 Turkey in June 2015 and November 2015;  
 the United Kingdom in February 1974 and October 1974;  
 and Northern Ireland in May 2016 and March 2017.

Returning to democracy as a regime type, for this there must be not just free and fair elections but also responsible government thus making the elections relevant, in that they determine or at least constrain government formation – and the government so determined must actually govern the country. The first part of this aspect is lacking in Monaco, where the government is chosen by and accountable only to the monarch, with the parliament and its composition playing no role in this regard. The second part of this aspect has not been the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or at least was certainly not until 2006, as the (foreign national) High Representative had the final say.

Given the aforementioned criteria and the related country information, several European countries do not merit a complete analysis due to the lack of four free and fair elections in a row and/or the lack of responsible government. These countries can be divided into a couple that have never had a free and fair parliamentary election nor are likely to have one soon (Azerbaijan and Belarus) which are henceforth excluded, and the remainder (Albania, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Monaco, Russia, and Ukraine) the individual party systems of which will be noted briefly in Part III but which are not included in the comparative analysis of the following chapters in Part I. Such comparative analysis will be based on 48 different party systems of “longstanding democratic polities” including Flanders, Northern Cyprus, the Faroe Islands, Corsica, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and the European Union, and distinguishing the French Fourth and Fifth Republics.

### *Dimensions of partisan political competition*

The most common traditional partisan dimension in Europe is the socio-economic cleavage between labour and capital, or more generally the ideological division between left and right. This division sees the left standing for greater government intervention in the economy including public ownership, regulation, redistribution of income, and high levels of social welfare, and the right standing for a smaller role for government in the economy with less regulation (free markets), lower taxes, and less social welfare (Lijphart 1984: 129).

The second traditional partisan dimension, especially in Catholic or mixed Catholic-Protestant countries, was a religious versus secular division which related to religious versus secular education issues as well as various moral issues. This partisan dimension was common in Catholic or mixed Catholic-Protestant countries where a Catholic or Christian Democratic party arose. The dimension would later arise in Scandinavian and thus Protestant countries (first in Norway) with the creation of Christian parties (Lijphart 1984: 132–134). However, this second partisan dimension has morphed from religiosity into a much broader one (Flanagan and Lee 2003). There is varying terminology here, with some (Kitschelt 1994; Flanagan and Lee 2003) calling this dimension libertarian-authoritarian, Inglehart (1977 and subsequent works) speaking to post-materialism versus materialism, and Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002) more broadly calling the dimension green-alternative-libertarian versus traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (GAL-TAN). Certainly this partisan dimension speaks ever more centrally to attitudes to globalization (Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012), including the increasing importance of immigration as an issue here and the nostalgic ethnocentric response to immigration and multiculturalism this has often produced (Betz and Johnson 2004). Summarizing these points, for this analysis I shall call one end of this partisan dimension libertarian-environmentalist-cosmopolitan or LEC and the other end traditional-authoritarian-nativist or TAN. This LEC-TAN partisan dimension began at one end with the rise of new left parties in the 1960s and then Green parties in the 1970s and 1980s and then at the other end with populist radical right parties. For several countries in Part II, I shall provide a diagram of party positions in 2014 on left-right ideology in terms of economics and LEC-TAN using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey data (Polk et al. 2017).<sup>1</sup>

Beyond socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN there have been two other traditional partisan dimensions: language and ethnicity (often regional) in multilingual/multiethnic societies, and a rural-urban division which once spoke to agricultural versus industrial interests, most clearly in the creation of agrarian parties in the Nordic countries. These parties, though, would mostly rename themselves as Centre parties in the 1950s and 1960s in an attempt to broaden their geographic appeal (see Pattern Four later). Today there still is a rural-urban division in voting in many European countries, but this division now feeds into the LEC-TAN partisan dimension.

## *Party families*

The notion of a party family goes back to Klaus von Beyme (1985). He noted nine main types of parties or “spiritual families” found in Western Europe, all of which can also now be found in Eastern Europe. Other scholars (Krouwel 2012) have also adopted this concept. For these purposes I shall classify 13 such party families.

In a rough chronological order of formation, these party families are as follows: First, there are **liberal or radical parties**. These arose to struggle for responsible government, the separation of church and state, and free market economics. They have also been internationalist and in the postwar context committed to European integration. Their historic support came from the secular middle class, and that is still the group most likely to support these parties. However, liberal and radical parties are now rather small, and rarely are the main party of the middle classes. Later on **left liberal or left radical or social liberal parties** would break off (or arise separately), especially in Northern Europe. These parties tended to be more clearly left-leaning/progressive on non-economic issues, and often worked with socialist parties, such as the alliance between the Left Radical Movement (MRG) and the Socialists in France. For our purposes, these left liberal/radical or social liberal parties are considered a separate party family. In this party family we can put Pirate parties with their emphasis on liberalism and freedom, of the internet and otherwise.

In many West European countries, the main middle-class party is thus now a non-populist **conservative party**, standing for tradition and certainly the traditional political order with an aversion to constitutional change. Originally rather elitist, paternalistic, and suspicious of unrestrained capitalism, conservatives today share the liberal commitment to free markets. They are often more nationalistic than internationalist liberals, especially where a polity has separate conservative and liberal parties. This is certainly the case in Britain (the Conservatives versus now the Liberal Democrats). However, the conservative parties of Scandinavia and the Mediterranean (Greece, Malta, Portugal, Spain) are not significantly nationalistic and are strongly committed to European integration. The Mediterranean countries, except for Spain, do not have liberal parties, and in Finland and Norway the liberals have basically disappeared over time; so in these places the conservatives cover a broader spectrum. A further way in which conservatives can often be distinguished from liberals is that whereas liberals are strongly secular, conservatives tend to be moderately religious and supportive of “family values”, even if their religiosity is more implicit than explicit. Here too, however, the secular Nordic conservatives are exceptions to this general pattern.

Next there are **socialist or social democratic parties**. These were formed to represent the working class, and to push for socio-economic change. Most of these parties have long shed their explicit socialism, and are leftist more in their commitment to social programmes than to state ownership. Since the 1960s, at least, these parties tend to be quite pro-European integration. Their support base has broadened from the working class to include elements of the middle class, especially in

the public sector. Indeed, the French Socialists' core supporters have always been white-collar middle class rather than working class.

Rivalling the socialists for the support of the working class (and some intellectuals) were **communist parties**. These were clearly more left-wing than socialist parties in their economics and in their foreign policy, and also more sceptical of European integration. With the ending of the Cold War, there are very few parties that still call themselves "communist", mainly the parties of France, a rump group in Italy, and those of post-Soviet countries such as Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. Everywhere else, including East-Central Europe, the communist parties which used to exist have transformed themselves – usually into social democratic parties (for example, in Italy and Poland) but sometimes into what will be called new left parties (for example, in Sweden). On the other hand, one can – perhaps controversially – put into this party family **left-wing populist parties**, such as the Socialist Party in the Netherlands, SYRIZA in Greece, and Podemos in Spain. These generally newer left-wing populist parties have ideologies of majoritarianism which match those of traditional communist parties. Likewise, communists draw a sharp distinction between the economic and political elite and the working people.

In most Catholic or mixed Catholic-Protestant countries in Western Europe, there is a **Christian democratic party**. These are obviously explicit in their religiosity, and seek to be a party for all Christians. Nevertheless, they tend to do better amongst Catholics than amongst Protestants, and are weaker (Scandinavia) or non-existent in protestant nations. Christian democrats are explicitly cross-class in their orientation and are strong supporters of the welfare state, thus being more centrist on the left-right economic division. The major Christian democratic parties have also been the most ardent supporters of European integration right from the beginnings in the 1950s. There have also been Christian parties in most Nordic countries, and also in post-communist Europe. However, in contrast to the long-standing West European parties these parties – even if called Christian democratic – are more conservative especially on social issues and are less strongly internationalist/pro-European integration. They will thus be classified as **religious conservative parties**, a category that will include Islamist parties in Turkey, and grouped with **conservative parties**.

Separate **agrarian parties** have always existed in Nordic Europe, and these now exist in many Eastern European systems as well. With the decline in the rural population the Nordic agrarian parties in the 1960s and 1970s renamed themselves **centre parties**. They tend to be fairly environmentalist and sometimes sceptical of European integration, especially if this seems to hurt national farmers.

In countries where there is a cohesive, geographically concentrated, and self-conscious national minority (based on language or religion or both of these factors), then one tends to find **regional, separatist, or ethno-nationalist parties**. In Italy there was until recently a regional party, the Northern League, based essentially on regional economic differences. The support for regional or ethnic parties tends to cut across class lines, but usually they are moderately conservative

on left-right issues (as in Belgium [Flanders], Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Spain). In the United Kingdom, however, the Scottish and Welsh nationalists are left of centre.

**Right-wing extremist parties** are certainly not new; witness the fascist and Nazi parties of interwar Europe. After the war **neo-fascist parties** arose, most successfully in Italy (the MSI). However, today these parties are generally non-existent or very tiny, although they have achieved contemporary relevance in some countries like Greece (Golden Dawn), Bulgaria (ATAKA), and Hungary (Jobbik until recently). Neo-fascist parties oppose or at least question the democratic order and often have a militia or followers who engage in political violence. What are much more common now are **populist radical right parties**. The first such postwar anti-elitist party was likely the Italian Common Man's (UQ) Front right after the war. However, in the 1950s and 1960s (not coincidentally decades of prosperity) radical right parties were quite marginal, except briefly for the Poujadists in France. Since the 1970s, however, populist right-wing parties have grown in support, capitalizing on unemployment, immigration, and populist opposition to the "political class". In Scandinavia in earlier decades, such parties campaigned primarily against high levels of taxation, and could be placed separately as "neoliberal populist" parties (Mudde 2007: 47). In contrast, populist radical right parties in post-communist Europe – such as now Fidesz in Hungary or Law and Justice in Poland – are centrist or even leftist on socio-economic matters. The core supporters of populist radical right and right-wing extremist parties are young, poorly educated males, but these parties also appeal to disaffected conservatives. In some countries like Hungary with Fidesz they are now the main right of centre party.

In comparison to the preceding types of parties, more moderate or at least less populist positions on many issues have been taken by what we shall call **nationalist right-wing parties**. The earlier variants of such parties, exemplified by the Gaullists in France and Fianna Fáil in Ireland, stressed national sovereignty as their central goal and the need for and creation of new political systems/institutions in their countries. They also were not consistently conservative ideologically especially on socio-economic issues and related had a broad cross-class appeal (less so for the Gaullists post-de Gaulle). Over time these parties became the new political establishment and began to differ less from traditional conservatism. In recent years such nationalist right-wing parties tend to be less successful and more fleeting, often with a focus on economics, such as the anti-euro AfD founded in Germany in 2013 (subsequently, from 2015, said party became populist radical right). Sometimes, as in the case of the BZÖ in Austria, these nationalist right-wing parties have arisen as a split off from populist radical right parties.

Various **left socialist** or **new left parties** arose in the 1960s in prosperous Northern European countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands. Although clearly quite leftist on socio-economic affairs, they stressed greater citizen input and other "post-materialist" issues. Since the 1970s, in a wider group of nations, **ecology** or **green** parties have arisen. Although they often arose in opposition



to nuclear power (and thus seemed single-issue), and sometimes refused to place themselves on the traditional left-right axis, these green parties now place themselves on the left, and are more than willing to be part of social democratic-led governments (as in France, Germany, Italy, and now Sweden). Green parties also overlap with new left parties in that they share the same broader themes and bases of support, that is, young, well educated, and secular voters.

All of these parties occur throughout Europe, as the country analyses in this chapter and in Part II show. However, there is a further type of party found in some East-Central European cases – Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia (initially), and Slovakia (twice). In these cases the party usually is or was a major one, so it is worth noting. These parties are left of centre on socio-economic issues, and usually are members of the pan-European Party of European Socialists (though often with controversy, such as the Slovakian SMER-SD). In the Bulgarian and Romanian cases they are post-communist. However, these parties are nationalistic and socially traditional rather than cosmopolitan and socially liberal and thus not very left of centre overall, and what is important for them is often nationalism or even a certain xenophobia as much as economics. They thus have points in common with populist radical right parties, including an imperfect commitment to democracy (certainly liberal democracy), but they are generally much broader in their support base in part because of their origins. Let us call such parties **national populist social democratic parties**. One can also note that the existence of such parties is part of the reason why social liberalism overlaps with economic leftism in Western Europe but economic rightism in Eastern Europe (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012: 82).

There are however two important individual political parties that do not fit into the spectrum of party families: ANO 2011 in the Czech Republic and the M5S in Italy. Both are clearly populist, but neither is radical right nor left-wing. ANO 2011 is usually seen as liberal populist and the M5S as centrist populist, so one could argue that they go together – but two parties do not a party family make. In the European Parliament ANO 2011 sits with the liberals; the M5S applied to do so in 2017 but was turned down. ANO 2011 is now governing with social democrats, and M5S tried to do likewise before turning to the populist radical right.

On an overall left-right scale these parties can be placed as follows:

- 1 Communist and left-wing populist parties
- 2 Left socialist or new left parties
- 3 Green or ecology parties
- 4 Socialist or social democratic parties
- 5 Left liberal or radical liberal or social liberal parties
- 6 National populist social democratic parties
- 7 Agrarian or centre parties
- 8 Christian democratic parties

- 9 Right liberal parties
- 10 (Traditional or mainstream) conservative parties, or religious conservative parties
- 11 Nationalist right-wing parties
- 12 Populist radical right parties
- 13 Extreme right-wing or neo-fascist parties

Ethnic minority (ethno-nationalist), regional, and separatist parties operate on their own dimension, and therefore cannot be placed globally on this continuum. These are numbered 21. Nor can single-issue parties such as pensioners' or animal rights parties. (Several pensioners' parties have existed in Europe, and in Slovenia perhaps in response there was a Youth Party in the 2000s.) Single-issue parties are numbered 31, and 'frivolous' or humorous parties are numbered 41. Lastly, Islamist parties in Turkey are also numbered 10 and are noted as such.

That said, it is important to note that on LEC-TAN issues communist parties are fairly centrist, and thus certainly more conservative than left socialist and green parties, if not indeed social democratic and radical liberal parties. At the other end of the spectrum, both populist radical right and right-wing extremist parties are fairly centrist on socio-economic economic issues, at least for the main ethnic group as opposed to for minorities and immigrants (as were right-wing extremist parties between the wars).

Table 1.3 indicates for the 38 national European longstanding democratic polities the presence today of each of these types of parties, with the criterion for inclusion being that such a party has won at least 1.0 percent of the vote or two seats in any two of the last three elections as of October 2018. A capital M indicates a major or large party, with at least 15 percent of the vote in both of the last two elections; otherwise a small m indicates a minor or small party. The thresholds are taken from Mair (1991).

As can be seen, the most common party family is the social democratic one, which exists almost everywhere. The next most common party families are in order the populist radical right, conservative, and right liberal ones. Of these four party families, the populist radical right only became a broad family in recent decades, whereas the other three in contrast are the first party families. The populist radical right is likewise clearly the most successful of the newer party families.

Focussing just on major parties, these are by definition less common across the categories and they show that most countries are bipolar (or indeed remain bipolar) although a few are tripolar. In the case of bipolar party systems, these involves bipolarity between (a) on the left usually a major socialist/social democratic party but in some cases a major national populist social democratic party and in Cyprus and now Greece a major communist/left-wing populist party and (b) on the (centre-) right a major Christian democratic or right liberal or conservative party (nationalist conservative in Turkey). However, in Ireland and Liechtenstein the key competition




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is between two parties on the centre-right, and in Poland it is now between one party on the populist radical right and one on the centre-right. For their part, tripolar systems exist in two forms. In one of these, found in Austria, Norway, in Switzerland, there are major parties on the left, the centre-right, and the populist radical right. Denmark has this situation as of its 2015 election though not yet such a system, and Sweden seems to be heading in this direction as well. In the second variant, found in Finland and Luxembourg, there is a major party of the left and two of the centre-right.

However, analytical problems arise where there is only one major party so defined (as currently in the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Montenegro, the Netherlands, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and even more where there are none (in Belgium) – although in these countries (shifting) bipolar or tripolar situations can still arise. Alternatively then in terms of summary analysis, if one focusses on the underlying cleavages and divisions between key parties (not always major ones), one can suggest perhaps seven main patterns of party competition in Europe – the first five of which are historical and mostly in Western Europe.

The first of these is essentially unidimensional, involving a social democratic party on the left and a conservative party on the right. There may be other smaller parties, but the social democrats and the conservatives are the main ones, and the key competition is between these two. This pattern was found in Greece, Spain, the United Kingdom, and for a time in the Czech Republic, and still is found in Malta and basically in Portugal. In the Maltese case, the conservatives are quite religious, however there is not a separate liberal pole; thus we would want to place it with the others in this group rather than the next one.


**Pattern One:**



In the second pattern, competition was centred around two dimensions: left-right issues but also a religiosity cleavage. The social democrats were on the left, but there was no clear right; rather there were Christian democrats on the religious centre-right and liberals on the secular centre-right. Consequently, there were points of commonality between social democrats and the Christian democrats (union rights and welfare state spending), between the social democrats and the liberals (civil liberties and usually foreign policy), and between the Christian democrats and the liberals (private ownership and limiting the size of government). This pattern was at the core of postwar party politics in Austria,


the Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands), Germany, Switzerland to a large extent, and Italy until the 1990s. Slovenia also essentially had this pattern in its first decade of democracy. Of course, in most of these systems there were additional parliamentary parties (the exceptions being Austria and Germany in the 1960s and 1970s), but the three parties illustrated reflected the core dimensions.

**Pattern Two:**



In the analogous third pattern, the division on the centre-right was not religiosity, but rather the rural versus urban cleavage. That is, there was a right of centre urban (or more precisely suburban) party – the conservatives, and there was a right of centre rural party. This pattern was found in Denmark, Finland starting in the 1970s, Iceland, and to some extent Switzerland. Incidentally, in each case the right of centre rural party has a different name: Liberals in Denmark, Centre

Pattern Three:




Party in Finland (which was quite centrist between the wars and after the war but moved right in the 1970s), Progressive Party in Iceland, and People's Party in Switzerland.

In the fourth, even more historical, pattern, the axes remain the same as in the third pattern, but the (main) rural party was clearly in the centre on left-right matters (and would eventually adopt that name), and was thus open to co-operation with the social democrats. This pattern existed in Norway and Sweden (each with additional parties) until the 1970s. Then in the 1970s and 1980s Norway and Sweden exhibited a fifth pattern, wherein the urban-rural cleavage was subsumed into a broader growth versus environmentalism division, with attitudes towards EU membership paralleling this division. In this fifth pattern, a new left party drew support away from the social democrats.

Nowadays most everywhere in Europe has a libertarian-environmentalist-cosmopolitan (LEC) versus traditional-authoritarian-nativist (TAN) axis, which as defined and noted earlier includes this economic growth versus environmentalism dimension but is much broader. However, the intersection of

Pattern Four:




the LEC-TAN divide with traditional left-right economics differs in Western Europe and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, as illustrated in Pattern Six, the social democrats and greens/new left are left LEC, thus there are parties plural competing with each other in this space. The main traditional opponent of the social democrats, be this Christian democrats or conservatives, is right TAN, though Christian democrats are quite moderate on economics and conservatives are often moderate on TAN matters. In contrast, a populist radical right party strongly speaks to the TAN end. There is usually a smaller liberal party which is right LEC.

In Eastern Europe social democratic parties in the Western sense exist but are weaker. Green parties are much less successful or enduring or even common, and new left parties have been fleeting at most. There is a left TAN party often reflecting communist roots, which could definitely be a national populist social democratic party. Conversely, it is a right liberal party (such as Civic Platform in Poland) who best speak to LEC values, and indeed although the liberals occupy



Pattern Five:




the same broad space as in Western Europe they are often stronger. The populist radical right party strongly speaks to TAN values as in Western Europe, but in Eastern Europe is centrist or even somewhat leftist on economics. Overall, then, the axis of competition is rotated 90 degrees from that in Western Europe; that is, the axis goes from left LEC to right TAN in Western Europe but from left TAN to right LEC in Eastern Europe.

*Party system institutionalization*

Finally, some comments can be made about party system institutionalization, that is, the extent to which a party system is coherent and stable in terms of the main parties, their differences in terms of ideology and core voters, and their ties to society. One would assume this to be (much) lower in post-Communist Europe, where continuous multi-party competition only goes back to the start of the


Pattern Six:



1990s, and thus where most parties have little history (unless they predate communism) or distinctive roots in society (which was “flattened” by communism). And indeed some of the measures that could indicate institutionalization, such as the age of parties, would put post-Communist Europe at a clear disadvantage. However, a couple illustrative measures are available for all countries, and a third for most countries.

The first two measures are taken from 2000 to 2018, so as to exclude the often turbulent (in terms of party politics) first decade of post-Communist elections in those countries. The first measure is average voter turnout, as where this is high voters are more committed to elections with the parties on offer. Of course, other factors affect turnout not least compulsory voting but that still fully exists only in Belgium and Luxembourg and not in the country with the highest turnout, Malta. The second variable is the mean inter-election volatility using the Pedersen index, or rather 100 less this value to be consistent with the first variable. (For this second variable the first election included is thus based on the difference

Pattern Seven:



with the last pre-2000 election.) A third variable is trust in political parties, as measured by the average value of the Eurobarometer surveys in Spring 2017 and Autumn 2017 (Eurobarometers 87 and 88). The only regional value provided here is for Northern Cyprus. For missing countries (not in the European Union or the Balkans), the (average) values of neighbouring European countries are used as follows: Andorra – France and Spain; Iceland and Norway – Denmark, Finland, and Sweden; Liechtenstein – Austria; Switzerland – Austria and Germany; and San Marino – Italy.

These three values are combined in a Z-score as is shown in Table 1.4 for the longstanding national democracies and for Northern Cyprus. One sees that the most institutionalized party systems in Europe are found in Luxembourg and Malta, followed by Liechtenstein and Denmark. The least institutionalized party system is that of Lithuania, followed by Latvia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Poland. That said, overall post-Communist Europe countries have less institutionalized party systems, but so too does France.

Another way the less institutionalized countries stand out is that they have seen the rise of as Sikk would say “genuinely new” major parties, and indeed with such parties often entering government right away. Table 1.5 shows this for the period since 1994 (thus skipping the first election in post-Communist countries when most parties were genuinely new). Major parties are defined as those having at least 15 percent of the vote (as in Table 1.3 and Chapter 3), but Table 1.5 also includes parties with at least 5 percent of the vote which immediately entered government. One sees that such relevant genuinely new parties have arisen not just in Eastern Europe but in France, Italy, and the Netherlands.

**TABLE 1.4** Party system institutionalization

	<i>Mean turnout since 2000</i>	<i>Mean volatility since 2000</i>	<i>Trust in political parties 2017</i>	<i>Mean Z-score</i>
Andorra	75.4	21.9	8.3	−0.37
Austria	79.3	15.8	33.5	0.75
Belgium	90.4	12.7	21.5	0.79
Bulgaria	56.6	33.6	14.5	−1.12
Croatia	61.8	15.6	11.0	−0.38
Cyprus	81.6	8.6	7.5	0.29
Northern Cyprus	76.8	23.7	15.5	−0.18
Czech Republic	61.0	27.4	11.0	−0.87
Denmark	86.4	11.0	32.5	1.09
Estonia	61.6	20.9	17.0	−0.41
Finland	68.1	8.9	31.0	0.66
France Fifth Republic	58.1	22.9	9.0	−0.83
Germany	75.1	12.1	35.5	0.85
Greece	68.1	15.8	4.5	−0.43
Hungary	66.5	15.6	21.5	0.06
Iceland	83.0	21.2	32.0	0.59
Ireland	66.2	17.0	23.5	0.06
Italy	78.7	21.9	12.0	−0.17
Latvia	62.3	33.4	7.5	−1.18
Liechtenstein	83.0	9.4	33.5	1.10
Lithuania	51.4	39.9	10.5	−1.62
Luxembourg	89.6	9.0	37.0	1.39
Malta	93.5	2.9	25.5	1.38
Montenegro	71.6	17.5	22.5	0.15
Netherlands	78.5	21.6	44.5	0.84
Norway	77.2	12.9	32.0	0.77
Poland	48.1	28.6	15.5	−1.11
Portugal	59.9	11.2	22.5	0.10
Romania	48.8	22.6	15.5	−0.85
San Marino	67.5	17.4	12.0	−0.28

(Continued)

**TABLE 1.4** (Continued)

	<i>Mean turnout since 2000</i>	<i>Mean volatility since 2000</i>	<i>Trust in political parties 2017</i>	<i>Mean Z-score</i>
Serbia	57.9	23.7	12.0	−0.77
Slovakia	60.5	28.4	14.5	−0.81
Slovenia	60.6	32.7	8.5	−1.16
Spain	71.7	13.5	7.5	−0.15
Sweden	83.9	12.1	32.5	0.98
Switzerland	47.6	7.4	34.5	0.30
Turkey	84.3	16.9	36.5	0.93
United Kingdom	64.4	10.2	14.0	−0.01
European Union	43.2	9.6	18.5	−0.39

**TABLE 1.5** Genuinely new major parties or parties immediately into government since 1994

<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Vote %</i>	<i>Seat %</i>	<i>Government?</i>
Bulgaria	2001	National Movement Simeon II	42.7	50	yes, and with PM
	2009	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	39.7	48.3	yes, and with PM
Czech Republic	2010	Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09	16.7	20.5	yes
	2013	ANO 2011	18.7	23.5	yes
Estonia	2003	Res Publica	24.6	27.7	yes, and with PM
France (Métropole)	2017	The Republic on the Move!	28.6	55.3	yes, and with PM
Italy	1994	Forza Italia	21	16.8	yes, and with PM
	2013	Five Star Movement	25.6	17.3	
Latvia	1995	Popular Movement for Latvia*	15	16	
	1995	Latvian Unity Party	7.2	8	yes
	1998	New Party	7.3	8	yes
	2002	New Era	24	26	yes, and with PM
	2011	Zatler's Reform Party**	20.8	22	yes
Lithuania	2000	New Union	19.6	19.9	yes
	2004	Labour Party	28.4	27.7	yes
	2008	National Resurrection Party	15.1	11.3	yes
Netherlands	2002	List Pim Fortuyn	17	17.3	yes

Country	Year	Party	Vote %	Seat %	Government?
Slovakia	1998	Party of Civic Understanding	8	8.7	yes
	2002	Alliance of the New Citizen	8	10	yes
	2010	Freedom and Solidarity	12.1	14.7	yes
Slovenia	2011	Positive Slovenia	28.5	31.1	
	2014	Party of Miro Cerar	34.6	40	yes, and with PM
	2018	List of Marjan Šarec	12.7	14.4	yes, and with PM

\* borderline case, started by one MP.

\*\* created by the president, who was not an established politician.

Source: Sikk 2018, Chapter 7, Table 7.1 on page 201 with additions.

## Note

- 1 The LEC-TAN calculation combines the following factors: position on social lifestyle, position on environment protection versus economic growth, position on cosmopolitanism versus nationalism (weighted twice), galton ideology (libertarian/postmaterialist versus traditional/authoritarian), and position on civil liberties versus law and order.

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# 2

## DATA ON ELECTIONS

This chapter provides a comprehensive data set on the 640 elections in the 48 cases examined in this part and Part II. Information is given case-by-case. For France, as is common and for long-term consistency, calculations in this chapter are based on the results in metropolitan France only (excluding overseas constituencies). Likewise for Denmark, calculations are based on mainland Denmark (excluding the constituent countries of the Faroe Islands and Greenland). The variables given, and their lowest and highest values in specific elections, are as follows:

### **TO – Turnout**

Unless otherwise noted, turnout is the total number of votes cast, whether valid or invalid, as a share of the electorate. For elections in which multiple rounds of voting occur, the first round turnout is given as all seats are in play then. However, for Corsica the second round turnout is given as this determines all the seats (and the turnout is higher). The lowest individual turnout values have been those of Wales 2003 (38.2 percent), Romania 2008 (39.2 percent) and 2016 (39.4 percent), and Poland 2005 (40.6 percent). The highest individual turnout values have been those of Austria 1949 (96.8 percent), the Czech Republic 1990 (96.7 percent), Liechtenstein 1958 (96.4 percent), and Malta 1987 and 1996 (96.3 percent).

### **EFRG – Electoral Fragmentation**

Fragmentation as a party system measure was introduced by Rae (1967). This measure weights parties by size, and is obtained for electoral fragmentation by first taking the vote share of each party as a decimal (for example, 42.7 percent = 0.427), squaring this value, and summing these squared values for all political parties. Independents are ignored. The figure obtained is then subtracted from 1 to produce the value for



electoral fragmentation. Consequently, the higher the value, the more fragmented electorally the election. The lowest EFRG scores have been those of San Marino 1945 (0.449) and 1949 (0.488), Liechtenstein 1945 and 1958 (0.496 each time), and Luxembourg 1949 (0.499). The highest EFRG scores have been those of Poland 1991 (0.928), Belgium 1999 (0.903) and 2010 (0.900), and Latvia 1995 (0.900).

### **ENEP – effective number of electoral parties**

The calculation of an effective number of parties goes back to Laakso and Taagepera (1979). This value weights parties by size by first taking the vote share of each party as a decimal (for example, 42.7 percent = 0.427), squaring this value, and summing these squared values for all political parties. Independents are ignored. The value obtained is then inverted (that is,  $1/X$ ) to produce the value for effective number of electoral parties. The correlation between EFRG and ENEP is always perfect, but the latter measure is perhaps more intuitively understandable. The lowest ENEP scores, that is, the lowest effective number of electoral parties have been, again, those of San Marino 1945 (1.81) and 1949 (1.95), Liechtenstein 1945 and 1958 (1.98 each time), and Luxembourg 1949 (2.00). The highest ENEP scores have been those of Poland 1991 (13.83), Belgium 1999 (10.32) and 2010 (10.03), and Latvia 1995 (9.96).

### **P15%V – number of parties with 15 percent of the vote**

This measure – needing to win 15 percent or more of the vote in a parliamentary election, ideally persistently across elections – has recently been used by McGraw (2015: 4) to denote “major” parties, with his focus being those parties that became major through 1980. A similar cut-off for “large” parties of “normally poll[ing] 15 percent or more of the national vote” was once used by Mair (1991: 44). This measure is always an integer value (one, two, three, four, et cetera). The lowest P15%V value of 0, indicating no such party, occurred in Poland 1991 and Belgium 1999. The highest value of 5 occurred in Andorra 1993, and the value of 4 has occurred in many cases.

### **PFRG – parliamentary fragmentation**

This figure is obtained in the same way as EFRG, except that the percentage of filled seats won is used instead of the percentage of votes. Likewise, then, the higher the value, the more fragmented the parliament. The lowest PFRG scores have been those of Turkey 1954 (0.128) – though not a fair election – and 1950 (0.250), and Andorra 2011 (0.337). The highest PFRG scores have been those of Poland 1991 (0.908), and Belgium 1995 (0.892) and 1999 (0.890).

### **ENPP – effective number of parliamentary parties**

This figure is obtained in the same way as ENEP, except that the percentage of filled seats won is used instead of the percentage of votes. The lowest ENPP scores,

that is, the lowest effective number of parliamentary parties have been those of Turkey 1954 (1.15) – though not a fair election – and 1950 (1.33), and Andorra 2011 (1.51). Again, since parties are weighted by size this did not mean that Turkey had literally less than two parties, but that it had one very predominant party. The highest ENPP scores have been those of Poland 1991 (10.85), and Belgium 1995 (9.29) and 1999 (9.05).

### **1PSS – one-party seat share**

This is the percentage of filled seats for the party obtaining the most seats in the election (contrast with 2PSS later). The lowest 1PSS values have been those of Poland 1991 (13.0 percent), and Belgium 1999 (15.3 percent) and 2003 (16.7 percent). The highest 1PSS values have been those of Turkey 1954 (93.0 percent) – again, not a fair election – and 1950 (85.4 percent), and Andorra 2011 (78.6 percent). The 1PSS measure leads in to:

### **$N_{\infty}P$ – inverse of the seat share of the largest party**

This measure of largest party (pre)dominance was introduced by Taagepera (1999) who argued that it was a useful supplement to the effective number of parties where the largest party's seat share is over 50 percent. By inverting the seat share it can be directly compared with ENPP. The lowest  $N_{\infty}P$  values have been, again, those of Turkey 1954 (1.08) – though not a fair election – and 1950 (1.17), and Andorra 2011 (1.27). The highest  $N_{\infty}P$  values have been those of Poland 1991 (7.67), and Belgium 1999 (6.52) and 2003 (6.00).

### **$N_bP$ – mean of ENPP and $N_{\infty}P$**

This is the mean of the effective number of parliamentary parties and the inverse of the seat share of the largest party. This calculation has been suggested by Dunleavy and Boucek (2003) to get a smoother measure with less extreme maximums than the effective number of parties. Yet the same cases remain at each extreme: The lowest values of  $N_bP$  have been those of Turkey 1954 (1.11) – though not a fair election – and 1950 (1.25), and Andorra 2011 (1.39). The highest values of  $N_bP$  have been those of Poland 1991 (9.26), and Belgium 1999 (7.79) and 2003 (7.23).

### **P2%S – parties with 2 percent of the seats**

Ware (1996) uses a measure of parties with 3 percent of the seats, however he does not provide a theoretical justification for such a cut-off. I shall use 2 percent as this is the electoral threshold in Denmark, the lowest such threshold in Europe. P2%S is simply the number of parties winning 2 percent or more of the filled seats. There is no weighting of the parties herein. This figure is always an integer value (one, two, three, four, et cetera). Note that the calculation, like all in this analysis, is always made as a result of the election, not what may happen 'down the road' when

parties may split or independents may join a tiny party. The lowest P2%S value of 2 has occurred always in Malta, and at times in Andorra, Northern Cyprus, Liechtenstein (indeed, continuously through 1989), San Marino, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The highest P2%S values have been those of the Netherlands 2017 (12), Denmark 1977 (11), and the Netherlands 1972 (11).

## ED – electoral decisiveness

This is not a numerical value, but rather a two-letter code indicating how decisive was the particular election. One of the following results is given: HP = hung parliament (no party with a majority of seats); EM = earned majority (a party with a majority of both seats and votes); or MM = manufactured majority (a party with a majority of seats but not a majority of votes).

## ICD – index of coalition difficulty

This measure has been used by O'Malley (2016: 260–261) for Ireland adapted from the measure of Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power (2014). Both measures combine the effective number of parliamentary parties with the size of the largest party, however they are limited to cases where there is no single-party majority. For our purposes a variant is calculated as follows:

$$\text{ICD} = \text{ENPP} \star (100 - 1\text{PSS}) / 10$$

The higher this value, then, the assumed greater the challenge of forming a government. No calculation is made for Cyprus, it being presidential. The lowest ICD values have been those of Turkey 1954 (0.81) – though not a fair election – and 1950 (1.94), Andorra 2011 (3.24), and Northern Cyprus 1976 (4.23). The highest ICD values have been those of Poland 1991 (94.35), and Belgium 1999 (76.62) and 1995 (74.94).

## F(+I)P – formation (and investiture) period

This value is the number of days after the election until a new cabinet successfully takes office. No calculation is made for Cyprus or Turkey 2018, these being presidential systems. After the Greek election of May 2012, the Spanish election of December 2015, and the Turkish election of June 2015, no government was deemed to be formed (in each case a new election was held). As discussed Chapter 5, under a system of positive parliamentarianism a government must first be confirmed by the legislature in a vote of investiture before it can actually assume power, even if it has already been sworn in by the head of state. Consequently this latter date is used for the calculation, whenever this finally occurs. (Previous to a successful vote by the legislature, there may have been failed investiture attempts.)

The lowest FP value is 1, wherein a cabinet is appointed ‘immediately’ (that is, the next day after an election) presumably reappointing a cabinet without change or else an extremely quick formation likely of a single-party government (and maybe only partially in terms of ministers) – either way without a vote of investiture. FP scores of 1 have occurred at times in several countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Iceland, Malta, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom – all of which use negative parliamentarism (no vote of investiture). The consistently highest individual F(+I)P values, that is, the longest formation periods, arguably have been those of the European Union since 1994 in terms of the formation of the European Commission and its approval (thus investiture) by the European Parliament (the latter required since the 1994 European Parliament election). Nationally, the highest individual F(+I)P values have been those of Belgium 2010 (545 days), the Czech Republic 2017 (264 days) and 2006 (230 days), and the Netherlands 2017 (225 days) and 1977 (208 days). (On the Belgian government formation of 2010–2011, see Hooghe 2012.)

## DISP – disproportionality

Disproportionality refers to the difference between the vote shares and the seat shares. There are alternative ways to calculate disproportionality. In this analysis the Loosemore–Haneby Index is used. That is, one takes the absolute difference between the percentage of votes and the percentage of seats won by a particular party (or the ‘others’), and sums this value for all parties (and others). Finally, as one party’s over-representation must be another’s under-representation, the summation value is divided by two to produce DISP. Consequently, the higher the DISP value the more disproportionate the result, in other words the more biased is the electoral system. Conversely, a disproportionality score of 0.0 would indicate that each party received exactly the share of seats to match its share of votes. This ‘perfect’ outcome has never occurred precisely in Europe, but the closest such outcomes have occurred in Liechtenstein (DISP of 0.2 in 1982 and 0.4 in 1949). Very low DISP values of less than 1.0 have also occurred in Denmark (0.6 in 1950 and 0.8 in 1998), (West) Germany (0.8 in 1983 and 0.9 in 1976), Malta (0.5 in 1987 and 0.8 in 1976), and San Marino (0.6 in 1949 and 0.7 in 1945). In contrast, the highest DISP values have been those of Turkey 2002 (45.3), metropolitan France 1993 (41.6), and Poland 1993 (37.5).

## WV – wasted votes

This is the total percentage of votes cast for parties that did not receive any parliamentary representation. In electoral systems with various parts (that is, single-member and proportional seats, or multi-tiered districts), it is sufficient to achieve representation *somewhere* to be excluded from this value. That is, wasted votes only measures the votes for parties who did not receive any seats in any way. Of course,

a given party may not have received a proportionate number of seats, but that outcome is assessed by DISP. There have been many elections where there were no discernible votes wasted, that is,  $WV = 0.0$  percent. Indeed, that has occurred most of the time in each of Andorra, the Faroe Islands, Liechtenstein, and San Marino – all small polities with fewer parties running. In contrast, the highest WV values have been those of Turkey 2002 (45.3 percent), Poland 1993 (34.6 percent), and Cyprus 1976 (27.6 percent).

### **SBLP – seat bias in favour of the largest party**

This is the value obtained by subtracting the percentage of votes won from the percentage of seats won by the party winning the most seats. It reflects the extent to which the electoral system is biased in favour of or much less likely against the plurality or largest party (in terms of seats). In the vast majority of cases this value is positive, indicating that the leading party received more seats than strictly merited proportional to its votes. However, there have been cases where the value is negative: most frequently in the Faroe Islands, and most strongly in Iceland June 1956 (–5.9), 1959 (–4.0), and 1949 (–3.0) – all due to under-representation of the urban-based Independence Party – and Italy 1994 (–2.3 percent). In contrast, the highest SBLP values have been in Turkey (35.4 in 1954 – though not a fair election, 31.7 in 2002, 30.2 in 1950, and 28.6 in 1987), in metropolitan France in its Fifth Republic (28.6 in 2002 in favour of Sarkozy's UMP, and 26.7 in 2017 in favour of Macron's LRM), and in Northern Ireland 1958 (27.2).

### **SB2P – seat bias in favour of the two largest parties**

This is the same measure as SBL, except calculated for the two largest parties (in terms of seats). That is, this value is obtained by subtracting the combined percentage of votes won from the combined percentage of seats won by the two parties winning the most seats. SB2P is simply the difference between the next two variables, 2PSS and 2PVS. SB2P reflects the extent to which the electoral system is biased either in favour of or against the two largest parties (in terms of seats). Only rarely is this value negative (and less frequently than for SBL), indicating that the two largest parties almost always receive more seats than strictly merited proportionally by their combined votes – thus potentially creating a manufactured 'two-partyness'. However, for metropolitan France 1951 this value was –10.9, as the system of bonuses given to (centrist) alliances outside of Paris was intended to lessen the strength of the Communists and Gaullists. The French Communists were clearly the leading party in terms of votes (26.7 percent), but only came second in terms of seats (17.8 percent). The Gaullists still won the most seats, but not their proportionate amount. That specific election was very much an outlier, as the second lowest SB2P value – that of Northern Ireland in 1975 – was only –3.3. In contrast, the highest SBT2 values have been those of Turkey 2002 (44.7); France 1993 (41.5), 1958 (32.9), and 2017 (30.7); Cyprus 1976 (34.0); and Poland 1993 (30.1).

## 2PSS – two-party seat share

This is the combined percentage of seats for the two parties obtaining the most seats in parliament – a key variable for indicating a two-and-a-half-party type. The lowest 2PSS values have been those of Poland 1991 (26.5 percent) and Belgium 1999 (30.0 percent) and 1995 and 2003 (33.3 percent in both cases). The highest possible value, 100.0 percent, occurred in every election in Liechtenstein from 1945 through 1989, in every election in Malta from 1966 through 2013, in Andorra 2011, and in Northern Cyprus 1990.

## 2PVS – two-party vote share

This is the combined percentage of votes for the two parties obtaining the most *seats* in parliament; that is, the two parties in the previous variable. The lowest 2PVS values have been those of San Marino 2016 (21.7 percent), Poland 1991 (24.3 percent), Belgium 1999 and 2003 (28.4 percent in each case), Italy 1994 (28.8 percent), and Latvia 1995 (30.0 percent). The highest possible value, 100.0 percent, has occurred at various times in Liechtenstein from 1945 through 1982, and in San Marino 1945 and 1949.

## SR1:2 – seat ratio first to second party

This is the ratio obtained by comparing the number of seats of the party with the largest number with the number of seats of the party with the second largest number. If the top two parties win exactly the same number of seats, then the SR1:2 is 1.00. This equality has occurred in Belgium 2003; Northern Cyprus 1993; the Faroe Islands 1978, 1998, 2002, and 2011; Estonia 2003; Iceland 2013; the Netherlands 1952; and Switzerland 1959 and 1979. Otherwise, the greater the seat ratio the larger the value. The highest SR1:2 values have been those of Turkey 1954 (16.23), Romania 1990 (9.07), and Croatia 1992 (6.07) – none of which were fair elections; Turkey 1950 (6.03); and Northern Ireland 1969 (6.00).

## SR2:3 – seat ratio second to third party

This is the ratio obtained by comparing the number of seats of the party with the second largest number with the number of seats of the party with the third largest number. If the second and third largest parties win exactly the same number of seats, then the SR2:3 is 1.00. This equality has occurred on many occasions in the Faroe Islands, and in Andorra 1993, Austria 1999, Belgium 1995, Flanders 2009, Denmark 1979, Estonia 1999, Finland 1945, 1958, and 1970, Iceland 1978 and 2016, Latvia 2006, Luxembourg 2013, Norway 1997, Romania 1990, and Slovakia 2012. Conversely, if only two parties win all the seats and there is no third party in parliament, then this value is infinity. Such values exist in all cases where the 2PSS is 100.0; that is, they have occurred in every election in Liechtenstein from 1945

through 1989, in every election in Malta from 1966 through 2013, in Andorra 2011, and in Northern Cyprus 1990.

### TVOL – total volatility

The value is the only one to compare an election with the previous election. It is thus not given for the first election in a case. Nor is any calculation made for Turkey 1983, as the previous political parties had all been banned by the military. Total volatility is calculated by taking the absolute difference between the percentage of votes won in the election and the percentage won in the previous election by a particular party (or any ‘others’), and summing these absolute values for all parties (and others). This summation value is then divided by two to yield TVOL. If TVOL is 0.0 then there is no percentage vote change from the previous election for any party. This outcome essentially occurred in Malta 1987 (TVOL of 0.2), Austria 1975 (0.5), Malta 2003 (0.5), and to a lesser extent Malta 1976 (1.1), Austria 1979 (1.3), and Iceland 1949 (1.4). Conversely, the highest TVOL values have been those of certain East European elections: Poland 1997 (63.9), Slovakia 1992 (52.8), Slovenia 2014 (51.8), Latvia 1995 (51.4 percent), and Lithuania 2000 (51.2) and 2004 (50.3) – but also Northern Ireland 1973 (52.5). Note that using the individual election data in the case analyses of Part II will not normally yield precisely the same value as here, since in the Part II tables tiny and/or fleeting parties are usually put into ‘others’ to save space. In this Part, however, the calculations are based on as many parties as for which separate data exist. Also, volatility across most cases since 2000 was compared in Chapter 1 in the context of party system institutionalization.

Overall, there are more categories on seats than on votes as seats are what determine party systems. Finally, one can note that for the European Union these measures refer not to parties (**P**) but party groups (**PG**).

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**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** Data on elections

*ANDORRA*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>IPSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
12/12/1993	81.0	0.792	4.82	5	0.821	5.60	28.6	3.50	4.55
16/02/1997	81.6	0.697	3.30	3	0.531	2.13	64.3	1.56	1.84
04/03/2001	81.6	0.641	2.78	3	0.554	2.24	60.7	1.65	1.94
24/04/2005	80.4	0.622	2.64	2	0.495	1.98	50.0	2.00	1.99
26/04/2009	75.3	0.656	2.91	3	0.584	2.40	50.0	2.00	2.20
03/04/2011	74.1	0.569	2.32	2	0.337	1.51	78.6	1.27	1.39
01/03/2015	65.6	0.717	3.53	3	0.615	2.60	53.6	1.87	2.23

*AUSTRIA*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>IPSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
25/10/1945	94.3	0.550	2.22	2	0.522	2.09	51.5	1.94	2.02
09/10/1949	96.8	0.640	2.78	2	0.607	2.54	46.7	2.14	2.34
22/02/1953	95.8	0.638	2.76	2	0.596	2.48	44.8	2.23	2.35
13/05/1956	96.0	0.597	2.48	2	0.551	2.23	49.7	2.01	2.12
10/05/1959	94.2	0.597	2.48	2	0.545	2.20	47.9	2.09	2.14
18/11/1962	93.8	0.594	2.47	2	0.591	2.44	49.1	2.04	2.24
06/03/1966	93.8	0.581	2.39	2	0.533	2.14	51.5	1.94	2.04
01/03/1970	91.8	0.653	2.29	2	0.529	2.12	49.1	2.04	2.08
10/10/1971	92.4	0.561	2.28	2	0.529	2.12	50.8	1.97	2.04
05/10/1975	92.9	0.559	2.27	2	0.548	2.21	50.8	1.97	2.09
06/05/1979	92.2	0.561	2.28	2	0.550	2.22	51.9	1.93	2.07
24/04/1983	92.6	0.584	2.40	2	0.557	2.26	49.2	2.03	2.15
23/11/1986	90.5	0.632	2.72	2	0.620	2.63	43.7	2.29	2.46
07/10/1990	86.1	0.684	3.16	3	0.666	2.99	43.7	2.29	2.64
09/10/1994	81.9	0.742	3.87	3	0.732	3.73	35.5	2.82	3.27
17/12/1995	86.0	0.721	3.59	3	0.712	3.47	38.8	2.58	3.02
03/10/1999	80.4	0.738	3.82	3	0.707	3.41	35.5	2.82	3.11
24/11/2002	84.3	0.667	3.00	2	0.653	2.88	43.2	2.32	2.60
01/10/2006	78.5	0.731	3.72	2	0.704	3.38	37.2	2.69	3.04
28/09/2008	78.8	0.793	4.82	3	0.766	4.27	31.1	3.21	3.74
29/09/2013	74.9	0.806	5.15	3	0.782	4.59	28.4	3.52	4.05
15/10/2017	80.0	0.754	4.07	3	0.722	3.60	33.9	2.95	3.28

*BELGIUM*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>IPSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
17/02/1946	90.3	0.695	3.28	2	0.656	2.91	45.5	2.20	2.55
25/06/1949	94.4	0.693	3.26	3	0.636	2.75	49.5	2.02	2.38
04/06/1950	92.6	0.638	2.76	2	0.599	2.50	50.9	1.96	2.23
11/04/1954	93.2	0.675	3.08	2	0.620	2.63	44.8	2.23	2.43
01/06/1958	93.6	0.642	2.79	2	0.592	2.45	49.1	2.04	2.24
26/03/1961	92.3	0.676	3.08	2	0.628	2.69	45.3	2.21	2.45
23/05/1965	91.6	0.749	3.98	3	0.722	3.59	36.3	2.75	3.17
31/03/1968	90.0	0.805	5.13	3	0.797	4.93	27.8	3.59	4.26
07/11/1971	91.5	0.838	6.16	2	0.824	5.69	28.8	3.48	4.58
10/03/1974	90.3	0.836	6.11	3	0.827	5.79	27.8	3.59	4.69
17/04/1977	95.1	0.824	5.70	2	0.810	5.26	29.2	3.42	4.34

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PV'S</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	40.00	38	23.6	0.0	2.2	-2.0	46.4	48.4	1.60	1.00	—
4	MM	7.61	33	22.1	0.0	22.1	5.2	85.7	70.5	3.00	3.00	33.9
3	MM	8.80	32	14.6	0.0	14.6	6.0	82.1	76.1	2.83	1.20	16.3
4	HP	9.90	33	8.8	3.5	8.8	7.5	92.9	85.4	1.17	6.00	28.8
3	HP	12.00	38	12.0	3.8	5.0	12.0	89.3	77.3	1.27	3.67	20.3
2	EM	3.24	39	23.4	10.1	23.4	10.1	100.0	89.9	3.67	$\infty$	23.0
4	MM	12.07	31	17.4	0.0	16.6	17.4	82.1	64.7	1.88	2.67	21.2

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PV'S</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
3	MM	10.13	54	3.2	0.2	1.7	3.2	97.6	94.4	1.12	19.00	—
4	HP	13.55	29	4.6	0.5	2.7	4.6	87.3	82.7	1.15	4.19	12.0
4	HP	13.68	38	5.7	0.4	3.5	5.6	89.0	83.4	1.01	5.21	3.6
3	HP	11.22	40	5.6	0.1	3.7	5.5	94.5	89.0	1.11	12.33	5.8
3	HP	11.47	67	6.3	3.4	3.7	6.2	95.2	89.0	1.01	9.75	3.0
3	HP	12.42	129	4.6	3.5	2.1	0.8	90.2	89.4	1.07	9.50	1.7
3	MM	10.38	44	5.5	3.7	3.2	5.4	96.4	90.9	1.15	12.33	4.8
3	HP	10.79	50	3.9	1.4	0.7	3.9	96.4	93.1	1.03	15.80	6.9
3	EM	10.43	25	1.4	1.4	0.8	1.4	94.5	93.1	1.16	8.00	2.0
3	EM	10.87	23	1.3	1.2	0.4	1.2	94.5	93.3	1.16	8.00	0.5
3	EM	10.68	1	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.1	94.0	92.9	1.23	7.00	1.3
3	HP	11.49	30	4.7	4.1	1.6	2.7	93.5	90.8	1.11	6.75	4.6
4	HP	14.80	59	1.5	1.0	0.6	1.4	85.8	84.4	1.04	4.28	9.7
4	HP	16.83	71	3.8	3.8	0.9	1.6	76.5	74.9	1.33	1.82	9.6
5	HP	24.05	47	1.8	1.6	0.6	1.3	63.9	62.6	1.25	1.24	14.1
5	HP	21.24	86	2.0	1.4	0.7	1.4	67.8	66.4	1.34	1.33	3.8
4	HP	21.99	124	5.6	5.6	2.3	3.8	63.9	60.1	1.25	1.00	8.1
4	HP	16.37	96	1.9	1.7	0.9	1.7	80.9	79.2	1.14	3.63	20.9
5	HP	21.24	102	4.5	4.2	1.9	3.6	73.2	69.6	1.03	3.14	9.2
5	HP	29.40	65	6.1	6.1	1.8	3.7	59.0	55.3	1.12	1.50	15.0
6	HP	32.86	78	5.7	5.6	1.6	3.3	54.1	50.8	1.11	1.18	14.6
5	HP	23.80	64	5.9	5.9	2.4	3.9	62.3	58.4	1.19	1.02	19.1

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PV'S</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
4	HP	15.85	46	5.6	2.1	3.0	5.6	79.7	74.1	1.33	3.00	—
4	HP	13.88	38	7.4	4.0	6.0	7.4	80.6	73.2	1.59	2.28	10.1
4	MM	12.26	24	5.1	1.8	3.2	5.0	87.2	82.2	1.40	3.85	9.9
3	HP	14.51	25	7.0	2.8	3.7	7.0	85.4	78.4	1.10	3.44	7.6
3	HP	12.48	32	6.5	2.8	2.6	6.4	88.7	82.3	1.24	4.00	5.4
5	HP	14.72	40	6.7	1.4	3.8	6.7	84.9	78.2	1.14	4.20	7.1
6	HP	22.86	69	5.0	2.5	1.9	3.9	66.5	62.6	1.20	1.33	16.1
7	HP	35.58	89	2.0	0.3	-0.2	1.1	51.4	50.3	1.18	1.07	7.4
8	HP	40.53	82	3.2	0.9	2.4	2.6	50.9	48.3	1.30	1.96	7.3
7	HP	41.79	55	3.8	1.5	1.1	1.4	51.4	50.0	1.18	2.00	4.3
7	HP	37.22	53	5.1	2.2	2.1	2.3	55.6	53.3	1.11	2.33	4.8

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

*BELGIUM*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
17/12/1978	94.8	0.867	7.53	1	0.853	6.80	26.9	3.72	5.26
08/11/1981	94.5	0.889	9.00	1	0.869	7.63	20.3	4.93	6.28
13/10/1985	93.6	0.877	8.14	1	0.857	7.01	23.1	4.33	5.67
13/12/1987	93.4	0.877	8.12	2	0.860	7.13	20.3	4.93	6.03
24/11/1991	92.7	0.898	9.81	1	0.881	8.41	18.4	5.44	6.92
21/05/1995	91.1	0.894	9.46	1	0.892	9.29	19.3	5.17	7.23
13/06/1999	90.6	0.903	10.32	0	0.890	9.05	15.3	6.52	7.79
18/05/2003	91.6	0.887	8.83	2	0.858	7.03	16.7	6.00	6.52
10/06/2007	91.1	0.890	9.07	1	0.874	7.91	20.0	5.00	6.46
13/06/2010	89.2	0.900	10.03	1	0.881	8.42	18.0	5.56	6.99
25/05/2014	89.5	0.895	9.57	1	0.872	7.82	22.0	4.55	6.18

*Flanders*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
21/05/1995	92.5	0.821	5.59	3	0.792	4.81	29.8	3.35	4.08
13/06/1999	92.2	0.833	6.00	4	0.818	5.49	24.2	4.13	4.81
13/06/2004	93.8	0.790	4.76	4	0.770	4.35	28.2	3.54	3.95
07/06/2009	93.1	0.851	6.71	4	0.833	5.97	25.0	4.00	4.99
25/05/2014	92.7	0.805	5.13	2	0.779	4.52	34.7	2.88	3.70

*Note:* Turnout figures are only for Flanders proper, excluding Flemish voters in Brussels for whom no totals of registered voters are provided.

*BULGARIA*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
10/06/1990*	90.6	0.624	2.66	2	0.587	2.42	52.8	1.90	2.16
13/10/1991	83.9	0.762	4.19	2	0.585	2.41	45.8	2.18	2.30
18/12/1994	75.3	0.740	3.85	2	0.633	2.73	52.1	1.92	2.33
19/04/1997	62.9	0.668	3.01	2	0.603	2.52	57.1	1.75	2.14
17/06/2001	67.0	0.746	3.94	3	0.657	2.92	50.0	2.00	2.46
25/06/2005	55.3	0.827	5.79	2	0.792	4.80	34.2	2.93	3.86
05/07/2009	60.6	0.773	4.41	2	0.700	3.34	48.3	2.07	2.70
12/05/2013	51.3	0.813	5.35	2	0.682	3.15	40.4	2.47	2.81
05/10/2014	51.1	0.827	5.78	2	0.802	5.06	35.0	2.86	3.96
26/03/2017	54.1	0.787	4.69	2	0.705	3.39	39.6	2.53	2.96

\* Election for constituent assembly.

*CROATIA*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
02/08/1992	75.6	0.765	4.26	2	0.600	2.50	61.6	1.62	2.06
29/10/1995	68.8	0.737	3.81	2	0.613	2.59	59.1	1.69	2.14
03/01/2000	76.5	0.746	3.93	3	0.660	2.94	47.0	2.13	2.53
23/11/2003	66.8	0.815	5.41	2	0.687	3.19	45.8	2.18	2.69
17/11/2007	59.6	0.756	4.10	2	0.637	2.76	45.5	2.20	2.48
04/12/2011	54.3	0.707	3.41	2	0.619	2.62	53.0	1.89	2.25
08/11/2015	60.8	0.747	3.95	2	0.693	3.25	39.1	2.56	2.90
11/09/2016	52.6	0.738	3.82	2	0.698	3.31	40.4	2.48	2.89

*Note:* For Croatia in 2000 and again since 2011, vote and seat calculations are done only for blocks.

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
8	HP	49.72	115	7.4	2.6	0.8	0.7	39.2	38.5	2.19	1.04	4.7
8	HP	60.82	43	9.5	2.1	1.0	4.8	36.8	32.0	1.23	1.25	16.4
8	HP	53.90	46	7.8	3.7	1.8	4.4	39.6	35.2	1.40	1.09	8.8
8	HP	56.84	146	7.2	2.8	0.8	4.0	39.2	35.2	1.08	1.25	4.9
10	HP	68.63	104	8.1	1.5	1.7	4.6	34.9	30.3	1.11	1.25	11.4
10	HP	74.94	33	7.9	4.0	2.1	3.0	33.3	30.3	1.38	1.00	9.7
10	HP	76.62	33	6.9	4.6	1.0	1.6	30.0	28.4	1.05	1.16	10.1
9	HP	58.58	57	11.1	6.7	1.3	4.9	33.3	28.4	1.00	1.04	12.8
10	HP	63.28	196	7.8	2.8	1.5	4.3	35.3	31.0	1.30	1.15	11.7
10	HP	69.04	545	8.3	4.8	0.7	4.0	35.3	31.3	1.04	1.44	15.8
10	HP	61.00	144	11.2	3.8	1.7	5.3	37.3	32.0	1.43	1.15	10.4

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	33.75	30	7.6	4.1	3.1	4.7	51.6	47.0	1.37	1.04	—
6	HP	41.62	30	5.9	3.6	2.1	1.9	46.0	44.1	1.11	1.23	11.6
5	HP	31.22	37	4.7	1.6	2.1	3.8	54.0	50.2	1.09	1.28	8.8
7	HP	44.78	36	5.8	2.1	2.1	3.8	41.9	38.1	1.48	1.00	17.7
6	HP	29.53	61	5.8	4.1	2.8	4.1	56.5	52.4	1.59	1.42	20.7

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
4	MM	11.43	102	7.1	0.9	5.6	3.8	88.8	85.0	1.47	6.26	—
3	HP	13.05	30	25.0	25.0	11.5	22.5	90.0	67.5	1.05	4.42	21.6
5	MM	13.08	39	15.6	15.6	8.6	13.2	80.9	67.7	1.81	3.83	26.3
5	EM	10.82	32	7.7	7.7	4.9	7.1	81.3	74.2	2.36	3.22	25.5
4	HP	14.60	37	14.5	14.5	7.3	10.3	71.2	60.9	2.35	1.06	42.7
7	HP	31.60	52	8.8	8.9	3.2	5.4	56.3	50.9	1.55	1.56	33.3
6	HP	17.26	22	10.0	7.8	8.6	7.6	65.0	57.4	2.90	1.05	46.8
4	HP	18.77	17	24.2	24.2	9.9	18.2	75.4	57.2	1.15	2.61	24.3
8	HP	32.89	33	6.6	6.6	2.3	3.2	51.3	48.1	2.15	1.03	26.4
5	HP	20.48	39	15.8	15.8	6.1	11.4	72.9	61.5	1.19	2.96	28.0

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
7	MM	9.60	37	26.5	11.8	19.0	11.4	71.7	60.3	6.07	1.27	—
4	MM	10.60	9	18.1	11.0	13.9	9.7	73.2	63.5	4.17	1.50	7.6
4	HP	15.58	37	15.5	13.5	8.3	12.1	77.5	65.4	1.54	1.92	23.8
6	HP	17.28	30	19.2	12.8	11.9	19.2	75.7	56.5	1.53	3.91	14.4
4	HP	15.04	49	17.4	9.4	9.5	16.7	84.1	67.4	1.18	8.00	14.6
4	MM	12.32	19	18.7	8.0	12.3	8.8	84.1	75.3	1.70	7.83	9.6
3	HP	19.80	75	13.7	5.8	5.1	8.4	76.2	67.8	1.05	2.95	25.5
4	HP	19.73	38	11.5	6.3	3.8	6.2	76.2	70.0	1.13	4.15	5.6

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

<i>CYPRUS</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
05/09/1976	85.3	0.751	4.02	4	0.561	2.28	60.0	1.67	1.97
24/05/1981	95.7	0.740	3.85	3	0.705	3.39	34.3	2.92	3.15
08/12/1985	94.6	0.723	3.61	3	0.720	3.57	33.9	2.95	3.26
19/05/1991	93.0	0.728	3.67	3	0.715	3.51	35.7	2.80	3.16
26/05/1996	92.9	0.737	3.81	3	0.716	3.53	35.7	2.80	3.17
27/05/2001	91.8	0.735	3.78	2	0.725	3.64	35.7	2.80	3.22
21/05/2006	89.0	0.767	4.30	3	0.744	3.90	32.1	3.11	3.51
22/05/2011	78.7	0.741	3.86	3	0.722	3.60	35.7	2.80	3.20
22/05/2016	66.7	0.805	5.12	2	0.778	4.51	32.1	3.11	3.81
<i>Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
20/06/1976	74.3	0.640	2.78	2	0.410	1.69	75.0	1.33	1.51
28/06/1981	88.6	0.706	3.40	3	0.666	3.00	45.0	2.22	2.61
23/06/1985	87.4	0.776	4.47	3	0.666	2.99	48.0	2.08	2.54
06/05/1990	91.5	0.503	2.01	2	0.435	1.77	68.0	1.47	1.62
12/12/1993	92.9	0.748	3.97	3	0.718	3.54	32.0	3.13	3.33
06/12/1998	86.6	0.742	3.88	3	0.668	3.01	48.0	2.08	2.55
15/12/2003	86.0	0.732	3.74	2	0.692	3.25	38.0	2.63	2.94
20/02/2005	80.7	0.679	3.12	2	0.610	2.57	48.0	2.08	2.33
19/04/2009	81.4	0.700	3.34	2	0.626	2.68	52.0	1.92	2.30
28/07/2013	69.6	0.718	3.54	3	0.684	3.16	42.0	2.38	2.77
07/01/2018	66.2	0.781	4.57	3	0.725	3.63	42.0	2.38	3.01
<i>CZECH REPUBLIC</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
08-09/06/1990	96.7	0.715	3.50	1	0.565	2.30	62.0	1.61	1.96
05-06/06/1992	85.0	0.863	7.29	1	0.792	4.80	38.0	2.63	3.72
31/05-01/06/1996	76.3	0.815	5.41	2	0.759	4.15	34.0	2.94	3.55
19-20/06/1998	73.9	0.784	4.63	2	0.730	3.71	37.0	2.70	3.21
14-15/06/2002	57.9	0.792	4.81	3	0.727	3.67	35.0	2.86	3.26
02-03/06/2006	64.4	0.744	3.91	2	0.677	3.10	40.5	2.47	2.78
28-29/05/2010	62.6	0.852	6.74	3	0.778	4.51	28.0	3.57	4.04
25-26/10/2013	59.5	0.869	7.62	2	0.822	5.62	25.0	4.00	4.81
20-21/10/2017	60.8	0.853	6.79	1	0.792	4.81	39.0	2.56	3.69
<i>Note:</i> The 1990 and 1992 elections were to the Czech National Council within then-Czechoslovakia.									
<i>DENMARK</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
30/10/1945	86.3	0.781	4.56	3	0.777	4.47	32.4	3.08	3.78
28/10/1947	85.8	0.737	3.80	2	0.719	3.56	38.5	2.60	3.08
05/09/1950	81.9	0.751	4.01	3	0.749	3.98	39.6	2.53	3.25
21/04/1953	80.8	0.745	3.92	3	0.740	3.85	40.9	2.44	3.15
22/09/1953	80.6	0.737	3.80	3	0.725	3.63	42.3	2.36	3.00
14/05/1957	83.7	0.744	3.90	3	0.735	3.77	40.0	2.50	3.14

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
3	MM	n.a.	n.a.	35.6	27.6	33.2	34.0	85.7	51.7	2.33	2.25	—
4	HP	n.a.	n.a.	7.7	7.6	1.5	3.9	68.6	64.7	1.00	1.50	11.7
4	HP	n.a.	n.a.	1.3	0.3	0.3	1.3	62.5	61.2	1.19	1.07	12.7
4	HP	n.a.	n.a.	3.3	3.2	−0.1	1.4	67.8	66.4	1.11	1.64	8.3
5	HP	n.a.	n.a.	4.4	4.3	1.2	2.1	69.6	67.5	1.05	1.90	7.5
4	HP	n.a.	n.a.	2.9	0.2	1.0	0.9	69.6	68.7	1.05	2.11	4.5
5	HP	n.a.	n.a.	4.7	4.0	1.0	2.9	64.3	61.4	1.00	1.64	8.3
5	HP	n.a.	n.a.	2.9	0.5	1.4	2.6	69.6	67.0	1.05	2.11	5.8
8	HP	n.a.	n.a.	6.1	3.2	1.5	4.3	60.7	56.4	1.13	1.78	15.6
<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
4	EM	4.23	15	21.3	1.5	21.3	16.1	90.0	73.9	5.00	3.00	—
5	HP	16.50	37	6.5	0.3	2.5	6.5	77.5	71.0	1.38	2.17	24.5
4	HP	15.55	37	18.1	17.3	11.3	13.9	72.0	58.1	2.00	1.20	25.0
2	EM	5.66	55	13.3	0.8	13.3	0.8	100.0	99.2	2.13	∞	10.2
4	HP	24.07	31	6.8	3.5	2.1	4.9	64.0	59.1	1.00	1.23	31.8
4	HP	15.65	36	11.1	8.4	7.7	11.1	74.0	62.9	1.85	1.86	17.5
4	HP	20.15	40	7.0	5.8	2.8	5.9	74.0	68.1	1.06	2.57	27.6
4	HP	13.36	16	9.8	4.5	3.5	9.8	86.0	76.2	1.26	3.17	12.0
5	MM	12.86	29	8.8	2.9	7.9	8.8	82.0	73.2	1.73	3.00	21.6
4	HP	18.33	45	5.1	3.7	3.6	4.3	70.0	65.7	1.50	1.17	23.5
6	HP	21.05	39	10.4	2.9	6.4	9.5	66.0	56.5	1.75	1.33	33.6
<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
4	MM	8.74	20	18.8	18.8	12.5	15.8	78.5	62.7	3.76	1.43	—
8	HP	29.76	27	19.1	19.1	8.3	11.7	55.5	43.8	2.17	2.19	20.2
6	HP	27.39	54	11.2	11.2	4.4	8.5	64.5	56.0	1.11	2.77	24.2
5	HP	23.37	59	11.3	11.3	4.7	8.5	68.5	60.0	1.17	2.63	16.1
4	HP	23.86	54	12.5	12.5	4.8	9.3	64.0	54.7	1.21	1.41	8.6
5	HP	18.45	230	10.0	6.0	5.1	9.8	77.5	67.7	1.09	2.85	16.9
5	HP	32.47	73	18.8	18.8	5.9	12.2	54.5	42.3	1.06	1.29	33.6
7	HP	42.15	115	12.5	12.5	4.5	9.3	48.5	39.2	1.06	1.42	37.3
9	HP	29.34	264	11.4	6.3	9.4	10.6	51.5	40.9	3.12	1.14	40.8
<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	30.20	9	2.5	0.0	−0.4	1.9	58.1	56.2	1.26	1.46	—
6	HP	21.89	34	5.5	1.8	−1.5	4.0	71.6	67.6	1.16	2.88	14.7
6	HP	24.04	10	0.6	0.3	0.0	0.2	61.1	60.9	1.84	1.19	10.4
6	HP	22.74	14	1.2	1.2	0.5	0.5	63.0	62.5	1.85	1.27	3.2
6	HP	20.95	8	3.1	2.7	1.0	1.9	66.3	64.4	1.76	1.40	4.7
6	HP	22.62	13	2.5	2.3	0.6	1.2	65.7	64.5	1.56	1.50	3.8

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

*DENMARK*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
15/11/1960	85.8	0.737	3.81	3	0.722	3.60	43.4	2.30	2.95
22/09/1964	85.5	0.734	3.75	3	0.715	3.51	43.4	2.30	2.91
22/11/1966	88.6	0.763	4.22	3	0.748	3.97	39.4	2.54	3.25
23/01/1968	89.3	0.781	4.56	4	0.764	4.24	35.4	2.82	3.53
21/09/1971	87.2	0.779	4.52	3	0.746	3.94	40.0	2.50	3.22
04/12/1973	88.7	0.859	7.11	2	0.855	6.90	26.3	3.80	5.35
09/01/1975	88.2	0.821	5.60	2	0.815	5.42	30.3	3.30	4.36
15/02/1977	88.7	0.809	5.23	1	0.808	5.20	37.1	2.69	3.95
23/10/1979	85.6	0.799	4.99	1	0.793	4.82	38.9	2.57	3.70
08/12/1981	83.3	0.826	5.75	1	0.817	5.47	33.7	2.97	4.22
10/01/1984	88.4	0.809	5.25	2	0.802	5.04	32.0	3.13	4.08
08/09/1987	86.7	0.829	5.83	2	0.812	5.31	30.9	3.24	4.28
10/05/1988	85.7	0.829	5.84	2	0.812	5.32	31.4	3.18	4.25
12/12/1990	82.8	0.794	4.86	3	0.771	4.37	39.4	2.54	3.45
21/09/1994	84.3	0.790	4.77	3	0.780	4.54	35.4	2.82	3.68
11/03/1998	85.9	0.789	4.73	2	0.788	4.72	36.0	2.78	3.75
20/11/2001	87.1	0.787	4.69	2	0.777	4.48	32.0	3.13	3.80
08/02/2005	84.5	0.807	5.19	2	0.795	4.89	29.7	3.37	4.13
13/11/2007	86.6	0.815	5.42	2	0.813	5.33	26.3	3.80	4.57
15/09/2011	87.7	0.825	5.72	2	0.822	5.61	26.9	3.72	4.67
18/06/2015	85.9	0.829	5.85	3	0.826	5.75	26.9	3.72	4.74

*Note:* Calculations for Denmark are based on mainland Denmark only.

*Faroe Islands*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
06/11/1945		0.691	3.24	3	0.635	2.74	47.8	2.09	2.42
08/11/1946		0.671	3.04	3	0.700	3.33	40.0	2.50	2.92
08/11/1950		0.755	4.08	3	0.749	3.98	32.0	3.13	3.55
08/11/1954		0.787	4.67	4	0.793	4.83	25.9	3.86	4.35
08/11/1958		0.784	4.63	4	0.787	4.69	26.7	3.75	4.22
08/11/1962		0.790	4.77	4	0.790	4.75	27.6	3.62	4.19
08/11/1966		0.781	4.57	4	0.781	4.57	26.9	3.72	4.14
07/11/1970		0.787	4.69	4	0.781	4.57	26.9	3.72	4.14
07/11/1974		0.798	4.95	4	0.793	4.83	26.9	3.72	4.27
07/11/1978		0.799	4.97	4	0.797	4.92	25.0	4.00	4.46
08/11/1980		0.810	5.27	4	0.807	5.17	25.0	4.00	4.59
08/11/1984	92.1	0.805	5.13	4	0.799	4.97	25.0	4.00	4.49
08/11/1988		0.809	5.24	4	0.799	4.97	25.0	4.00	4.49
17/11/1990		0.807	5.19	3	0.791	4.79	31.3	3.20	4.00
07/07/1994		0.856	6.94	3	0.842	6.32	25.0	4.00	5.16
30/04/1998	88.2	0.809	5.24	4	0.787	4.70	25.0	4.00	4.35
30/04/2002	91.2	0.786	4.66	4	0.777	4.49	25.0	4.00	4.25
20/01/2004	92.1	0.801	5.03	4	0.789	4.74	25.0	4.00	4.37
19/01/2008	89.7	0.812	5.31	4	0.806	5.16	24.2	4.13	4.65
29/10/2011	86.6	0.814	5.37	4	0.808	5.21	24.2	4.13	4.67
01/09/2015	88.8	0.814	5.37	4	0.819	5.53	24.2	4.13	4.83

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	20.37	3	3.3	3.3	1.3	1.9	65.1	63.2	2.00	1.19	11.1
6	HP	19.86	4	3.7	3.3	1.5	2.4	65.1	62.7	2.00	1.06	3.1
6	HP	24.05	6	3.2	3.1	1.1	1.8	59.4	57.6	1.97	1.03	9.6
6	HP	27.38	10	3.7	3.7	1.3	2.0	56.5	54.5	1.68	1.09	10.9
5	HP	23.64	19	6.9	6.9	2.7	3.7	57.7	54.0	2.26	1.03	9.6
10	HP	50.86	14	2.2	1.5	0.7	0.8	42.3	41.5	1.64	1.40	21.2
10	HP	37.79	35	3.1	1.8	0.4	1.1	54.3	53.2	1.26	1.75	17.8
11	HP	32.69	10	1.7	0.9	0.1	0.4	52.0	51.6	2.50	1.24	18.3
10	HP	29.47	3	2.7	2.3	0.6	0.7	51.5	50.8	3.09	1.00	10.6
9	HP	36.26	22	2.8	2.8	0.8	0.9	48.6	47.7	2.27	1.24	12.5
9	HP	34.27	1	2.6	2.3	0.4	1.0	56.0	55.0	1.33	1.91	10.8
8	HP	36.71	2	4.5	4.5	1.6	2.5	52.6	50.1	1.42	1.41	9.2
8	HP	36.48	24	4.8	4.8	1.6	2.3	51.4	49.1	1.57	1.46	6.2
8	HP	26.47	5	5.2	5.2	2.0	3.1	56.5	53.4	2.30	1.03	13.9
8	HP	29.32	5	2.4	1.8	0.8	1.5	59.4	57.9	1.48	1.56	10.1
10	HP	30.21	12	0.8	0.5	0.0	0.0	60.0	60.0	1.50	2.63	11.8
8	HP	30.46	7	2.5	2.3	0.7	1.3	61.7	60.4	1.08	2.36	13.3
7	HP	34.37	10	3.1	3.0	0.7	1.8	56.6	54.8	1.11	1.96	7.5
8	HP	39.29	10	1.0	0.9	0.0	0.2	52.0	51.8	1.02	1.80	10.4
8	HP	41.03	18	1.3	0.9	0.2	0.4	52.0	51.6	1.07	2.00	11.6
9	HP	42.06	10	1.3	0.9	0.6	0.6	48.0	47.4	1.27	1.09	12.4

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
3	HP	14.30	n.a.	9.4	9.4	4.4	6.1	73.9	67.8	1.83	1.00	4.9
4	HP	19.98	n.a.	3.2	2.3	-0.9	0.4	70.0	69.6	1.33	1.50	6.6
5	HP	27.06	37	2.3	0.0	-0.3	0.4	60.0	59.6	1.14	1.17	12.3
6	HP	35.79	40	2.8	0.0	-0.1	-1.7	48.1	49.8	1.17	1.00	16.5
6	HP	34.38	62	2.1	0.0	0.9	0.3	50.0	49.7	1.14	1.00	9.0
6	HP	34.39	57	2.0	0.0	0.1	-0.8	48.3	49.1	1.33	1.00	5.6
6	HP	33.41	65	2.5	0.0	-0.1	-0.7	50.0	50.7	1.17	1.00	4.8
6	HP	33.41	35	2.9	0.0	-0.3	0.9	50.0	49.1	1.17	1.00	3.6
6	HP	35.31	65	3.7	2.5	1.1	1.7	50.0	48.3	1.17	1.20	5.1
6	HP	36.90	77	2.5	0.0	-1.3	1.4	50.0	48.6	1.00	1.33	10.8
6	HP	38.78	58	2.3	0.0	1.1	1.3	46.9	45.6	1.14	1.17	4.3
6	HP	37.28	63	3.0	0.0	1.6	1.9	46.9	45.0	1.14	1.00	5.1
6	HP	37.28	71	3.5	2.2	1.8	2.1	46.9	44.8	1.14	1.00	3.8
6	HP	32.91	59	4.7	2.3	3.8	3.7	53.1	49.4	1.43	1.17	10.2
8	HP	47.40	65	5.6	4.3	1.6	4.4	43.8	39.4	1.33	1.20	24.5
6	HP	35.25	15	5.7	3.3	1.2	4.9	50.0	45.1	1.00	1.14	23.9
6	HP	33.68	37	3.4	0.0	-1.0	0.3	50.0	49.7	1.00	1.14	8.2
6	HP	35.55	14	5.7	2.4	3.3	1.5	46.9	45.4	1.14	1.00	4.5
6	HP	39.11	16	1.8	0.7	0.9	1.2	45.5	44.3	1.14	1.00	8.1
7	HP	39.49	16	2.1	0.0	-0.5	1.3	48.5	47.2	1.00	1.33	12.4
7	HP	41.92	14	3.0	0.0	-0.9	-0.3	45.5	45.8	1.14	1.17	10.4

(Continued)



**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

*ESTONIA*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
20/09/1992	67.8	0.848	6.60	1	0.772	4.39	28.7	3.48	3.94
05/03/1995	69.1	0.834	6.03	2	0.763	4.22	40.6	2.46	3.34
07/03/1999	57.4	0.855	6.88	4	0.818	5.50	27.7	3.61	4.55
02/03/2003	58.2	0.816	5.43	3	0.786	4.67	27.7	3.61	4.14
04/03/2007	61.0	0.801	5.02	3	0.771	4.37	30.7	3.26	3.81
06/03/2011	62.9	0.791	4.78	4	0.740	3.84	32.7	3.06	3.45
01/03/2015	64.2	0.806	5.15	3	0.788	4.72	29.7	3.37	4.04

*FINLAND*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
17-18/03/1945	74.9	0.804	5.09	4	0.790	4.77	25.0	4.00	4.39
01-02/07/1948	78.2	0.796	4.90	4	0.780	4.54	28.0	3.57	4.06
02-03/07/1951	74.6	0.798	4.96	3	0.791	4.78	26.5	3.77	4.28
07-08/03/1954	79.9	0.799	4.98	3	0.788	4.71	27.0	3.70	4.21
06-07/07/1958	75.0	0.807	5.19	4	0.795	4.87	25.0	4.00	4.44
04-05/02/1962	85.1	0.829	5.86	4	0.804	5.09	26.5	3.77	4.43
20-21/03/1966	84.9	0.808	5.22	3	0.799	4.96	27.5	3.64	4.30
15-16/03/1970	82.2	0.838	6.17	4	0.821	5.58	25.5	3.92	4.75
02-03/01/1972	81.4	0.832	5.95	4	0.818	5.51	27.5	3.64	4.57
21-22/09/1975	73.8	0.830	5.89	4	0.812	5.31	27.0	3.70	4.51
12-13/03/1979	75.3	0.826	5.74	4	0.808	5.21	26.0	3.85	4.53
20-21/03/1983	75.7	0.816	5.45	3	0.813	5.34	28.5	3.51	4.42
15-16/03/1987	72.1	0.837	6.15	3	0.797	4.93	28.0	3.57	4.25
17/03/1991	68.4	0.831	5.92	3	0.809	5.23	27.5	3.64	4.43
19/03/1995	68.6	0.827	5.78	3	0.795	4.88	31.5	3.17	4.03
21/03/1999	65.3	0.830	5.90	3	0.806	5.15	25.5	3.92	4.54
16/03/2003	66.7	0.823	5.65	3	0.797	4.92	27.5	3.64	4.28
18/03/2007	65.0	0.829	5.88	3	0.805	5.13	25.5	3.92	4.53
17/04/2011	70.4	0.845	6.44	4	0.828	5.83	22.0	4.55	5.19
19/04/2015	70.1	0.848	6.57	4	0.829	5.84	24.5	4.08	4.96

*Note:* Starting in 1975, turnout figures are based only on the Finnish electorate resident in Finland.

*FRANCE - FOURTH REPUBLIC (MÉTROPOLE)*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
21/10/1945*	79.8	0.783	4.61	3	0.762	4.20	28.4	3.53	3.86
02/06/1946*	81.9	0.778	4.51	3	0.759	4.15	30.7	3.26	3.71
10/11/1946	78.1	0.785	4.65	3	0.769	4.32	30.5	3.28	3.80
17/06/1951	80.2	0.815	5.42	2	0.831	5.92	19.7	5.08	5.50
02/01/1956	82.6	0.836	6.09	4	0.825	5.73	27.0	3.70	4.72

\* Election for constituent assembly.

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	31.30	31	17.6	8.0	7.9	11.1	55.4	44.3	2.29	1.13	—
7	HP	25.07	43	12.8	12.8	8.4	11.0	59.4	48.4	2.16	1.19	47.7
7	HP	39.75	18	9.6	8.4	4.3	6.0	45.5	39.5	1.56	1.00	26.9
6	HP	33.75	38	6.6	5.0	2.3	5.4	55.4	50.0	1.00	1.47	34.1
6	HP	30.29	32	6.4	3.4	2.9	5.5	59.4	53.9	1.07	1.53	21.5
4	HP	25.85	31	10.5	10.5	4.1	6.5	58.4	51.9	1.27	1.13	11.1
6	HP	33.18	39	4.1	1.8	2.0	3.9	56.4	52.5	1.11	1.80	16.7

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	35.78	30	4.2	1.5	−0.1	0.9	49.5	48.6	1.02	1.00	—
6	HP	32.69	27	4.5	0.8	3.8	4.5	55.0	50.5	1.04	1.42	6.3
6	HP	35.13	79	2.3	0.6	0.0	2.2	52.0	49.8	1.04	1.19	3.8
6	HP	34.38	58	3.2	0.1	0.8	3.2	53.5	50.3	1.02	1.23	3.1
6	HP	36.53	53	3.9	1.0	1.8	2.6	49.0	46.4	1.04	1.00	6.3
6	HP	37.41	67	7.9	3.7	3.5	5.0	50.0	45.0	1.13	1.24	5.6
7	HP	35.96	67	4.5	0.4	0.3	3.6	52.0	48.4	1.12	1.20	8.4
8	HP	41.57	60	5.7	1.6	2.1	3.6	44.0	41.4	1.38	1.00	14.6
9	HP	39.95	49	4.4	1.0	1.7	3.2	46.0	42.8	1.49	1.06	4.1
7	HP	38.76	69	6.6	0.8	2.1	3.2	47.0	43.8	1.35	1.03	7.2
9	HP	38.55	74	5.1	1.7	2.2	3.9	49.5	45.6	1.11	1.34	5.8
7	HP	38.18	46	3.9	0.2	1.8	1.7	50.5	48.8	1.30	1.16	10.3
10	HP	35.50	45	10.5	3.6	3.9	7.3	54.5	47.2	1.06	1.33	11.3
9	HP	37.92	40	6.7	2.3	2.7	4.6	51.5	46.9	1.15	1.20	10.9
7	HP	33.43	25	8.5	3.7	3.2	5.3	53.5	48.2	1.43	1.13	10.6
7	HP	38.37	23	7.4	3.8	2.6	4.2	49.5	45.3	1.06	1.04	8.8
7	HP	35.67	30	6.3	2.9	2.8	4.8	54.0	49.2	1.04	1.33	6.1
8	HP	38.22	32	6.2	1.9	2.4	5.1	50.5	45.4	1.02	1.11	6.8
8	HP	45.47	66	6.0	1.7	1.6	3.5	43.0	39.5	1.05	1.08	14.9
8	HP	44.09	40	5.7	2.1	3.4	4.8	43.5	38.7	1.29	1.03	7.6

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
5	HP	30.09	97	6.3	0.5	2.3	4.4	55.4	51.0	1.05	1.05	—
5	HP	28.78	21	5.3	0.4	2.6	4.4	58.7	54.3	1.10	1.27	5.4
5	HP	30.02	36	4.7	0.3	1.9	4.6	59.5	54.9	1.05	1.76	6.0
6	HP	47.56	55	11.6	0.7	−2.0	−10.9	37.5	48.4	1.10	1.03	20.0
7	HP	41.82	30	6.3	1.1	1.1	3.3	44.5	41.2	1.55	1.08	20.2

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

## FRANCE - FIFTH REPUBLIC (MÉTROPOLE)

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N<sub>∞</sub>P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
23-30/11/1958	77.2	0.851	6.72	3	0.727	3.67	42.6	2.35	3.01
18-25/11/1962	68.7	0.803	5.08	2	0.710	3.45	49.5	2.02	2.74
05-12/03/1967	81.1	0.781	4.56	3	0.734	3.76	40.6	2.46	3.11
23-30/06/1968	80.0	0.769	4.32	3	0.598	2.49	60.0	1.67	2.08
04-11/03/1973	81.3	0.824	5.70	3	0.781	4.56	37.2	2.69	3.62
12-19/03/1978	83.2	0.795	4.88	4	0.750	4.01	30.4	3.29	3.65
14-21/06/1981	70.9	0.750	4.00	4	0.621	2.64	56.5	1.77	2.20
16/03/1986	78.5	0.791	4.77	3	0.743	3.90	35.6	2.81	3.35
05-12/06/1988	66.1	0.772	4.39	3	0.674	3.07	46.8	2.13	2.60
21-28/03/1993	69.5	0.854	6.84	3	0.657	2.92	42.9	2.33	2.63
25/05-01/06/1997	68.5	0.858	7.04	3	0.705	3.39	44.3	2.26	2.82
09-16/06/2002	64.4	0.800	5.00	2	0.498	1.99	62.5	1.60	1.79
10-17/06/2007	60.4	0.764	4.23	2	0.585	2.41	55.3	1.81	2.11
10-17/06/2012	57.2	0.806	5.17	2	0.632	2.72	49.0	2.04	2.38
11-18/06/2017	50.2	0.850	6.68	2	0.644	2.81	55.3	1.81	2.31

*Corsica*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N<sub>∞</sub>P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
06-13/12/2015	67.0	0.712	3.48	3	0.671	3.04	47.1	2.13	2.58
03-10/12/2017	52.6	0.616	2.60	2	0.533	2.14	65.1	1.54	1.84

*Note:* Data are based on the second round (turnout, vote percentages, et cetera).

## GERMANY

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N<sub>∞P</sub></i>	<i>N<sub>bP</sub></i>
14/08/1949	78.5	0.796	4.90	2	0.751	4.01	34.6	2.89	3.45
06/09/1953	85.8	0.698	3.31	2	0.641	2.79	49.9	2.00	2.40
15/09/1957	87.8	0.637	2.76	2	0.582	2.39	54.3	1.84	2.12
17/09/1961	87.7	0.646	2.83	2	0.602	2.51	48.5	2.06	2.29
19/09/1965	86.6	0.609	2.56	2	0.581	2.38	49.4	2.02	2.20
28/09/1969	86.7	0.600	2.50	2	0.554	2.24	48.8	2.05	2.14
19/11/1972	91.1	0.582	2.39	2	0.572	2.33	46.4	2.16	2.24
30/10/1976	90.7	0.576	2.36	2	0.568	2.31	49.0	2.04	2.18
09/10/1980	88.6	0.606	2.54	2	0.589	2.43	45.5	2.20	2.31
06/03/1983	89.1	0.608	2.55	2	0.602	2.51	49.0	2.04	2.28
25/01/1987	84.3	0.652	2.87	2	0.643	2.80	44.9	2.23	2.51
02/12/1990	77.8	0.681	3.14	2	0.622	2.65	48.2	2.08	2.36
16/10/1994	79.0	0.683	3.15	2	0.655	2.90	43.8	2.29	2.59
27/09/1998	82.2	0.698	3.31	2	0.656	2.91	44.5	2.24	2.58
22/09/2002	79.1	0.681	3.13	2	0.643	2.80	41.6	2.40	2.60
18/09/2005	77.7	0.734	3.76	2	0.709	3.44	36.8	2.72	3.08
27/09/2009	70.8	0.785	4.66	2	0.748	3.97	38.4	2.60	3.29
22/09/2013	71.5	0.742	3.88	2	0.643	2.80	49.3	2.03	2.41
24/09/2017	76.2	0.805	5.13	2	0.784	4.64	34.7	2.88	3.76

*Note:* The CDU/CSU is always counted as one party.

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
7	HP	21.07	39	34.1	4.0	22.0	32.9	67.7	34.8	1.69	2.05	22.8
8	HP	17.44	12	20.3	0.9	15.8	17.1	63.2	46.1	3.59	1.56	19.5
5	HP	22.32	26	17.1	2.0	7.6	13.8	65.7	51.9	1.62	1.64	11.5
5	MM	9.96	19	27.7	5.4	22.0	27.2	73.6	46.4	4.41	1.12	9.7
8	HP	28.63	26	16.9	2.2	11.3	11.0	56.0	45.0	1.98	1.22	16.1
5	HP	27.92	18	11.5	7.7	7.6	11.5	58.2	46.7	1.09	1.29	8.6
5	MM	11.47	9	21.7	2.1	20.2	16.6	74.1	57.5	3.23	1.26	13.5
6	HP	25.11	4	11.9	3.7	4.4	8.4	61.9	53.5	1.36	1.14	13.6
4	HP	16.32	16	18.5	1.0	10.4	15.1	70.3	55.2	2.00	1.06	7.8
5	HP	16.68	8	41.6	25.4	22.6	41.5	81.1	39.6	1.12	3.85	19.4
5	HP	18.87	3	35.0	7.5	20.5	28.4	67.7	39.3	1.89	1.19	13.8
4	MM	7.46	1	28.7	20.0	28.6	28.7	87.2	58.5	2.53	5.07	13.1
5	MM	10.77	2	24.7	11.1	15.4	23.0	87.9	64.9	1.70	10.70	11.4
6	HP	13.88	4	27.6	2.7	19.5	27.2	84.2	57.0	1.39	11.88	22.2
6	MM	12.56	3	34.0	2.6	26.7	30.7	75.1	44.4	2.79	2.68	44.8

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
4	HP	16.09	4	11.8	0.0	11.8	6.8	70.6	63.8	2.00	1.09	9.1
4	EM	7.47	23	8.6	0.0	8.6	6.2	81.0	74.8	4.10	1.67	37.6

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
8	HP	26.23	37	7.0	5.2	3.6	7.0	67.2	60.2	1.06	2.52	—
5	HP	13.98	44	7.3	7.5	4.7	6.9	80.9	74.0	1.61	3.15	21.2
4	EM	10.92	43	6.9	7.0	4.1	6.3	88.3	82.0	1.60	4.12	9.2
3	HP	12.93	58	5.7	5.7	3.2	5.1	86.6	81.5	1.27	2.84	11.5
3	HP	12.04	37	3.6	3.6	1.8	3.2	90.1	86.9	1.21	4.12	7.6
3	HP	11.47	23	5.4	5.4	2.7	5.2	94.0	88.8	1.08	7.47	6.0
3	HP	12.50	26	1.1	1.0	0.6	1.1	91.8	90.7	1.02	5.61	6.0
3	HP	11.78	47	0.9	0.8	0.4	0.9	92.1	91.2	1.14	5.49	3.9
3	HP	13.25	31	2.1	2.0	1.0	2.0	89.4	87.4	1.04	4.11	4.5
4	HP	12.80	24	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.8	87.8	87.0	1.26	5.68	8.4
4	HP	15.44	45	1.4	1.3	0.6	1.0	82.3	81.3	1.20	4.04	5.7
4	HP	13.73	47	8.1	8.1	4.4	7.0	84.3	77.3	1.33	3.03	8.4
5	HP	16.31	32	3.6	3.5	2.3	3.4	81.3	77.9	1.17	5.36	8.3
5	HP	16.14	30	6.0	6.0	3.6	5.1	81.1	76.0	1.22	5.21	7.8
4	HP	16.34	30	6.7	3.0	3.1	5.8	82.8	77.0	1.01	4.51	6.3
5	HP	21.74	65	3.9	3.9	1.6	3.5	73.0	69.5	1.02	3.64	8.0
5	HP	24.45	31	6.0	6.0	4.6	5.1	61.9	56.8	1.64	1.57	12.6
4	HP	14.20	86	15.8	15.8	7.8	12.7	79.9	67.2	1.61	3.02	16.6
6	HP	30.30	171	5.0	5.0	1.8	2.8	56.3	53.4	1.61	1.63	17.0

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

<i>GREECE</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
17/11/1974	79.5	0.635	2.74	2	0.420	1.73	73.3	1.36	1.55
20/11/1977	81.1	0.733	3.74	2	0.574	2.35	57.0	1.75	2.05
18/10/1981	81.5	0.627	2.68	2	0.523	2.10	57.3	1.74	1.92
02/06/1985	80.2	0.614	2.59	2	0.534	2.14	53.7	1.86	2.00
18/06/1989	80.3	0.634	2.73	2	0.584	2.40	48.3	2.07	2.23
05/11/1989	80.7	0.609	2.56	2	0.570	2.32	49.3	2.03	2.17
08/04/1990	79.2	0.621	2.64	2	0.580	2.37	50.0	2.00	2.19
10/10/1993	79.2	0.620	2.63	2	0.540	2.17	56.7	1.76	1.97
22/09/1996	76.3	0.674	3.07	2	0.575	2.36	54.0	1.85	2.11
09/04/2000	75.0	0.621	2.64	2	0.547	2.21	52.7	1.90	2.05
07/03/2004	76.6	0.624	2.66	2	0.543	2.19	55.0	1.82	2.00
16/09/2007	74.2	0.669	3.02	2	0.619	2.62	50.7	1.97	2.30
04/10/2009	70.9	0.683	3.16	2	0.614	2.59	53.3	1.88	2.23
06/05/2012	65.1	0.888	8.94	2	0.793	4.83	36.0	2.78	3.80
17/06/2012	62.5	0.808	5.20	2	0.734	3.76	43.0	2.33	3.04
25/01/2015	63.9	0.774	4.43	2	0.676	3.09	49.7	2.01	2.55
20/09/2015	56.6	0.781	4.57	2	0.691	3.24	48.3	2.07	2.65

<i>HUNGARY</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
25/03-08/04/1990	65.0	0.851	6.71	2	0.737	3.80	42.5	2.35	3.08
08-29/05/1994	68.9	0.818	5.49	2	0.655	2.90	54.1	1.85	2.37
10-24/05/1998	56.3	0.785	4.64	2	0.710	3.45	38.3	2.61	3.03
07-21/04/2002	70.5	0.649	2.85	2	0.547	2.21	46.1	2.17	2.19
09-23/04/2006	67.8	0.630	2.70	2	0.571	2.33	49.5	2.02	2.18
11-25/04/2010	64.4	0.651	2.87	3	0.496	1.98	68.1	1.47	1.72
06/04/2014	61.7	0.689	3.22	3	0.503	2.01	66.8	1.50	1.75
08/04/2018	69.7	0.698	3.31	2	0.522	2.09	66.8	1.50	1.79

<i>ICELAND</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
30/06/1946	87.4	0.721	3.58	4	0.722	3.60	38.5	2.60	3.10
23/10/1949	89.0	0.719	3.55	4	0.712	3.47	36.5	2.74	3.10
28/06/1953	89.9	0.760	4.16	4	0.709	3.44	40.4	2.48	2.96
24/06/1956	92.1	0.724	3.62	4	0.712	3.48	36.5	2.74	3.11
28/06/1959	90.6	0.706	3.40	3	0.687	3.20	38.5	2.60	2.90
25/10/1959	90.4	0.726	3.66	4	0.710	3.44	40.0	2.50	2.97
06/06/1963	91.1	0.703	3.37	3	0.699	3.33	40.0	2.50	2.92
11/06/1967	91.4	0.735	3.77	4	0.718	3.55	38.3	2.61	3.08
13/06/1971	90.4	0.756	4.10	3	0.740	3.85	36.7	2.73	3.29
30/06/1974	91.4	0.712	3.47	3	0.705	3.38	41.7	2.40	2.89
25/06/1978	90.3	0.763	4.21	4	0.741	3.85	33.3	3.00	3.43
02/12/1979	89.3	0.744	3.90	4	0.736	3.79	35.0	2.86	3.32
23/04/1983	88.3	0.765	4.26	3	0.754	4.07	38.3	2.61	3.34

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
4	EM	4.61	27	19.0	2.2	18.9	18.5	93.3	74.8	3.67	5.00	—
4	MM	10.11	27	20.9	0.9	15.2	20.9	88.0	67.1	1.84	8.36	35.9
3	MM	8.96	37	11.7	5.1	9.2	11.6	95.6	84.0	1.50	8.85	27.0
3	MM	9.92	23	9.1	1.6	7.9	9.1	95.7	86.6	1.28	10.50	5.6
3	HP	12.40	20	6.6	2.0	4.0	6.6	90.0	83.4	1.16	4.46	8.6
3	HP	11.75	28	5.1	1.0	3.1	5.1	92.0	86.9	1.16	6.10	4.2
3	HP	11.85	18	5.6	2.2	3.1	5.5	91.0	85.5	1.22	6.47	3.8
4	MM	9.40	15	9.8	4.5	9.8	7.5	93.7	86.2	1.53	11.10	10.8
5	MM	10.86	21	12.5	5.3	12.5	10.4	90.0	79.6	1.50	9.80	8.6
4	MM	10.46	15	8.9	4.8	8.9	7.8	94.3	86.5	1.26	11.36	6.9
4	MM	9.86	16	9.6	4.8	9.6	8.0	94.0	86.0	1.41	9.75	3.2
5	MM	12.93	15	8.9	3.1	8.9	4.8	84.7	79.9	1.49	4.64	6.1
5	MM	12.09	15	9.4	4.9	9.4	6.3	83.7	77.4	1.76	4.33	9.4
7	HP	30.91	ngf	18.9	18.9	17.1	17.6	53.3	35.7	2.08	1.27	48.0
7	HP	21.43	21	13.3	5.9	13.3	10.1	66.7	56.6	1.82	2.15	21.1
7	HP	15.55	16	13.3	8.6	13.3	10.9	75.0	64.1	1.96	4.47	22.8
8	HP	16.74	18	12.8	6.4	12.8	9.7	73.3	63.6	1.93	4.17	9.3

ngf = no government formed

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	21.85	45	22.0	15.8	17.8	20.2	66.3	46.1	1.78	2.09	—
6	MM	13.30	27	21.1	12.7	21.1	19.4	72.2	52.8	2.99	1.89	21.8
6	HP	21.27	45	14.0	9.2	10.1	12.5	73.0	60.5	1.10	2.79	31.0
3	HP	11.91	36	11.7	11.3	4.0	11.7	94.8	83.1	1.06	8.90	19.6
4	HP	11.77	47	6.8	3.3	6.3	6.8	92.0	85.2	1.16	8.20	4.1
4	EM	6.31	34	15.4	3.8	15.4	11.4	83.4	72.0	4.46	1.26	32.7
4	MM	6.67	61	22.3	3.7	22.3	15.4	85.9	70.5	3.50	1.65	11.4
5	MM	6.93	40	17.6	6.2	17.6	11.6	79.9	68.3	5.12	1.30	11.1

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
4	HP	22.15	1	1.9	0.1	−1.0	0.9	63.5	62.6	1.54	1.30	—
4	HP	22.02	45	8.2	0.0	−3.0	5.2	69.2	64.0	1.12	1.89	1.4
5	HP	20.51	77	12.2	3.3	3.3	12.2	71.2	59.0	1.31	2.29	9.4
4	HP	22.08	30	17.1	4.5	−5.9	11.2	69.2	58.0	1.12	2.13	11.2
4	HP	19.69	1	9.3	2.5	−4.0	5.3	75.0	69.7	1.05	2.71	11.8
5	HP	20.64	26	3.6	3.4	0.3	2.9	68.3	65.4	1.41	1.70	4.4
4	HP	19.98	1	3.5	0.2	−1.4	2.1	71.7	69.6	1.26	2.11	4.4
4	HP	21.89	1	3.8	1.1	0.8	2.7	68.3	65.6	1.28	2.00	6.3
5	HP	24.38	31	3.5	2.0	0.5	3.5	65.0	61.5	1.29	1.70	10.4
5	HP	19.72	59	3.5	0.4	−1.0	2.4	70.0	67.6	1.47	1.55	8.1
4	HP	25.67	68	5.5	5.5	0.6	0.0	55.6	55.6	1.43	1.00	19.3
4	HP	24.64	67	3.4	0.9	−0.4	3.0	63.3	60.3	1.24	1.55	11.1
6	HP	25.10	33	4.9	1.1	−0.2	4.6	61.6	57.0	1.64	1.40	16.1

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 2.1 (Continued)

ICELAND

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
25/04/1987	90.1	0.827	5.77	3	0.813	5.35	28.6	3.50	4.43
20/04/1991	87.6	0.763	4.23	3	0.735	3.77	41.3	2.42	3.10
08/04/1995	87.4	0.767	4.29	2	0.747	3.95	39.7	2.52	3.24
08/05/1999	84.1	0.718	3.55	3	0.711	3.45	41.3	2.42	2.94
10/05/2003	87.7	0.746	3.93	3	0.731	3.71	34.9	2.86	3.29
12/05/2007	83.6	0.754	4.06	2	0.724	3.62	39.7	2.52	3.07
25/04/2009	85.1	0.780	4.55	3	0.761	4.18	31.7	3.15	3.67
27/04/2013	81.4	0.828	5.81	2	0.774	4.42	30.2	3.32	3.87
29/10/2016	79.2	0.835	6.08	2	0.804	5.09	33.3	3.00	4.05
28/10/2017	81.2	0.852	6.76	2	0.847	6.54	25.4	3.94	5.24

IRELAND

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
04/02/1948	74.2	0.756	4.10	2	0.724	3.62	46.3	2.16	2.89
30/05/1951	75.3	0.704	3.37	2	0.692	3.25	46.9	2.13	2.69
18/04/1954	76.5	0.692	3.25	2	0.671	3.04	44.2	2.26	2.65
05/03/1957	71.3	0.684	3.16	2	0.636	2.75	53.1	1.88	2.32
04/10/1961	70.6	0.690	3.23	2	0.645	2.82	48.6	2.06	2.44
07/04/1965	75.1	0.632	2.72	3	0.620	2.63	50.0	2.00	2.32
16/06/1969	76.9	0.646	2.82	3	0.592	2.45	52.1	1.92	2.19
28/02/1973	76.6	0.644	2.81	2	0.613	2.58	47.9	2.09	2.33
16/06/1977	76.3	0.637	2.76	2	0.579	2.38	56.8	1.76	2.07
11/06/1981	76.2	0.651	2.86	2	0.617	2.61	47.0	2.13	2.37
18/02/1982	73.8	0.628	2.69	2	0.609	2.56	48.8	2.05	2.30
24/11/1982	72.9	0.632	2.72	2	0.608	2.55	45.2	2.21	2.38
17/02/1987	73.3	0.712	3.48	2	0.655	2.89	48.8	2.05	2.47
15/06/1989	68.5	0.704	3.38	2	0.664	2.98	46.4	2.16	2.57
25/11/1992	68.5	0.746	3.94	3	0.711	3.46	41.0	2.44	2.95
06/06/1997	65.9	0.752	4.03	2	0.667	3.00	46.4	2.16	2.58
17/05/2002	62.6	0.759	4.15	2	0.706	3.41	48.8	2.05	2.73
24/05/2007	67.0	0.734	3.77	2	0.668	3.01	47.0	2.13	2.57
25/02/2011	70.0	0.791	4.78	3	0.719	3.56	45.8	2.18	2.87
26/02/2016	65.2	0.849	6.61	2	0.797	4.92	30.1	3.32	4.12

ITALY

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
02/06/1946*	89.1	0.787	4.71	3	0.772	4.39	37.2	2.69	3.54
18-19/04/1948	92.2	0.660	2.94	2	0.611	2.57	53.0	1.89	2.23
07/06/1953	93.8	0.761	4.18	2	0.718	3.54	44.6	2.24	2.89
25-26/05/1958	93.8	0.741	3.87	2	0.710	3.45	45.8	2.18	2.82
28-29/04/1963	92.9	0.759	4.15	2	0.733	3.74	41.3	2.42	3.08
19-20/05/1968	92.8	0.747	3.95	2	0.717	3.53	42.2	2.37	2.95
07-08/05/1972	93.2	0.754	4.07	2	0.719	3.55	42.2	2.37	2.96
20-21/06/1976	93.4	0.716	3.52	2	0.684	3.16	41.7	2.40	2.78
03-04/06/1979	90.6	0.744	3.91	2	0.713	3.48	41.6	2.40	2.94
26-27/06/1983	89.0	0.778	4.51	2	0.751	4.01	35.7	2.80	3.41
14-15/06/1987	88.8	0.783	4.61	2	0.755	4.08	37.1	2.69	3.39
05-06/04/1992	87.3	0.849	6.62	2	0.825	5.73	32.7	3.06	4.39
26-27/03/1994	86.1	0.868	7.58	2	0.862	7.26	18.6	5.38	6.32
21/04/1996	82.9	0.860	7.14	3	0.838	6.17	27.1	3.68	4.93

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	38.21	74	4.4	3.1	1.4	3.1	49.2	46.1	1.38	1.30	23.7
5	HP	22.14	10	4.8	4.3	2.7	4.4	61.9	57.5	2.00	1.30	13.3
6	HP	23.83	15	3.1	1.8	2.6	3.1	63.5	60.4	1.67	1.67	11.6
5	HP	20.26	20	1.7	0.7	0.6	0.8	68.3	67.5	1.53	1.42	16.9
5	HP	24.14	13	3.3	1.4	1.2	2.0	66.7	64.7	1.10	1.67	8.1
5	HP	21.83	12	4.9	3.3	3.1	4.9	68.3	63.4	1.39	2.00	11.7
5	HP	28.53	15	4.2	2.8	1.9	3.6	57.1	53.5	1.25	1.14	20.7
6	HP	30.87	26	12.1	11.8	3.5	9.2	60.3	51.1	1.00	2.11	34.1
7	HP	33.93	74	7.6	5.7	4.3	4.3	49.2	44.9	2.10	1.00	31.0
8	HP	48.79	33	3.3	1.4	0.2	0.8	42.9	42.1	1.45	1.38	21.7

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	19.45	14	7.3	0.1	4.4	5.7	67.4	61.7	2.19	2.21	—
4	HP	17.24	14	3.3	0.1	0.6	2.0	74.1	72.1	1.73	2.50	12.3
5	HP	16.96	44	4.1	2.3	0.8	2.8	78.2	75.4	1.30	2.63	7.3
5	MM	12.91	15	5.4	0.5	4.8	5.4	80.3	74.9	1.95	3.33	11.2
3	HP	14.49	7	5.8	1.2	4.8	5.4	81.2	75.8	1.49	2.94	9.9
3	MM	13.15	14	2.4	0.7	2.3	0.8	82.6	81.8	1.53	2.14	8.3
3	MM	11.74	18	7.0	2.5	6.4	7.0	86.8	79.8	1.50	2.78	2.8
3	HP	13.44	14	4.1	2.5	1.7	4.1	85.4	81.3	1.28	2.84	3.8
3	EM	10.29	19	6.2	2.9	6.2	4.8	85.9	81.1	1.95	2.53	7.6
3	HP	13.84	19	4.5	1.2	1.7	4.4	86.2	81.8	1.15	4.33	9.1
3	HP	13.11	19	2.2	1.7	1.5	2.2	86.8	84.6	1.29	4.20	3.5
3	HP	13.98	19	3.2	1.1	0.0	3.0	87.4	84.4	1.07	4.38	3.8
5	HP	14.80	21	9.3	4.5	4.7	8.3	79.5	71.2	1.59	3.64	16.2
5	HP	15.98	27	6.2	2.3	2.2	6.0	79.5	73.5	1.40	3.67	7.8
5	HP	20.43	48	6.5	2.5	1.9	4.5	68.1	63.6	1.51	1.36	15.1
5	HP	16.08	20	11.7	2.0	7.1	11.7	78.9	67.2	1.43	3.18	9.9
6	HP	17.46	20	10.0	0.1	7.3	3.5	67.5	64.0	2.61	1.48	6.2
5	HP	15.96	21	10.8	0.8	5.4	8.8	77.7	68.9	1.53	2.55	6.2
4	HP	19.30	12	12.8	2.4	9.7	12.6	68.1	55.5	2.05	1.85	29.6
6	HP	34.38	70	11.5	2.8	4.6	9.7	59.5	49.8	1.14	1.91	26.1

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	27.56	44	3.3	2.1	2.0	2.0	57.9	55.9	1.80	1.11	—
5	MM	12.09	35	5.6	1.4	4.5	5.3	84.8	79.5	1.66	5.55	23.0
7	HP	19.62	39	6.1	2.3	4.5	6.1	68.8	62.7	1.84	1.91	14.1
7	HP	18.70	38	4.4	0.5	3.4	4.2	69.3	65.1	1.95	1.67	5.2
6	HP	21.97	73	4.3	0.9	3.1	4.1	67.6	63.5	1.57	1.91	8.5
6	HP	20.40	52	4.4	1.0	3.2	4.4	70.3	65.9	1.50	1.95	7.8
7	HP	20.51	60	5.3	3.6	3.5	4.7	70.6	65.9	1.49	2.93	5.3
6	HP	18.41	50	4.6	0.1	3.0	4.6	77.7	73.1	1.16	3.98	9.1
7	HP	20.33	68	5.8	1.8	3.3	4.8	73.5	68.7	1.30	3.24	5.3
7	HP	25.78	45	4.5	2.0	2.8	4.4	67.2	62.8	1.14	2.71	8.3
8	HP	25.65	51	5.0	1.9	2.8	4.3	65.2	60.9	1.32	1.88	16.2
10	HP	38.56	89	5.0	1.7	3.0	3.8	49.6	45.8	1.93	1.16	13.7
9	HP	59.12	54	21.0	1.2	−2.3	7.2	36.0	28.8	1.01	1.01	41.4
8	HP	44.95	40	10.7	1.9	6.0	5.0	46.7	41.7	1.39	1.32	21.0

(Continued)



**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

ITALY

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
13/05/2001	81.4	0.841	6.31	2	0.823	5.65	30.6	3.26	4.46
09-10/04/2006	83.6	0.818	5.50	2	0.797	4.92	35.9	2.79	3.85
13-14/04/2008	80.5	0.738	3.82	2	0.675	3.08	43.8	2.28	2.68
24-25/02/2013	75.2	0.815	5.39	3	0.715	3.51	47.1	2.12	2.82
04/03/2018	72.9	0.807	5.19	3	0.768	4.32	36.0	2.78	3.55

\* Election for constituent assembly.

LATVIA

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
05-06/06/1993	91.2	0.840	6.26	1	0.802	5.05	36.0	2.78	3.91
30/09-01/10/1995	72.6	0.900	9.96	2	0.868	7.59	18.0	5.56	6.57
03-04/10/1998	71.0	0.858	7.03	2	0.818	5.49	21.0	4.76	5.13
05/10/2002	77.0	0.852	6.77	3	0.801	5.04	26.0	3.85	4.44
07/10/2006	61.0	0.867	7.49	3	0.833	6.00	23.0	4.35	5.17
02/10/2010	63.0	0.774	4.43	3	0.746	3.93	33.0	3.03	3.48
17/09/2011	59.5	0.802	5.06	3	0.779	4.52	31.0	3.23	3.87
04/10/2014	58.9	0.821	5.60	4	0.805	5.13	24.0	4.17	4.65
10/06/2018	54.6	0.876	8.07	1	0.844	6.39	23.0	4.35	5.37

LIECHTENSTEIN

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
29/04/1945	93.8	0.496	1.98	2	0.498	1.99	53.3	1.88	1.93
06/02/1949	92.3	0.499	2.00	2	0.498	1.99	53.3	1.88	1.93
15/02/1953	90.7	0.560	2.27	2	0.498	1.99	53.3	1.88	1.93
14/06/1953	93.3	0.501	2.00	2	0.498	1.99	53.3	1.88	1.93
01/09/1957	93.4	0.500	2.00	2	0.498	1.99	53.3	1.88	1.93
23/03/1958	96.4	0.496	1.98	2	0.480	1.92	60.0	1.67	1.79
24/03/1962	94.7	0.585	2.41	2	0.498	1.99	53.3	1.88	1.93
06/02/1966	95.6	0.576	2.36	2	0.498	1.99	53.3	1.88	1.93
01/02/1970	94.8	0.516	2.06	2	0.498	1.99	53.3	1.88	1.93
03/02/1974	95.4	0.528	2.12	2	0.498	1.99	53.3	1.88	1.93
03/02/1978	95.7	0.501	2.00	2	0.498	1.99	53.3	1.88	1.93
07/02/1982	95.4	0.498	1.99	2	0.498	1.99	53.3	1.88	1.93
02/02/1986	93.3	0.562	2.28	2	0.498	1.99	53.3	1.88	1.93
03-05/03/1989	90.8	0.593	2.46	2	0.499	2.00	52.0	1.92	1.96
07/02/1993	87.5	0.588	2.43	2	0.570	2.32	48.0	2.08	2.20
24/10/1993	85.3	0.571	2.33	2	0.534	2.15	52.0	1.92	2.04
31/01-02/02/1997	86.8	0.591	2.44	2	0.563	2.29	52.0	1.92	2.11
09-11/02/2001	86.1	0.574	2.35	2	0.534	2.15	52.0	1.92	2.04
11-13/03/2005	86.5	0.600	2.50	2	0.595	2.47	48.0	2.08	2.28
08/02/2009	84.6	0.576	2.36	2	0.534	2.15	52.0	1.92	2.04
01-03/02/2013	79.8	0.692	3.25	3	0.698	3.31	40.0	2.50	2.91
05/02/2017	77.8	0.713	3.48	3	0.714	3.49	36.0	2.78	3.13

*Note:* Women were not granted the right to vote in or stand for elections in Liechtenstein until 01/07/1984.

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
8	HP	39.19	39	13.9	1.0	1.1	6.0	52.1	46.1	1.43	1.36	21.2
10	HP	31.55	37	5.7	3.5	4.4	3.1	58.1	55.0	1.61	1.93	11.8
5	HP	17.31	31	9.7	5.5	6.6	8.0	78.3	70.3	1.27	3.62	11.4
6	HP	18.55	63	25.3	7.1	21.6	13.8	64.4	50.6	2.72	1.11	36.5
6	HP	27.63	94	10.1	4.0	3.8	6.3	55.7	49.4	1.83	1.11	28.4

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
8	HP	32.32	44	10.8	10.7	3.7	5.3	51.0	45.7	2.40	1.15	—
9	HP	62.24	4	13.4	12.5	2.7	5.0	35.0	30.0	1.06	1.06	51.4
6	HP	43.37	54	11.9	11.9	2.8	5.7	45.0	39.3	1.14	1.24	32.5
6	HP	37.30	33	16.0	16.0	2.1	7.2	50.0	42.8	1.08	1.14	42.9
7	HP	46.20	31	12.4	12.4	3.4	4.7	41.0	36.3	1.28	1.00	27.1
5	HP	26.33	32	7.7	7.7	1.8	4.8	62.0	57.2	1.14	1.32	29.4
5	HP	31.19	38	5.0	5.0	2.4	3.4	53.0	49.6	1.41	1.10	29.2
6	HP	38.99	32	4.8	4.8	0.8	1.8	47.0	45.2	1.04	1.10	26.6
7	HP	49.20		12.2	12.2	3.1	4.8	39.0	34.2	1.44	1.00	44.9

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
2	EM	9.29	?	1.5	0.0	−1.4	0.0	100.0	100.0	1.14	n.a.	—
2	EM	9.29	?	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.0	100.0	100.0	1.14	n.a.	1.8
2	EM	9.29	?	7.0	6.8	2.8	7.0	100.0	93.0	1.14	∞	6.9
2	EM	9.29	?	2.9	0.0	2.9	0.0	100.0	100.0	1.14	n.a.	7.4
2	EM	9.29	?	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	1.14	n.a.	1.9
2	EM	7.68	?	5.5	0.0	5.5	0.0	100.0	100.0	1.50	n.a.	2.2
2	MM	9.29	?	10.1	10.0	6.1	10.0	100.0	90.0	1.14	∞	10.1
2	MM	9.29	26	8.8	8.7	4.9	8.7	100.0	91.3	1.14	∞	1.5
2	MM	9.29	45	3.6	1.6	3.6	1.6	100.0	98.4	1.14	∞	7.2
2	MM	9.29	52	3.4	2.8	3.4	2.8	100.0	97.2	1.14	∞	2.5
2	MM	9.29	82	4.2	0.0	4.2	0.0	100.0	100.0	1.14	∞	2.9
2	EM	9.29	?	0.2	0.0	−0.2	0.0	100.0	100.0	1.14	∞	4.4
2	EM	9.29	87	7.1	7.0	3.2	7.0	100.0	93.0	1.14	∞	7.1
2	MM	9.60	68	10.8	10.8	4.8	10.7	100.0	89.3	1.08	∞	3.7
3	HP	12.06	115	3.8	0.0	3.8	2.4	92.0	89.6	1.09	5.50	5.0
3	EM	10.32	52	4.6	0.0	1.9	4.6	96.0	91.4	1.18	11.00	4.8
3	MM	10.99	66	3.6	0.0	2.8	3.6	92.0	88.4	1.30	5.00	3.1
3	MM	10.32	53	5.0	0.2	2.1	5.0	96.0	91.0	1.18	11.00	10.9
3	HP	12.84	39	1.8	0.0	−0.7	1.0	88.0	87.0	1.20	3.33	4.2
3	MM	10.32	45	4.9	0.0	4.4	4.9	96.0	91.1	1.18	11.00	9.4
4	HP	19.86	53	1.5	0.0	0.0	−1.5	72.0	73.5	1.25	2.00	17.5
4	HP	22.34	53	2.4	0.0	0.8	−0.9	68.0	68.9	1.13	1.60	4.8

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

*LITHUANIA*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
25/10/1992	75.3	0.739	3.83	2	0.671	3.04	51.8	1.93	2.49
20/10-04/11/1996	52.9	0.861	7.19	1	0.700	3.33	51.1	1.96	2.64
08/10/2000	58.6	0.821	5.57	3	0.774	4.43	36.2	2.76	3.60
10/10/2004	46.1	0.827	5.78	2	0.837	6.13	27.7	3.62	4.87
12/10-24/10/2008	48.6	0.888	8.91	2	0.829	5.85	31.2	3.20	4.53
14/10-28/10/2012	52.9	0.868	7.58	3	0.810	5.25	27.7	3.62	4.43
09/10-23/10/2016	50.6	0.853	6.79	3	0.774	4.42	38.3	2.61	3.52

*LUXEMBOURG*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
21/10/1945	?	0.715	3.50	3	0.672	3.05	49.0	2.04	2.55
06/06/1948-03/06/1951	91.3	0.683	3.15	3	0.674	3.07	40.4	2.48	2.77
30/05/1954	92.6	0.677	3.09	2	0.626	2.68	50.0	2.00	2.34
01/02/1959	92.3	0.700	3.33	3	0.682	3.14	40.4	2.48	2.81
07/06/1964	90.6	0.717	3.53	2	0.684	3.17	39.3	2.55	2.86
15/12/1968	88.6	0.719	3.56	3	0.706	3.41	37.5	2.67	3.04
26/05/1974	90.1	0.769	4.32	3	0.753	4.06	30.5	3.28	3.67
10/06/1979	88.9	0.767	4.29	3	0.711	3.46	40.7	2.46	2.96
17/06/1984	88.8	0.719	3.56	3	0.690	3.77	39.1	2.56	3.17
18/06/1989	87.6	0.785	4.66	3	0.735	3.90	36.7	2.73	3.31
12/06/1994	88.3	0.788	4.72	3	0.744	3.90	35.0	2.86	3.38
13/06/1999	86.5	0.782	4.59	3	0.769	4.34	31.7	3.16	3.75
13/06/2004	91.9	0.765	4.26	3	0.737	3.81	40.0	2.50	3.16
07/06/2009	85.2	0.765	4.26	3	0.724	3.63	43.3	2.31	2.97
20/10/2013	91.4	0.794	4.85	3	0.746	3.93	38.3	2.61	3.27
14/10/2018	89.7	0.823	5.66	4	0.781	4.56	35.0	2.86	3.71

*Note:* The 1948 and 1951 elections were each partial, 1948 in the South and East constituencies and 1951 in the North and Centre Constituencies. The data thus combine the 1948 and 1951 elections.

*MALTA*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
26-28/03/1966	89.7	0.581	2.39	2	0.493	1.97	56.0	1.79	1.88
12-14/06/1971	92.9	0.510	2.04	2	0.500	2.00	50.9	1.96	1.98
17-18/09/1976	94.9	0.500	2.00	2	0.499	2.00	52.3	1.91	1.96
12/12/1981	94.6	0.500	2.00	2	0.499	2.00	52.3	1.91	1.96
09/05/1987	96.1	0.502	2.01	2	0.500	2.00	50.7	1.97	1.99
22/02/1992	96.1	0.515	2.06	2	0.499	2.00	52.3	1.91	1.96
26/10/1996	96.3	0.514	2.06	2	0.500	2.00	50.7	1.97	1.99
05/09/1998	95.4	0.511	2.04	2	0.497	1.99	53.8	1.86	1.92
12/04/2003	95.7	0.506	2.02	2	0.497	1.99	53.8	1.86	1.92
08/03/2008	93.3	0.519	2.08	2	0.500	2.00	50.7	1.97	1.99
09/03/2013	93.0	0.511	2.05	2	0.491	1.97	56.5	1.77	1.87
03/06/2017	92.1	0.519	2.08	2	0.507	2.03	55.2	1.81	1.92

*Note:* Only post-independence elections are analyzed.

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	MM	14.66	46	8.8	9.7	7.8	6.4	71.6	65.2	2.61	1.56	—
6	MM	16.29	30	23.8	11.0	19.8	21.1	62.8	41.7	4.38	1.23	41.5
6	HP	28.28	19	15.6	2.8	2.9	10.5	58.9	48.4	1.37	1.21	51.2
7	HP	44.34	65	12.0	5.2	−0.9	0.3	49.6	49.3	1.26	1.24	50.3
9	HP	40.24	68	20.7	8.6	11.6	18.2	49.6	31.4	1.69	1.63	31.4
7	HP	37.98	45	16.4	8.9	8.5	16.2	51.1	34.9	1.18	1.14	28.2
6	HP	27.27	30	16.5	4.1	15.8	15.2	60.3	45.1	1.74	1.82	38.6

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
4	HP	15.55	29	9.9	1.8	7.6	3.2	70.6	67.4	2.27	1.22	—
4	HP	18.30	30	4.7	0.0	3.5	1.2	76.9	75.7	1.11	2.38	—
4	HP	13.40	30	8.3	2.8	7.6	5.2	82.7	77.5	1.53	2.84	—
4	HP	18.72	24	6.2	0.7	3.5	1.3	73.1	71.8	1.24	1.55	8.6
5	HP	19.25	41	6.2	0.0	6.0	5.8	76.8	71.0	1.05	3.50	12.2
4	HP	21.31	47	5.3	0.4	2.2	2.0	69.6	67.7	1.17	1.64	11.0
5	HP	28.21	23	4.1	1.1	2.6	2.3	59.3	57.0	1.06	1.21	16.0
5	HP	20.53	36	10.3	1.4	6.2	10.3	66.1	55.8	1.60	1.07	14.3
5	HP	22.97	33	5.0	2.6	2.5	3.5	71.9	68.4	1.19	1.50	14.1
5	HP	24.70	27	9.2	4.4	4.3	8.1	66.7	58.6	1.22	1.64	15.9
5	HP	25.35	25	8.9	6.1	4.7	7.6	63.3	55.7	1.24	1.42	13.2
5	HP	29.66	60	4.5	3.4	1.3	2.3	56.7	54.4	1.27	1.15	5.2
5	HP	22.86	48	4.5	2.9	3.9	3.8	63.3	59.5	1.71	1.40	10.4
5	HP	20.57	46	5.4	2.3	5.3	5.4	65.0	59.6	2.00	1.44	4.8
6	HP	24.24	45	9.4	6.1	4.6	6.0	60.0	54.0	1.77	1.00	9.3
7	HP	29.64		9.8	1.8	6.7	9.8	55.0	45.2	1.75	1.20	11.4

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
2	MM	8.67	1	9.1	9.1	8.1	9.0	100.0	91.0	1.27	∞	15.1
2	EM	9.82	7	1.1	1.1	0.1	1.1	100.0	98.9	1.04	∞	8.0
2	EM	9.54	7	0.8	0.0	0.8	0.0	100.0	100.0	1.10	∞	1.1
2	MM	9.54	6	3.2	0.0	3.2	0.0	100.0	100.0	1.10	∞	2.4
2	EM	9.86	3	0.5	0.3	−0.2	0.2	100.0	99.8	1.03	∞	0.2
2	EM	9.54	5	1.7	1.7	0.5	1.7	100.0	98.3	1.10	∞	2.6
2	EM	9.86	2	1.5	1.5	0.0	1.5	100.0	98.5	1.03	∞	4.2
2	EM	9.18	2	2.1	1.3	2.0	1.2	100.0	98.8	1.17	∞	4.0
2	EM	9.18	3	2.0	0.7	2.0	0.7	100.0	99.3	1.17	∞	0.5
2	MM	9.86	4	1.9	1.9	1.4	1.9	100.0	98.1	1.03	∞	2.5
2	EM	8.57	4	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	100.0	98.2	1.30	∞	6.5
2	EM	9.09	6	1.4	1.3	0.2	1.4	98.5	97.1	1.28	29.00	2.2

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

*MONTENEGRO*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
20/10/2002	76.4	0.617	2.61	2	0.606	2.54	52.0	1.92	2.23
10/09/2006	71.4	0.703	3.37	1	0.683	3.16	50.6	1.98	2.57
29/03/2009	66.2	0.687	3.19	2	0.595	2.47	59.3	1.69	2.08
14/10/2012	70.6	0.710	3.45	2	0.686	3.18	48.1	2.08	2.63
16/10/2016	73.3	0.760	4.16	2	0.727	3.66	44.4	2.25	2.96

*THE NETHERLANDS*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
17/05/1946	93.1	0.787	4.68	2	0.776	4.47	32.0	3.13	3.80
07/07/1948	93.7	0.800	4.99	2	0.786	4.68	32.0	3.13	3.90
25/06/1952	95.0	0.800	5.00	2	0.785	4.65	30.0	3.33	3.99
13/06/1956	95.5	0.765	4.26	2	0.754	4.07	33.3	3.00	3.54
12/03/1959	95.6	0.790	4.77	2	0.759	4.14	32.7	3.06	3.60
15/05/1963	95.1	0.792	4.80	2	0.778	4.50	33.3	3.00	3.75
15/02/1967	94.9	0.839	6.22	2	0.820	5.56	28.0	3.57	4.57
28/03/1971	79.1	0.859	7.11	2	0.844	6.40	26.0	3.85	5.12
29/11/1972	83.5	0.854	6.85	2	0.844	6.41	28.7	3.49	4.95
25/05/1977	88.0	0.741	3.87	3	0.730	3.70	35.3	2.83	3.27
26/05/1981	87.0	0.781	4.56	3	0.728	3.67	32.0	3.13	3.40
08/09/1982	81.0	0.764	4.24	3	0.751	4.02	31.3	3.19	3.61
21/05/1986	85.8	0.735	3.77	3	0.713	3.49	36.0	2.78	3.13
06/09/1989	80.3	0.744	3.90	2	0.733	3.75	36.0	2.78	3.26
03/05/1994	78.8	0.824	5.68	3	0.814	5.36	24.7	4.05	4.71
06/05/1998	73.3	0.805	5.14	3	0.793	4.82	30.0	3.33	4.08
15/05/2002	79.1	0.837	6.14	4	0.827	5.79	28.7	3.49	4.64
21/01/2003	79.9	0.799	4.98	3	0.789	4.74	29.3	3.41	4.07
22/11/2006	80.4	0.827	5.79	3	0.819	5.54	27.3	3.66	4.60
09/06/2010	75.4	0.857	6.97	3	0.852	6.74	20.7	4.84	5.79
12/09/2012	74.6	0.832	5.94	2	0.825	5.70	27.3	3.66	4.68
15/03/2017	81.4	0.883	8.55	1	0.878	8.19	22.0	4.55	6.37

!!

*Note:* Compulsory voting in the Netherlands was abolished in 1970.

*NORWAY*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
08/10/1945	76.4	0.757	4.12	2	0.685	3.17	50.7	1.97	2.57
10/10/1949	82.0	0.734	3.76	2	0.626	2.67	56.7	1.76	2.22
12/10/1953	79.3	0.717	3.53	2	0.677	3.09	51.3	1.95	2.52
07/10/1957	78.3	0.709	3.44	2	0.666	2.99	52.0	1.92	2.46
11/09/1961	79.1	0.724	3.62	2	0.689	3.22	49.3	2.03	2.62
12/09/1965	85.4	0.744	3.90	2	0.715	3.51	45.3	2.21	2.86
07/09/1969	83.8	0.724	3.63	2	0.686	3.18	49.3	2.03	2.60
09/09/1973	80.2	0.810	5.27	2	0.759	4.14	40.0	2.50	3.32
11/09/1977	82.9	0.739	3.82	2	0.663	2.97	49.0	2.04	2.50

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
4	MM	12.19	80	5.9	5.4	4.0	5.6	92.0	86.4	1.30	7.50	5.8
5	MM	15.60	61	4.0	2.5	2.9	2.3	64.4	62.1	3.42	1.09	29.2
5	EM	10.06	73	11.9	11.0	7.4	10.3	79.0	68.7	3.00	2.00	13.7
5	HP	16.49	52	4.6	3.7	1.8	3.3	72.8	69.5	1.95	2.22	22.8
7	HP	20.33	43	5.0	3.8	3.0	5.0	66.7	61.7	2.00	2.00	16.0

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
7	HP	30.40	47	2.2	1.0	1.2	1.9	61.0	59.1	1.10	2.23	—
7	HP	31.82	31	2.8	1.6	1.0	2.4	59.0	56.6	1.19	2.08	5.6
7	HP	32.55	69	3.4	2.1	1.0	2.3	60.0	57.7	1.00	2.50	5.6
7	HP	27.13	122	1.9	1.4	0.6	1.6	66.0	64.4	1.02	3.27	4.1
7	HP	27.88	68	3.3	2.0	1.1	2.7	64.7	62.0	1.02	2.53	5.7
9	HP	30.00	70	2.5	1.6	1.4	2.1	62.0	59.9	1.16	2.69	5.0
10	HP	40.03	49	3.5	2.6	1.5	2.6	52.7	50.1	1.14	2.18	10.8
9	HP	47.36	69	4.4	2.5	1.4	2.9	49.3	46.4	1.11	2.19	12.0
11	HP	45.72	163	2.7	1.0	1.4	1.7	46.7	45.0	1.59	1.23	12.2
6	HP	23.93	208	3.3	2.0	1.5	2.3	68.0	65.7	1.08	1.75	12.8
8	HP	24.96	108	2.5	2.0	1.2	2.2	61.3	59.1	1.09	1.69	8.8
7	HP	27.60	57	2.9	1.7	0.9	1.5	61.3	59.8	1.04	1.25	9.4
5	HP	22.34	54	3.6	2.3	1.4	2.8	70.7	67.9	1.04	1.93	10.4
6	HP	24.00	62	1.9	1.2	0.7	1.5	68.7	67.2	1.10	2.23	4.6
7	HP	40.38	111	2.9	1.8	0.7	1.2	47.4	46.2	1.09	1.10	21.7
8	HP	33.74	89	2.9	3.0	1.0	1.6	55.3	53.7	1.18	1.31	14.0
8	HP	41.30	68	2.2	0.8	0.8	1.1	46.0	44.9	1.65	1.08	30.5
8	HP	33.50	126	2.4	1.3	0.7	1.4	57.3	55.9	1.05	1.50	15.8
8	HP	40.26	92	1.9	1.2	0.8	1.6	49.3	47.7	1.24	1.32	19.6
8	HP	53.47	127	1.7	1.1	0.3	0.7	40.7	40.0	1.03	1.25	22.4
9	HP	41.42	54	2.3	0.9	0.7	1.3	52.7	51.4	1.08	2.53	15.9
12	HP	63.88	225	2.6	1.4	0.7	0.9	35.3	34.4	1.65	1.05	25.6

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	MM	15.64	26	9.7	0.3	9.7	9.4	67.4	58.0	3.04	1.25	—
5	MM	11.57	1	12.6	6.5	11.0	10.4	72.0	61.6	3.70	1.10	7.0
6	MM	15.04	1	4.9	0.0	4.6	4.2	69.3	65.1	2.85	1.80	4.5
5	MM	14.35	1	6.6	0.2	3.7	6.2	71.3	65.1	2.69	1.93	2.3
5	HP	16.31	20	6.7	3.1	2.5	2.5	68.6	66.1	2.55	1.81	3.6
5	HP	19.19	30	7.0	1.4	2.2	2.6	66.0	63.4	2.19	1.72	6.8
5	HP	16.11	2	7.2	4.6	2.8	3.3	68.6	65.3	2.55	1.45	5.4
6	HP	24.84	33	11.0	0.9	4.7	6.2	58.7	52.5	2.14	1.38	15.9
4	HP	15.14	8	10.9	4.2	6.7	8.7	75.5	66.8	1.85	1.86	14.7

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

<i>NORWAY</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
14/09/1981	82.0	0.745	3.92	2	0.686	3.18	42.6	2.35	2.76
08/09/1985	84.0	0.724	3.63	2	0.677	3.09	45.2	2.21	2.65
11/09/1989	83.2	0.793	4.84	2	0.764	4.24	38.2	2.62	3.43
13/09/1993	75.8	0.789	4.74	3	0.752	4.04	40.6	2.46	3.25
16/09/1997	78.3	0.803	5.07	2	0.770	4.36	39.4	2.54	3.45
10/09/2001	75.5	0.838	6.17	2	0.813	5.35	26.1	3.84	4.59
12/09/2005	77.4	0.804	5.10	2	0.781	4.56	36.1	2.77	3.67
14/09/2009	76.4	0.780	4.55	3	0.754	4.07	37.9	2.64	3.36
08-09/09/2013	78.3	0.795	4.88	3	0.772	4.39	32.5	3.07	3.73
11/09/2017	78.2	0.820	5.55	3	0.798	4.95	29.0	3.45	4.20
<i>POLAND</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
27/10/1991	43.2	0.928	13.83	0	0.908	10.85	13.0	7.67	9.26
19/09/1993	52.1	0.898	9.79	2	0.742	3.87	37.2	2.69	3.28
21/09/1997	47.9	0.800	5.00	2	0.661	2.95	43.7	2.29	2.62
23/09/2001	46.3	0.778	4.50	1	0.722	3.60	47.0	2.13	2.86
25/09/2005	40.6	0.829	5.86	2	0.765	4.26	33.7	2.97	3.61
21/10/2007	53.9	0.699	3.32	2	0.646	2.82	45.4	2.20	2.51
09/10/2011	48.9	0.733	3.74	2	0.666	3.00	45.0	2.22	2.61
25/10/2015	50.9	0.775	4.45	2	0.636	2.75	51.1	1.96	2.35
<i>PORTUGAL</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
25/04/1975*	91.7	0.727	3.67	2	0.661	2.95	46.4	2.16	2.55
25/04/1976	85.6	0.750	4.00	4	0.708	3.43	40.7	2.46	2.94
02/12/1979	82.9	0.774	4.42	4	0.745	3.92	32.0	3.13	3.52
05/10/1980	83.9	0.772	4.39	4	0.743	3.90	32.8	3.05	3.47
25/04/1983	77.8	0.732	3.74	3	0.701	3.35	40.4	2.48	2.91
06/10/1985	74.2	0.790	4.77	4	0.761	4.18	35.2	2.84	3.51
19/07/1987	71.6	0.665	2.98	2	0.576	2.36	59.2	1.69	2.02
06/10/1991	67.8	0.635	2.74	2	0.552	2.23	58.7	1.70	1.97
01/10/1995	66.3	0.664	2.97	2	0.608	2.55	48.7	2.05	2.30
10/10/1999	61.1	0.673	3.06	2	0.616	2.61	50.0	2.00	2.31
17/03/2002	61.5	0.671	3.04	2	0.611	2.57	45.7	2.19	2.38
20/02/2005	64.3	0.681	3.13	2	0.609	2.56	52.6	1.90	2.23
27/09/2009	59.7	0.755	4.07	2	0.681	3.13	42.2	2.37	2.75
05/06/2011	58.0	0.727	3.67	2	0.659	2.93	47.0	2.13	2.53
04/10/2015	55.9	0.709	3.43	2	0.631	2.71	46.5	2.15	2.43
* Election for constituent assembly.									
Note: Calculations for 1979 and 1980 are based on the component parts of the AD electoral alliance.									
<i>ROMANIA</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
20/05/1990	86.2	0.548	2.21	1	0.542	2.18	66.6	1.50	1.84
27/09/1992	76.3	0.859	7.09	2	0.791	4.78	34.3	2.91	3.85
03/11/1996	76.0	0.836	6.09	2	0.768	4.31	35.6	2.81	3.56

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	18.26	30	9.7	1.7	5.4	7.9	76.8	68.9	1.25	3.53	11.2
5	HP	16.93	18	8.8	4.7	4.4	5.8	77.0	71.2	1.42	3.13	4.9
6	HP	26.21	35	5.1	5.1	3.9	4.1	60.6	56.5	1.70	1.68	15.7
6	HP	24.00	24	6.4	1.5	3.7	6.4	60.0	53.6	2.09	1.14	14.9
6	HP	26.42	32	6.5	3.8	4.4	4.5	54.6	50.3	2.60	1.00	33.2
6	HP	39.56	39	7.4	3.6	1.7	3.5	49.1	45.6	1.13	1.46	15.5
7	HP	29.14	35	3.9	3.1	3.4	3.8	58.6	54.8	1.61	1.65	18.8
6	HP	25.29	36	5.4	2.7	2.5	3.8	62.1	58.3	1.56	1.37	6.6
7	HP	29.61	37	5.1	2.9	1.7	3.3	60.9	57.6	1.15	1.66	14.4
7	HP	35.15	39	6.3	1.9	1.6	3.2	55.6	52.4	1.09	1.67	9.3

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
10	HP	94.35	57	13.0	7.1	1.0	2.2	26.5	24.3	1.03	1.22	—
6	HP	24.31	37	37.5	34.6	16.8	30.1	65.9	35.8	1.30	1.78	29.4
4	HP	16.61	26	18.7	12.8	9.9	18.5	79.4	60.9	1.23	2.73	63.9
6	HP	19.10	26	<b>9.3</b>	9.3	6.0	7.4	61.1	53.7	3.32	1.23	41.5
6	HP	28.25	46	13.1	10.9	6.7	11.5	62.6	51.1	1.17	2.38	34.1
4	HP	15.39	36	7.9	4.1	3.9	7.9	81.5	73.6	1.26	3.13	24.4
5	HP	16.50	41	10.0	4.1	5.8	10.0	79.1	69.1	1.32	3.93	10.0
5	MM	13.45	24	19.8	16.6	13.5	19.4	81.1	61.7	1.70	3.29	33.1

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
5	HP	15.81	97	9.7	3.8	5.7	9.7	78.8	69.1	1.43	2.70	—
4	HP	20.35	89	6.2	3.9	4.1	6.2	68.4	62.2	1.47	1.74	11.5
5	HP	26.66	32	6.2	4.0	2.9	4.4	61.6	57.2	1.08	1.57	9.7
5	HP	26.21	96	6.1	4.3	3.0	4.2	62.4	58.2	1.11	1.61	2.5
4	HP	19.97	45	5.3	3.5	3.1	5.3	70.4	65.1	1.35	1.70	10.3
5	HP	27.09	31	6.0	3.5	4.6	6.0	58.0	52.0	1.54	1.27	22.5
4	EM	9.63	29	9.1	4.0	7.9	9.1	83.2	74.1	2.47	1.94	22.6
4	EM	9.21	24	8.7	3.7	7.1	8.7	90.0	81.3	1.88	4.24	7.8
4	HP	13.08	28	7.6	2.7	4.1	7.6	87.0	79.4	1.27	5.87	20.1
4	HP	13.05	11	7.3	4.0	5.1	7.3	85.2	77.9	1.42	4.76	4.1
4	HP	13.97	20	8.0	3.4	4.8	8.0	87.4	79.4	1.09	6.86	8.6
5	MM	12.13	20	9.2	4.9	6.2	9.2	85.2	76.0	1.61	5.36	13.1
5	HP	18.10	29	11.7	6.2	5.6	11.7	77.4	65.7	1.20	3.86	8.5
5	HP	15.54	16	12.3	8.4	8.3	12.3	79.1	66.8	1.46	3.08	13.1
4	HP	14.49	61	10.4	6.0	6.6	10.4	83.9	73.5	1.24	4.53	12.7

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
8	EM	7.29	39	5.4	5.2	0.3	0.4	73.9	73.5	9.07	1.00	—
7	HP	31.40	38	19.8	19.8	6.6	10.7	58.4	47.7	1.43	1.91	28.7
6	HP	27.77	39	18.0	18.0	5.4	10.4	62.1	51.7	1.34	1.72	13.5

(Continued)



**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

ROMANIA

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
26/11/2000	65.3	0.809	5.23	2	0.717	3.53	44.9	2.23	2.88
28/11/2004	58.5	0.749	3.98	2	0.703	3.36	39.8	2.52	2.94
30/11/2008	39.2	0.729	3.69	3	0.723	3.60	34.4	2.90	3.25
09/12/2012	41.7	0.607	2.54	2	0.527	2.12	66.3	1.51	1.81
11/12/2016	39.4	0.734	3.76	2	0.718	3.54	46.8	2.14	2.84

*Note:* For Romania in 1996, vote and seat calculations are done for blocs.

*Note:* For Romania in 2012, vote and seat calculations are done by electoral alliances.

SAN MARINO

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
11/03/1945	57.4	0.449	1.81	2	0.444	1.80	66.7	1.50	1.65
27/02/1949	67.5	0.488	1.95	2	0.486	1.95	58.3	1.71	1.83
16/09/1951	62.6	0.677	3.10	3	0.673	3.06	43.3	2.31	2.68
14/08/1955	70.1	0.687	3.19	3	0.681	3.13	38.3	2.61	2.87
13/09/1959	85.7	0.692	3.24	3	0.686	3.19	45.0	2.22	2.71
13/09/1964	84.0	0.685	3.17	3	0.674	3.07	48.3	2.07	2.57
07/09/1969	79.5	0.707	3.42	3	0.696	3.28	45.0	2.22	2.75
08/09/1974	79.7	0.743	3.89	3	0.723	3.61	41.7	2.40	3.01
28/05/1978	79.0	0.724	3.62	2	0.708	3.43	43.3	2.31	2.87
29/05/1983	79.7	0.721	3.58	2	0.709	3.44	43.3	2.31	2.87
29/05/1988	81.1	0.692	3.25	2	0.676	3.09	45.0	2.22	2.66
13/05/1993	80.0	0.728	3.68	3	0.716	3.52	43.3	2.31	2.91
31/05/1998	75.3	0.732	3.73	3	0.726	3.65	41.7	2.40	3.03
10/06/2001	73.8	0.717	3.53	3	0.716	3.52	41.7	2.40	2.96
04/06/2006	71.8	0.753	4.05	2	0.742	3.88	35.0	2.86	3.37
09/11/2008	68.5	0.764	4.24	2	0.748	3.97	36.7	2.73	3.35
11/11/2012	63.8	0.847	6.52	1	0.809	5.23	35.0	2.86	4.04
20/11-04/12/2016	59.7	0.857	6.99	2	0.834	6.01	23.3	4.29	5.15

*Note:* For calculation purposes, the small amount of direct votes for each coalition in 2008 and 2012 are redistributed proportionally to the respective component parties.

SERBIA

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
23/12/2000	57.7	0.536	2.16	1	0.471	1.89	70.4	1.42	1.66
28/12/2003	58.7	0.844	6.42	2	0.792	4.80	32.8	3.05	3.92
21/01/2007	60.6	0.820	5.55	3	0.780	4.55	32.4	3.09	3.82
11/05/2008	61.3	0.731	3.72	2	0.708	3.43	40.8	2.45	2.94
06/05/2012	57.8	0.842	6.32	3	0.794	4.87	29.2	3.42	4.15
16/03/2014	53.1	0.716	3.53	1	0.558	2.26	63.2	1.58	1.92
24/04/2016	56.1	0.720	3.57	1	0.690	3.23	52.4	1.91	2.57

SLOVAKIA

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
08-09/06/1990	95.4	0.829	5.85	2	0.799	4.98	32.0	3.13	4.05
05-06/06/1992	84.2	0.837	6.14	1	0.702	3.36	46.3	2.16	2.76
30/09-01/10/1994	75.7	0.830	5.90	1	0.733	4.41	40.7	2.46	3.43

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
5	HP	19.44	32	20.1	20.1	8.3	13.3	69.3	56.0	1.85	2.71	30.6
4	HP	20.24	31	12.5	12.5	3.0	5.2	73.5	68.3	1.18	2.33	19.4
4	HP	23.60	22	6.1	6.1	2.0	3.1	68.6	65.5	1.01	1.75	20.2
4	EM	7.15	12	9.6	3.0	7.7	4.8	79.9	75.1	4.88	1.19	20.9
6	HP	18.83	24	8.5	8.5	1.3	2.3	67.8	65.5	2.23	2.30	21.7

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
2	EM	6.00	13	0.7	0.0	0.7	0.0	100.0	100.0	2.00	$\infty$	—
2	EM	8.13	18	0.6	0.0	0.6	0.0	100.0	100.0	1.40	$\infty$	8.3
4	HP	17.34	9	1.0	0.0	0.3	1.0	73.3	72.3	1.44	1.38	6.3
4	HP	19.30	33	1.4	0.0	0.1	0.2	70.0	69.8	1.21	1.19	10.4
4	HP	17.55	16	1.4	0.0	0.7	1.4	71.7	70.3	1.69	1.78	17.3
4	HP	15.86	46	2.0	0.0	1.5	0.8	71.7	70.9	2.07	1.40	5.0
4	HP	18.04	60	1.8	1.2	1.0	1.5	68.3	66.8	1.93	1.27	8.4
4	HP	21.06	64	3.5	0.9	2.1	3.5	66.7	63.2	1.67	1.67	7.7
5	HP	19.44	50	3.2	0.7	1.0	2.6	70.0	67.4	1.63	2.00	22.3
4	HP	19.49	36	2.0	0.0	1.2	1.8	68.3	66.5	1.73	1.67	7.9
4	HP	17.00	38	2.8	2.5	1.9	2.2	75.0	72.8	1.50	2.25	7.7
6	HP	19.95	57	1.9	0.0	1.9	1.6	66.7	65.1	1.86	1.27	12.9
6	HP	21.29	49	1.1	0.0	0.8	0.9	65.0	64.1	1.79	1.27	6.3
5	HP	20.53	33	1.0	0.0	0.2	1.0	66.7	65.7	1.67	1.25	5.8
5	HP	25.22	53	3.6	0.0	2.1	3.6	68.3	64.7	1.05	2.86	21.8
7	HP	25.14	25	4.0	0.0	4.6	2.4	66.7	64.3	1.22	2.57	5.4
8	HP	34.00	24	8.3	4.7	5.4	7.7	51.7	44.0	2.10	1.43	27.8
8	HP	46.08	23	26.9	5.7	11.2	20.0	41.7	21.7	1.27	1.10	26.2

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
4	EM	5.59	33	6.0	6.0	4.7	5.4	85.2	79.8	4.76	1.61	—
6	HP	32.26	66	14.1	14.1	4.8	8.0	54.0	46.0	1.55	1.43	42.7
6	HP	30.76	128	11.2	8.9	3.8	6.7	58.0	51.3	1.27	1.36	20.0
5	HP	20.31	57	3.7	1.6	1.5	2.6	72.0	69.4	1.31	2.60	19.8
7	HP	34.48	82	12.8	12.4	4.0	7.7	56.0	48.3	1.09	1.52	15.1
5	MM	8.32	42	19.9	19.9	13.2	16.9	80.8	63.9	3.59	2.32	32.4
7	MM	15.37	109	4.0	3.6	2.7	3.0	64.0	61.0	4.52	1.32	11.9

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
7	HP	33.86	18	7.7	7.7	2.7	4.2	52.7	48.5	1.55	1.41	—
5	HP	18.06	27	23.8	23.8	9.0	18.6	70.6	52.0	2.40	1.67	52.8
7	HP	26.17	73	13.0	13.0	5.7	7.3	52.7	45.4	3.39	1.06	23.3

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

*SLOVAKIA*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
25-26/09/1998	84.2	0.813	5.33	2	0.790	4.75	28.7	3.49	4.12
20-21/09/2002	70.1	0.887	8.86	2	0.837	6.12	24.0	4.17	5.14
17/06/2006	54.7	0.836	6.11	2	0.792	4.81	33.3	3.00	3.91
12/06/2010	58.8	0.819	5.54	2	0.750	4.01	41.3	2.42	3.21
10/03/2012	59.1	0.771	4.36	1	0.653	2.88	55.3	1.81	2.34
05/03/2016	59.8	0.863	7.31	1	0.824	5.67	32.7	3.06	4.37

*Note:* The 1990 and 1992 elections were to the Slovak National Council within then-Czechoslovakia.

*SLOVENIA*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
06/12/1992	85.7	0.882	8.46	1	0.849	6.61	24.4	4.09	5.35
10/11/1996	73.7	0.842	6.34	3	0.819	5.53	27.8	3.60	4.57
15/10/2000	70.3	0.805	5.14	2	0.794	4.86	37.8	2.65	3.75
03/10/2004	60.6	0.832	5.96	2	0.796	4.90	32.2	3.10	4.00
21/09/2008	63.1	0.798	4.94	2	0.774	4.43	32.2	3.10	3.77
04/12/2011	65.6	0.820	5.54	2	0.788	4.73	31.1	3.21	3.97
13/07/2014	51.7	0.812	5.33	2	0.759	4.15	40.0	2.50	3.33
03/06/2018	52.1	0.880	8.34	1	0.853	6.81	27.8	3.60	5.21

*SPAIN*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
15/06/1977	78.8	0.768	4.31	2	0.657	2.92	47.1	2.12	2.52
01/03/1979	68.3	0.766	4.28	2	0.645	2.81	48.0	2.08	2.45
28/10/1982	79.9	0.686	3.19	2	0.572	2.34	57.7	1.73	2.04
22/06/1986	70.5	0.722	3.60	2	0.626	2.67	52.6	1.90	2.29
29/10/1989	69.7	0.745	3.92	2	0.651	2.86	50.0	2.00	2.43
06/06/1993	76.4	0.712	3.47	2	0.626	2.67	45.4	2.20	2.44
03/03/1996	77.4	0.688	3.21	2	0.633	2.72	44.6	2.24	2.48
12/03/2000	68.7	0.669	3.02	2	0.596	2.48	52.3	1.91	2.20
14/03/2004	75.7	0.661	2.95	2	0.600	2.50	46.9	2.13	2.32
09/03/2008	73.8	0.637	2.75	2	0.572	2.34	48.3	2.07	2.21
20/11/2011	68.9	0.700	3.34	2	0.615	2.60	53.1	1.88	2.24
20/12/2015	73.2	0.801	5.04	3	0.757	4.11	35.1	2.85	3.48
26/06/2016	69.8	0.773	4.41	3	0.737	3.80	39.1	2.55	3.18

*Basque Country*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
09/03/1980	59.8	0.786	4.68	2	0.749	3.98	41.7	2.40	3.19
26/02/1984	68.5	0.733	3.75	2	0.717	3.53	42.7	2.34	2.94
30/11/1986	69.6	0.824	5.70	4	0.809	5.23	25.3	3.95	4.59
28/10/1990	61.0	0.820	5.54	3	0.810	5.26	29.3	3.41	4.33

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	33.88	34	5.8	5.8	1.7	3.4	56.7	53.3	1.02	1.83	20.2
7	HP	46.51	25	18.2	18.2	4.5	8.1	42.7	34.6	1.29	1.12	37.5
6	HP	32.07	48	12.0	12.0	4.2	6.5	54.0	47.5	1.61	1.55	27.8
6	HP	23.53	59	16.0	16.0	6.5	9.8	60.0	50.2	2.21	1.27	26.1
6	MM	12.86	25	19.3	19.3	10.9	12.8	66.0	53.2	5.19	1.00	18.5
8	HP	38.18	52	13.2	13.2	4.4	6.3	46.7	40.4	2.33	1.11	31.9

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
8	HP	49.94	50	17.5	17.5	0.9	3.1	41.1	38.0	1.47	1.07	—
7	HP	39.94	109	11.4	11.4	0.8	2.5	48.9	46.4	1.32	1.19	32.4
8	HP	30.24	46	4.7	3.7	1.6	1.2	53.3	52.1	2.43	1.27	27.4
7	HP	33.21	61	11.7	11.7	3.1	5.9	57.8	51.9	1.26	2.30	21.6
7	HP	30.03	61	7.9	7.9	1.8	3.7	63.3	59.6	1.04	3.11	33.4
7	HP	32.58	68	8.5	7.6	2.6	5.2	60.0	54.8	1.08	2.60	40.0
7	HP	24.90	67	12.7	12.7	5.5	8.1	63.3	55.2	1.71	2.10	51.8
9	HP	49.18	102	12.1	12.1	2.8	4.6	42.2	37.6	1.92	1.30	22.2

more institutionalized

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	15.43	19	16.6	5.5	12.3	15.7	80.8	65.1	1.40	7.38	—
6	HP	14.61	29	17.8	6.2	13.0	17.0	82.5	65.5	1.39	12.10	12.1
5	MM	9.89	36	13.4	3.2	9.3	13.1	88.0	74.9	1.91	8.83	41.8
5	MM	12.66	33	12.2	6.1	8.0	11.9	82.8	70.9	1.75	5.53	11.7
5	HP	14.30	37	14.3	6.1	10.1	14.5	80.3	65.8	1.65	5.89	9.6
4	HP	14.57	37	12.2	5.4	6.7	12.2	85.7	73.5	1.13	7.83	6.3
4	HP	15.08	63	8.4	1.7	5.4	7.7	84.9	77.2	1.11	6.71	5.6
5	MM	11.83	45	8.7	3.2	7.1	8.1	88.0	79.9	1.46	8.33	9.1
5	HP	13.29	33	7.8	2.9	3.6	7.5	89.1	81.6	1.11	14.80	9.7
3	HP	12.10	30	7.9	2.7	3.9	7.5	92.3	84.8	1.10	15.40	4.6
5	MM	12.18	30	11.3	2.6	7.9	10.2	84.6	74.4	1.69	6.88	15.4
6	HP	26.66	ngf	10.4	3.3	6.2	9.8	60.9	51.1	1.37	1.30	36.8
6	HP	23.13	125	7.8	2.5	5.8	7.3	63.4	56.1	1.61	1.20	5.3

ngf = no government formed

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
6	HP	23.22	31	7.8	4.0	3.6	5.3	60.0	54.7	2.27	1.22	—
5	HP	20.24	45	3.0	2.9	0.7	2.9	68.0	65.1	1.68	1.73	16.7
7	HP	39.05	88	6.0	1.9	3.2	2.2	48.0	45.8	1.12	1.31	25.3
7	HP	37.17	96	5.8	3.9	0.8	2.2	50.6	48.4	1.38	1.23	12.7

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

<i>Basque Country</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
23/10/1994	59.7	0.815	5.41	3	0.823	5.59	29.3	3.41	4.50
25/10/1998	70.0	0.807	5.19	4	0.799	4.96	28.0	3.57	4.27
13/05/2001	79.0	0.719	3.56	3	0.702	3.35	44.0	2.27	2.81
17/04/2005	68.0	0.750	4.00	3	0.737	3.80	38.7	2.59	3.19
01/03/2009	64.7	0.730	3.71	2	0.695	3.28	40.0	2.50	2.89
21/10/2012	64.0	0.766	4.28	3	0.729	3.68	36.0	2.78	3.23
25/09/2016	60.0	0.766	4.27	2	0.753	4.04	37.3	2.68	3.36
<i>Catalonia</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
20/03/1980	61.4	0.814	5.36	3	0.776	4.46	31.9	3.14	3.80
29/04/1984	64.3	0.675	3.08	2	0.614	2.59	53.3	1.88	2.23
29/05/1988	59.4	0.686	3.19	2	0.633	2.73	51.1	1.96	2.34
15/03/1992	54.9	0.689	3.22	2	0.631	2.71	51.9	1.93	2.32
19/11/1995	63.6	0.730	3.70	2	0.708	3.42	44.4	2.25	2.84
17/10/1999	59.2	0.691	3.24	2	0.663	2.97	41.5	2.41	2.69
16/11/2003	62.5	0.756	4.10	3	0.741	3.87	34.1	2.93	3.40
01/11/2006	56.0	0.779	4.52	2	0.755	4.08	35.6	2.81	3.45
28/11/2010	58.8	0.777	4.49	2	0.716	3.52	45.9	2.18	2.85
25/11/2012	69.8	0.827	5.78	1	0.783	4.60	37.0	2.70	3.65
27/09/2015	77.4	0.771	4.36	2	0.722	3.60	45.9	2.18	2.89
21/12/2017	81.9	0.813	5.33	3	0.785	4.64	27.4	3.65	4.14
<i>SWEDEN</i>									
<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
19/09/1948	82.7	0.701	3.35	2	0.673	3.06	48.7	2.05	2.56
21/09/1952	79.1	0.695	3.28	2	0.677	3.09	47.8	2.09	2.59
26/09/1956	79.8	0.704	3.37	3	0.686	3.18	45.9	2.18	2.68
01/06/1958	77.4	0.698	3.31	3	0.684	3.16	48.1	2.08	2.62
18/09/1960	85.9	0.693	3.26	3	0.679	3.12	49.1	2.04	2.58
20/09/1964	83.9	0.708	3.42	2	0.692	3.25	48.5	2.06	2.66
15/09/1968	89.3	0.686	3.18	2	0.653	2.88	53.6	1.86	2.37
20/09/1970	88.3	0.713	3.49	3	0.698	3.31	46.6	2.15	2.73
16/09/1973	90.8	0.714	3.50	2	0.701	3.35	44.6	2.24	2.80
19/09/1976	91.8	0.720	3.58	3	0.709	3.44	43.6	2.30	2.87
16/09/1979	90.7	0.725	3.63	3	0.713	3.49	44.1	2.27	2.88
19/09/1982	91.4	0.706	3.40	3	0.680	3.13	47.6	2.10	2.62
15/09/1985	89.9	0.712	3.48	2	0.704	3.38	45.6	2.19	2.79
18/09/1988	86.0	0.742	3.87	2	0.727	3.67	44.7	2.24	2.95
15/09/1991	86.7	0.777	4.49	2	0.765	4.26	39.5	2.53	3.39
18/09/1994	86.8	0.725	3.64	2	0.715	3.51	46.1	2.17	2.84
20/09/1998	81.4	0.779	4.53	2	0.767	4.29	37.5	2.66	3.48
15/09/2002	80.1	0.779	4.54	2	0.763	4.23	41.3	2.42	3.33
17/09/2006	82.0	0.785	4.66	2	0.759	4.15	37.2	2.68	3.42
19/09/2010	84.6	0.791	4.78	2	0.780	4.54	32.1	3.12	3.83
14/09/2014	85.8	0.815	5.41	2	0.800	4.99	32.4	3.09	4.04
09/09/2018	87.2	0.827	5.79	3	0.822	5.63	28.7	3.49	4.56

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
7	HP	39.50	67	4.6	0.3	-0.5	-1.6	45.3	46.9	1.83	1.09	16.5
7	HP	35.71	65	4.4	0.7	0.0	1.2	49.3	48.1	1.31	1.14	8.2
5	HP	18.76	60	3.5	0.6	1.3	3.5	69.3	65.8	1.74	1.46	8.0
5	HP	23.31	67	3.9	1.2	0.0	1.3	62.7	61.4	1.61	1.20	10.1
4	HP	19.68	65	7.3	1.3	1.4	4.0	73.3	69.3	1.20	1.92	17.5
4	HP	23.55	53	8.3	7.7	1.4	4.4	64.0	59.6	1.29	1.31	19.0
5	HP	25.32	60	4.6	4.2	-0.3	2.4	61.3	58.9	1.56	1.64	18.2

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
5	HP	30.39	35	9.7	8.1	3.9	5.7	56.3	50.6	1.30	1.32	—
5	MM	12.09	32	6.9	5.0	6.3	6.0	83.7	77.3	1.76	3.73	32.0
6	MM	13.35	24	6.5	2.8	5.1	6.2	82.2	76.0	1.64	4.67	6.1
5	MM	13.05	25	6.9	4.7	5.2	6.9	81.5	74.6	1.75	3.64	6.3
5	HP	19.00	27	3.2	0.9	3.0	3.1	69.6	66.5	1.76	2.00	11.9
4	HP	17.38	30	3.9	2.9	3.5	3.8	80.0	76.2	1.08	4.33	15.1
5	HP	25.51	30	3.2	1.3	2.9	2.6	65.2	62.6	1.10	1.83	15.2
6	HP	26.29	23	4.6	2.4	3.4	3.4	63.0	59.6	1.30	1.76	7.5
7	HP	19.03	25	9.0	7.1	6.3	8.2	66.7	58.5	2.21	1.56	17.7
7	HP	28.96	26	8.6	5.9	5.8	7.5	52.6	45.1	2.38	1.05	17.3
6	HP	19.47	105	6.7	3.8	6.2	6.7	64.4	57.7	2.48	1.56	15.4
7	HP	33.68	144	7.6	1.2	1.9	5.4	52.6	47.2	1.09	1.06	12.1

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
5	HP	15.70	39	5.3	0.1	2.6	4.7	73.5	68.8	1.96	1.90	—
5	HP	16.12	1	3.2	0.1	1.8	2.6	73.0	70.4	1.90	1.87	3.8
5	HP	17.21	1	3.8	0.1	1.3	2.6	71.0	68.4	1.83	1.38	3.3
5	HP	16.42	1	3.0	0.0	1.9	1.9	67.6	65.7	2.47	1.18	7.3
5	HP	15.87	13	2.7	0.1	1.3	1.0	66.3	65.3	2.85	1.03	3.7
5	HP	16.74	14	3.8	1.8	1.2	2.2	66.5	64.3	2.69	1.27	2.6
4	EM	13.35	14	4.2	1.5	3.5	3.7	69.5	65.8	3.38	1.16	5.7
5	HP	17.68	9	2.4	2.3	1.3	1.7	66.9	65.2	2.30	1.22	7.2
5	HP	18.57	45	2.3	2.3	1.0	1.6	70.3	68.7	1.73	1.76	8.5
5	HP	19.42	15	1.8	1.7	0.9	1.4	68.2	66.8	1.77	1.56	3.0
5	HP	19.50	26	2.2	2.2	0.9	1.5	65.0	63.5	2.11	1.14	6.5
5	HP	16.41	19	3.8	3.8	2.0	3.0	72.2	69.2	1.93	1.54	7.9
5	HP	18.40	19	1.5	1.5	0.5	1.0	67.4	66.4	2.09	1.49	8.4
6	HP	20.30	16	3.0	3.0	1.1	1.6	63.6	62.0	2.36	1.50	10.7
7	HP	25.76	19	4.5	3.7	1.3	2.2	62.4	60.2	1.73	2.58	15.0
7	HP	18.91	19	2.2	2.2	0.8	1.3	69.0	67.7	2.01	2.96	11.3
7	HP	26.80	16	2.6	2.6	0.9	1.7	61.0	59.3	1.60	1.91	15.6
7	HP	24.85	36	3.0	3.0	1.5	2.0	57.0	55.0	2.62	1.15	13.9
7	HP	26.04	18	5.7	5.7	2.0	3.7	65.0	61.3	1.34	3.34	15.4
8	HP	30.83	16	2.2	1.4	1.5	2.1	62.8	60.7	1.05	4.28	8.6
8	HP	33.74	19	4.1	4.1	1.4	2.1	56.4	54.3	1.35	1.71	10.7
8	HP	40.17		1.1	1.1	0.4	0.6	48.7	48.1	1.43	1.13	11.8

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

*SWITZERLAND*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>6</sub>P</i>
26/10/1947	72.4	0.812	5.33	3	0.799	4.97	26.8	3.73	4.35
28/10/1951	71.2	0.804	5.09	3	0.792	4.80	26.0	3.84	4.32
30/10/1955	70.1	0.800	4.99	3	0.788	4.71	27.0	3.70	4.20
25/10/1959	68.5	0.801	5.04	3	0.790	4.75	26.0	3.84	4.30
27/10/1963	66.1	0.800	5.01	3	0.791	4.78	26.5	3.77	4.28
29/10/1967	65.7	0.820	5.55	3	0.805	5.13	25.5	3.92	4.53
31/10/1971	56.9	0.836	6.08	3	0.818	5.49	24.5	4.08	4.79
26/10/1975	52.4	0.828	5.80	3	0.800	5.00	27.5	3.64	4.32
21/10/1979	48.0	0.819	5.52	3	0.804	5.11	25.5	3.92	4.52
23/10/1983	48.9	0.834	6.03	3	0.810	5.26	27.0	3.70	4.48
18/10/1987	46.5	0.854	6.83	3	0.826	5.76	25.5	3.92	4.84
20/10/1991	46.0	0.865	7.38	3	0.849	6.62	22.0	4.55	5.58
22/10/1995	42.2	0.854	6.86	3	0.822	5.60	27.0	3.70	4.65
24/10/1999	43.3	0.822	5.62	4	0.806	5.16	25.5	3.92	4.54
19/10/2003	45.2	0.817	5.47	3	0.800	4.99	27.5	3.64	4.31
21/10/2007	48.3	0.822	5.60	3	0.799	4.97	31.0	3.23	4.10
23/10/2011	48.5	0.843	6.37	3	0.821	5.57	27.0	3.70	4.64
18/10/2015	48.4	0.828	5.82	3	0.797	4.93	32.5	3.08	4.00

*Note:* Women were not granted the right to vote in or stand for national elections in Switzerland until 07/02/1971.

*TURKEY*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>6</sub>P</i>
14/05/1950	89.3	0.536	2.16	2	0.250	1.33	85.4	1.17	1.25
02/05/1954	88.6	0.541	2.18	2	0.132	1.15	93.0	1.08	1.11
27/10/1957	76.6	0.595	2.47	2	0.432	1.76	69.5	1.44	1.60
15/10/1961	81.4	0.706	3.40	2	0.694	3.27	38.4	2.60	2.94
10/10/1965	71.3	0.631	2.71	2	0.619	2.62	53.3	1.88	2.25
12/10/1969	64.3	0.700	3.34	2	0.573	2.34	56.9	1.76	2.05
14/10/1973	66.8	0.768	4.31	2	0.699	3.32	41.1	2.43	2.88
05/06/1977	70.4	0.680	3.13	2	0.596	2.47	47.3	2.11	2.29
06/11/1983	92.3	0.649	2.85	3	0.603	2.52	52.9	1.89	2.21
29/11/1987	93.3	0.757	4.12	3	0.513	2.05	64.9	1.54	1.80
20/10/1991	83.9	0.786	4.67	4	0.763	4.21	39.6	2.53	3.37
24/12/1995	85.2	0.837	6.15	3	0.773	4.41	28.7	3.48	3.95
18/04/1999	86.9	0.853	6.79	3	0.795	4.87	24.7	4.04	4.46
03/11/2002	79.0	0.816	5.43	2	0.460	1.85	66.0	1.52	1.68
22/07/2007	84.3	0.713	3.48	2	0.556	2.25	62.0	1.61	1.93
12/06/2011	87.2	0.663	2.97	2	0.573	2.34	59.5	1.68	2.01
07/06/2015	83.9	0.727	3.66	3	0.680	3.13	46.9	2.13	2.63
01/11/2015	85.2	0.665	2.99	2	0.592	2.45	57.6	1.74	2.09
24/06/2018	86.2	0.731	3.72	2	0.675	3.07	49.2	2.03	2.55

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
8	HP	36.38	46	5.8	0.5	3.8	2.3	51.5	49.2	1.08	1.09	—
7	HP	35.51	46	4.1	1.4	2.0	1.0	51.0	50.0	1.04	1.02	4.0
8	HP	34.36	46	3.6	1.0	0.0	2.2	52.5	50.3	1.06	1.06	2.3
7	HP	35.14	53	3.5	1.0	−0.4	1.9	52.0	50.1	1.00	1.09	1.5
8	HP	35.13	46	3.2	1.8	−0.1	1.5	52.0	50.5	1.04	1.06	1.6
7	HP	38.22	46	4.5	2.3	2.0	3.3	50.0	46.7	1.04	1.09	6.0
8	HP	41.45	38	5.5	2.0	2.8	2.9	47.5	44.6	1.07	1.05	7.6
8	HP	36.25	45	7.2	3.6	2.6	3.9	51.0	47.1	1.17	1.02	5.2
6	HP	38.07	60	4.3	2.2	1.1	2.5	51.0	48.5	1.00	1.16	6.4
8	HP	38.40	57	7.4	3.4	3.6	4.2	50.5	46.3	1.15	1.15	6.1
7	HP	42.91	52	9.2	2.3	2.6	3.6	46.5	42.9	1.21	1.02	8.6
9	HP	51.64	45	8.3	4.0	1.0	3.5	43.0	39.5	1.05	1.17	7.4
7	HP	40.88	52	7.5	4.2	5.2	7.5	49.5	42.0	1.20	1.32	6.3
6	HP	38.44	52	5.9	1.5	2.5	1.4	47.5	46.1	1.16	1.02	9.7
6	HP	36.18	52	4.8	2.1	0.9	3.6	53.5	49.9	1.06	1.44	8.0
6	HP	34.29	52	5.7	3.2	2.0	4.0	52.5	48.5	1.44	1.39	6.5
7	HP	40.66	52	7.3	4.5	0.4	4.7	50.0	45.3	1.17	1.53	10.1
7	HP	33.28	52	8.1	4.2	3.1	5.8	54.0	48.2	1.51	1.30	5.1

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
2	EM	1.94	5	30.2	0.0	30.2	4.8	99.6	94.8	6.03	69.00	—
2	EM	0.81	12	35.4	0.6	35.4	5.7	98.7	93.0	16.23	6.20	4.2
2	MM	5.37	5	21.6	0.1	21.6	10.8	98.7	89.0	2.38	44.50	11.8
4	HP	20.13	36	2.8	0.8	1.7	2.0	73.5	71.5	1.09	2.43	20.5
5	EM	12.23	17	3.2	3.2	0.4	1.5	83.1	81.6	1.79	4.32	28.6
3	MM	10.09	22	14.9	2.7	10.4	14.8	88.7	73.9	1.79	9.53	11.5
4	HP	19.55	103	11.1	1.9	7.8	11.1	74.2	63.1	1.24	3.10	29.6
4	HP	13.01	16	11.0	2.1	5.9	11.0	89.3	78.3	1.13	7.88	18.2
3	MM	11.87	48	7.8	1.1	7.8	6.6	82.2	75.6	1.81	1.65	—
3	MM	7.20	31	28.6	19.8	28.6	25.9	86.9	61.0	2.95	1.58	38.5
5	HP	25.45	41	14.1	0.5	12.6	14.1	65.1	51.0	1.55	1.31	18.1
5	HP	31.43	79	17.0	14.4	7.3	12.6	53.2	40.6	1.17	1.02	21.5
5	HP	36.66	52	18.7	18.3	2.5	8.0	48.2	40.2	1.05	1.16	21.2
2	MM	6.29	25	45.3	45.3	31.7	44.7	98.4	53.7	2.04	∞	41.4
4	MM	8.55	45	15.4	13.0	15.4	14.9	82.4	67.5	3.04	1.58	18.6
4	MM	9.49	31	9.7	4.6	9.7	8.2	84.0	75.8	2.42	2.55	9.7
4	HP	16.62	ngf	7.5	4.7	6.0	5.1	70.9	65.8	1.95	1.65	10.7
4	MM	10.38	23	8.1	2.5	8.1	7.2	82.0	74.8	2.37	2.27	9.2
5	HP	n.a.	n.a.	8.3	2.0	6.6	8.3	73.5	65.2	2.02	2.18	11.9

ngf = no government formed

(Continued)



APPENDIX TABLE 2.1 (Continued)

UNITED KINGDOM

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
05/07/1945	72.8	0.606	2.54	2	0.515	2.06	61.4	1.63	1.84
23/02/1950	83.9	0.591	2.44	2	0.518	2.08	50.4	1.98	2.03
25/10/1951	82.6	0.531	2.13	2	0.513	2.05	51.4	1.95	2.00
26/04/1955	76.8	0.537	2.16	2	0.506	2.02	54.8	1.83	1.92
08/10/1959	78.7	0.561	2.28	2	0.497	1.99	57.9	1.73	1.86
15/10/1964	77.2	0.605	2.53	2	0.514	2.06	50.3	1.99	2.02
31/03/1966	76.0	0.587	2.42	2	0.505	2.02	57.8	1.73	1.88
18/06/1970	72.2	0.593	2.46	2	0.516	2.07	52.4	1.91	1.99
28/02/1974	78.9	0.680	3.13	3	0.555	2.25	47.4	2.11	2.18
10/10/1974	72.9	0.683	3.15	3	0.557	2.26	50.2	1.99	2.13
03/05/1979	76.3	0.652	2.87	2	0.534	2.15	53.4	1.87	2.01
09/06/1983	72.8	0.679	3.12	3	0.521	2.09	61.1	1.64	1.86
11/06/1987	75.4	0.676	3.08	3	0.542	2.18	57.8	1.73	1.95
09/04/1992	77.8	0.674	3.06	3	0.559	2.27	51.6	1.94	2.10
01/05/1997	71.6	0.687	3.20	3	0.528	2.12	63.6	1.57	1.85
07/06/2001	59.6	0.679	3.12	3	0.539	2.17	62.5	1.60	1.88
05/05/2005	61.6	0.722	3.59	3	0.594	2.47	55.0	1.82	2.14
06/05/2010	65.8	0.731	3.72	3	0.611	2.57	47.2	2.12	2.34
07/05/2015	66.1	0.746	3.93	2	0.605	2.53	50.9	1.96	2.25
08/06/2017	68.7	0.653	2.88	2	0.595	2.47	48.9	2.04	2.26

*Note:* Turnout figures consist only of valid votes counted until 1959. Beginning with the 1964 election, the turnout figure provided included both valid and invalid votes.

Northern Ireland

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
14/06/1945	70.3	0.693	3.25	2	0.556	2.25	63.5	1.58	1.91
19/02/1949	79.3	0.530	2.13	2	0.462	1.86	71.2	1.41	1.63
22/10/1953	60.2	0.716	3.52	1	0.445	1.80	73.1	1.37	1.58
20/03/1958	67.1	0.750	4.01	2	0.469	1.88	71.2	1.41	1.64
31/05/1962	66.0	0.672	3.05	3	0.535	2.15	65.4	1.53	1.84
25/11/1965	57.6	0.598	2.49	2	0.487	1.95	69.2	1.44	1.70
24/02/1969	71.9	0.725	3.64	2	0.501	2.00	69.2	1.44	1.72
28/06/1973	56.1	0.790	4.76	2	0.752	4.03	39.7	2.52	3.27
01/05/1975*	65.1	0.823	5.65	2	0.822	5.62	24.4	4.11	4.86
20/10/1982	63.5	0.803	5.07	3	0.763	4.23	33.3	3.00	3.62
30/05/1996**	64.5	0.829	5.84	4	0.812	5.31	27.3	3.67	4.49
25/06/1998	69.9	0.833	6.00	4	0.815	5.40	25.9	3.86	4.63
26/11/2003	63.1	0.797	4.92	4	0.780	4.54	27.8	3.60	4.07
07/03/2007	62.9	0.792	4.81	3	0.767	4.30	33.3	3.00	3.65
05/05/2011	54.5	0.793	4.84	2	0.760	4.16	35.2	2.84	3.50
05/05/2016	54.9	0.819	5.54	2	0.768	4.32	35.2	2.84	3.58
02/03/2017	64.8	0.803	5.07	2	0.774	4.43	31.1	3.21	3.82

\* Election to constitutional convention.

\*\* Election to peace forum.

\*\*\* *Note:* The post-1998 election government did not actually form fully until November 1999, due to difficulties with the peace process.

\*\*\*\* *Note:* Devolution still suspended.

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
2	MM	7.95	22	14.3	0.0	13.7	6.7	94.2	87.5	1.87	17.50	—
2	MM	10.32	5	8.6	0.7	4.3	8.6	98.1	89.5	1.06	33.11	3.9
2	MM	9.97	9	3.4	0.2	3.4	1.8	98.6	96.8	1.09	49.17	7.3
2	MM	9.14	20	5.1	0.5	5.1	2.6	98.7	96.1	1.25	46.17	2.4
2	MM	8.37	8	8.5	0.7	8.5	5.7	98.9	93.2	1.41	43.00	3.4
2	MM	10.23	1	11.1	1.3	6.2	11.1	98.6	87.5	1.04	33.78	6.0
2	MM	8.53	5	9.8	1.1	9.8	8.0	97.9	89.9	1.44	21.08	4.3
2	MM	9.86	1	8.6	1.0	6.0	8.6	98.1	89.5	1.15	48.00	6.1
3	HP	11.83	5	19.3	0.7	10.2	19.1	94.2	75.1	1.01	21.21	14.9
3	MM	11.25	8	18.9	1.0	10.9	18.7	93.8	75.1	1.15	21.31	3.5
2	MM	10.02	2	15.2	1.4	9.5	14.9	95.7	80.8	1.26	24.45	8.5
3	MM	8.13	2	24.2	0.9	18.7	23.2	93.2	70.0	1.90	9.09	12.1
3	MM	9.19	2	20.9	0.8	15.5	20.1	93.1	73.0	1.64	10.41	3.6
3	MM	10.98	2	16.9	1.6	7.7	14.9	93.2	78.3	1.24	13.55	5.2
3	MM	7.72	6	21.5	6.6	20.4	14.7	88.6	73.9	2.54	3.59	12.7
3	MM	8.13	1	20.6	0.9	21.8	15.3	87.7	72.4	2.48	3.19	4.3
3	MM	11.13	1	20.4	5.4	19.8	18.0	85.6	67.6	1.79	3.18	6.4
3	HP	13.56	5	22.7	5.7	11.1	21.8	86.9	65.1	1.19	4.53	7.2
3	MM	12.42	1	24.0	0.9	14.0	19.3	86.6	67.3	1.43	4.14	17.8
3	HP	12.62	1	10.3	3.4	6.5	6.8	89.2	82.4	1.21	7.49	15.5

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
4	EM	8.22	34	23.6	4.6	13.1	23.2	82.7	59.5	3.30	5.00	—
3	EM	5.37	53	17.0	7.3	8.5	−1.0	88.5	89.5	4.11	4.50	30.2
3	MM	4.85	4	29.6	15.2	24.5	27.1	86.5	59.4	5.43	3.50	30.7
3	MM	5.42	n.c.	27.2	16.3	27.2	25.7	84.6	58.9	5.29	1.75	14.7
3	MM	7.44	n.c.	20.7	2.3	16.6	18.8	82.7	63.9	3.78	2.25	17.9
4	EM	6.00	11	22.1	2.7	10.1	19.2	86.5	67.3	4.00	4.50	16.6
5	MM	6.15	16	26.4	14.3	21.0	25.0	80.8	55.8	6.00	2.00	29.2
6	HP	24.28	187	8.8	4.8	3.9	6.2	64.1	57.9	1.63	2.38	52.5
6	HP	42.51	n.a.	7.4	2.6	−1.4	−3.3	46.2	49.5	1.12	1.21	9.3
5	HP	28.20	n.a.	11.1	5.3	3.6	7.6	60.3	52.7	1.24	1.50	30.3
6	HP	38.62	n.a.	7.9	2.4	3.1	6.1	49.1	43.0	1.25	1.14	19.6
6	HP	40.00	***	7.1	4.5	4.6	4.8	48.1	43.3	1.17	1.20	6.2
5	HP	32.79	****	6.4	2.5	2.1	4.4	52.8	48.4	1.11	1.13	15.9
5	HP	28.67	62	6.6	3.1	3.2	3.0	59.3	56.3	1.29	1.56	11.1
5	HP	26.96	11	6.8	2.2	5.2	5.1	62.0	56.9	1.31	1.81	6.1
5	HP	28.00	20	10.5	3.8	6.0	7.9	61.1	53.2	1.36	1.75	7.2
6	HP	30.52	ngf	6.5	1.8	3.0	5.1	61.1	56.0	1.04	2.25	6.3

n.c. = no change to ministry  
ngf = no government formed

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 2.1** (Continued)

*Scotland*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
06/05/1999	58.7	0.771	4.37	3	0.701	3.34	43.4	2.30	2.82
01/05/2003	49.4	0.823	5.64	3	0.764	4.24	38.8	2.58	3.41
03/05/2007	51.8	0.784	4.63	2	0.707	3.41	36.4	2.74	3.08
05/05/2011	50.4	0.717	3.53	2	0.616	2.61	53.5	1.87	2.24
05/05/2016	55.6	0.730	3.70	3	0.665	2.99	48.8	2.05	2.52

*Wales*

<i>Election</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
06/05/1999	46.2	0.738	3.82	3	0.669	3.03	46.7	2.14	2.59
01/05/2003	38.2	0.771	4.38	3	0.666	3.00	50.0	2.00	2.50
03/05/2007	43.7	0.804	5.09	3	0.700	3.33	43.3	2.31	2.82
05/05/2011	42.2	0.770	4.35	3	0.655	2.90	50.0	2.00	2.45
05/05/2016	45.3	0.798	4.95	3	0.679	3.11	48.3	2.07	2.59

*EUROPEAN  
UNION*

<i>Election(s)</i>	<i>TO</i>	<i>EFRG</i>	<i>ENEP</i>	<i>P15%V</i>	<i>PFRG</i>	<i>ENPP</i>	<i>1PSS</i>	<i>N∞P</i>	<i>N<sub>b</sub>P</i>
07-10/06/1979- 18/10/1981	63.0	0.804	5.11	2	0.803	5.08	28.3	3.53	4.30
14-17/06/1984- 10/06-19/07/1987	60.8	0.823	5.65	2	0.804	5.11	31.9	3.14	4.12
15-18/06/1989	58.5	0.827	5.77	2	0.801	5.03	34.7	2.88	3.95
09-12/06/1994- 17/09/1995- 13/10-20/10/1996	56.7	0.832	5.95	2	0.779	4.53	34.3	2.91	3.72
10-13/06/1999	49.8	0.777	4.48	2	0.759	4.15	37.2	2.69	3.42
10-13/06/2004- 20/05-25/11/2007	44.4	0.780	4.56	2	0.761	4.19	37.1	2.70	3.44
04-07/06/2009- 14/04/2013	42.7	0.793	4.83	2	0.778	4.51	36.1	2.77	3.64
22-25/05/2014	42.6	0.849	6.62	2	0.814	5.38	29.4	3.40	4.39

*Note:* Duration in days for government formation and investiture are calculated from the initial EP election for 1994, 2004, and 2009.

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
4	HP	18.90	13	10.6	4.5	9.8	9.6	70.5	60.9	1.60	1.94	–
6	HP	25.97	13	11.0	4.5	9.5	9.6	59.7	50.1	1.85	1.50	12.6
4	HP	21.68	13	13.0	10.6	5.4	11.9	72.1	60.2	1.02	2.71	15.9
4	MM	12.14	14	11.9	6.6	9.5	11.9	82.2	70.3	1.86	2.47	13.5
5	HP	15.30	12	8.3	4.5	7.1	8.3	72.9	64.6	2.03	1.29	15.3

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
4	HP	16.16	6	11.2	4.9	11.2	9.0	75.0	66.0	1.65	1.89	–
4	HP	15.00	6	13.7	3.5	13.4	13.7	70.0	56.3	2.50	1.09	11.1
4	HP	18.87	22	17.7	16.3	13.7	17.7	68.3	50.6	1.73	1.25	9.1
4	HP	14.50	7	14.7	14.7	13.1	13.9	73.3	59.4	2.14	1.27	9.7
4	HP	16.07	13	16.8	9.4	16.8	16.0	68.3	52.3	2.42	1.09	16.2

<i>P2%S</i>	<i>ED</i>	<i>ICD</i>	<i>F(+I)P</i>	<i>DISP</i>	<i>WV</i>	<i>SBLP</i>	<i>SB2P</i>	<i>2PSS</i>	<i>2PVS</i>	<i>SR1:2</i>	<i>SR2:3</i>	<i>TVOL</i>
7	HP	36.40	n.a.	12.6	6.3	1.0	–2.5	54.8	57.3	1.07	1.80	–
8	HP	34.82	n.a.	14.9	8.7	3.9	0.8	55.4	54.6	1.35	1.79	10.2
10	HP	32.82	n.a.	11.7	6.7	5.2	3.2	58.1	54.9	1.49	2.47	11.2
8	HP	29.74	225	11.2	10.1	6.8	9.3	63.3	54.0	1.19	3.35	16.7
7	HP	26.05	94	6.0	4.7	1.0	2.7	66.0	63.3	1.28	3.60	11.7
7	HP	26.37	163	8.8	2.9	1.3	3.0	64.7	61.7	1.34	2.19	5.5
7	HP	28.82	248	5.6	4.3	1.3	2.2	61.4	59.2	1.43	2.25	9.0
7	HP	37.97	161	9.4	8.3	5.0	5.9	54.9	49.0	1.16	2.73	14.3

# 3

## CLASSIFYING PARTY PATTERNS AND PARTY SYSTEMS

For each election from Chapter 2 one can indicate what will be called the “party pattern” based on that individual election. However, for there to be a “party system” the pattern must hold for a certain duration. Duration is a scholarly criterion when establishing (pre)dominant party systems, but not apparently other types of party systems. Such duration has been set at three elections by Sartori (1976: 199, if a stable system), but at four elections by Bogaards (2004) on Africa and by de Jager and du Toit (2013: 10), and even at five elections by Greene (2013: 25). There is also the issue of total years of dominance, often requiring 20 years (Abedi and Schneider 2010; Greene *ibid.*). However, predominance does place particular emphasis on durability. Consequently, for distinguishing a party system of *any* type a lesser duration should suffice: In this analysis the minimum duration is set at *three* consecutive elections provided that at least a full 10 years elapse between the first election instituting the party system and the first election after the end of the system (again, that election being at a minimum three elections after the first one) or 2018. This information about party patterns and party systems is provided at the start of each analysis in Part II.

Both party patterns and party systems (jointly, “party types”) are defined in terms of certain measures provided in Chapter 2: P2%S – the number of parties with 2 percent of the seats; 2PSS – two-party seat share; and sometimes SR1:2 and SR2:3 – the seat ratios of the first to second parties and the second to third parties. These measures classify five different types: one-party, two-party, two-and-a-half-party, moderately multi-party, and highly multi-party, although only the last four types have existed in democratic Europe. (There are thus a much smaller number of (actual) types than in the first edition of this work.)

Given that party systems last over time, but also that one atypical election by itself arguably should not be considered sufficient to undo a system, a smoothing technique will be employed based on Martin (2000: 161). His technique groups together

for a given election the value for said election, the previous election, and the subsequent election and takes the *median* value of these three. Martin does this for specific variables; however, in this analysis it will be done for party types and thus use modal classifications. Consequently, if the party type of an election is a one-off phenomenon between two elections which themselves share the same type, then the one-off election party type will be smoothed into the ongoing party system, assuming there is such a party system. However, if the party type of a given election can qualify as the start of a new party system, that new party system will take precedence. For example, if a polity has election types < C A B B A B > this becomes party system < B > from the third election and the second < A > type is smoothed out. However, if a polity has election types < C B B A B A > then a new party system < A > is deemed to exist for the last three elections (assuming the 10 year requirement is met). Where there is no previous election for a polity (the first in the data set) the party type for the election in question will also serve as that of the previous election. Where there is no subsequent election (the most recent one in the data set) the current party type will also serve as that of the next election. (Otherwise, following Martin, the classifications would have to be for a shorter period.)

The types are defined as follows, with the polity-specific information about party patterns and party systems provided at the start of each analysis in Part II:

- 1 A **one-party** type has a P2%S of 1. This has never occurred in longstanding democratic Europe, but has occurred at times in Monaco with the UND: such a pattern in 1968, such a system from 1978 to 1988, and such a pattern in 1998.
- 2 A **two-party** type has a P2%S of 2 and a 2PSS of 96.0 or more. Given these parameters, unless there is a literal tie then one party will almost certainly have a seat majority. However, it is the two-party duopoly of seats that is key feature here.
- 3 A **two-and-a-half-party** type has a P2%S of 2 to 6 (though usually 3 to 5); a 2PSS of at least 80.0 but less than 96.0; a SR1:2 below 2.00; and a SR2:3 of at least 2.00 and a value at least one-third greater than the SR1:2 – thus the relative gap between the second and third party is clearly greater than that between the first and second party. Given these parameters, there is definitely the possibility of a single-party seat majority. The ‘half’ may be a single smaller party or more than one.
- 4 A **moderately multi-party** type has a P2%S of 3 to 5, and 6 if the 2PSS is over 55.0. The 2PSS is always below 80.0 except in cases where there is no distinctive break between the top two parties and the others. In other words, where the 2PSS is 80.0 or more but where the SR1:2 is 2.00 or more or is close to or greater than the SR2:3, then this is moderately multi-party as it lacks two main parties standing out from the rest as in the previous category. In these moderately multi-party cases, the high 2PSS is thus driven by the largest party, not the top two combined. (As we shall note later, the size of the largest party is a feature of predominance, but predominance is not a systemic aspect.)
- 5 A **highly multi-party** type has a P2%S of greater than 6, or 6 where the 2PSS is 55.0 or less.

One can note that there is no category of a predominant party system, even though this has been a categorization of party systems by scholars since Sartori as noted previously. The central issue here is whether a predominant party system is in fact a category of its own, or whether predominance is but a factor that can be combined with any type of party system. The latter view was argued by Mair (2002: 106–107 [his endnote 3]):

Although the predominant-party system constitutes a useful category, it fits rather uneasily into Sartori's framework, since it is defined by wholly different criteria, and can by definition co-exist with every possible category of party numbers (that is, it can develop within a context of a two-party system, a system of limited pluralism, and a system of extreme pluralism) and, at least theoretically, with every possible spread of ideological opinion.

Indeed, predominance is best seen as a further component within a specific party type (of more than one-party). As a numerical statement of relative size independent of duration, predominance can also be applied to a party pattern. However, it is not the only such indicator. The following additional components are thus provided in Part II:

- For all types but most crucially for two-party types (patterns or systems), *single-party super-majorities* of 70 percent or more of the seats are noted, and the specific party given.
- For two-and-a-half-party types (patterns or systems), *single-party majorities* are noted, and the specific party given.
- For multi-party types (patterns or systems), be these moderately or highly multi-party, there are four potential (alternative) additional components noted:

*predominance*, where the 1PSC is above 50.0 (in other words, a single-party majority) and where the SR1:2 is 1.80 [Ireland 1977 1.95] or above;

*dominance*, where the 1PSC is at least 40.0 up through 50.0 and where the SR1:2 is 1.50 or above;

*two main parties*, where the 2PSC is at least 65.0 but below 80.0, where the SR1:2 is less than 1.50, and where the SR2:3 is 1.50 or above; and

*relative balance of the top three or more parties*, where the SR1:2, SR2:3 et cetera is 1.50 or less in each case and where the seat ratio of the largest party to the last party included is 2.00 or less. The most extreme pattern here is the relative balance of the top *seven* parties in Poland 1991, with these top seven parties having 62, 60, 49, 48, 46, 44, and 37 seats, respectively.

Based on these criteria, and using the data given in Chapter 2, European party systems and patterns are classified in Table 3.1. There have been a total of 138 party types (67 systems and 71 patterns), with almost half of the party systems being moderately multi-party ones and the plurality of the party patterns also being moderately multi-party. The table gives: the total number of elections; median values for

P2%S, 1PSS, 2PSS, SR1:2, SR2:3; mean values for ENPP,  $N_{\infty}P$ , and  $N_bP$ ; and (just) for the party systems the percentages of the three types of electoral decisiveness (HP, MM, and EM). End years with a plus sign indicate the most recent election; if a given type holds then said classification can obviously be extended down the road. Importantly, there is greater variance in the data for party patterns than for party systems (leaving aside two-party types as there is only one two-party pattern), especially for highly multi-party types.

Of course, there is no absolute guarantee that a polity will have had an actual party system, especially given the 10-year requirement for this. For example, Serbia has never had a party system, just shifts between highly multi-party and moderately multi-party patterns. Yet most places have had one if not two-party systems, and where two the distinction between them can be quite clear. For example, in Denmark there is a sharp difference between its moderately multi-party system from 1945 through 1971 and its highly multi-party system since 1973 and what was called its “earthquake election” of that year. As for the duration of a party system, as noted definitionally this requires three straight elections and 10 years. However, in Iceland a moderately multi-party system lasted 21 elections, from 1946 through 2013. And there are some European polities which have had the same party system through the entire relevant period up through the time of writing – these being the two-party system in Malta, the moderately multi-party systems in Scotland and Wales, and the highly multi-party systems in Finland, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the European Union.

For those who are curious about a traditional measure like ENPP, this does not help define a party type, but one can see that it does differ in a linear fashion across the systems and patterns in terms of their means (of each individual election within each category), as follows:

two-party systems – 1.95;  
 two-party patterns – 1.88;  
 two-and-a-half-party systems – 2.47;  
 two-and-a-half-party patterns – 2.61;  
 moderately multi-party systems – 3.46;  
 moderately multi-party patterns – 3.48;  
 highly multi-party systems – 5.27;  
 highly multi-party patterns – 4.66.

Moreover, an ENPP of, say, 4.00 just by itself merely indicated multipartism and thus is not specific enough to be used directly for classification.

We have thus classified European party types (party systems and party patterns) mathematically. What do these categories mean in a more practical sense, especially for party systems which have regularity? For two-party systems, there may literally be only two parties, such as Labour and the Nationalists in Malta from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. More likely however there may be only two parties that matter in any sense of the term, even if some other party or parties win a couple



**TABLE 3.1** Party system and party pattern classifications

TWO-PARTY TYPES	# of elections	median P2%S	median 1PSS	median 2PSS	median SR1:2	median SR2:3	mean ENPP	mean NcoP	mean N <sub>p</sub>	ED percentages			
										HP	MM	EM	
TWO-PARTY SYSTEMS (WITH SMOOTHING)													
		standard											
		deviations:											
Liechtenstein 1945 to 1989 inclusive	14	2	53.3	100.0	1.14	4	1.99	1.86	1.93		43	57	
Malta 1966 to 2017+ inclusive	12	2	52.3	100.0	1.10	4	2.00	1.89	1.95		25	75	
Turkey 1950 to 1957 inclusive	3	2	85.4	98.7	6.03	44.50	1.41	1.23	1.32		33	67	
United Kingdom 1950 to 1970 inclusive	7	2	52.4	98.6	1.15	43.00	2.04	1.87	1.96		100		
TWO-PARTY PATTERNS													
San Marino 1945 to 1949 inclusive	2	2	62.5	100.0	1.70	4	1.88	1.61	1.74				
TWO-AND-A-HALF-PARTY TYPES	# of elections	median P2%S	median 1PSS	median 2PSS	median SR1:2	median SR2:3	mean ENPP	mean NcoP	mean N <sub>p</sub>	ED percentages			
										HP	MM	EM	
TWO-AND-A-HALF-PARTY SYSTEMS (WITH SMOOTHING)													
		standard											
		deviations:											
Andorra 2005 to 2015+ inclusive	4	3.5	51.8	89.3	1.58	4.59	2.24	1.78	2.01	50	25	25	
Austria 1945 to 1986 inclusive	13	3	49.2	94.5	1.11	8.00	2.28	2.05	2.17	62	15	23	
Belgium 1949 to 1961 inclusive	5	4	49.1	85.4	1.24	3.85	2.60	2.09	2.35	80	20		
Bulgaria 1990 to 1997 inclusive	4	4.5	52.5	85.1	1.64	4.13	2.52	1.94	2.23	25	50	25	
Catalonia 1984 to 1992 inclusive	3	5	51.9	82.2	1.75	3.73	2.68	1.92	2.30		100		

Germany 1953 to 2002 inclusive	14	4	48.3	87.2	1.21	4.32	2.57	2.12	2.35	93	7
Greece 1977 to 2009 inclusive	12	4	53.5	91.5	1.45	8.36	2.32	1.89	2.11	25	75
Ireland 1957 to 11/1982 inclusive	9	3	48.8	85.9	1.49	2.94	2.59	2.01	2.30	56	33
Liechtenstein 02/1993 to 2009 inclusive	6	3	52.0	94.0	1.18	8.25	2.26	1.98	2.12	33	50
Poland 2007 to 2015+ inclusive	3	5	45.4	81.1	1.32	3.29	2.86	2.13	2.49	67	33
Portugal 1991 to 2005 inclusive	5	4	50.0	87.0	1.42	5.36	2.50	1.97	2.24	60	20
Spain 1977 to 2011 inclusive	11	5	48.3	84.9	1.40	7.83	2.63	2.03	2.33	64	36
Turkey 1965 to 1977 inclusive	4	4	50.3	85.9	1.52	6.10	2.69	2.04	2.37	50	25
United Kingdom 02/1974 to 1992 inclusive	6	3	52.5	93.5	1.25	17.38	2.20	1.88	2.04	17	83
United Kingdom 2005 to 2017+ inclusive	4	3	49.9	86.8	1.32	4.34	2.51	1.99	2.25	50	50
TWO-AND-A-HALF-PARTY PATTERNS											
		standard deviations:									
			4.68	5.74	0.29	4.37	0.29	0.18	0.20		
Austria 2002	1	4	43.2	80.9	1.14	3.63	2.88	2.32	2.60		
Croatia 2007 to 2011 inclusive	2	4	49.2	84.1	1.44	7.92	2.69	2.04	2.37		
France V 2007 to 2012 inclusive	2	4.5	51.4	84.3	1.56	8.64	2.67	1.95	2.31		
Hungary 2002 to 2006 inclusive	2	3.5	47.8	93.4	1.11	8.55	2.27	2.09	2.18		
Italy 1948	1	5	53.0	84.8	1.66	5.55	2.57	1.89	2.23		
Montenegro 2002	1	5	48.1	72.8	1.95	2.22	3.18	1.92	2.55		
Northern Cyprus 2005 to 2009 inclusive	2	4.5	50.0	84.0	1.50	3.09	2.63	2.00	2.32		
Portugal 2015+	1	4	46.5	83.9	1.24	4.53	2.71	2.15	2.43		
Scotland 2011	1	4	53.5	82.2	1.86	2.47	2.61	1.87	2.24		
United Kingdom 1945	1	2	61.4	94.2	1.87	17.50	2.06	1.63	1.85		

(Continued)

TABLE 3.1 (Continued)

MODERATELY MULTI-PARTY TYPES	# of elections	standard deviations:	median	median	median	median	median	mean	mean	mean	ED percentages		
			p2%S	1PSS	2PSS	SR1:2	SR2:3	ENPP	N <sub>co</sub> P	N <sub>i</sub> P	HP	MM	EM
			MODERATELY MULTI-PARTY SYSTEMS (WITH SMOOTHING)										
Austria 1990 to 1999 inclusive	4	4.5	37.2	65.9	1.29	1.28	3.40	2.62	3.01	100			
Basque Country 2001 to 2016+ inclusive	5	4.6	38.7	64.0	1.56	1.46	3.63	2.56	3.10	100			
Bulgaria 2001 to 2017+	6	5.5	40.0	68.1	1.85	1.31	3.78	2.48	3.13	100			
Catalonia 1995 to 2006 inclusive	4	5	38.5	67.4	1.20	1.92	3.59	2.60	3.10	100			
Croatia 1995 to 2003 inclusive	3	4	47.0	75.7	1.54	1.92	2.91	2.00	2.46	67	33		
Cyprus 1976 to 2011 inclusive	8	4	35.7	69.1	1.05	1.77	3.43	2.73	3.08	88	13		
Czech Republic 1996 to 2010 inclusive	5	5	35.0	64.5	1.11	2.63	3.83	2.91	3.37	100			
Denmark 1945 to 1971 inclusive**	11	6	40.0	63.0	1.84	1.19	3.87	2.54	3.21	100			
Estonia 2003 to 2015+ inclusive	4	6	30.2	57.4	1.09	1.50	4.40	3.32	3.86	100			
France V 1967 to 2002 inclusive	10	5	43.6	69.0	1.94	1.24	3.27	2.30	2.79	70	30		
Germany 2005 to 2017+ inclusive	4	5	37.6	67.5	1.61	2.33	3.71	2.56	3.14	100			
Hungary 1990 to 1998 inclusive	3	6	42.5	72.2	1.78	2.09	3.38	2.27	2.83	67	33		
Hungary 2010 to 2018+ inclusive*	3	4	66.8	83.4	4.46	1.30	2.03	1.49	1.76		67	33	
Iceland 1946 to 2013 inclusive	21	5	38.3	66.7	1.31	1.67	3.76	2.72	3.24	100			
Ireland 1987 to 2016+ inclusive	8	5	46.4	72.9	1.52	2.23	3.40	2.31	2.86	100			
Italy 1963 to 1972 inclusive	3	6	42.2	70.3	1.50	1.95	3.61	2.39	3.00	100			
Italy 2008 to 2018+ inclusive	3	6	43.8	64.4	1.83	1.11	3.64	2.39	3.02	100			
Lithuania 1992 to 2000 inclusive	3	6	51.1	62.8	2.61	1.23	3.60	2.22	2.91	33	67		
Luxembourg 1945 to 2013 inclusive	15	5	39.3	66.7	1.24	1.44	3.55	2.58	3.07	100			
Montenegro 2006 to 2012 inclusive	3	5	50.6	72.8	3.00	2.00	2.94	1.91	2.43	33	33		

Northern Cyprus 1976 to 2003 inclusive	7	4	48.0	74.0	1.85	2.37	2.75	2.14	2.45	71	29
Northern Ireland 2003 to 2017+ inclusive	5	5	33.3	61.1	1.29	1.75	4.35	3.10	3.73	100	
Norway 1945 to 1993 inclusive***	13	5	49.0	68.6	2.19	1.72	3.35	2.16	2.76	69	31
Poland 1993 to 2005 inclusive	4	6	40.4	64.3	1.27	2.08	3.67	2.52	3.10	100	
Portugal 1975 to 1987 inclusive	7	5	40.4	68.4	1.43	1.70	3.44	2.54	2.99	86	14
Romania 1996 to 2016+ inclusive	6	4.5	42.3	69.0	1.60	2.03	3.41	2.35	2.88	83	17
San Marino 1951 to 2006 inclusive	13	4	43.3	68.3	1.67	1.40	3.37	2.36	2.87	100	
Scotland 1999 to 2007 inclusive	3	4	38.8	70.5	1.60	1.94	3.66	2.54	3.10	100	
Sweden 1948 to 1988 inclusive**	14	5	47.1	67.9	2.10	1.44	3.25	2.13	2.69	93	7
Turkey 1983 to 2018 inclusive	11	4	52.9	82.0	2.02	1.65	3.01	2.22	2.62	45	55
Wales 1999 to 2016+ inclusive **	5	4	48.3	70.0	2.14	1.25	3.07	2.10	2.59	100	

\* includes (sub)system of predominance.

\*\* includes (sub)system(s) of dominance.

#### MODERATELY MULTI-PARTY PATTERNS

		<i>standard deviations:</i>									
		0.80	10.87	9.27	0.88	0.87	0.72	0.55	0.62		
Andorra 1997 to 2001 inclusive	2	3.5	62.5	83.9	2.92	2.10	2.19	1.60	1.90		
Austria 2006 to 2008 inclusive	2	5	34.2	66.1	1.08	2.32	3.83	2.95	3.39		
Austria 2017+	1	5	33.9	62.3	1.19	1.02	3.60	2.95	3.28		
Basque Country 1980 to 1984 inclusive	2	5.5	42.2	64.0	1.98	1.48	3.76	2.37	3.07		
Belgium 1946	1	4	45.5	79.7	1.33	3.00	2.91	2.20	2.56		
Belgium 1965	1	6	36.3	66.5	1.20	1.33	3.59	2.75	3.17		
Catalonia 1980	1	5	31.9	56.3	1.30	1.32	4.46	3.14	3.80		

(Continued)

TABLE 3.1 (Continued)

MODERATELY MULTI-PARTY TYPES	# of elections	median p2%S	median 1PSS	median 2PSS	median SR1:2	median SR2:3	mean ENPP	mean NøP	mean N <sub>i</sub> P	ED percentages		
										HP	MM	EM
Catalonia 2015	1	6	45.9	64.4	2.48	1.56	3.60	2.18	2.89			
Corsica 2015 to 2017+ inclusive	2	4	56.1	75.8	3.05	1.38	2.59	1.83	2.21			
Croatia 2015 to 2016 inclusive	2	3.5	39.7	76.2	1.09	3.55	3.28	2.52	2.90			
Czech Republic 1990	1	4	63.5	79.5	3.97	1.45	2.22	1.57	1.90			
Estonia 1992	1	6	28.7	55.4	2.29	1.13	4.39	3.48	3.94			
Faroe Islands 1945 to 1950 inclusive	3	4	40.0	70.0	1.33	1.17	3.35	2.57	2.96			
Flanders 2004	1	5	28.2	54.0	1.09	1.28	4.35	3.54	3.95			
Flanders 2014	1	6	34.7	56.5	1.59	1.42	4.52	2.88	3.70			
France IV 1945 to 11/1946 inclusive	3	5	30.5	58.7	1.05	1.27	4.22	3.36	3.79			
France V 2017+	1	6	55.3	75.1	2.79	2.68	2.81	1.81	2.31			
Greece 1974	1	4	73.3	93.3	3.67	5.00	1.73	1.36	1.55			
Ireland 1948 to 1954 inclusive	3	5	46.3	74.1	1.73	2.50	3.30	2.18	2.74			
Italy 1946	1	6	37.2	57.9	1.80	1.11	4.39	2.69	3.54			
Latvia 2010 to 2011 inclusive	2	5	32.0	57.5	1.28	1.21	4.23	3.13	3.68			
Liechtenstein 2013 to 2017+ inclusive	2	4	38.0	71.2	1.19	1.80	3.40	2.64	3.02			
Lithuania 2016+	1	6	38.3	60.3	1.74	1.82	4.42	2.61	3.52			
Netherlands 1986 to 1989 inclusive	2	5.5	36.0	69.7	1.07	2.08	3.62	2.78	3.20			
Northern Cyprus 2013 to 2018+ inclusive	2	5	42.0	68.0	1.63	1.25	3.40	2.38	2.89			
Portugal 2009 to 2011 inclusive	2	5	44.6	78.3	1.33	3.47	3.03	2.25	2.64			
Scotland 2016+	1	5	48.8	72.9	2.03	1.29	2.99	2.05	2.52			
Serbia 2007 to 2008 inclusive	2	5.5	36.6	65.0	1.29	1.98	3.99	2.77	3.38			
Serbia 2014	1	5	63.2	80.8	3.59	2.32	2.26	1.58	1.92			
Slovakia 1992	1	5	46.3	70.6	2.40	1.67	3.36	2.16	2.76			
Slovakia 2010 to 2012 inclusive	2	6	48.3	63.0	3.70	1.14	3.45	2.11	2.78			
Spain 2015 to 2016+ inclusive	2	6	37.1	62.2	1.49	1.25	3.96	2.70	3.33			
Turkey 1961	1	4	38.4	73.5	1.09	2.43	3.27	2.60	2.94			

HIGHLY MULTI-PARTY TYPES (WITH SMOOTHING)	# of elections	standard deviations:	median	median	median	median	median	mean	mean	mean	ED percentages		
			P2%S	1PSS	2PSS	SR1:2	SR2:3	ENPP	N50P	N6P	HP	MM	EM
HIGHLY MULTI-PARTY SYSTEMS													
(WITH SMOOTHING)													
Basque Country 1986 to 1998 inclusive	4		7	28.7	48.7	1.35	1.19	5.26	3.58	4.42	100		
Belgium 1968 to 2014+ inclusive	15		8	20.3	37.3	1.18	1.16	7.21	4.68	5.95	100		
Denmark 1973 to 2015+ inclusive	16		8.5	31.7	52.3	1.45	1.51	5.20	3.17	4.19	100		
European Union 1979 to 2014+ inclusive	8		7	34.5	59.8	1.31	2.36	4.75	3.00	3.88	100		
Faroe Islands 1954 to 2015+ inclusive	18		6	25.0	48.4	1.14	1.07	4.96	3.89	4.43	100		
Finland 1945 to 2015+ inclusive	20		7	26.8	50.3	1.09	1.15	5.13	3.78	4.46	100		
Italy 1976 to 2006 inclusive	9		8	35.7	58.1	1.32	1.88	4.94	3.16	4.05	100		
Latvia 1993 to 2006 inclusive	5		7	23.0	45.0	1.14	1.14	5.83	4.26	5.05	100		
Lithuania 2004 to 2012 inclusive	3		7	27.7	49.6	1.26	1.24	5.75	3.48	4.62	100		
Netherlands 1946 to 1982 inclusive	12		7	32.0	61.2	1.10	2.19	4.69	3.22	3.96	100		
Netherlands 1994 to 2017+ inclusive	8		8	27.3	48.4	1.14	1.28	5.86	3.87	4.87	100		
Norway 1997 to 2017+ inclusive	6		6.5	34.3	57.1	1.36	1.56	4.61	3.05	3.83	100		
San Marino 2008 to 2016+ inclusive	3		8	35.0	51.7	1.27	1.43	5.07	3.29	4.18	100		
Slovakia 1994 to 2006 inclusive	4		6.5	31.0	53.4	1.45	1.34	5.02	3.28	4.15	100		
Slovenia 1992 to 2018+ inclusive	8		7	31.7	55.6	1.40	1.70	5.25	3.23	4.24	100		
Sweden 1991 to 2018+ inclusive	8		7	37.4	61.7	1.52	2.25	4.45	2.77	3.61	100		
Switzerland 1947 to 2015+ inclusive	18		7	26.7	51.0	1.08	1.09	5.20	3.77	4.49	100		
HIGHLY MULTI-PARTY PATTERNS													
standard deviations:													
Andorra 1993	1		6	28.6	42.9	1.40	1.00	5.60	3.50	4.55			
Austria 2013	1		6	28.4	54.1	1.11	1.18	4.59	3.52	4.06			
Catalonia 2010 to 2012 inclusive	2		7	41.5	59.7	2.30	1.31	4.06	2.44	3.25			
Catalonia 2017+	1		7	27.4	52.6	1.09	1.06	4.64	3.65	4.15			

(Continued)

TABLE 3.1 (Continued)

HIGHLY MULTI-PARTY TYPES	# of elections	median p2%S	median 1PSS	median 2PSS	median SR1:2	median SR2:3	mean ENPP	mean N5oP	mean N6P	ED percentages		
										HP	MM	EM
Croatia 1992	1	7	61.6	71.7	6.07	1.27	2.50	1.62	2.06			
Cyprus 2016+	1	8	32.1	60.7	1.13	1.78	4.51	3.11	3.81			
Czech Republic 1992	1	8	38.0	55.5	2.17	2.19	4.80	2.63	3.72			
Czech Republic 2013 to 2017+ inclusive	2	8	32.0	50.0	2.09	1.28	5.22	3.28	4.25			
Estonia 1995 to 1999 inclusive	2	7	34.2	52.5	1.86	1.10	5.09	3.04	4.07			
Flanders 1995 to 1999 inclusive	2	6	27.0	48.8	1.24	1.14	5.15	3.74	4.45			
Flanders 2009	1	7	25.0	41.9	1.48	1.00	5.97	4.00	4.99			
France IV 1951 to 1956 inclusive	2	6.5	23.4	41.0	1.33	1.06	5.83	4.39	5.11			
France V 1958 to 1962 inclusive	2	7.5	46.0	65.5	2.64	1.81	3.56	2.19	2.88			
Germany 1949	1	8	34.6	67.2	1.06	2.52	4.01	2.89	3.45			
Greece 05/2012 to 09/2015+ inclusive	4	7	45.7	70.0	1.95	3.16	3.73	2.30	3.02			
Iceland 2016 to 2017+ inclusive	2	7.5	29.4	46.0	1.78	1.19	5.82	3.47	4.65			
Italy 1953 to 1958 inclusive	2	7	45.2	69.1	1.90	1.79	3.50	2.21	2.86			
Latvia 2014 to 2018+ inclusive	2	6.5	23.5	43.0	1.24	1.05	5.76	4.26	5.01			
Luxembourg 2018+	1	7	35.0	55.0	1.75	1.20	4.56	2.86	3.71			
Montenegro 2016+	1	7	44.4	66.7	2.00	2.00	3.66	2.25	2.96			
Northern Ireland 1996 to 1998 inclusive	2	6	26.6	48.6	1.21	1.17	5.36	3.76	4.56			
Poland 1991	1	10	13.0	26.5	1.03	1.22	10.85	7.67	9.26			
Romania 1992	1	7	34.3	58.4	1.43	1.91	4.78	2.91	3.85			
Serbia 2003	1	6	32.8	54.0	1.55	1.43	4.80	3.05	3.93			
Serbia 2012	1	7	29.2	56.0	1.09	1.52	4.87	3.42	4.15			
Serbia 2016+	1	7	52.4	64.0	4.52	1.32	3.23	1.91	2.57			
Slovakia 1990	1	7	32.0	52.7	1.55	1.41	4.98	3.13	4.06			
Slovakia 2016+	1	8	32.7	46.7	2.33	1.11	5.67	3.06	4.37			

seats. For example, in the United Kingdom from 1950 to 1970 other parties always won a few seats – but only a few – and the elections were clearly head-to-head competitions between the Conservatives and Labour. Indeed, in a two-party system, ‘someone always wins’.

In two-and-a-half-party systems there is a relevant ‘half’ consisting of one or more smaller (or third) parties (Siaroff 2003). This party or these parties are clearly much smaller than the main two, but its/their strength is often or usually (although not always) enough to produce a hung parliament. Hung parliaments occurred in every election in Germany except 1957 (where the public seemed to prefer them to single-party majorities) but often did not occur in Ireland, where Fianna Fáil was able to win outright majorities from time to time until the 1980s. If there is a hung parliament, and unless the two main parties choose to form a grand coalition as was the case in Austria and Liechtenstein, the smaller party or a smaller party may well get into cabinet as a junior partner. This was the situation, for example, of the Free Democrats and later the Greens in Germany, or the Labour Party in Ireland. Even if they do not get into cabinet, their support for a minority government of one of the main parties will come at a price. In Spain, the regional parties, especially the CiU in Catalonia, were very adept at trading support for concessions from each of the main parties (socialists and conservatives) in turn.

In a moderately multi-party system, much depends on whether there is a predominant or dominant party, or conversely whether the parties are balanced in terms of size. First of all, a predominant party in such a system or pattern by definition wins a majority of seats outright, as has occurred for example with Labour in Norway from 1949 to 1957, ANAP in Turkey in the 1980s and later the AKP in Turkey 2002–2011, and Fidesz-MPSz in Hungary since 2010. Even when there is a hung parliament, if there is a dominant party this is normally the central force in government formation (in other words, the system is effectively unipolar). In such cases, one main outcome is for the dominant party to lead a coalition government, as occurred with for example the Socialists in France in 1981, 1988, 1997, and 2012. The other main outcome is for the dominant party to form a single-party minority government, as occurred with the Labour Party in Norway in the 1960s and 1970s, or the Social Democrats in Sweden for most of 1948–1985. In Wales, the Labour Party has done both. A third, but much rarer scenario, is for all of the other parties (and normally all are required) to “gang up” together in government so as to exclude the dominant party. This occurred in Ireland in 1948 (to keep Fianna Fáil out) and in Sweden from 1976 to 1982 (to keep the Social Democrats out).

In contrast, in moderately multi-party systems with a balance amongst the parties there is rarely such a sense of unipolarity (or bipolarity). Normally in this situation there are three or four reasonably large parties. Coalition government is always the norm here. Such coalitions tend to include at least two of the top three or four parties. This could even involve the two largest of the larger parties, for example the Christian Socials and the Socialists in Luxembourg. If the largest of the various larger parties is relatively flexible, it can normally (but not always) get itself into



government, as with the Independence Party in Iceland and the Christian Socials in Luxembourg.

In a highly multi-party pattern or system a single-party majority is quite unlikely (though mathematically possible) and indeed none has ever occurred. Indeed, even there being a dominant party in a highly multi-party type is fairly rare, though for example SYRIZA in Greece since June 2012 has been one and this was the case with the Social Democrats in Sweden in 1994 and 2002. Such dominant parties have though certainly been able to form governments – normally coalitions but in the Swedish examples single-party minorities with confidence and supply agreements. Yet as implied most highly multi-party systems lack a dominant party and tend to have a mixture of medium-sized and smaller parties. Governments therefore tend to also be multi-party (as opposed to two-party) coalitions, and can even involve four or more parties – with the French Fourth Republic and Switzerland being classic cases of this in terms of governments (though with polar opposite levels of government stability). A full analysis of party systems and governments will be provided in Chapter 5.

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# 4

## ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR EFFECTS

To what extent are the different party patterns and systems in Europe ‘produced’, at least in part, by their electoral systems? For those who view the world of electoral systems through the dichotomy of single-member versus party list proportional representation electoral systems, Europe hardly provides a balanced sample. Single-member systems exist now only in France (single-member majority-plurality) and the United Kingdom (SMP), and France is planning to elect 15 percent of its deputies by proportional representation starting in 2022. SMP was also used in Northern Ireland up through the 1969 election. In contrast, party list proportional representation is quite common in (continental) Europe. That said, there are in fact a range of electoral systems in Europe, as outlined later. In this analysis we shall not get into all the minutia of electoral systems (for this, Lijphart 1990 is recommended), although the formula used for proportional representation is given in the country analyses, and data on districts for current electoral systems are given in Appendix Table 4.1. One point worth stressing however is the presence of thresholds which, if they exist nationally, are given in Table 4.1, which identifies the different electoral systems since 1945 (and which lists changes effective the election they were first used, not the date of legislation).

That said, in a couple cases (indicated by #) national systems with only slight changes will be merged so that the following are used for assessment purposes (each as one system): Northern Cyprus 1976–1998, the French Fourth Republic (1946–1956), and Greece 2007–2015.

There have been perhaps seven broad types of electoral systems used in postwar Europe. First and most common are ‘standard’ party list proportional representation systems without very high thresholds or bonus seats as noted later. In these standard party list proportional representation systems all deputies are elected off party lists. There may be a formal threshold to receive seats; nationally this ranges from 2 percent in Denmark up to 5 percent in Serbia and Slovakia. Where there are

**TABLE 4.1** National electoral systems (by election)

Andorra 1993–2015	parallel system: one-half multi-member plurality, one-half party list proportional representation
Austria 1945–2017	party list proportional representation
Belgium 1946–2014	party list proportional representation
Flanders	party list proportional representation
Bulgaria 1990	parallel system: mixture of single-member majority with re-run elections and party list proportional representation, with a 4 percent national threshold for party list proportional representation
Bulgaria 1991–2005 and 2013–2017	party list proportional representation, with a 4 percent national threshold
Bulgaria 2009	parallel system: mixture of single-member plurality and (mostly) party list proportional representation, with a 4 percent national threshold for party list proportional representation
Croatia 1992–1995	parallel system: mixture of single-member plurality and party list proportional representation, with a 5 percent national threshold for party list proportional representation
Croatia 2000–2016	party list proportional representation
Cyprus 1976	multi-member plurality
Cyprus 1981–2016	party list proportional representation
#Northern Cyprus 1976–1981 and 1990	party list proportional representation, with a seat bonus for large parties
#Northern Cyprus 1985 and 1993–1998	party list proportional representation, with an 8 percent national threshold
Northern Cyprus 2003–2018	party list proportional representation, with a 5 percent national threshold
Czech Republic 1990–2017	party list proportional representation, with a 5 percent national threshold
Denmark 1945–2015	party list proportional representation, with a very low 2 percent national threshold as of the 1971 election
Faroe Islands	party list proportional representation
Estonia 1992–2015	party list proportional representation, with a 5 percent national threshold
Finland 1945–2015	party list proportional representation

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#France 1945–1946	party list proportional representation
#France 1951–1956	party list proportional representation, with bonuses for majority cartels
France 1958–1981 and 1988–2017	single-member majority-plurality
France 1986	party list proportional representation
Corsica 2015–2017	two-round party list proportional representation, with a seat bonus for the winning list
Germany 1949	mixed-member proportional: mixture of single-member plurality and fully compensatory party list proportional representation, with a 5 percent regional threshold
Germany 1953–2017	mixed-member proportional: mixture of single-member plurality and fully compensatory party list proportional representation, with a 5 percent national threshold (except in 1990, when two regional thresholds of 5 percent each)
Greece 1974–2004	three-tiered party list proportional representation, with a 3 percent national threshold starting with the 1993 election
#Greece 2007–2009	party list proportional representation, with a 3 percent national threshold for 260 seats, plus a bonus of 40 seats to the plurality party
#Greece 2012–2015	party list proportional representation, with a 3 percent national threshold for 250 seats, plus a bonus of 50 seats to the plurality party
Hungary 1990–2010	mixed-member majoritarian with partial compensation: mixture of single-member majority-plurality and two-tiered party list proportional representation, with a 4 percent national threshold for party list proportional representation in the 1990 election and a 5 percent national threshold as of the 1994 election
Hungary 2014–2018	mixed-member majoritarian with (somewhat) partial compensation: mixture of single-member plurality and party list proportional representation, with a 5 percent national threshold for party list proportional representation (higher for coalitions)

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(Continued)

**TABLE 4.1** (Continued)

Iceland 1946–06/1959	mixed-member majoritarian with partial compensation: mixture of single-member plurality and party list proportional representation including in two-member districts
Iceland 08/1959–2017	party list proportional representation
Ireland 1948–2016	single transferable vote
Italy 1946–1992	party list proportional representation
Italy 1994–2001	mixed-member majoritarian with partial compensation: mixture of single-member plurality and somewhat compensatory party list proportional representation, with a 4 percent national threshold for party list proportional representation
Italy 2006–2013	party list proportional representation, with a 4 percent national threshold (higher for coalitions), and a guaranteed majority of 340 seats (about 54 percent) to the leading party or coalition
Italy 2018	parallel system: mixture of single-member plurality and party list proportional representation, with a 3 percent national threshold for party list proportional representation
Latvia 1992–2018	party list proportional representation, with a 5 percent national threshold
Liechtenstein 1945–2017	party list proportional representation, with an 8 percent national threshold
Lithuania 1992–2016	mixed-member majoritarian: mixture of single-member majority – run-off/ plurality and party list proportional representation, with a 4 percent national threshold for party list proportional representation in the 1992 election and a 5 percent national threshold since the 1996 election (higher for coalitions)
Luxembourg 1945–2018	party list proportional representation
Malta 1966–1981	single transferable vote
Malta 1987–2017	single transferable vote, with extra seats added if needed to change a manufactured minority into an earned majority as of the 1987 election, to give the plurality party a seat majority as of the 1998 election, and to make the overall result proportional since the 2008 election

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Montenegro 2002–2016	party list proportional representation, with a 3 percent national threshold
Netherlands 1946–2017	party list proportional representation
Norway 1945–1985	party list proportional representation
Norway 1989–2017	two-tiered party list proportional representation, with a 4 percent national threshold for the upper tier (at-large compensatory seats)
Poland 1991–1997	two-tiered party list proportional representation, with a 5 percent national threshold for the upper tier (higher for coalitions)
Poland 2001–2015	party list proportional representation, with a 5 percent national threshold (higher for coalitions)
Portugal 1975–2015	party list proportional representation
Romania 1990–2004 and 2016	party list proportional representation, with a 3 percent national threshold as of the 1992 election and a 5 percent national threshold as of the 2000 election and again in the 2016 election (higher threshold for coalitions)
Romania 2008–2012	mixed-member proportional: mixture of single-member plurality and fully compensatory party list proportional representation, with a 5 percent national threshold (higher for coalitions)
San Marino 1945–2006	party list proportional representation
San Marino 2008–2016	party list proportional representation, with a guaranteed majority of 35 seats (about 58 percent) to the leading coalition (in 2016 if no coalition wins a majority then a run-off between the top two coalition lists to this end)
Serbia 2003–2016	party list proportional representation, with a 5 percent national threshold
Slovakia 1990–2016	party list proportional representation, with a 5 percent national threshold (higher for coalitions)
Slovenia 1992–2018	party list proportional representation, with a 3 percent national threshold as of the 1992 election and a 4 percent national threshold since the 2000 election

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*(Continued)*

TABLE 4.1 (Continued)

Spain 1977–2016	party list proportional representation
Basque Country	party list proportional representation
Catalonia	party list proportional representation
Sweden 1948–1968	party list proportional representation
Sweden 1970–2014	two-tiered party list proportional representation, with a 4 percent national threshold for the upper tier
Switzerland 1947–2015	party list proportional representation
Turkey 1950–1957	multi-member plurality
Turkey 1961–1977	party list proportional representation
Turkey 1983–2018	party list proportional representation, with a 10 percent national threshold
United Kingdom 1945–2017	single-member plurality, except in the 1945 election when there were 15 two-member districts and 1 three-member district
Northern Ireland	single-member plurality through 1969; single transferable vote since 1973
Scotland	mixed-member proportional: mixture of single-member plurality and somewhat compensatory party list proportional representation (additional member system)
Wales	mixed-member proportional: mixture of single-member plurality and somewhat compensatory party list proportional representation (additional member system)
European Parliament 1979–1994	varying systems in the member states
European Parliament 1999–2014	party list proportional representation in individual member states, except STV in Ireland, Malta, and in Northern Ireland

significant wasted votes (parties failing to meet the threshold) there will be overall disproportionality, but proportionality across all seat-winning parties. Additionally, in some countries such as Spain small district magnitudes in parts of the country do make the outcome less than fully proportional.

A second and related electoral system is mixed-member proportional, as used most notably in Germany. Here deputies are elected either in single-member districts or off party lists, however the key point is that the overall result is meant to be explicitly proportional, and so seats won off the party lists are meant to

achieve this (the more district seats won, the less seats come from the party list). That said, there needs to be a sufficient number of part list seats to achieve full proportionality. Such is the case in Germany, where these are half of the seats. However, in the “additional member” variant in Scotland and Wales the list seats are less than half (only one-third in Wales) and this share combined with multiple districts and the list seats being allocated by district means the results are less than fully proportional.<sup>1</sup>

A third type of proportional electoral system is the single transferable vote (STV), in which votes express preferences in multi-member districts, candidates are elected once they reach a quota, and both surplus votes beyond the quota and wasted votes of eliminated candidates are transferred to the voter’s next choice. The main limitation on proportionality here is the moderate district magnitude (especially in Ireland where these range from three to five, versus all being five in Malta and all being six in Northern Ireland).

At the opposite extreme from proportional electoral systems are those that make no attempt at proportionality or indeed seek to achieve a majority for the lead party or coalition. Thus a fourth type of electoral system is the single-member system where members are elected in single-member districts either by plurality vote (the United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland through 1969) or majority vote with a plurality run-off if needed (France). These systems certainly bias the results in favour of the largest parties, be these national or regional, and often manufacture a majority government. A fifth and even more biased electoral system is that of multi-member plurality (bloc vote), in which the lead party gets *all* of the seats in the district. Historically this electoral system was used in Turkey in the 1950s and in Cyprus in 1976. It is not used anywhere currently in Europe.<sup>2</sup>

A sixth and rather newer type is an electoral system that started out as proportional, but now guarantees a working majority of seats to the lead party or coalition. This electoral system is now found in San Marino and was used in Italy from 2006 through 2013. (In theory Malta in 1998 and 2003 should go here as the system did guarantee such an outcome to the plurality party but given the then-pure two-party system in Malta in both of those elections earned majorities were won anyway. Consequently, Malta is treated as a continuous STV system.) Effectively, then, in systems with guaranteed majorities to the winner proportionality only occurs with respect to the various opposition parties vis-à-vis each other.

Seventh and finally for our purposes is a residual category of all systems that either are mixed-member with no aim at overall proportionality, or are list proportional representation systems with very high thresholds or with bonus seats (but no guaranteed majority) for the largest party. These systems all lack full proportionality, but without always or usually manufacturing majorities. Within this broad intermediate category are: (i) parallel systems, or what Shugart and Wattenberg (2001: 13–15) call mixed-member majoritarian systems, where the party list proportional representation seats are calculated totally independently of the single-member results; (ii) what Shugart and Wattenberg (*ibid.*) call mixed-member majoritarian



systems with partial compensation, where the party lists seats go (somewhat) more to parties that did not win the single-member seats but without full compensation; (iii) party list proportional representation systems with very high thresholds (above 5 percent), that is, those used in Northern Cyprus historically (8 percent), in Liechtenstein (8 percent), and in Turkey since 1983 (10 percent); (iv) the systems used in Northern Cyprus in 1976, 1981, and 1990 with a (regionally based) bonus for large parties; and (v) the systems used in Greece since 2007 which include a bonus of 40 (2007) then 50 (2012) seats to the largest party, with the majority of the remainder of the seats being proportional.

The various electoral systems in European elections can thus be grouped into these seven types to compare disproportionality and (where they exist) the modal majority party type (after smoothing), as is shown in Table 4.2 for the 71 different electoral systems. (By “modal majority party type” is meant that the modal or most common type occurred in the majority of elections in the case. It is possible of course that no such modal majority exists.) One sees in Table 4.2 that the first three electoral system types do have the lowest disproportionality and a strong tendency to multipartism, though never high multipartism under STV and only Germany 1949 under MMP. Indeed, STV has the lowest overall disproportionality of all seven electoral system types, although this is driven in part by two-party Malta. Austria and Germany have each had modal majority two-and-a-half-party types ‘despite’ party list proportional representation/STV. One should also note the high disproportionality of many post-communist party list proportional representation electoral systems due to high amounts of wasted votes, reflecting the weak institutionalization of their party systems. Whereas for Greece through 2004 and Spain, the key cause of on average double-digit disproportionality is small district magnitudes, which arguably could place these electoral systems into the seventh type.

One also sees in Table 4.2 that there is quite high disproportionality in the single-member electoral systems of type 4, and the highest disproportionality in the rare multi-member plurality systems of type 5. Neither of these types lead to high multipartism. Lastly the mostly residual systems of types 6 and 7 fall in between the two broad groupings in terms of disproportionality.

That said, disproportionality can work in favour of the largest party, certain parties, or all seat-winning parties (at the expense of all the parties who fail to win any seats). Consequently, a given disproportionality value does not give the full sense of the effects of an electoral system. One thus needs a more refined way of measuring electoral system effects than simple disproportionality. Dieter Nohlen (1989: 113) has suggested various ways in which electoral systems can penalize smaller parties and benefit larger ones. We shall build on this to examine six of these ways, as given in Table 4.3. For simplicity’s sake, each factor will be transferred from the raw data into a low/medium/high measure. These are then scored as 1 / 2 / 3 and a summary value out of 18 is produced.

The first three factors relate to parliamentary concentration. The first factor is the mechanical (as opposed to the psychological) concentration of the party

**TABLE 4.2** Electoral system type, disproportionality, and modal majority party type

	<i>Disproportionality</i>	<i>Modal majority party type (after smoothing)</i>
<b>Type 1</b>		
San Marino 1945–2006	1.9	moderately multi-party
Netherlands	2.7	highly multi-party
Sweden 1970–2018	2.8	highly multi-party
Denmark	2.9	highly multi-party
Faroe Islands	3.5	highly multi-party
Sweden 1948–1968	3.7	moderately multi-party
Austria	3.9	two-and-a-half party
Cyprus 1981–2016	4.2	moderately multi-party
Iceland August 1959–2017	4.5	moderately multi-party
Italy 1946–1992	4.9	highly multi-party
Basque Country	5.5	moderately multi-party
Finland	5.7	highly multi-party
Norway 1989–2017	5.8	highly multi-party
Switzerland	5.9	highly multi-party
Flanders	6.0	highly multi-party
Montenegro	6.3	moderately multi-party
Catalonia	6.4	moderately multi-party
Belgium	6.8	highly multi-party
France IV	6.8	moderately multi-party
Luxembourg	7.0	moderately multi-party
European Union 1999–2014	7.5	highly multi-party
Northern Cyprus 2003–2018	7.7	no modal majority
Portugal	8.3	moderately multi-party
Norway 1945–1985	8.6	moderately multi-party
Estonia	9.7	moderately multi-party
Latvia	10.5	highly multi-party
Greece 1974–2004	10.8	two-and-a-half party
Slovenia	10.8	highly multi-party
Serbia	11.0	no modal majority
Spain	11.4	two-and-a-half party
Romania 1992–2004, 2016	11.7	moderately multi-party
Poland 2001–2015	12.1	moderately multi-party
Slovakia	12.9	highly multi-party
France 1986	13.0	moderately multi-party
Czech Republic	14.3	moderately multi-party
Bulgaria 1991–2005, 2013–2017	14.8	no modal majority
Croatia 2000–2016	16.0	moderately multi-party
Poland 1991–1997	18.7	moderately multi-party
<i>Electoral system type unweighted mean</i>	<i>8.1</i>	
<b>Type 2</b>		
Germany 1953–2017	5.0	two-and-a-half party
Germany 1949	7.0	highly multi-party
Romania 2008–2012	7.9	moderately multi-party
Scotland	11.0	moderately multi-party
Wales	14.8	moderately multi-party
<i>Electoral system type unweighted mean</i>	<i>9.1</i>	

*(Continued)*

**TABLE 4.2** (Continued)

	<i>Disproportionality</i>	<i>Modal majority party type (after smoothing)</i>
<b>Type 3</b>		
Malta 1987–2017	1.6	two-party
Malta 1966–1981	3.6	two-party
Ireland	6.7	moderately multi-party
Northern Ireland 1973–2017	7.9	moderately multi-party
<i>Electoral system type unweighted mean</i>	<i>5.0</i>	
<b>Type 4</b>		
United Kingdom	15.2	two-and-a-half party
Northern Ireland 1945–1969	23.8	moderately multi-party, with predominance
France 1958–1981, 1988–2017	25.7	moderately multi-party
<i>Electoral system type unweighted mean</i>	<i>21.6</i>	
<b>Type 5</b>		
Turkey 1950–1957	30.6	two-party, with single-party super-majority
Cyprus 1976	35.6	moderately multi-party, with predominance
<i>Electoral system type unweighted mean</i>	<i>33.1</i>	
<b>Type 6</b>		
San Marino 2008–2016	13.1	highly multi-party
Italy 2006–2013	13.6	moderately multi-party
<i>Electoral system type unweighted mean</i>	<i>13.4</i>	
<b>Type 7</b>		
Liechtenstein	4.3	two-party
Bulgaria 1990	7.1	two-and-a-half party
Turkey 1961–1977	8.6	two-and-a-half party
Iceland 1946–June 1959	9.7	moderately multi-party
Bulgaria 2009	10.0	moderately multi-party
Italy 2018	10.1	moderately multi-party
Corsica 2015–2017	10.2	moderately multi-party
European Union 1979–1994	12.6	highly multi-party
Greece 2007–2015	12.8	highly multi-party
Northern Cyprus 1976–1998	12.9	moderately multi-party
Italy 1994–2001	15.2	highly multi-party
Hungary 1990–2010	15.2	moderately multi-party
Turkey 1983–2018	16.4	moderately multi-party
Andorra	16.6	no modal majority
Lithuania	16.6	moderately multi-party
Hungary 2014–2018	20.4	moderately multi-party, with predominance
Croatia 1992–1995	22.3	no modal majority, but predominance
<i>Electoral system type unweighted mean</i>	<i>13.0</i>	

system. This is measured by mean electoral fragmentation less parliamentary fragmentation (EFRG minus PFRG), for which a mean reduction of less than 0.050 is considered low mechanical concentration, EFRG minus PFRG from 0.050 to 0.100 is considered medium concentration, and EFRG minus PFRG of more than 0.100 is considered high concentration. Second, there is the extent to which small parties are completely excluded from gaining seats. This is the measurement of wasted votes (WV), for which mean WV of less than 2.0 is considered low exclusion, WV from 2.0 to 4.0 is considered medium, and WV of more than 4.0 is considered high. Third, there is the extent to which the main two parties are jointly advantaged by the electoral system. SB2P – the ‘seat bias in favour of the two largest parties’ – is designed to measure this. Mean SB2P of less than 5.0 is considered low bias, SB2P from 5.0 to 10.0 is considered medium, and SB2P of more than 10.0 is considered high.

The remaining three factors speak to advantages for the largest party. The fourth factor is thus simply the mean SBLP, that is, “seat bias in favour of the largest party”. Mean SBLP of less than 4.0 is considered low bias, SBLP from 4.0 to 8.0 is considered medium, and SBLP of more than 8.0 is considered high. The fifth factor is the extent to which the leading party wins an overall majority of seats, whether this is earned through a concentration of the votes or manufactured by the electoral system (Rae 1967: 74). For a given election, this is of course a dichotomous result (either it happens or it does not). Here we thus measure the frequency of its occurrence over the period. Parliamentary majorities occurring less than 20 percent of the time are considered low, those occurring from 20 to 80 percent of the time are considered medium, and those occurring more than 80 percent of the time are considered high. Of course, in most cases here ‘low’ actually means ‘never’. Over 80 percent is obviously a high cut-off (and below 20 percent a low one), but it is felt that only when a majority occurs more than four times out of five can the polity and the parties take it to be the ‘normal’ outcome. Finally, the sixth factor measures just manufactured majorities of seats, and uses the same scale as for parliamentary majorities. It is worth noting that, in the overall data set of elections of Chapter 3, there are a lot more manufactured majorities than earned majorities (98–45). Europe thus confirms Rae’s (1967: 74–77) general point that most parliamentary majorities are manufactured majorities.

Table 4.3 groups the various electoral systems by the total level of overall bias. The highest possible overall bias (within the parameters of the scale) is found in Cyprus 1976 and Hungary since 2014. High overall bias is also found in all of the single-member electoral systems. Conversely, the low overall bias systems are largely party list proportional representation ones, with a couple STV systems and a couple residual ones. However, what is more striking is the general range of party list proportional representation systems, with these found in all categories up to medium-high overall bias. Thus the nuances of party list proportional representation especially in terms of electoral thresholds and sometimes district magnitudes are quite important.

**TABLE 4.3** Electoral system bias effects

<i>Bias in the electoral system</i>	<i>Electoral system type</i>	<i>1.</i>	<i>2.</i>	<i>3.</i>	<i>4.</i>	<i>5.</i>	<i>6.</i>	<i>Total / 18</i>
<b>High</b>								
Cyprus 1976	5	H	H	H	H	H	H	18
Hungary 2014–2018	7	H	H	H	H	H	H	18
Northern Ireland 1945–1969	4	H	H	H	H	H	M	17
Croatia 1992–1995	7	H	H	H	H	M	M	16
France V 1958–1981, 1988–2017	4	H	H	H	H	M	M	16
Turkey 1983–2018	7	H	H	H	H	M	M	16
United Kingdom	4	H	L	H	H	H	H	16
Andorra	7	H	M	H	H	M	M	15
Hungary 1990–2010	7	H	H	H	H	M	L	15
Lithuania	7	M	H	H	H	M	M	15
<b>Medium-high</b>								
Bulgaria 1991–2005, 2013–2017	1	M	H	H	M	M	M	14
Greece 1974–2004	1	M	M	H	H	M	M	14
Greece 2007–2015	7	M	H	M	H	M	M	14
Poland 1991–1997	1	H	H	H	H	L	L	14
Turkey 1950–1957	5	H	L	M	H	H	M	14
Wales	2	H	H	H	H	L	L	14
Croatia 2000–2016	1	M	H	H	H	L	L	13
Czech Republic	1	H	H	H	M	L	L	13
Northern Cyprus 1976–1998	7	M	H	M	H	M	L	13
Northern Cyprus 2003–2018	1	M	H	M	M	M	M	13
Scotland	2	M	H	H	H	L	L	13
Serbia	1	M	H	M	M	M	M	13
Bulgaria 2009	7	M	H	M	H	L	L	12
Italy 2006–2013	6	M	H	M	H	L	L	12
Norway 1945–1985	1	M	M	M	M	M	M	12
Poland 2001–2015	1	M	H	H	M	L	L	12
Spain	1	M	L	H	M	M	M	12
<b>Medium</b>								
Bulgaria 1990	7	L	L	L	M	H	H	11
Catalonia	1	L	M	M	M	M	M	11
Corsica 2015–2017	7	M	L	M	H	M	L	11
Montenegro	1	L	H	M	L	M	M	11
Portugal	1	M	H	M	M	L	L	11
Romania 1992–2004, 2016	1	M	H	M	M	L	L	11
Slovakia	1	M	H	M	M	L	L	11
Turkey 1961–1977	7	M	M	M	M	M	L	11
Estonia	1	L	H	M	M	L	L	10
France V 1986	1	M	M	M	M	L	L	10
Liechtenstein	7	L	M	L	L	H	M	10
Malta 1966–1981	3	L	M	L	L	H	M	10
Romania 2008–2012	2	L	H	L	M	M	L	10
<b>Medium-low</b>								
EU 1979–1994	7	L	H	L	M	L	L	9
Germany 1949	2	L	H	M	L	L	L	9
San Marino 2008–2016	6	L	M	M	M	L	L	9
Austria	1	L	M	L	L	M	L	8
EU 1999–2014	1	L	H	L	L	L	L	8
Germany 1953–2017	2	L	H	L	L	L	L	8
Iceland 1946–June 1959	7	L	M	M	L	L	L	8

Latvia	1	L	H	L	L	L	L	8
Luxembourg	1	L	M	L	M	L	L	8
Malta 1987–2017	3	L	L	L	L	H	L	8
Slovenia	1	L	H	L	L	L	L	8
<b>Low</b>								
Basque Country	1	L	M	L	L	L	L	7
Belgium	1	L	M	L	L	L	L	7
Cyprus 1981–2016	1	L	M	L	L	L	L	7
Denmark	1	L	M	L	L	L	L	7
Flanders	1	L	M	L	L	L	L	7
Iceland August 1959–2017	1	L	M	L	L	L	L	7
Ireland	3	L	L	M	L	L	L	7
Italy 1994–2001	7	L	L	M	L	L	L	7
Italy 2018	7	L	L	M	L	L	L	7
Northern Ireland 1973–2017	3	L	M	L	L	L	L	7
Norway 1989–2017	1	L	M	L	L	L	L	7
Sweden 1970–2018	1	L	M	L	L	L	L	7
Switzerland	1	L	M	L	L	L	L	7
Faroe Islands	1	L	L	L	L	L	L	6
Finland	1	L	L	L	L	L	L	6
France IV	1	L	L	L	L	L	L	6
Italy 1946–1992	1	L	L	L	L	L	L	6
Netherlands	1	L	L	L	L	L	L	6
San Marino 1945–2006	1	L	L	L	L	L	L	6
Sweden 1948–1968	1	L	L	L	L	L	L	6

1 mechanical concentration of party system (EFRG–PFRG).

2 exclusion of smaller parties (WV).

3 seat bias in favour of the two largest parties (SB2P).

4 seat bias in favour of the largest party (SBLP).

5 frequency of parliamentary majorities (EM+MM).

6 frequency of ‘manufactured majorities’ (MM).

[measures from Nohlen 1989, with addition].

## Notes

1 For a comparison between the German electoral system and those of Scotland and Wales, see Siaroff (2000).

2 A multi-member plurality electoral system can be found nowadays for example in Singapore in its Group Representation constituencies.

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**APPENDIX TABLE 4.1** Current electoral system data (late-2018)

SYSTEM	TOTAL SEATS	SINGLE-MEMBER SEATS	MULTI-MEMBER SEATS		SEATS FROM A NATIONAL LIST
			Total	#D	Seat range
Andorra	28	none	14	7	2
Austria	183	none	170	9	7–36
Belgium	150	none	all	11	4–24
Flanders	124	none	all	6	6–33
Bulgaria	240	none	all	31	4–14
Croatia	151	8	143	11	3*, 14
* for the Croatian diaspora					
Cyprus (Greek)	56	none	all	6	3–21
Northern Cyprus	50	none	all	6	2–16
Czech Republic	200	none	all	14	5–26
Denmark*	175	none	135	10	2–20
* mainland Denmark only; plus two seats for each of the Faroe Islands and Greenland					
Faroe Islands	33	none	none		all
Estonia	101	none	all	12	6–12
Finland	200	1	199	14	6–33
France (Métropole)	577	all	none		none
Corsica	63	none	none		all
Germany	599*	299	299*	16	2–64

\* may be more if a party or parties win “overhang seats” or “balance seats” (the latter added in 2013)

Greece	300	8	280	48	2-42	12
Hungary	199	106	none			93
Iceland	63	none	54	6	9	9
Ireland	166	none	all	42	3-5	none
Italy	630	2	616*	62	4-9	none
★ plus 12 seats for the Italian diaspora						
Latvia	100	none	all	5	13-30	none
Liechtenstein	25	none	all	2	10-15	none
Lithuania	141	71	none			70
Luxembourg	60	none	all	4	7-23	none
Malta	65	none	all	13	5	none
Montenegro	81	none	none			all
Netherlands	150	none	none			all
Norway	169	none	150	19	3-16	19
Poland	460	none	all	41	4-19	none
Portugal	230	none	all	22*	2-47	none
★ including two districts for the Portuguese diaspora						
Romania	329*	none	312	43	4-29	none
★ including 17 reserved seats for minorities						
San Marino	60	none	none			all
Serbia	250	none	none			all
Slovakia	150	none	none			all
Slovenia	90	2*	88	8	11	none

★ one each for Hungarian and Italian minorities

(Continued)



APPENDIX TABLE 4.1 (Continued)

SYSTEM	TOTAL SEATS	SINGLE-MEMBER SEATS	MULTI-MEMBER SEATS		SEAT range	SEATS FROM A NATIONAL LIST
			Total	#D		
Spain	350	2	348	50	2-35	none
Basque Country	75	none	all	3	25	none
Catalonia	135	none	all	4	15-85	none
Sweden	349	none	310	29	2-37	39
Switzerland	200	6	194	20	2-34	none
Turkey	600	1	599	86	2-35	none
United Kingdom	650	all	none			none
N.Ireland	90	none	all	18	5	none
Scotland	129	73	56	8	7	none
Wales	60	40	20	5	4	none
European Union	751	none	all	28	6-96	none

#D = number of (subnational) districts.

# 5

## GOVERNMENTS AND PARTY TYPES

To what extent do the different party types (systems and patterns) have different outcomes in terms of governments? Do two-party systems and patterns (almost) always yield single-party majorities? Are dominant parties in multi-party systems and patterns also dominant around the cabinet table? This chapter will provide relevant data and answers for these questions. First of all, though, for a party system or pattern to have any causal effect on a government there must be a linkage between the composition of parliament and the resulting government. Such a linkage occurs by definition in a parliamentary system. However, in a presidential system wherein the government is not accountable to the legislature, the composition of the cabinet reflects presidential wishes not legislative outcomes. Thus the governments in the presidential system of this analysis, that of Cyprus (Greek), cannot be analysed as reflections of Cyprus' party system. Arguably a similar point can be made for the composition of the European Commission: even if it now requires the investiture of the European Parliament, its composition in terms of individuals is determined by member state governments. Outside of these two exceptions then, one can analyse the subsequent governmental patterns of European party systems.

However, one must first be clear on what is meant by a government or more precisely a government change before one can count and analyse governments. This study takes what may be called a 'maximalist' approach, in that it considers a new government to occur when any of the following happens: (a) a change in the party membership of a cabinet, that is, a party or parties either entering or leaving the government (but not merely changing their relative weights); (b) the loss of majority status of a government; (c) the change of a prime minister; or (d) the (re)formation of a government after an election, even if nothing else occurs. (However, the between-elections resignation and reformation of the same government in a partisan sense is not coded as a new government.) Each criteria but the first one here is controversial, and various scholars do use varying definitions (Laver

and Schofield 1990: 145–147, Lijphart 1999: 131). Based on these criteria, the most governments since 1945 (through October 2018) have been in Italy with 65, France (combining the Fourth and Fifth Republics) with 63, and Finland with 56.

This analysis will be in two parts, as the analysis will first be done nationally and then by party types. This dual approach occurs in this chapter as some institutional features vary by nations. The raw data for this analysis are provided in Appendix Table 5.1. For each polity, it lists all postwar or post-democratization governments (as defined), and gives for each first the month and year it took office, the month and year it broke up, resigned, or faced the voters in an election, and then the consequent number of months in power. (Unless otherwise indicated, where there is a gap between the end date and a new post-election government, the incumbent government serves in a caretaker capacity during these months; however, given that the focus is months in power not months in office this period is not included in government duration.) Appendix Table 5.1 then gives the number of parties in the government and the combined parliamentary base of these parties – the latter being rounded to an integer value except where between 49.5 and 50.5 inclusive. Of course, for a single-party government the parliamentary base is just the percentage of seats held by that party.

Next is given the type of government in terms of five key types, although these are seven in number with a further indicator. These five key types are as follows: a single-party majority government [SP MAJ]; a single-party minority government [SP MIN]; a multi-party minority coalition government [MP MIN]; a multi-party minimal-winning coalition [MP MWC], that is, one in which removing any one party would cost it its parliamentary majority; or a multi-party oversized coalition [MP OVC], that is, one which contains ‘extra parties’ beyond those needed to have a (bare) majority in parliament. In addition, if a multi-party coalition of two parties involves the two largest parties and these are the main political rivals, this is what is known in German as a “grand coalition” [GC]. Such coalitions have been quite common in Austria and Liechtenstein, but have certainly occurred elsewhere. They are thus indicated as such in Appendix Table 5.1, although these are ultimately subtypes of either multi-party minimal-winning coalitions or multi-party oversized coalitions, as the case may be. Non-partisan caretaker or technocratic governments are classified separately. Then Appendix Table 5.1 gives a measure of cabinet dominance, that is, the percentage of cabinet seats held by the party with the largest number, and thus percentage, of seats. If one party holds all the cabinet seats, then this value is 100. Independent ministers – which are indicated in the case studies with an “(I)” – are certainly considered part of the cabinet, and thus part of the denominator for this calculation.

Finally, Appendix Table 5.1 provides for reference purposes the change in the composition of government. Peter Mair (2002) argues that the key distinction of party systems involves the structure of competition for government, that is, whether this is closed or open. One of his indicators is alternation in government, where he distinguishes between non-alternation (no change in the governing party or parties), partial alternation, and wholesale alternation (a complete change between

one party or coalition of parties and a different party or totally different coalition). In this analysis 'partial alternation' is reserved for situations where there is both an entering and an exiting coalition party or parties; where just the former this is deemed an expansion, and where just the latter this is deemed a contraction. Lastly, where the previous government was a non-partisan one, the comparison is made with this and the alternation is always considered wholesale.

Given that a re-elected government is still considered a new government for the purpose of analysis, individual heads of government can and do serve across multiple governments. However, where these are sequential one can refer to a period of being head of government, and likewise individuals can serve multiple periods as head of government (empirically, the maximum has been three periods). In any case, cumulatively some heads of government have served in that position for long periods of time. Specifically, since 1945 in the countries and regions under focus here the following individuals served as heads of government for 15 years or more (including election periods and rounding to the nearest year):

Jordi Pujol as prime minister (formally, president) of Catalonia for 24 years;  
 Tage Erlander as prime minister of Sweden for 23 years;  
 Pierre Werner as prime minister of Luxembourg for 20 years (across two periods);  
 Basil Brooke as prime minister of Northern Ireland for 18 years (in fact 20 years from 1943);  
 Jean-Claude Juncker as prime minister of Luxembourg for 18 years;  
 Alexander Frick as prime minister of Liechtenstein for 17 years;  
 Einar Gerhardsen as prime minister of Norway for 17 years (across three periods);  
 Atli Dam as prime minister of the Faroe Islands for 16 years (across three periods);  
 Gabriele Gatti as secretary of state for foreign and political affairs of San Marino for 16 years;  
 Helmut Kohl as chancellor of Germany for 16 years; and  
 Hans Brunhart as prime minister of Liechtenstein for 15 years.

One can note that at the end of 2020 Angela Merkel will reach 15 years as Chancellor of Germany if she is still in the position. Conversely, the shortest total period as a head of government belongs to Pierre Pflimlin at the end of the French Fourth Republic, who achieved this perhaps dubious distinction by serving for just 18 days before power was passed to Charles de Gaulle.

Returning to governments as a whole, in terms of government formation it is important to note the difference between negative and positive parliamentarism. Under negative parliamentarism, a government once sworn in is assumed to have the support, or at least the tolerance, of the parliament. If this assumed or implicit support is not truly the case, then it is up to the opposition party or parties to move a motion of non-confidence. Under positive parliamentarism, a new government must show that it has the explicit support of parliament. This is done by holding a *vote of investiture* which a government must pass before it can assume power. Even if a government has already been sworn in by the head of state, it does

not properly take over until it has passed a vote of investiture. Should a government fail a vote of investiture, then it is 'stillborn' and does not count as ever having been a government.

As Table 5.1 on national institutional features shows, the vast majority of European governments use the system of positive parliamentarianism. Indeed, every new democracy in Central and Eastern Europe has adopted it. Finland changed to this procedure in the 1990s. In contrast, whereas the French Fourth Republic used positive parliamentarianism, the Fifth Republic uses negative parliamentarianism (as part of France's general weakening of the role of parliament). Two countries are a bit deceptive in this regard. First, Sweden adopted the requirement of a vote of investiture in its 1975 constitution, however this is framed so as to count abstentions and absences on the government side thus, as Bergman (1993: 287) stresses, it still functions as negative parliamentarianism in terms of (minority) government formation. Second, the Netherlands formally is a system of negative parliamentarianism. However, votes of investiture are often held there, and more crucially it has a longstanding tradition of seeking to have a majority (coalition) government.

As Bergman (1993) notes, negative parliamentarianism tends to lead to minority governments after a hung parliament, since a minority party may be able to get support from different parties on different issues and thus separate its agenda, unlike under positive parliamentarianism. Indeed, sometimes – especially, as Bergman stresses, in the Nordic countries – these minority governments are not even close to a majority, in that they hold 40 percent or less of the seats. Finally, governments take longer to form under positive parliamentarianism. Part of this is just the procedure of calling back parliament, debating the proposed government's programme, and holding the actual vote of investiture. Under negative parliamentarianism, a government can be simply appointed or reappointed, and it takes power right there and then. Of course, what usually takes much longer than the formalities under positive parliamentarianism are the negotiations needed to form a coalition and/or ensure that the investiture vote is a success.

Certainly the difference between negative and positive parliamentarianism can be seen in terms of the duration of the formation and investiture period (the latter, again apply only to positive parliamentarianism). For the countries effectively using negative parliamentarianism (so including Sweden since 1976 and excluding the Netherlands) the average formation time is 27 days. For the other countries, using positive parliamentarianism and/or seeking a majority government in the case of the Netherlands, the average formation and investiture time is 44 days. Of course, as noted in Chapter 2, in individual cases this has involved many months or well over a year. The longest national average is that of the Czech Republic, at 100 days, followed by the Netherlands and Belgium. Such long formation periods (invariably with more than one attempted formation) raise the question of whether these can be lessened. In a couple places this is done by the threat (and reality) of another election.

**TABLE 5.1** National institutional features and data on government formation and survival

	<i>Parliamentarianism</i>	<i>Mean F(+I)P integer value</i>	<i>F(+I)P correlation with ICD</i>	<i>Non-confidence rules</i>	<i>Mean government duration in months</i>
Andorra	positive	35	0.299	absolute majority motion	35
Austria	negative	60	0.437	simple majority (plurality) motion	31
Belgium	positive	92	0.402	simple majority (plurality) motion until 1995	17
				absolute majority constructive motion since 1995	25
Flanders	positive	39	-0.552	absolute majority constructive motion	38
Bulgaria	positive	40	-0.138	absolute majority motion	18
Croatia	positive	37	0.634	absolute majority motion	28
Cyprus	n.a.			n.a.	32
Northern Cyprus	positive	35	0.177	absolute majority motion	17
Czech Republic	positive	100	0.134	absolute majority motion	24
Denmark	negative	12	0.170	simple majority (plurality) motion	22
Faroe Islands	negative	46	-0.019	simple majority (plurality) motion	29
Estonia	positive	33	-0.630	absolute majority motion	18
Finland	negative until 1995 election	55	0.293	simple majority (plurality) motion	13
	positive since 1995 election	36	0.823	simple majority (plurality) motion	22
France Fourth Republic	positive	36	0.747	absolute majority motion	6
France Fifth Republic	negative	13	0.510	absolute majority motion	20
Corsica	positive	14	n.a.	absolute majority motion	24
Germany	positive	48	0.565	absolute majority constructive motion	27
Greece	positive	21	-0.320	absolute majority motion	20
Hungary	positive	42	-0.018	absolute majority constructive motion	30
Iceland	negative	32	0.313	absolute majority motion	25
Ireland	positive	23	0.767	simple majority (plurality) motion	25
Italy	positive	53	0.112	simple majority (plurality) motion	13
Latvia	positive	34	-0.625	simple majority (plurality) motion	14
Liechtenstein	positive	60	-0.079	simple majority (plurality) motion	36

(Continued)

TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

	Parliamentarianism	Mean $F(+I)P$ integer value	$F(+I)P$ correlation with ICD	Non-confidence rules	Mean government duration in months
Lithuania	positive	43	0.621	absolute majority motion	23
Luxembourg	positive	36	0.284	simple majority (plurality) motion	42
Malta	negative	4	0.290	absolute majority motion	47
Montenegro	positive	62	-0.926	absolute majority motion	21
Netherlands	negative	94	0.397	simple majority (plurality) motion	28
Norway	negative	24	0.817	simple majority (plurality) motion	27
Poland	positive	37	0.793	absolute majority constructive motion	13
Portugal	negative*	42	0.390	absolute majority motion	25
Romania	positive	30	0.431	absolute majority motion	15
San Marino	positive	36	0.049	absolute majority motion	24
Serbia	positive	74	0.568	absolute majority motion	20
Slovakia	positive	40	-0.050	absolute majority motion	23
Slovenia	positive	71	0.373	absolute majority constructive motion	23
Spain	positive	43	0.811	absolute majority constructive motion	37
Basque Country	positive	63	0.660	simple majority (plurality) motion	29
Catalonia	positive	44	0.421	simple majority (plurality) motion	31
Sweden	negative until 1976 election	15	0.192	simple majority (plurality) motion until 1971	27
				absolute majority motion since 1971	28
	positive since 1976 election**	20	-0.037		
Switzerland	positive	50	-0.162	n.a.	39
Turkey until 2018	positive	35	0.658	absolute majority motion until 2018	20
United Kingdom	negative*	5	-0.332	simple majority (plurality) motion	32
Northern Ireland	positive	44	0.355	absolute majority motion	19
Scotland	positive	13	-0.207	simple majority (plurality) motion	29
Wales	positive	11	0.899	simple majority (plurality) motion	29
means (unweighted)		40.1			25.2

\* A required debate on the government programme may involve a motion of rejection, as happened in Portugal in 2015.

\*\* There is a required vote of investiture, but under a negative voting procedure.

In Greece, as per Article 37 of its constitution, in a hung parliament an exploratory mandate to ascertain the possibility of forming a government which has the confidence of parliament is given first to the leader of the plurality party, then if unsuccessful to the leader of the second-largest party, then if that is unsuccessful to the leader of the third-largest party. Each exploratory mandate is for only three days. If all three exploratory mandates are unsuccessful, and a final meeting of all party leaders summoned by the president confirms the inability to form a cabinet with the confidence of parliament, then another election is held. This situation occurred in 2012.

In Spain, as per Article 99.5 of its constitution, if within two months of the first vote of investiture no candidate has received the confidence of parliament (either with an absolute majority on the first ballot or a plurality on the second ballot) then the king dissolves parliament and a new election is held. No specific number of additional investiture attempts are needed. Similar procedures apply to the Spanish autonomous communities. Of course, some time may occur before the first investiture vote, but once it is held then an “electoral countdown” (Bosco and Verney 2016: 401) begins and this cannot be stopped except by a successful vote of investiture. This situation of no government being formed and a new election held occurred in Spain in (2015–)2016. In Catalonia in (2017–)2018 the imminence of such a new election led the exiled separatist leader Carles Puigdemont to finally step aside for another candidate for premier.

Of course, if an election is decisive – producing a single-party majority – then government formation should be quick and easy. Alternatively, the more indecisive the election the more difficult, and slow, should be the government formation. In Chapter 2 an Index of Coalition Difficulty (ICD) was introduced and indeed the Pearson correlation coefficient between the ICD and FP(+IP) in days across the cases in this section is a reasonable 0.370. That said, *within* individual cases the correlation is extremely varied, as is shown in Table 5.1. In most post-communist cases the correlation is weak or indeed negative. Presumably a certain level of party system institutionalization is needed to facilitate this relationship (that is, lacking such institutionalization government formation can be challenging even with moderate ICD). The cases with the highest correlation are often those where the party system has become more fragmented over time (Norway) or quite recently (Germany, Ireland, Spain).

In terms of government duration – ultimately, whether a government can last a full parliamentary term – one can also note three different procedures in terms of non-confidence motions, as given in Table 5.1. In one version all this needs to be successful is having more votes in favour than against. Thus in the United Kingdom in March 1979 the Callaghan Labour government lost a vote of non-confidence by 311 votes to 310, even though there were three abstentions (plus that of the Speaker). Only a minority of European systems uses such a simple majority (that is, plurality) threshold. Most require the votes in favour to be an absolute majority of all deputies, thus counting those absent or abstaining to be on the government side. Finally, some of these absolute majority systems go further and require a



constructive vote (or motion) of non-confidence, in which a (head of) government is voted out and replaced by a specified alternative. This requires the parties in favour to agree on an alternative government, and this has been a rare event – being successful only once in each of Germany, Hungary, and Spain.

There is but a modest sense, however, that these differences shape overall government duration. Certainly governments have lasted a few months longer in Belgium since the constructive vote was introduced in 1995. However, there is a wide range of lengths in each category. The French Fourth Republic had by far though short-est governments, even with an absolute majority requirement for a non-confidence motion. Poland has had short-lasting governments despite requiring a constructive vote of non-confidence. Governments have been long-lasting in Luxembourg and Liechtenstein despite requiring only a plurality for a successful motion of non-confidence. The reality here is that the requirement for a non-confidence motion does not affect the tendency of coalitions to come apart, or prime ministers to resign. Rather, the type of government in terms of more or less stable matters much more (see later).

Turning now to differences in government formation in terms of party types (systems and patterns), Table 5.2 provides various data in this regard. First there is the mean F(+I)P in days. This shows a clear linear pattern across the party systems, though less so the party patterns, with the mean of these means as follows:

- two-party systems – 22 days;
- two-and-a-half-party systems – 31 days;
- moderately multi-party systems – 38 days;
- highly multi-party systems – 53 days;
- two-party patterns – 21 days;
- two-and-a-half-party patterns – 38 days;
- moderately multi-party patterns – 45 days;
- highly multi-party patterns – 47 days.

Given the partial definitional overlap between two-and-a-half-party and moderately multi-party types, it is not surprising that they have similar formation times.

Regarding the duration of a government, this seems to relate strongly to the specific type of government in question. As Laver and Schofield (1990: 151) note, there is general agreement that minority governments are less stable than majority ones, given how they are more likely to be defeated in parliament. Laver and Shonfield (*ibid.*) then note that, “[a]rguing along the same lines, minimal winning majority [coalition] governments should be less susceptible to change than surplus majority [coalition] governments”, since the latter can shed one or perhaps more members and the rest of the parties can still have a majority. (Of course, this would still be a new government.) Laver and Schofield's (1990: 151–152) evidence from 12 West European countries bears out these assumptions, although it shows that single-party majorities are even longer lasting than multi-party minimal winning coalitions.

TABLE 5.2 Governments by party types

	Mean <i>F(+I)P</i> in days	Total governments	Of which, SP MAJ or MP MWC	Percentage of these two types	Median number of parties in government	Of these, median cabinet dominance	Mean number of months in power
TWO-PARTY SYSTEMS							
Liechtenstein 1945–1989 inclusive	67	16	0	0%	2	50	35
Malta 1966–2017+ inclusive	4	14	14	100%	1	100	47
Turkey 1950–1957 inclusive	9	3	3	100%	1	100	40
United Kingdom 1950–1970 inclusive	7	11	11	100%	1	100	31
TWO-PARTY PATTERNS							
San Marino 1945–1949 inclusive	16	3	2	67%	1	100	36
Turkey 2002	25	2	2	100%	1	100	28
overall two-party means and medians:	21.3				1	100	36.4
TWO-AND-A-HALF-PARTY SYSTEMS							
Andorra 2005–2015+ inclusive	35	4	2	50%	1	65	38
Austria 1945–1986 inclusive	45	17	15	88%	2	53	28
Belgium 1949–1961 inclusive	32	9	8	89%	2	57	27

(Continued)

TABLE 5.2 (Continued)

	Mean $F(+I)P$ in days	Total governments	Of which, SP MAJ or MP MWC	Percentage of these two types	Median number of parties in government	Of these, median cabinet dominance	Mean number of months in power
Bulgaria 1990–1997 inclusive	51	8	3	38%	1	100	18
Catalonia 1984–1992 inclusive	27	4	3	75%	1	100	34
Germany 1953–2002 inclusive	37	25	18	72%	2	76	30
Greece 1977–2009 inclusive	21	18	14	78%	1	100	33
Ireland 1957–11/1982 inclusive	16	14	8	57%	1	100	25
Liechtenstein 02/1993–2009 inclusive	62	6	5	83%	2	60	34
Poland 2007–2015+ inclusive	34	5	5	100%	2	58	31
Portugal 1991–2005 inclusive	21	6	4	67%	1	66	45
Spain 1977–2011 inclusive	36	12	4	33%	1	100	37
Turkey 1965–1977 inclusive	40	10	5	50%	1.5	100	14
United Kingdom 02/1974–1992 inclusive	4	9	6	67%	1	100	31
United Kingdom 2005–2017+ inclusive	2	6	5	83%	1	100	21
TWO-AND-A-HALF-PARTY PATTERNS							
Austria 2002	96	1	1	100%	2	64	44
Croatia 2007–2011 inclusive	34	3	1	33%	4	79	24
France V 1993	8	2	2	100%	2	53	26
France V 2007–2012 inclusive	3	8	2	25%	2.5	84	15
Hungary 2002–2006 inclusive	42	5	3	60%	2	53	22
Italy 1948	35	3	0	0%	3	68	18
Montenegro 2002	80	1	0	0%	3	68	32
Northern Cyprus 2005–2009 inclusive	23	7	6	86%	1	100	16

Portugal 2015+	61	1	0	0%	1	72	tbd
Scotland 2011	14	2	2	100%	1	100	60
United Kingdom 1945	22	1	1	100%	1	100	55
<i>overall two-and-a-half-party means and medians:</i>	<i>33.9</i>				<i>1.25</i>	<i>77.5</i>	<i>30.3</i>
MODERATELY MULTI-PARTY SYSTEMS							
Austria 1990–1999 inclusive	82	5	5	100%	2	50	27
Basque Country 2001–2016+ inclusive	61	6	0	0%	2	74	35
Bulgaria 2001–2017+ inclusive	33	10	2	20%	2	63	23
Catalonia 1995–2006 inclusive	28	5	2	40%	2	87	35
Croatia 1995–2003 inclusive	25	4	1	25%	3.5	78	32
Cyprus 1976–2011 inclusive	n.a.	13	2	15%	2	44	33
Czech Republic 1996–2010 inclusive	74	9	4	44%	3	50	19
Denmark 1945–1971 inclusive**	12	16	3	19%	1	95	19
Estonia 2003–2015+ inclusive	35	8	7	88%	3	43	24
France IV 1945–11/1946 inclusive	29	15	0	0%	4	43	3
France V 1967–2002 inclusive	13	23	4	17%	2	68	19
Germany 2005–2017+ inclusive	88	4	4	100%	2	63	46
Hungary 1990–1998 inclusive	39	4	0	0%	3	62	31
Hungary 2010–2018+ inclusive*	45	3	0	0%	2	55	47
Iceland 1946–2013 inclusive	30	32	22	69%	2	50	32
Ireland 1948–1954 inclusive	24	4	1	25%	3.5	55	22
Ireland 1987–2016+ inclusive	30	16	4	25%	2	87	36
Italy 1963–1972 inclusive	62	14	2	14%	3	62	11

(Continued)

TABLE 5.2 (Continued)

	Mean <i>F(+I)P</i> in days	Total governments	Of which, SP MAJ or MP MWC	Percentage of these two types	Median number of parties in government	Of these, median cabinet dominance	Mean number of months in power
Italy 2008–2018+ inclusive	63	7	1	14%	3	62	19
Lithuania 1992–2000 inclusive	32	8	4	50%	2.5	47	22
Luxembourg 1945–2013+ inclusive	36	20	18	90%	2	58	44
Montenegro 2006–2012 inclusive	62	6	0	0%	4	74	22
Northern Cyprus 1976–2003 inclusive	30	17	15	88%	2	60	18
Northern Ireland 2003–2017+ inclusive	31	11	1	9%	4	42	7
Norway 1945–1993 inclusive**	18	25	9	36%	1	100	27
Poland 1993–2005 inclusive	34	14	8	57%	2	56	10
Portugal 1975–1987 inclusive	60	9	5	56%	1	76	23
Romania 1996–2016+ inclusive	27	18	5	28%	2.5	60	15
San Marino 1951–2006 inclusive	42	29	21	72%	2	60	27
Scotland 1999–2007 inclusive	13	5	4	80%	2	82	24
Sweden 1948–1988 inclusive**	17	21	7	33%	1	100	25
Turkey 1983–11/2015+ inclusive	42	19	15	79%	1	100	23
Wales 1999–2016+ inclusive**	11	8	3	38%	1.5	94	29

★ includes (sub)system of predominance

\*\* includes (sub)system(s) of dominance

MODERATELY MULTI-PARTY  
PATTERNS

Andorra 1997–2001 inclusive	33	2	2	100%	1	?	48
Austria 2006–2008 inclusive	84	2	2	100%	2	50	39
Basque Country 1980–1984 inclusive	38	3	0	0%	1	100	25
Belgium 1946	46	3	3	100%	3	54	37

Belgium 1965	69	2			100%	2	64	16
Catalonia 1980	35	1	0		0%	1	100	48
Catalonia 2015	105	1	1		100%	1	57	21
Corsica 2015–2017+ inclusive	14	2	1		50%	2	76	24
Croatia 2015–2016+ inclusive	57	2	1		50%	2	57	8
Czech Republic 1990	20	1	0		0%	3	48	24
Estonia 1992	31	2	1		50%	3	29	24
Faroe Islands 1945–1950 inclusive	37	2	2		100%	3	50	30
Flanders 2004	37	2	2		100%	3	33	30
Flanders 2014+	61	1	0		0%	3	44	tbd
France V 2017+	4	1	0		0%	2	5	tbd
Greece 1974	27	1	1		100%	1	100	35
Italy 1946	44	4	0		0%	3.5	44	4
Latvia 2010–2011 inclusive	35	3	2		67%	3	36	27
Liechtenstein 2013–2017+ inclusive	53	2	2		100%	2	60	47
Lithuania 2016+	30	1	1		100%	2	79	tbd
Netherlands 1986–1989 inclusive	58	2	2		100%	2	61	46
Portugal 2009–2011 inclusive	23	2	1		50%	1.5	51	36
Scotland 2016+	12	1	0		0%	1	100	tbd
Serbia 2007–2008 inclusive	93	2	1		50%	6	44	29
Serbia 2014	42	1	0		0%	5	42	24
Slovakia 1992	27	4	2		50%	2	92	7
Slovakia 2010–2012 inclusive	42	2	2		100%	2.5	56	34
Spain 2015–2016+ inclusive	125	2	0		0%	1	74	19
Turkey 1961	36	4	3		75%	2.5	49	12
overall moderately multi-party means and medians:	41.7					2	60	26.3

(Continued)

**TABLE 5.2** (Continued)

	<i>Mean F(+D)P in days</i>	<i>Total governments</i>	<i>Of which, SP MAJ or MP MWC</i>	<i>Percentage of these two types</i>	<i>Median number of parties in government</i>	<i>Of these, median cabinet dominance</i>	<i>Mean number of months in power</i>
<b>HIGHLY MULTI-PARTY SYSTEMS</b>							
Basque Country 1986–1998 inclusive	79	6	2	33%	2	67	26
Belgium 1968–2014+ inclusive	116	28	9	32%	4	31	20
Denmark 1973–2015+ inclusive	12	24	1	4%	2	63	25
Faroe Islands 1954–2015+ inclusive	46	26	23	88%	3	40	34
Finland 1945–2015+ inclusive	49	56	8	14%	4	40	22
Greece 05/2012–09/2015+ inclusive	18	6	3	50%	2	76	13
Italy 1976–2006 inclusive	53	26	6	23%	6	52	21
Latvia 1993–2006 inclusive	33	15	1	7%	4	36	16
Lithuania 2004–2012 inclusive	59	4	1	25%	4	53	37
Netherlands 1946–1982 inclusive	88	18	6	33%	4	42	30
Netherlands 1994–2017+ inclusive	112	10	6	60%	3	43	31
Norway 1997–2017+ inclusive	36	8	2	25%	3	53	43
San Marino 2008–2016+ inclusive	24	3	1	33%	4	50	47
Slovakia 1994–2006 inclusive	45	4	3	75%	3.5	56	46
Slovenia 1992–2018+ inclusive	71	14	4	29%	4	43	26
Sweden 1991–2014+ inclusive	20	8	1	13%	1.5	88	35
Switzerland 1947–2015+ inclusive	50	21	2	10%	4	29	40
<b>HIGHLY MULTI-PARTY PATTERNS</b>							
Andorra 1993	38	2	0	0%	1	?	19
Austria 2013	78	2	2	100%	2	47	23

Catalonia 2010–2012 inclusive	26	3	0	0%	1	85	19
Catalonia 2017+	144	1	0	0%	2	50	tbđ
Croatia 1992	37	2	2	100%	1	100	17
Cyprus 2016+	n.a.	1	0	0%	1	42	tbđ
Czech Republic 1992	27	1	1	100%	4	58	48
Czech Republic 2013–2017+ inclusive	190	3	1	33%	2.5	57	44
Estonia 1995–1999 inclusive	31	6	3	50%	2	43	11
Flanders 1995–1999 inclusive	30	3	2	67%	4	42	30
Flanders 2009	36	1	1	100%	3	44	59
France IV 1951–1956 inclusive	43	12	0	0%	4	33	7
France V 1958–1962 inclusive	26	4	2	50%	3.5	45	15
Germany 1949	37	1	1	100%	3	64	47
Iceland 2016–2017+ inclusive	54	2	2	100%	3	50	9
Italy 1953–1958 inclusive	39	11	3	27%	1	100	8
Latvia 2014+	32	2	2	100%	3	40	15
Montenegro 2016+	43	1	1	100%	5	67	tbđ
Northern Ireland 1996–1998 inclusive	n.a.	4	0	0%	4	33	8
Poland 1991	57	3	0	0%	4	23	6
Romania 1992	38	3	0	0%	1	95	12
Serbia 2003	66	1	0	0%	4	43	34
Serbia 2012	82	2	0	0%	7.5	32	10
Serbia 2016+	109	2	0	0%	5	50	tbđ
Slovakia 1990	18	2	1	50%	3	52	12
Slovakia 2016+	52	3	3	100%	3	60	19
<i>overall highly multi-party means and medians:</i>	<i>54.6</i>				<i>3</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>25.2</i>



Consequently, Table 5.2 calculates for each case the percentage of all governments that are either single-party majorities or multi-party minimal winning coalitions (the totals are provided first) – the two most stable government types. Here one sees that two-party types not surprisingly have these stable government types, specifically single-party majorities. The one exception here was Liechtenstein until 1989, and its grand coalitions were actually generally stable. Two-and-a-half-party types also tend to have stable government types. In contrast to the time of government formation, moderately and highly multi-party types go together with each usually lack the most stable government types. The epitome of such multi-party government instability was the French Fourth Republic, which was both moderately and highly multi-party, but in each case with many governments – not one of which was the most stable type.

In terms of identifying the ‘normal’ governmental outcome, Table 5.2 then gives the median number of parties in government of all the governments in a specific national party type. The median is used to provide a clear integer value if possible. Then, of all the governments with said number of parties (or just above and below it if not an integer value), it gives the median cabinet dominance for these governments and their mean number of months in power. Using the median number of parties in government and then their median cabinet dominance has the advantage of inevitably excluding extreme values in terms of the number of parties, which of course are likely also extreme in their cabinet dominance scores.

What, then, are the typical (median) governments for each of the four categories of party types (systems and patterns)? For a two-party type, not surprisingly, the typical (median and modal) government is a single-party one in which said party holds all of the cabinet seats. These governments last on average three years. Liechtenstein 1945–1989 is an exception here though, in that instead of presumably the larger of the two main parties governing alone, the two parties chose to form repeated grand coalitions. In a two-and-a-half-party type, one of two outcomes tend to occur. In some cases one of the main parties will govern alone, either because it has a majority of seats (Greece) or because it is close to this (as often the situation in Spain until recently). Such single-party governments are the median occurrence in exactly half of the two-and-a-half-party types, but the clear majority of two-and-a-half-party *systems* (9 out of 15). Alternatively, two-and-a-half-party types will have a median occurrence of a coalition government, and for two-and-a-half-party *systems* these are almost always two-party coalitions (and from above usually stable minimum-winning ones). Governments in two-and-a-half-party types last on average 30 months (mean of means).

In a moderately multi-party type the median and modal situation across the cases is having a median government of two parties – similar to the second alternative in a two-and-a-half-party system. However, there are certainly situations of single-party government where there is predominance (such as Turkey and early postwar Norway) or dominance (such as systems in Sweden). Finally, in a highly multi-party type governments are also multi-party, with the median situation across the cases being a median government of three parties and the modal situation across

the cases being a median government of four parties (as in Belgium since 1968, Finland, Slovenia, and Switzerland). No highly multi-party system has a median outcome of single-party government. That said, both moderately and highly multi-party types have governments of short duration, on average two years in each case, paralleling how they lack the most stable government types.

## References

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**APPENDIX TABLE 5.1** Governments in power through October 2018

COUNTRY / Region									
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government	
ANDORRA									
Ribas i Reig	01/1994 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1994	11	1	29	SP MIN		..	
Forné i Molné	12/1994	02/1997	26	1	18	SP MIN		wholesale alternation	
Forné i Molné	03/1997 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2001	48	1	64	SP MAJ		non-alternation	
Forné i Molné	04/2001 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2005	48	1	54	SP MAJ		non-alternation	
Pintat	05/2005 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2009	47	1	50.0	SP MIN		non-alternation	
Bartumeu	06/2009 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2011	22	1	50.0	SP MIN		wholesale alternation	
Martí	05/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2015	46	1	71	SP MAJ	60	wholesale alternation	
Martí	04/2015 <sup>pe</sup>			1	54	SP MAJ	70	non-alternation	
AUSTRIA									
Figl	12/1945 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1947	23	3	100	MP OVC	53	..	
Figl	11/1947	11/1949	24	2	98	MP MW/GC	53	contraction	
Figl	11/1949 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1953	39	2	87	MP MW/GC	55	non-alternation	
Raab	04/1953 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1956	37	2	89	MP MW/GC	55	non-alternation	
Raab	06/1956 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1959	35	2	95	MP MW/GC	58	non-alternation	
Raab	07/1959 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1961	21	2	95	MP MW/GC	50	non-alternation	
Gorbach	04/1961	03/1963	23	2	95	MP MW/GC	50	non-alternation	
Gorbach	03/1963 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1964	13	2	90	MP MW/GC	50	non-alternation	

Klaus	04/1964	03/1966	23	2	90	MP MW/GC	50	non-alternation
Klaus	04/1966 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1970	47	1	52	SP MAJ	92	contraction
Kreisky	04/1970 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1971	18	1	49	SP MIN	92	wholesale alternation
Kreisky	11/1971 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1975	47	1	51	SP MAJ	86	non-alternation
Kreisky	10/1975 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1979	43	1	51	SP MAJ	86	non-alternation
Kreisky	06/1979 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1983	46	1	52	SP MAJ	93	non-alternation
Sinowatz	05/1983 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1986	37	2	56	MP MW/C	75	expansion
Vranitzky	06/1986	11/1986	5	2	56	MP MW/C	76	non-alternation
Vranitzky	01/1987 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1990	45	2	86	MP MW/GC	47	partial alternation
Vranitzky	12/1990 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1994	47	2	77	MP MW/GC	47	non-alternation
Vranitzky	11/1994 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1995	13	2	64	MP MW/GC	50	non-alternation
Vranitzky	03/1996 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1997	10	2	67	MP MW/GC	50	non-alternation
Klima	01/1997	10/1999	33	2	67	MP MW/GC	47	non-alternation
Schüssel	02/2000 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2002	33	2	57	MP MW/C	50	partial alternation
Schüssel	02/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2006	44	2	53	MP MW/C	64	non-alternation
Gusenbauer	01/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2008	20	2	73	MP MW/GC	50	partial alternation
Faymann	12/2008 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2013	57	2	59	MP MW/GC	50	non-alternation
Faymann	12/2013 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2016	29	2	54	MP MW/GC	50	non-alternation
Kern	05/2016	10/2017	17	2	54	MP MW/GC	43	non-alternation
Kurz	12/2017 <sup>pe</sup>			2	62	MP MW/C	57	partial alternation
BELGIUM								
van Acker	04/1946 <sup>pe</sup>	07/1946	3	3	54	MP MW/C	39	..
Huysmans	08/1946	03/1947	7	3	54	MP MW/C	35	non-alternation
Spaak	03/1947	06/1949	27	2	80	MP MW/GC	45	partial alternation
Eyskens, G.	08/1949 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1950	10	2	63	MP MW/C	55	partial alternation

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 5.1** (Continued)

<i>COUNTRY / Region</i>								
<i>Prime Minister or equivalent</i>	<i>Government In (month/year)</i>	<i>Government Out (month/year)</i>	<i>number of months in power</i>	<i>number of parties</i>	<i>Parliamentary base</i>	<i>cabinet type</i>	<i>cabinet dominance</i>	<i>change in party composition of government</i>
Duvieusart	06/1950 <sup>pe</sup>	08/1950	2	1	51	SP MAJ	94	contraction
Pholien	08/1950	01/1952	17	1	51	SP MAJ	94	non-alternation
van Houtte	01/1952	04/1954	27	1	51	SP MAJ	94	non-alternation
van Acker	04/1954 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1958	50	2	52	MP MWC	53	wholesale alternation
Eyskens, G.	06/1958 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1958	5	1	49	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Eyskens, G.	11/1958	09/1960	22	2	59	MP MWC	67	expansion
Eyskens, G.	09/1960	03/1961	6	2	59	MP MWC	65	non-alternation
Lefèvre	04/1961 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1965	49	2	85	MP MWGC	57	partial alternation
Harmel	07/1965 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1966	8	2	67	MP MWGC	60	non-alternation
Vandenboeynants	03/1966	03/1968	24	2	59	MP MWC	68	partial alternation
Eyskens, G.	06/1968 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1971	41	2	60	MP MWGC	59	partial alternation
Eyskens, G.	01/1972 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1972	11	3	60	MP MWC	48	non-alternation
Leburton	01/1973	03/1974	14	4	70	MP OVC	41	expansion
Tindemans	04/1974 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1974	2	4	54	MP MWC	40	contraction
Tindemans	06/1974	12/1976	30	5	56	MP OVC	38	expansion
Tindemans	12/1976	04/1977	4	5	56	MP OVC	39	partial alternation
Tindemans	06/1977 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1978	16	5	81	MP OVC	40	partial alternation
Vandenboeynants	10/1978	12/1978	2	6	81	MP OVC	31	non-alternation
Martens	04/1979 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1980	9	5	71	MP OVC	31	contraction
Martens	01/1980	04/1980	3	4	66	MP OVC	29	contraction
Martens	05/1980	10/1980	5	6	76	MP OVC	24	expansion
Martens	10/1980	04/1981	6	4	66	MP OVC	31	contraction
Eyskens, M.	04/1981	11/1981	7	4	66	MP OVC	30	non-alternation
Martens	12/1981 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1985	46	4	49	MP MIN	33	partial alternation

Martens	11/1985 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1987	23	4	53	MP MWC	28	non-alternation
Martens	10/1987	12/1987	2	4	53	MP MWC	28	non-alternation
Martens	05/1988 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1991	39	6	71	MP OVC	30	partial alternation
Martens	09/1991	11/1991	2	4	63	MP OVC	31	contraction
Dehaene	02/1992 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1995	39	4	57	MP MWC	31	non-alternation
Dehaene	06/1995 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1999	48	4	55	MP MWC	33	non-alternation
Verhofstadt	07/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2003	46	6	63	MP OVC	27	partial alternation
Verhofstadt	07/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2007	47	4	65	MP MWC	27	contraction
Verhofstadt	12/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2008	3	5	67	MP OVC	29	partial alternation
Leterme	03/2008	01/2009	10	5	67	MP OVC	27	non-alternation
Van Rompuy	01/2009	11/2009	10	5	67	MP OVC	33	non-alternation
Leterme	11/2009	06/2010	7	5	67	MP OVC	33	non-alternation
Di Rupo	12/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2014	29	6	64	MP OVC	23	expansion
Michel	10/2014 <sup>pe</sup>			4	57	MP MWC	50	partial alternation
Flanders								
Van den Brande	06/1995 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1999	48	2	51	MP MWC	56	contraction
Dewael	07/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	07/2003	48	4	57	MP MWC	33	partial alternation
Somers	07/2003	06/2004	11	4	50.0	MP MIN	50	contraction
Leterme	07/2004 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2007	35	3	69	MP MWC	33	partial alternation
Peeters	06/2007	06/2009	24	3	69	MP MWC	33	non-alternation
Peeters	06/2009 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2014	59	3	53	MP MWC	44	partial alternation
Bourgeois	07/2014 <sup>pe</sup>			3	72	MP OVC	44	partial alternation
BULGARIA								
Lukanov	09/1990 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1990	3	1	53	SP MAJ	100	..
Popov	12/1990	10/1991	10	3	93	MP OVC	72	partial alternation
Dimitrov	11/1991 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1992	13	1	46	SP MIN	100	partial alternation

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region								
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government
Berov	12/1992	09/1994	22	non-partisan	technocratic government			
Indzhova	10/1994	12/1994	2	non-partisan	caretaker government			
Videnov	01/1995 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1997	25	1	52	SP MAJ	88	wholesale alternation
Sofiyski	02/1997	04/1997	2	1	29	SP MIN	41	wholesale alternation
Kostov	05/1997 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2001	49	1	57	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Sakskoburggotski	07/2001 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2005	47	2	59	MP MWC	76	wholesale alternation
Stanishev	08/2005 <sup>pe</sup>	07/2009	47	3	70	MP OVC	50	partial alternation
Borisov	07/2009 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2013	44	1	48	SP MIN	94	wholesale alternation
Raykov	03/2013	05/2013	2	non-partisan	caretaker government			
Oresharski	05/2013 <sup>pe</sup>	08/2014	15	2	50.0	MP MIN	22	wholesale alternation
Bliznashki	08/2014	10/2014	2	non-partisan	caretaker government			
Borisov	11/2014 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2016	18	3	49	MP MIN	58	wholesale alternation
Borisov	05/2016	01/2017	8	2	45	MP MIN	58	contraction
Gerdzhikov	01/2017	05/2017	4	non-partisan	caretaker government			
Borisov	05/2017 <sup>pe</sup>			2	51	MP MWC	67	wholesale alternation
CROATIA								
Šarinić	12/1992 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1993	4	1	62	SP MAJ	100	..
Valentinić	04/1993	10/1995	30	1	62	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Matšša	11/1995 <sup>pe</sup>	01/2000	50	1	59	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Račan	01/2000 <sup>pe</sup>	07/2002	30	6	64	MP OVC	50	wholesale alternation
Račan	07/2002	11/2003	16	5	49	MP MIN	63	partial alternation

Sanader	12/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2007	47	2	45	MP MIN	93	wholesale alternation
Sanader	01/2008 <sup>pe</sup>	07/2009	18	4	48	MP MIN	78	partial alternation
Kosor	07/2009	12/2011	29	4	48	MP MIN	80	non-alternation
Milanović	12/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2015	47	3	51	MP MWC	77	wholesale alternation
Orešković	01/2016 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2016	8	2	52	MP MWC	43	wholesale alternation
Plenković	10/2016 <sup>pe</sup>			2	49	MP MIN	71	non-alternation
CYPRUS (presidents)								
Makarios	12/1974	08/1977	32	non-partisan	technocratic government		..	..
Kyprianou	08/1977	02/1978	6	non-partisan	technocratic government		..	..
Kyprianou	02/1978 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1983	60	3	97	MP OVC	?	wholesale alternation
Kyprianou	02/1983 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1988	60	3	66	MP OVC	?	none
Vasilou	02/1988 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1993	60	1	27	SP MIN	?	contraction
Clerides	02/1993 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1997	57	2	55	MP MWC	42	wholesale alternation
Clerides	11/1997	02/1998	3	1	36	SP MIN	42	contraction
Clerides	02/1998 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1999	11	3	48	MP MIN	45	expansion
Clerides	01/1999	02/2003	49	2	39	MP MIN	55	contraction
Papadopoulos	02/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	07/2007	53	3	59	MP OVC	36	wholesale alternation
Papadopoulos	07/2007	02/2008	7	2	29	MP MIN	27	contraction
Christofias	02/2008 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2010	25	3	61	MP OVC	45	expansion
Christofias	03/2010	08/2011	17	2	52	MP MWC	45	contraction
Christofias	08/2011	02/2013	18	1	34	SP MIN	45	contraction
Anastasiades	02/2013 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2014	13	3	55	MP OVC	46	wholesale alternation
Anastasiades	03/2014	02/2018	47	2	39	MP MIN	46	contraction
Anastasiades	03/2018 <sup>pe</sup>			1	32	SP MIN	42	contraction

*Note:* As a presidential system, governments in Cyprus cannot be removed by motions of non-confidence.

(Continued)



**APPENDIX TABLE 5.1** (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region									
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government	
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus									
Konuk	07/1976 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1978	20	1	75	SP MAJ	100	..	
Örek	04/1978	11/1978	7	1	75	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Çağatay	12/1978	07/1981	31	1	?	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Çağatay	08/1981 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1981	4	1	45	SP MIN	100	non-alternation	
Çağatay	03/1982	11/1983	20	3	53	MP MWC	73	expansion	
Konuk	11/1983	06/1985	19	2	53	MP MWC	45	contraction	
Eroğlu	07/1985 <sup>pe</sup>	08/1986	13	2	68	MP MWC	73	partial alternation	
Eroğlu	09/1986	05/1988	20	2	56	MP MWC	91	partial alternation	
Eroğlu	05/1988	05/1990	24	1	50	SP MAJ	91	contraction	
Eroğlu	06/1990 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1993	30	1	68	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Atun	01/1994 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1995	13	2	56	MP MWC	55	wholesale alternation	
Atun	06/1995	11/1995	5	2	56	MP MWC	55	non-alternation	
Atun	12/1995	07/1996	7	2	56	MP MWC	55	non-alternation	
Eroğlu	08/1996	12/1998	28	2	?	MP MWC	?	partial alternation	
Eroğlu	01/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	01/2004	60	2	62	MP MWC	73	partial alternation	
Talat	01/2004 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2004	3	2	52	MP MWC	64	wholesale alternation	
Talat	04/2004	02/2005	10	2	48	MP MIN	64	non-alternation	
Talat	03/2005 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2005	2	2	60	MP MWC	73	non-alternation	
Soyer	05/2005	09/2009	4	2	56	MP MWC	73	non-alternation	
Soyer	09/2005	05/2009	44	2	58	MP MWC	73	partial alternation	
Eroğlu	05/2009 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2010	11	1	52	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation	

Özgürçün	04/2010	1	1	52	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Küçük	05/2010	37	1	52	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Siber	06/2013	3	(interim pre-election government)				wholesale alternation
Yorgancıoğlu	09/2013 <sup>pe</sup>	22	2	66	MP MWC	64	contraction
Kalyoncu	07/2015	9	2	70	MP MWC	55	partial alternation
Özgürçün	04/2016	21	2	52	MP MWC	73	partial alternation
Erhürman	02/2018 <sup>pe</sup>		4	54	MP MWC	36	partial alternation
CZECH REPUBLIC							
Pithart	06/1990 <sup>pe</sup>	24	3	75	MP OVC	48	..
Klaus	07/1992 <sup>pe</sup>		4	56	MP MWC	58	contraction
Klaus*	01/1993	(48)	4	56	MP MWC	58	
Klaus	07/1996 <sup>pe</sup>	16	3	49	MP MIN	50	non-alternation (merger)
Tošovský	12/1997	6	3	32	MP MIN	24	non-alternation
Zeman	07/1998 <sup>pe</sup>	47	1	37	SP MIN	95	wholesale alternation
Špidla	07/2002 <sup>pe</sup>	25	3	51	MP MWC	65	expansion
Gross	08/2004	8	3	51	MP MWC	67	non-alternation
Paroubek	04/2005	14	3	51	MP MWC	56	non-alternation
Topolánek	01/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	28	3	50.0	MP MIN	50	partial alternation
Fischer	05/2009	12	non-partisan technocratic government				
Nečas	07/2010 <sup>pe</sup>	36	3	59	MP MWC	40	wholesale alternation
Rusnok	07/2013 <sup>pe</sup>	3	non-partisan caretaker government				
Sobotka	02/2014	44	3	56	MP MWC	47	wholesale alternation
Babiš	07/2018 <sup>pe</sup>		2	47	MP MIN	67	contraction

\* No actual government change, but the Czech Republic now a sovereign country.

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region		Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government
DENMARK									
Kristensen	11/1945 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1947	23	1	26	SP MIN	93	..	..
Hedtoft	11/1947 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1950	34	1	39	SP MIN	94	wholesale alternation	wholesale alternation
Hedtoft	09/1950 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1950	1	1	40	SP MIN	93	non-alternation	non-alternation
Eriksen	10/1950	04/1953	30	2	40	MP MIN	53	wholesale alternation	wholesale alternation
Eriksen	05/1953 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1953	4	2	40	MP MIN	53	non-alternation	non-alternation
Hedtoft	09/1953 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1955	16	1	42	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation	wholesale alternation
Hansen	02/1955	05/1957	27	1	42	SP MIN	100	non-alternation	non-alternation
Hansen	05/1957 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1960	33	3	53	MP MWC	60	non-alternation	non-alternation
Kampmann	02/1960	11/1960	9	3	53	MP MWC	60	non-alternation	non-alternation
Kampmann	11/1960 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1962	22	2	49	MP MIN	65	non-alternation	non-alternation
Krag	09/1962	09/1964	24	2	49	MP MIN	67	non-alternation	non-alternation
Krag	09/1964 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1966	26	1	43	SP MIN	100	non-alternation	non-alternation
Krag	11/1966 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1968	14	1	39	SP MIN	100	non-alternation	non-alternation
Baunsgaard	02/1968 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1971	43	3	56	MP MWC	40	wholesale alternation	wholesale alternation
Krag	10/1971 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1972	12	1	40	SP MIN	95	wholesale alternation	wholesale alternation
Jørgensen	10/1972	12/1973	14	1	40	SP MIN	95	non-alternation	non-alternation
Hartling	12/1973 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1975	13	1	13	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation	wholesale alternation
Jørgensen	02/1975 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1977	24	1	30	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation	wholesale alternation
Jørgensen	02/1977 <sup>pe</sup>	08/1978	18	1	37	SP MIN	100	non-alternation	non-alternation
Jørgensen	08/1978	10/1979	14	2	49	MP MIN	64	expansion	expansion
Jørgensen	10/1979 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1981	26	1	39	SP MIN	100	contraction	contraction

Jørgensen	12/1981 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1982	9	1	34	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Schlüter	09/1982	01/1984	16	3	35	MP MIN	39	wholesale alternation
Schlüter	01/1984 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1987	44	3	42	MP MIN	39	non-alternation
Schlüter	09/1987 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1988	8	3	38	MP MIN	48	non-alternation
Schlüter	06/1988 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1989	18	3	38	MP MIN	50	partial alternation
Schlüter	12/1989	12/1990	12	2	33	MP MIN	52	contraction
Schlüter	12/1990 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1993	25	2	34	MP MIN	53	non-alternation
Rasmussen, P.	01/1993	09/1994	20	4	51	MP MWC	63	wholesale alternation
Rasmussen, P.	09/1994 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1997	28	3	43	MP MIN	75	contraction
Rasmussen, P.	12/1996	03/1998	14	2	40	MP MIN	78	contraction
Rasmussen, P.	03/1998 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2001	44	2	40	MP MIN	81	non-alternation
Rasmussen, A.	11/2001 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2005	39	2	41	MP MIN	67	wholesale alternation
Rasmussen, A.	02/2005 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2007	33	2	40	MP MIN	63	non-alternation
Rasmussen, A.	11/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2009	17	2	37	MP MIN	63	non-alternation
Rasmussen, L.	04/2009	09/2011	29	2	37	MP MIN	63	non-alternation
Thorning-Schmidt	10/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2014	28	3	44	MP MIN	48	wholesale alternation
Thorning-Schmidt	02/2014	06/2015	16	2	35	MP MIN	65	contraction
Rasmussen, L.	06/2015 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2016	17	1	19	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Rasmussen, L.	11/2016			3	30	MP MIN	59	expansion
Faroe Islands								
Samuelsen	05/1948	11/1950	30	3	60	MP MWC	50	..
Djurhuus, K.	12/1950 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1954	47	2	60	MP MWC	50	partial alternation
Djurhuus, K.	12/1954 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1958	47	3	56	MP MWC	33	expansion
Dam, P.M.	01/1959 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1962	46	3	57	MP MWC	50	partial alternation
Djurhuus, H.	01/1963 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1966	46	3	48	MP MIN	67	partial alternation
Dam, P.M.	01/1967 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1968	22	3	54	MP MWC	33	partial alternation
Djurhuus, K.	11/1968	11/1970	24	3	54	MP MWC	50	non-alternation
Dam, A.	12/1970 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1974	47	3	54	MP MWC	40	non-alternation

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region		Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government
Dam, A.		01/1975 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1978	46	3	69	MP MWC	33	partial alternation
Dam, A.		01/1979 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1980	22	3	63	MP MWC	50	non-alternation
Ellefsen		01/1981 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1984	46	3	53	MP MWC	40	partial alternation
Dam, A.		01/1985 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1988	39	4	56	MP MWC	33	partial alternation
Dam, A.		04/1988	11/1988	7	4	53	MP MWC	33	partial alternation
Sundstein		01/1989 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1989	5	4	56	MP MWC	43	partial alternation
Sundstein		06/1989	11/1990	17	3	66	MP MWC	50	partial alternation
Dam, A.		01/1991 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1993	25	2	53	MP MWC	57	partial alternation
Petersen		02/1993	04/1993	2	2	53	MP MWC	50	non-alternation
Petersen		04/1993	07/1994	15	3	53	MP MWC	33	partial alternation
Joensen		09/1994 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1996	21	4	56	MP MWC	50	partial alternation
Joensen		06/1996	04/1998	22	4	59	MP OVC	50	partial alternation
Kallsberg		05/1998 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2002	47	3	56	MP MWC	38	partial alternation
Kallsberg		06/2002 <sup>pe</sup>	01/2004	19	4	53	MP MWC	33	expansion
Eidesgaard		02/2004 <sup>pe</sup>	01/2008	47	3	66	MP MWC	43	partial alternation
Eidesgaard		02/2008 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2008	7	3	52	MP MWC	43	partial alternation
Johannesen, K.L.		09/2008	10/2011	37	3	61	MP MWC	38	partial alternation
Johannesen, K.L.		11/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2013	22	4	58	MP OVC	33	partial alternation
Johannesen, K.L.		09/2013	09/2015	24	3	55	MP MWC	33	contraction
Johannesen, A.		09/2015 <sup>pe</sup>			3	52	MP MWC	33	wholesale alternation
ESTONIA									
Laar		10/1992 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1994	24	3	50.5	MP MWC	29	..
Tarand		11/1994	03/1995	6	non-partisan caretaker government				

Vähi	04/1995 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1995	7	2	56	MP MWC	43	wholesale alternation
Vähi	11/1995	11/1996	12	2	59	MP MWC	43	partial alternation
Vähi	12/1996	02/1997	2	1	41	SP MIN	43	contraction
Simann	03/1997	03/1999	24	1	41	SP MIN	60	non-alternation
Laar	03/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	01/2002	34	3	52	MP MWC	33	wholesale alternation
Kallas	01/2002	03/2003	14	2	46	MP MIN	57	wholesale alternation
Parts	04/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2005	24	3	59	MP MWC	36	expansion
Ansip	04/2005	03/2007	23	3	51	MP MWC	36	non-alternation
Ansip	04/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2009	25	3	59	MP MWC	43	partial alternation
Ansip	05/2009	03/2011	22	2	49.5	MP MIN	54	contraction
Ansip	04/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2014	35	2	55	MP MWC	54	non-alternation
Rõivas	03/2014	03/2015	12	2	51	MP MWC	57	partial alternation
Rõivas	04/2015 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2016	19	3	58	MP MWC	47	expansion
Ratas	11/2016			3	55	MP MWC	33	partial alternation

#### FINLAND

Paasikivi	04/1945 <sup>pe</sup>	07/1945	3	5	86	MP OVC	28	..
Paasikivi	07/1945	03/1946	8	4	82	MP OVC	28	contraction
Pekkala	03/1946	07/1948	28	4	82	MP OVC	33	non-alternation
Fagerholm	07/1948 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1950	20	1	27	SP MIN	94	contraction
Kekkonen	03/1950	01/1951	10	3	38	MP MIN	67	wholesale alternation
Kekkonen	01/1951	07/1951	6	4	65	MP OVC	41	expansion
Kekkonen	09/1951 <sup>pe</sup>	07/1953	22	3	60	MP OVC	41	contraction
Kekkonen	07/1953	11/1953	4	2	33	MP MIN	57	contraction
Tuomija	11/1953	03/1954	4	non-partisan caretaker government				
Tönngrén	05/1954 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1954	5	3	60	MP OVC	43	wholesale alternation
Kekkonen	10/1954	03/1956	17	2	54	MP MWC	50	contraction
Fagerholm	03/1956	05/1957	14	4	67	MP OVC	40	expansion

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region									
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government	
Sukselainen	05/1957	07/1957	1	3	40	MP MIN	50	contraction	
Sukselainen	07/1957	09/1957	2	2	33	MP MIN	62	contraction	
Sukselainen	09/1957	11/1957	3	3	36	MP MIN	44	expansion	
von Fieandt	11/1957	04/1958	5	non-partisan caretaker government					
Kuuskoski	04/1958	07/1958	3	non-partisan caretaker government					
Fagerholm	08/1958 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1959	5	5	74	MP OVC	33	wholesale alternation	
Sukselainen	01/1959	07/1961	30	1	24	SP MIN	93	contraction	
Miettunen	07/1961	02/1962	7	1	24	SP MIN	93	non-alternation	
Karjalainen	04/1962 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1963	20	4	56	MP MWC	33	expansion	
Lehto	12/1963	09/1964	9	non-partisan caretaker government					
Virolainen	09/1964	03/1966	18	4	56	MP MWC	47	wholesale alternation	
Paasio	05/1966 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1968	22	4	76	MP OVC	40	partial alternation	
Koivisto	03/1968	03/1970	24	5	82	MP OVC	38	expansion	
Aura	05/1970 <sup>pe</sup>	07/1970	2	non-partisan caretaker government					
Karjalainen	07/1970	03/1971	8	5	72	MP OVC	29	wholesale alternation	
Karjalainen	03/1971	10/1971	7	4	56	MP OVC	47	contraction	
Aura	10/1971	01/1972	3	non-partisan caretaker government					
Paasio	02/1972 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1972	7	1	28	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation	
Sorsa	09/1972	06/1975	33	4	54	MP MWC	44	expansion	
Linamaa	06/1975	09/1975	3	non-partisan caretaker government					
Miettunen	11/1975 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1976	10	5	76	MP OVC	28	wholesale alternation	
Miettunen	09/1976	05/1977	8	3	29	MP MIN	56	contraction	
Sorsa	05/1977	03/1978	10	5	76	MP OVC	33	expansion	

Sorsa	03/1978	03/1979	12	4	71	MP OVC	33	contraction
Koivisto	05/1979 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1982	33	4	67	MP OVC	35	partial alternation
Sorsa	02/1982	12/1982	10	4	67	MP OVC	35	non-alternation
Sorsa	12/1982	03/1983	3	3	51	MP MWC	47	contraction
Sorsa	05/1983 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1987	46	4	62	MP OVC	47	expansion
Holkeri	04/1987 <sup>pe</sup>	08/1990	40	4	66	MP OVC	44	partial alternation
Holkeri	09/1990	03/1991	4	3	61	MP OVC	47	contraction
Aho	04/1991 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1995	47	4	58	MP OVC	47	partial alternation
Lipponen	04/1995 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1999	47	5	73	MP OVC	39	partial alternation
Lipponen	04/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2002	37	5	70	MP OVC	33	non-alternation
Lipponen	05/2002	03/2003	10	4	65	MP OVC	39	contraction
Jääteennmäki	04/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2003	2	3	59	MP OVC	53	partial alternation
Vanhanen	06/2003	03/2007	45	3	59	MP OVC	47	non-alternation
Vanhanen	04/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2010	38	4	63	MP OVC	40	partial alternation
Kiviniemi	06/2010	04/2011	10	4	63	MP OVC	40	non-alternation
Katainen	06/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2014	34	6	62	MP OVC	32	partial alternation
Katainen	04/2014	06/2014	2	5	56	MP OVC	35	contraction
Stubb	06/2014	09/2014	3	5	56	MP OVC	35	non-alternation
Stubb	09/2014	04/2015	7	4	51	MP MWC	41	contraction
Sipilä	06/2015 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2017	24	3	62	MP MWC	43	partial alternation
Sipilä	06/2017			3	53	MP MWC	43	contraction (effectively)

#### FRANCE – FOURTH REPUBLIC

Gouin	01/1946	06/1946	5	3	81	MP OVC	35	..
Bidault	06/1946 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1946	5	4	81	MP OVC	35	expansion
Blum	12/1946 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1947	1	1	21	SP MIN	100	contraction
Ramadier	01/1947	05/1947	4	5	86	MP OVC	35	expansion
Ramadier	05/1947	10/1947	5	4	69	MP OVC	46	contraction

(Continued)



APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region											
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government			
Ramadier	10/1947	11/1947	1	4	69	MP OVC	50	contraction			
Schuman	11/1947	07/1948	8	5	70	MP OVC	40	expansion			
Marie	07/1948	09/1948	2	4	69	MP OVC	32	contraction			
Schuman	09/1948	09/1948	0	4	69	MP OVC	40	non-alternation			
Queuille	09/1948	10/1949	13	5	70	MP OVC	33	expansion			
Bidault	10/1949	02/1950	4	5	70	MP OVC	33	non-alternation			
Bidault	02/1950	07/1950	5	4	53	MP OVC	47	contraction			
Queuille	07/1950	07/1950	0	4	53	MP OVC	43	non-alternation			
Pleven	07/1950	03/1951	8	5	70	MP OVC	27	expansion			
Queuille	03/1951	06/1951	3	5	70	MP OVC	32	non-alternation			
Pleven	08/1951 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1952	5	4	65	MP OVC	33	contraction			
Faure	01/1952	03/1952	2	4	65	MP OVC	31	non-alternation			
Pinay	03/1952	01/1953	10	4	65	MP OVC	35	non-alternation			
Mayer	01/1953	06/1953	5	4	65	MP OVC	35	non-alternation			
Laniel	06/1953	06/1954	12	5	65	MP OVC	36	non-alternation			
Mendès-France	06/1954	02/1955	8	4	49.8	MP MIN	31	partial alternation			
Faure	02/1955	01/1956	11	4	65	MP OVC	32	partial alternation			
Mollet	01/1956 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1957	17	3	33	MP MIN	50	partial alternation			
Bourges-Maunoury	06/1957	11/1957	6	3	33	MP MIN	50	non-alternation			
Gaillard	11/1957	05/1958	6	6	87	MP OVC	29	expansion			
Pfimlin	05/1958	05/1958	1	5	76	MP OVC	36	contraction			
de Gaulle	06/1958	01/1959	7	5	84	MP OVC	13	partial alternation			

Note: Given the divisions and the lack of discipline within parties, effective parliamentary support was normally less than the above nominal figures.

FRANCE – FIFTH REPUBLIC

Debré	01/1959 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1962	39	4	86	MP OVC	29	..
Pompidou	04/1962	05/1962	1	3	79	MP OVC	36	contraction
Pompidou	05/1962	11/1962	6	2	69	MP MWC	50	contraction
Pompidou	12/1962 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1967	51	2	56	MP MWC	59	non-alternation
Pompidou	04/1967 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1968	14	2	49	MP MIN	45	non-alternation
Couve de Murville	07/1968 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1969	11	2	73	MP OVC	63	non-alternation
Chaban-Delmas	06/1969	07/1972	37	3	79	MP OVC	58	expansion
Messmer	07/1972	03/1973	8	3	79	MP OVC	70	non-alternation
Messmer	04/1973 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1974	13	3	55	MP MWC	59	non-alternation
Chirac	05/1974	08/1976	27	4	62	MP OVC	31	expansion
Barre	08/1976	03/1978	19	4	62	MP OVC	28	non-alternation
Barre	04/1978 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1981	37	2	56	MP MWC	45	non-alternation
Mauroy	05/1981	06/1981	1	2	23	MP MIN	90	wholesale alternation
Mauroy	06/1981 <sup>pe</sup>	07/1984	37	3	67	MP OVC	83	expansion
Fabius	07/1984	03/1986	20	2	58	MP OVC	96	contraction
Chirac	03/1986 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1988	26	2	50	MP MIN	52	wholesale alternation
Rocard	05/1988	06/1988	1	2	37	MP MIN	73	wholesale alternation
Rocard	06/1988 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1991	35	2	48	MP MIN	64	non-alternation
Cresson	05/1991	04/1992	11	3	48	MP MIN	73	expansion
Bérégovoy	04/1992	03/1993	11	2	48	MP MIN	76	contraction
Balladur	03/1993 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1995	26	2	82	MP MWC	50	wholesale alternation
Juppé	05/1995	06/1997	25	2	82	MP MWC	55	non-alternation
Jospin	06/1997 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2002	59	5	55	MP OVC	71	wholesale alternation
Raffarin	05/2002	06/2002	1	2	44	MP MIN	68	wholesale alternation
Raffarin	06/2002 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2005	35	2	68	MP OVC	67	non-alternation
de Villepin	05/2005	05/2007	24	2	63	MP OVC	87	non-alternation
Fillon	05/2007	06/2007	1	2	68	MP OVC	88	partial alternation
Fillon	06/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2012	59	2	59	MP OVC	88	non-alternation

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 5.1** (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region									
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government	
Ayrault	05/2012	06/2012	1	3	35	MP MIN	88	wholesale alternation	
Ayrault	06/2012 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2014	21	3	57	MP OVC	86	non-alternation	
Valls	03/2014	08/2014	5	2	54	MP OVC	88	contraction	
Valls*	08/2014	02/2016	18	2	48	MP MIN	82	contraction (effectively)	
Valls	02/2016	12/2016	10	3	51	MP MWC	78	expansion	
Cazeneuve	12/2016	05/2017	5	3	51	MP MWC	78	non-alternation	
Philippe	05/2017	06/2017	1	2	05	MP MIN	11	wholesale alternation	
Philippe	06/2017 <sup>pe</sup>			2	64	MP OVC	40	non-alternation	
* loss of parliamentary majority.									
(Note: Parliamentary base is in terms of party groups in the National Assembly.									
Corsica									
Simeoni, G. (FC)	12/2015 <sup>pe</sup>	12/2017	24	2	47	MP MIN	78	wholesale alternation	
Simeoni, G. (PaC)	01/2018 <sup>pe</sup>			2	65	MP MWC	73	non-alternation	
GERMANY									
Adenauer	09/1949 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1953	47	3	52	MP MWC	64	..	
Adenauer	10/1953 <sup>pe</sup>	07/1955	21	4	68	MP OVC	62	expansion	
Adenauer	07/1955	03/1956	8	3	63	MP OVC	73	contraction	
Adenauer	03/1956	09/1957	18	3	54	MP OVC	72	contraction	
Adenauer	10/1957 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1960	32	2	58	MP OVC	89	contraction	
Adenauer	07/1960	09/1961	14	1	54	SP MAJ	100	contraction	

Adenauer	11/1961 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1962	12	2	62	MP MWC	76	expansion
Adenauer	11/1962	12/1962	1	1	48	SP MIN	100	contraction
Adenauer	12/1962	10/1963	10	2	62	MP MWC	76	expansion
Erhard	10/1963	09/1965	23	2	62	MP MWC	76	non-alternation
Erhard	10/1965 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1966	12	2	59	MP MWC	77	non-alternation
Erhard	10/1966	11/1966	1	1	49	SP MIN	100	contraction
Kiesinger	12/1966	09/1969	33	2	90	MP MW/GC	55	expansion
Brandt	10/1969 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1972	37	2	51	MP MWC	80	partial alternation
Brandt	12/1972 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1974	17	2	55	MP MWC	72	non-alternation
Schmidt	05/1974	10/1976	29	2	55	MP MWC	75	non-alternation
Schmidt	12/1976 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1980	46	2	51	MP MWC	75	non-alternation
Schmidt	11/1980 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1982	22	2	55	MP MWC	76	non-alternation
Schmidt	09/1982	10/1982	1	1	44	SP MIN	100	[effectively
Kohl	10/1982	03/1983	5	2	56	MP MWC	71	[partial alternation
Kohl	03/1983 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1987	46	2	56	MP MWC	76	non-alternation
Kohl	03/1987 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1990	43	2	54	MP MWC	74	non-alternation
Kohl	01/1991 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1994	45	2	60	MP MWC	75	non-alternation
Kohl	11/1994 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1998	46	2	54	MP MWC	83	non-alternation
Schröder	10/1998 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2002	47	2	52	MP MWC	75	wholesale alternation
Schröder	10/2002 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2005	35	2	51	MP MWC	79	non-alternation
Merkel	11/2005 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2009	46	2	73	MP MW/GC	50	partial alternation
Merkel	10/2009 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2013	47	2	53	MP MWC	69	partial alternation
Merkel	12/2013 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2017	45	2	80	MP MW/GC	63	partial alternation
Merkel	03/2018 <sup>pe</sup>			2	56	MP MW/GC	63	non-alternation
GREECE								
Karamanlis	12/1974 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1977	35	1	73	SP MAJ	100	..
Karamanlis	12/1977 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1980	29	1	58	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region											
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government			
Rallis	05/1980	10/1981	17	1	58	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation			
Papandreou	11/1981 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1985	43	1	57	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation			
Papandreou	06/1985 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1989	48	1	54	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation			
Tzannetakis	07/1989 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1989	3	2	58	MP MWC	91	wholesale alternation			
Grivas	10/1989	12/1989	2	non-partisan	caretaker government						
Zolotas	12/1989 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1990	2	3	99	MP OVC	29	wholesale alternation			
Zolotas	02/1990	04/1990	2	non-partisan	caretaker government						
Mitsotakis	04/1990 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1993	42	1	51	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation			
Papandreou	10/1993 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1996	28	1	57	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation			
Simitis	02/1996	09/1996	7	1	57	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation			
Simitis	10/1996 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2000	42	1	54	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation			
Simitis	04/2000 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2004	47	1	53	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation			
Karamanlis	03/2004 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2007	42	1	55	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation			
Karamanlis	10/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2009	24	1	51	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation			
Papandreou	10/2009 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2011	25	1	53	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation			
Papademos	11/2011	02/2012	3	3	89	MP OVC	67	expansion			
Papademos	02/2012	05/2012	3	2	84	MP MWGC	67	contraction			
Pikrammenos	05/2012 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2012	1	non-partisan	caretaker government						
Samaras	07/2012 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2013	11	1	43	SP MIN	72	wholesale alternation			
Samaras	06/2013	01/2015	19	2	54	MP MWC	76	expansion			
Tsipras	02/2015 <sup>pe</sup>	08/2015	6	2	54	MP MWC	80	wholesale alternation			
Thanou-Christophilou	08/2015	09/2015	1	non-partisan	caretaker government						
Tsipras	10/2015 <sup>pe</sup>			2	52	MP MWC	73	wholesale alternation			

# HUNGARY

Antall	05/1990 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1993	43	3	60	MP OVC	62	..
Boross	12/1993	05/1994	5	3	60	MP OVC	63	non-alternation
Horn	06/1994 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1998	47	2	72	MP OVC	80	wholesale alternation
Orbán	07/1998 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2002	45	3	55	MP OVC	56	wholesale alternation
Medgyessy	05/2002 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2004	28	2	51	MP MWC	53	wholesale alternation
Gyurcsány	09/2004	04/2006	19	2	51	MP MWC	61	non-alternation
Gyurcsány	06/2006 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2008	23	2	55	MP MWC	50	non-alternation
Gyurcsány	05/2008	04/2009	11	1	49	SP MIN	50	contraction
Bajnai	04/2009	04/2010	12	1	49	SP MIN	47	non-alternation
Orbán	05/2010 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2014	47	2	68	MP OVC	55	wholesale alternation
Orbán	06/2014 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2018	46	2	67	MP OVC	64	non-alternation
Orbán	05/2018 <sup>pe</sup>			2	67	MP OVC	43	non-alternation

# ICELAND

Thors	07/1946 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1946	3	3	75	MP OVC	33	..
Stefánsson	02/1947	10/1949	32	3	67	MP OVC	33	partial alternation
Thors	12/1949 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1950	3	1	37	SP MIN	100	contraction
Steinþórrsson	03/1950	06/1953	39	2	69	MP MWC	50	expansion
Thors	09/1953 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1956	33	2	54	MP MWC	50	non-alternation
Jónasson	07/1956 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1958	29	3	63	MP MWC	33	partial alternation
Jónsson	12/1958	06/1959	6	1	15	SP MIN	100	contraction
Jónsson	07/1959 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1959	3	1	12	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Thors	11/1959 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1963	43	2	53	MP MWC	57	expansion
Benediktsson	11/1963 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1967	43	2	53	MP MWC	57	non-alternation
Benediktsson	06/1967 <sup>pe</sup>	07/1970	37	2	53	MP MWC	57	non-alternation
Hafstein	07/1970	06/1971	11	2	53	MP MWC	57	non-alternation

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region								
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government
Jóhannesson	07/1971 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1974	35	3	53	MP MWC	43	wholesale alternation
Hallgrímsson	08/1974 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1978	46	2	70	MP MWC	50	partial alternation
Jóhannesson	09/1978 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1979	13	3	67	MP MWC	44	partial alternation
Gröndal	10/1979	12/1979	2	1	23	SP MIN	100	contraction
Thoroddsen	02/1980 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1983	38	3	82	MP OVC	40	wholesale alternation
Hermannsson	05/1983 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1987	47	2	62	MP MWC	60	contraction
Pálsson	07/1987 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1988	14	3	65	MP MWC	36	expansion
Hermannsson	09/1988	09/1989	12	3	49	MP MIN	33	partial alternation
Hermannsson	09/1989	04/1991	19	4	65	MP OVC	27	expansion
Oddsson	04/1991 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1995	48	2	57	MP MWC	50	partial alternation
Oddsson	04/1995 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1999	48	2	63	MP MWC	50	partial alternation
Oddsson	05/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2003	48	2	60	MP MWC	50	non-alternation
Oddsson	05/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2004	16	2	54	MP MWC	50	non-alternation
Ásgrímsson	09/2004	06/2006	21	2	54	MP MWC	58	non-alternation
Haarde	06/2006	05/2007	11	2	54	MP MWC	50	non-alternation
Haarde	05/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	01/2009	20	2	68	MP MWGC	50	partial alternation
Sigurðardóttir	01/2009	04/2009	3	2	43	MP MIN	40	partial alternation
Sigurðardóttir	05/2009 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2013	47	2	54	MP MWC	42	non-alternation
Gunnlaugsson	05/2013 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2016	35	2	60	MP MWC	56	wholesale alternation
Jóhannesson	04/2016	10/2016	6	2	60	MP MWC	50	non-alternation
Benediktsson	01/2017 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2017	9	3	51	MP MWC	55	partial alternation
Jakobsdóttir	11/2017 <sup>pe</sup>			3	56	MP MWC	45	partial alternation

IRELAND

Costello	02/1948 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1950	28	5	49.7	MP MIN	46	..
Costello	06/1950	05/1951	11	4	46	MP MIN	46	contraction
de Valera	06/1951 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1954	34	1	47	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Costello	06/1954 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1957	33	3	50.3	MP MWC	64	wholesale alternation
de Valera	03/1957 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1959	27	1	53	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation
Lemass	06/1959	10/1961	28	1	53	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Lemass	10/1961 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1965	42	1	49	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Lemass	04/1965 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1966	19	1	50.0	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Lynch	11/1966	06/1969	31	1	50.0	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Lynch	07/1969 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1973	43	1	52	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Cosgrave	03/1973 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1977	51	2	51	MP MWC	67	wholesale alternation
Lynch	07/1977 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1979	29	1	57	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Haughey	12/1979	06/1981	18	1	57	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Fitzgerald	06/1981 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1982	8	2	48	MP MIN	73	wholesale alternation
Haughey	03/1982 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1982	8	1	49	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Fitzgerald	12/1982 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1987	49	2	52	MP MWC	73	wholesale alternation
Fitzgerald	01/1987	02/1987	1	1	42	SP MIN	100	contraction
Haughey	03/1987 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1989	27	1	49	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Haughey	07/1989 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1992	31	2	50.0	MP MIN	87	expansion
Reynolds	02/1992	10/1992	8	2	50.0	MP MIN	87	non-alternation
Reynolds	10/1992	11/1992	1	1	46	SP MIN	100	contraction
Reynolds	01/1993 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1994	22	2	61	MP MWC	60	expansion
Reynolds	11/1994	12/1994	1	1	41	SP MIN	100	contraction
Bruton	12/1994	06/1997	30	3	47	MP MIN	53	wholesale alternation
Ahern	06/1997 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2002	59	2	49	MP MIN	93	wholesale alternation
Ahern	06/2002 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2007	59	2	54	MP MWC	87	non-alternation
Ahern	06/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2008	11	3	52	MP OVC	80	expansion
Cowen	05/2008	11/2009	18	3	52	MP OVC	80	non-alternation

(Continued)



**APPENDIX TABLE 5.1** (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region									
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government	
Cowen	11/2009	01/2011	14	2	52	MP MW/C	80	contraction	
Cowen	01/2011	02/2011	1	1	47	SP MIN	100	contraction	
Kenny	03/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2016	59	2	68	MP MW/C	67	wholesale alternation	
Kenny	05/2016 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2017	13	1	35	SP MIN	80	contraction	
Varadkar	06/2017			1	34	SP MIN	80	non-alternation	
ITALY									
de Gasperi	07/1946 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1947	7	5	88	MP OVC	41	..	
de Gasperi	02/1947	05/1947	3	3	77	MP OVC	47	contraction	
de Gasperi	05/1947	12/1947	7	2	45	MP MIN	65	partial alternation	
de Gasperi	12/1947	04/1948	4	4	70	MP OVC	40	expansion	
de Gasperi	05/1948 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1950	20	4	64	MP OVC	55	non-alternation	
de Gasperi	01/1950	07/1951	18	3	60	MP OVC	68	contraction	
de Gasperi	07/1951	06/1953	23	2	55	MP OVC	81	contraction	
de Gasperi	07/1953 <sup>pe</sup>	08/1953	1	1	45	SP MIN	100	contraction	
Pella	08/1953	01/1954	5	1	45	SP MIN	100	non-alternation	
Fanfani	01/1954	02/1954	1	1	45	SP MIN	95	non-alternation	
Scelba	02/1954	07/1955	17	3	50.0	MP MW/C	57	expansion	
Segni	07/1955	05/1957	22	3	50.0	MP MW/C	62	non-alternation	
Zoli	05/1957	05/1958	12	1	45	SP MIN	95	contraction	
Fanfani	07/1958 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1959	7	2	49	MP MIN	85	expansion	
Segni	02/1959	03/1960	13	1	46	SP MIN	100	contraction	

Tambroni	03/1960	07/1960	4	1	46	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Fanfani	07/1960	02/1962	19	1	46	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Fanfani	02/1962	04/1963	14	3	51	MP MWC	75	expansion
Leone	06/1963 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1963	6	1	41	SP MIN	100	contraction
Moro	12/1963	05/1968	53	4	61	MP OVC	62	expansion
Leone	07/1968 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1968	5	1	42	SP MIN	100	contraction
Rumor	12/1968	08/1969	8	3	58	MP OVC	59	expansion
Rumor	08/1969	03/1970	7	1	42	SP MIN	100	contraction
Rumor	03/1970	08/1970	5	4	58	MP OVC	59	expansion
Colombo	08/1970	02/1971	6	4	58	MP OVC	64	non-alternation
Colombo	02/1971	02/1972	12	3	57	MP MWC	67	contraction
Andreotti	02/1972	05/1972	3	1	42	SP MIN	100	contraction
Andreotti	06/1972 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1973	15	3	50.0	MP MWC	65	expansion
Rumor	09/1973	03/1974	6	4	59	MP OVC	55	partial alternation
Rumor	03/1974	11/1974	8	3	57	MP OVC	58	contraction
Moro	11/1974	02/1976	15	2	45	MP MIN	80	partial
Moro	02/1976	06/1976	4	1	42	SP MIN	100	contraction
Andreotti	07/1976 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1978	20	1	42	SP MIN	95	non-alternation
Andreotti	03/1978	03/1979	12	1	42	SP MIN	95	non-alternation
Andreotti	03/1979	06/1979	3	3	46	MP MIN	71	expansion
Cossiga	08/1979 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1980	8	3	46	MP MIN	61	partial alternation
Cossiga	04/1980	10/1980	6	3	54	MP OVC	54	partial alternation
Forlani	10/1980	06/1981	8	4	57	MP OVC	48	expansion
Spadolini	06/1981	12/1982	18	5	58	MP OVC	54	expansion
Fanfani	12/1982	06/1983	6	4	56	MP OVC	46	contraction
Craxi	08/1983 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1987	44	5	58	MP OVC	53	expansion
Fanfani	04/1987	06/1987	2	1	36	SP MIN	59	contraction
Goria	07/1987 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1988	9	5	60	MP OVC	52	expansion
De Mita	04/1988	07/1989	15	5	60	MP OVC	53	non-alternation
Andreotti	06/1989	03/1991	21	5	60	MP OVC	48	non-alternation

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 5.1** (Continued)

<i>COUNTRY / Region</i>											
<i>Prime Minister or equivalent</i>	<i>Government In (month/year)</i>	<i>Government Out (month/year)</i>	<i>number of months in power</i>	<i>number of parties</i>	<i>Parliamentary base</i>	<i>cabinet type</i>	<i>cabinet dominance</i>	<i>change in party composition of government</i>			
Andreotti	04/1991	04/1992	12	4	56	MP MWC	53	contraction			
Amato	06/1992 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1993	10	4	53	MP MWC	40	non-alternation			
Ciampi	04/1993	04/1993	0	7	76	MP OVC	31	expansion			
Ciampi	05/1993	03/1994	10	5	57	MP OVC	31	contraction			
Berlusconi	05/1994 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1994	7	3	58	MP MWC	35	wholesale alternation			
Dini	01/1995	04/1996	13	non-partisan technocratic government							
Prodi	05/1996 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1998	30	5	45	MP MIN	43	wholesale alternation			
D'Alema	10/1998	12/1999	14	7	53	MP MWC	30	expansion			
D'Alema	12/1999	04/2000	4	7	51	MP MWC	35	partial alternation			
Amato	04/2000	05/2001	14	8	51	MP MWC	28	expansion			
Berlusconi	06/2001 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2005	46	4	58	MP OVC	40	wholesale alternation			
Berlusconi	04/2005	04/2006	12	6	58	MP OVC	32	expansion			
Prodi	05/2006 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2008	23	7	55	MP OVC	41	wholesale alternation			
Berlusconi	05/2008 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2011	42	4	55	MP OVC	59	wholesale alternation			
Monti	11/2011	02/2013	15	non-partisan technocratic government							
Letta	04/2013 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2014	10	5	60	MP OVC	45	wholesale alternation			
Renzi	02/2014	02/2015	12	4	59	MP OVC	53	contraction			
Renzi	02/2015	12/2016	22	3	55	MP OVC	56	contraction			
Gentiloni	12/2016	03/2018	15	3	55	MP OVC	68	non-alternation			
Conte	06/2018 <sup>pe</sup>			2	56	MP MWC	40	wholesale alternation			

# LATVIA

Birkavs	07/1993 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1994	14	2	48	MP MIN	80	..
Galis	09/1994	09/1995	12	2	44	MP MIN	79	partial alternation
Šķēle	12/1995 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1997	14	6	73	MP OVC	25	partial alternation
Šķēle	02/1997	07/1997	5	5	65	MP OVC	31	contraction
Krasts	08/1997	04/1998	8	4	65	MP OVC	31	non-alternation
Krasts	04/1998	10/1998	6	3	47	MP MIN	36	contraction
Kristopans	11/1998 <sup>pe</sup>	07/1999	8	3	46	MP MIN	47	partial alternation
Šķēle	07/1999	05/2000	10	4	70	MP OVC	31	expansion
Bērziņš	05/2000	10/2002	29	4	70	MP OVC	36	non-alternation
Repše	11/2002 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2004	16	4	55	MP MWC	47	partial alternation
Emsis	03/2004	12/2004	9	4	69	MP OVC	44	partial alternation
Kalvītis	12/2004	10/2006	22	4	43	MP MIN	41	partial alternation
Kalvītis	11/2006 <sup>pe</sup>	12/2007	13	4	59	MP OVC	33	expansion
Godmanis	12/2007	03/2009	15	4	59	MP OVC	39	non-alternation
Dombrovskis	03/2009	10/2010	19	4	67	MP OVC	36	partial alternation
Dombrovskis	11/2010 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2011	10	2	55	MP MWC	57	partial alternation
Dombrovskis	10/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	01/2014	27	3	56	MP MWC	36	partial alternation
Straujuma	01/2014	10/2014	9	4	69	MP OVC	29	expansion
Straujuma	11/2014 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2016	15	3	61	MP MWC	36	contraction
Kučinskis	02/2016	10/2018	32	3	61	MP MWC	43	non-alternation

# LIECHTENSTEIN

Hoop	05/1945 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1945	4	2	100	MP OVGC	50	non-alternation
Frick, A.	09/1945	02/1949	44	2	100	MP OVGC	50	non-alternation
Frick, A.	03/1949 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1953	47	2	100	MP OVGC	50	non-alternation
Frick, A.	03/1953 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1953	3	2	100	MP OVGC	50	non-alternation

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region		Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government
		Frick, A.	07/1953 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1957	50	2	100	MP OVG	50	non-alternation
		Frick, A.	10/1957 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1958	5	2	100	MP OVG	50	non-alternation
		Frick, A.	04/1958 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1962	47	2	100	MP OVG	50	non-alternation
		Frick, A.	04/1962 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1962	2	2	100	MP OVG	50	non-alternation
		Batliner	07/1962	02/1966	43	2	100	MP OVG	50	non-alternation
		Batliner	03/1966 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1970	47	2	100	MP OVG	60	non-alternation
		Hilbe	03/1970 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1974	47	2	100	MP OVG	60	non-alternation
		Kieber	03/1974 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1978	47	2	100	MP OVG	60	non-alternation
		Brunhart	04/1978 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1982	46	2	100	MP OVG	60	non-alternation
		Brunhart	03/1982 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1986	47	2	100	MP OVG	60	non-alternation
		Brunhart	04/1986 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1989	35	2	100	MP OVG	60	non-alternation
		Brunhart	05/1989 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1993	45	2	100	MP OVG	60	non-alternation
		Büchel	05/1993 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1993	5	2	92	MP MWGC	60	non-alternation
		Frick, M.	12/1993 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1997	38	2	96	MP MWGC	60	non-alternation
		Frick, M.	04/1997 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2001	46	1	52	SP MAJ	100	contraction
		Hasler	04/2001 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2005	47	1	52	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation
		Hasler	04/2005 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2009	46	2	88	MP MWGC	60	expansion
		Tschüscher	03/2009 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2013	47	2	96	MP OVG	60	non-alternation
		Hasler	03/2013 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2017	47	2	72	MP MWGC	60	non-alternation
		Hasler	03/2017 <sup>pe</sup>			2	68	MP MWGC	60	non-alternation

# LITHUANIA

Lubys	12/1992 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1993	3	1	52	SP MAJ	100	..
Slezevicius	03/1993	02/1996	35	1	52	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Stankevicius	02/1996	10/1996	8	1	52	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Vagnorius	12/1996 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1999	29	3	72	MP OVC	76	wholesale alternation
Paksas	06/1999	10/1999	4	4	73	MP OVC	50	expansion
Kubilius	11/1999	10/2000	11	3	72	MP OVC	43	contraction
Paksas	10/2000 <sup>pe</sup>	07/2001	9	3	75	MP OVC	50	wholesale alternation
Brazauskas	07/2001	10/2004	39	2	56	MP MWC	50	contraction
Brazauskas	12/2004 <sup>pe</sup>	07/2006	19	4	57	MP MWC	54	partial alternation
Kirkilas	07/2006	10/2008	27	3	42	MP MIN	50	partial alternation
Kubilius	12/2008 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2012	46	4	56	MP OVC	53	partial alternation
Butkevicius	12/2012 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2016	46	4	62	MP OVC	53	wholesale alternation
Skvernelis	11/2016 <sup>pe</sup>			2	50.4	MP MWC	79	partial alternation

# LUXEMBOURG

Dupong	11/1945 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1947	15	4	98	MP OVC	37	..
Dupong	03/1947	06/1948	15	2	65	MP MWC	57	contraction
Dupong	07/1948 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1951	35	2	60	MP MWC	57	non-alternation
Dupong	07/1951 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1953	29	2	75	MP MWGC	50	partial alternation
Bech	12/1953	05/1954	5	2	75	MP MWGC	50	non-alternation
Bech	06/1954 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1958	45	2	83	MP MWGC	50	non-alternation
Frieden	03/1958	02/1959	11	2	83	MP MWGC	50	non-alternation
Werner	02/1959 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1964	64	2	62	MP MWC	57	partial alternation
Werner	07/1964 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1968	53	2	77	MP MWGC	50	partial alternation
Werner	01/1969 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1974	64	2	57	MP MWC	57	partial alternation
Thorn	06/1974 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1979	60	2	49	MP MIN	50	partial alternation

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region										
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government		
MALTA	Werner	07/1979 <sup>pe</sup>	59	2	66	MP MWC	63	partial alternation		
	Santer	07/1984 <sup>pe</sup>	59	2	72	MP MWGC	56	partial alternation		
	Santer	07/1989 <sup>pe</sup>	59	2	67	MP MWGC	50	non-alternation		
	Santer	07/1994 <sup>pe</sup>	5	2	63	MP MWGC	50	non-alternation		
	Juncker	01/1995	06/1999	53	2	63	MP MWGC	55	non-alternation	
	Juncker	08/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2004	58	2	57	MP MWC	50	partial alternation	
	Juncker	07/2004 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2009	59	2	63	MP MWGC	60	partial alternation	
	Juncker	07/2009 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2013	51	2	65	MP MWGC	60	non-alternation	
	Bettel	12/2013 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2018	58	3	53	MP MWC	40	partial alternation	
MALTA										
Olivier	03/1966 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1971	63	1	56	SP MAJ	100	..		
Mintoff	06/1971 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1976	63	1	51	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation		
Mintoff	09/1976 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1981	63	1	52	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation		
Mintoff	12/1981 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1984	36	1	52	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation		
Bonnici	12/1984	05/1987	29	1	52	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation		
Fenech Adami	05/1987 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1992	57	1	51	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation		
Fenech Adami	02/1992 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1996	56	1	52	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation		
Sant	10/1996 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1998	23	1	51	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation		
Fenech Adami	09/1998 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2003	55	1	54	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation		
Fenech Adami	04/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2004	11	1	54	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation		

Gonzi	03/2004	03/2008	48	1	54	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Gonzi	03/2008 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2013	60	1	51	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Muscat	03/2013 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2017	51	1	57	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation
Muscat	06/2017 <sup>pe</sup>			1	55	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
MONTENEGRO								
Đukanović	01/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2006	32	3	53	MP OVC	68	..
Šturanović	11/2006 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2008	15	3	52	MP OVC	76	non-alternation
Đukanović	02/2008	03/2009	13	3	52	MP OVC	76	non-alternation
Đukanović	06/2009 <sup>pe</sup>	12/2010	18	4	60	MP OVC	74	expansion
Lukšić	12/2010	10/2012	22	4	60	MP OVC	70	non-alternation
Đukanović	12/2012 <sup>pe</sup>	01/2016	37	4	53	MP OVC	74	partial alternation
Đukanović*	01/2016	10/2016	9	4	49	MP MIN	74	contraction (effectively)
Marković	11/2016 <sup>pe</sup>			5	51	MP MWC	67	expansion

★ loss of parliamentary majority

## NETHERLANDS

Beel	07/1946 <sup>pe</sup>	07/1948	24	2	61	MP MWGC	38	..
Drees	08/1948 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1951	31	4	81	MP OVC	40	expansion
Drees	03/1951	06/1952	15	4	71	MP OVC	40	partial alternation
Drees	09/1952 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1956	45	4	81	MP OVC	37	non-alternation
Drees	10/1956 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1958	26	4	85	MP OVC	36	non-alternation
Beel	12/1958	03/1959	15	3	51	MP MWC	53	contraction
de Quay	05/1959 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1963	48	4	63	MP OVC	46	expansion
Marijnn	07/1963 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1965	21	4	61	MP OVC	46	non-alternation
Cals	04/1965	11/1966	19	3	71	MP OVC	43	partial alternation

(Continued)



APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region									
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government	
Zijlstra	11/1966	02/1967	15	2	42	MP MIN	62	contraction	
de Jong	04/1967 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1971	47	4	57	MP MWC	43	expansion	
Biesheuvel	06/1971 <sup>pe</sup>	08/1972	14	5	55	MP MWC	37	expansion	
Biesheuvel	08/1972	11/1972	3	4	49	MP MIN	43	contraction	
den Uyl	05/1973 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1977	48	5	66	MP OVC	44	partial alternation	
van Agt	12/1977 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1981	41	2	51	MP MWC	67	partial alternation	
van Agt	09/1981 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1982	8	3	73	MP OVC	40	partial alternation	
van Agt	05/1982	09/1982	4	2	41	MP MIN	64	contraction	
Lubbers	11/1982 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1986	42	2	54	MP MWC	57	partial alternation	
Lubbers	07/1986 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1989	38	2	54	MP MWC	64	non-alternation	
Lubbers	11/1989 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1994	54	2	69	MP MWGC	57	partial alternation	
Kok	08/1994 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1998	45	3	61	MP MWC	36	partial alternation	
Kok	08/1998 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2002	44	3	65	MP OVC	36	non-alternation	
Balkenende	07/2002 <sup>pe</sup>	01/2003	6	3	62	MP MWC	43	partial alternation	
Balkenende	05/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	07/2006	38	3	52	MP MWC	50	partial alternation	
Balkenende	07/2006	11/2006	5	2	48	MP MIN	56	contraction	
Balkenende	02/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2010	36	3	53	MP MWC	50	partial alternation	
Balkenende	02/2010	06/2010	4	2	31	MP MIN	75	contraction	
Rutte	10/2010 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2012	23	2	35	MP MIN	50	partial alternation	
Rutte	11/2012 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2017	52	2	53	MP MWGC	54	partial alternation	
Rutte	10/2017 <sup>pe</sup>			4	51	MP MWC	38	partial alternation	

# NORWAY

Gerhardsen	11/1945 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1949	47	1	51	SP MAJ	100	..
Gerhardsen	10/1949 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1951	25	1	57	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Torp	11/1951	10/1953	23	1	57	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Torp	10/1953 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1955	15	1	51	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Gerhardsen	01/1955	10/1957	33	1	51	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Gerhardsen	10/1957 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1961	47	1	52	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Gerhardsen	10/1961 <sup>pe</sup>	08/1963	23	1	49	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Lyng	08/1963	09/1963	1	4	49	MP MIN	33	wholesale alternation
Gerhardsen	09/1963	09/1965	24	1	49	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Borten	10/1965 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1969	47	4	53	MP MWC	40	wholesale alternation
Borten	09/1969 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1971	18	4	51	MP MWC	40	non-alternation
Brattelli	03/1971	10/1972	19	1	49	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Korvald	10/1972	09/1973	11	3	31	MP MIN	40	wholesale alternation
Brattelli	10/1973 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1976	27	1	40	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Nordli	01/1976	09/1977	20	1	40	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Nordli	09/1977 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1981	41	1	49	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Brundtland	02/1981	09/1981	7	1	49	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Willoch	10/1981 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1983	20	1	35	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Willoch	06/1983	09/1985	27	3	52	MP MWC	61	expansion
Willoch	09/1985 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1986	8	3	49	MP MIN	44	non-alternation
Brundtland	05/1986	09/1989	40	1	45	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Syde	10/1989 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1990	13	3	39	MP MIN	39	wholesale alternation
Brundtland	11/1990	09/1993	34	1	40	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Brundtland	10/1993 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1996	36	1	41	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Jagland	10/1996	09/1997	11	1	41	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Bondevik	10/1997 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2000	29	3	25	MP MIN	47	wholesale alternation
Stoltenberg	03/2000	09/2001	18	1	39	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation

(Continued)

**APPENDIX TABLE 5.1** (Continued)

<i>COUNTRY / Region</i>								
<i>Prime Minister or equivalent</i>	<i>Government In (month/year)</i>	<i>Government Out (month/year)</i>	<i>number of months in power</i>	<i>number of parties</i>	<i>Parliamentary base</i>	<i>cabinet type</i>	<i>cabinet dominance</i>	<i>change in party composition of government</i>
Bondevik	10/2001 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2005	47	3	38	MP MIN	53	wholesale alternation
Stoltenberg	10/2005 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2009	47	3	51	MP MWC	53	wholesale alternation
Stoltenberg	10/2009 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2013	47	3	51	MP MWC	60	non-alternation
Solberg	10/2013 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2017	47	2	46	MP MIN	61	wholesale alternation
Solberg	10/2017 <sup>pe</sup>	01/2018	3	2	43	MP MIN	60	non-alternation
Solberg	01/2018			3	47	MP MIN	50	expansion
POLAND								
Olszewski	12/1991 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1992	6	4	27	MP MIN	22	..
Suchocka	07/1992	04/1993	9	6	41	MP MIN	19	partial alternation
Suchocka	04/1993	09/1993	5	4	35	MP MIN	23	contraction
Pawlak	10/1993 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1995	17	2	66	MP MWC	37	wholesale alternation
Oleksi	03/1995	01/1996	10	2	66	MP MWC	47	non-alternation
Cimoszewicz	02/1996	09/1997	19	2	66	MP MWC	47	non-alternation
Buzek	10/1997 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2000	7	2	57	MP MWC	85	wholesale alternation
Buzek	06/2000	09/2001	15	1	44	SP MIN	100	contraction
Miller	10/2001 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2003	16	2	56	MP MWC	56	wholesale alternation
Miller	03/2003	06/2004	15	1	47	SP MIN	76	contraction
Belka	06/2004	09/2005	15	1	47	SP MIN	50	non-alternation
Marcinkiewicz	10/2005 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2006	7	1	34	SP MIN	61	wholesale alternation
Marcinkiewicz	05/2006	07/2006	2	3	53	MP MWC	55	expansion

Kaczyński	07/2006	09/2006	2	3	53	MP MWC	55	non-alternation
Kaczyński	09/2006	10/2006	1	2	41	MP MIN	60	contraction
Kaczyński	10/2006	08/2007	10	3	53	MP MWC	55	expansion
Kaczyński	08/2007	10/2007	2	2	41	MP MIN	60	contraction
Tusk	11/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2011	47	2	52	MP MWC	53	wholesale alternation
Tusk	11/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2014	35	2	51	MP MWC	60	non-alternation
Kopacz	10/2014	10/2015	12	2	51	MP MWC	58	non-alternation
Szydło	11/2015 <sup>pe</sup>	12/2017	25	1	51	SP MAJ	92	wholesale alternation
Morawiecki	12/2017			1	51	SP MAJ	86	non-alternation
PORTUGAL								
Soares	07/1976 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1977	17	1	41	SP MIN	70	..
Soares	01/1978	07/1978	7	2	57	MP MWC	69	expansion
Mota Pinto	11/1978	06/1979	7	1	28	SP MIN	25	wholesale alternation
Pintassilgo	07/1979	12/1979	5	(non-partisan caretaker government)				
Sá Carneiro	01/1980 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1980	10	3	53	MP MWC	60	wholesale alternation
Pinto Balsemão	01/1981 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1982	23	3	53	MP MWC	56	non-alternation
Soares	06/1983 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1985	28	2	70	MP MWGC	53	partial alternation
Cavaco Silva	11/1985 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1987	17	1	35	SP MIN	81	contraction
Cavaco Silva	08/1987 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1991	50	1	59	SP MAJ	83	non-alternation
Cavaco Silva	10/1991 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1995	48	1	59	SP MAJ	89	non-alternation
Guterres	10/1995 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1999	48	1	49	SP MIN	78	wholesale alternation
Guterres	10/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2002	29	1	50.0	SP MIN	50	non-alternation
Durão Barroso	04/2002 <sup>pe</sup>	07/2004	27	2	52	MP MWC	78	wholesale alternation
Santana Lopez	07/2004	02/2005	7	2	52	MP MWC	80	non-alternation
Sócrates	03/2005 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2009	54	1	53	SP MAJ	53	wholesale alternation
Sócrates	10/2009 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2011	20	1	42	SP MIN	59	non-alternation
Passos Coelho	06/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2015	52	2	57	MP MWC	42	wholesale alternation
Costa	12/2015 <sup>pe</sup>			1	37	SP MIN	72	wholesale alternation

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

Grindeanu	01/2017 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2017	5	2	53	MP MWC	87	wholesale alternation
Tudose	06/2017	01/2018	7	2	53	MP MWC	83	non-alternation
Dăncilă	01/2018			2	53	MP MWC	80	non-alternation
SAN MARINO								
Casali	03/1945 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1949	47	1	67	SP MAJ	100	..
Casali	03/1949 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1951	25	1	58	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Celi	06/1951	09/1951	3	4	100	MP OVC	43	expansion
Reffi	09/1951 <sup>pe</sup>	08/1955	47	2	52	MP MWC	50	contraction
Giacomini	09/1955 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1957	19	2	58	MP MWC	50	non-alternation
Giacomini★	04/1957	09/1957	5	2	50,0	MP MIN	50	contraction (effectively)
Bigi	10/1957	09/1959	23	2	52	MP MWC	50	alternation
Bigi	09/1959 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1964	59	2	60	MP MWC	60	non-alternation
Bigi	10/1964 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1969	58	2	65	MP MWC	50	non-alternation
Bigi	11/1969 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1971	14	2	63	MP MWC	60	non-alternation
Ghironzi	01/1971	01/1973	24	2	63	MP MWC	60	non-alternation
Berti	03/1973	09/1974	17	3	58	MP OVC	70	partial alternation
Berti	11/1974 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1975	12	2	55	MP MWC	70	contraction
Berti	11/1975	01/1976	2	1	42	SP MIN	100	contraction
Ghironzi	03/1976	11/1977	20	2	55	MP MWC	70	expansion
Ghironzi	11/1977	07/1978	8	1	42	SP MIN	100	contraction
Reffi	07/1978 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1981	38	3	52	MP MWC	40	wholesale alternation
Reffi	09/1981	05/1983	20	4	55	MP OVC	36	expansion
Reffi	07/1983 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1986	35	3	53	MP MWC	40	contraction
Gatti	07/1986	05/1988	22	2	68	MP MWGC	56	partial alternation
Gatti	07/1988 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1992	44	2	75	MP MWGC	60	non-alternation
Gatti	03/1992	05/1993	14	2	57	MP MWC	60	partial alternation
Gatti	07/1993 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1998	59	2	67	MP MWC	60	non-alternation

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region									
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government	
Gatti	07/1998 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2000	20	2	65	MP MWC	60	non-alternation	
Gatti	03/2000	06/2001	14	3	63	MP OVC	60	partial alternation	
Gatti	07/2001 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2002	10	2	67	MP MWC	60	partial alternation	
MMorri	05/2002	06/2002	1	2	67	MP MWC	60	non-alternation	
Casali	06/2002	12/2002	6	3	53	MP MWC	50	partial alternation	
Stolfi	12/2002	12/2003	12	2	67	MP MWC	50	partial alternation	
Berardi	12/2003	06/2006	6	3	87	MP OVC	50	expansion	
Stolfi	07/2006 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2007	16	3	53	MP MWC	60	contraction	
Stolfi	11/2007	11/2008	11	4	53	MP OVC	50	expansion	
Mularoni	12/2008 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2012	47	4	58	MP OVC	50	partial alternation	
Valentini	12/2012 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2016	47	4	58	MP OVC	50	partial alternation	
Renzi	12/2016 <sup>pe</sup>			3	58	MP MWC	43	partial alternation	

★ loss of parliamentary majority

SERBIA

Đinđić	01/2001 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2003	26	1	70	SP MAJ	100	..
Živković	03/2003	12/2003	9	1	70	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Košunica	03/2004 <sup>pe</sup>	01/2007	34	4	44	MP MIN	43	partial alternation
Košunica	05/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2008	12	5	52	MP MWC	44	partial alternation
Cvetković	07/2008 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2012	46	7	44	MP MIN	44	partial alternation
Dačić	07/2012 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2013	14	7	53	MP OVC	32	partial alternation

Dačić	09/2013	03/2014	6	8	47	MP MIN	32	partial alternation
Vučić	04/2014 <sup>pe</sup>	04/2016	24	5	81	MP OVC	42	contraction
Vučić	08/2016 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2017	10	5	64	MP OVC	50	partial alternation
Brnabić	06/2017			6	64	MP OVC	41	expansion
SLOVAKIA								
Mečiar	06/1990 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1991	9	3	57	MP MWC	52	..
Čarnogurský	04/1991	06/1992	14	3	41	MP MIN	52	contraction
Mečiar	06/1992 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1993	9	2	59	MP MWC	94	wholesale alternation
Mečiar	03/1993	11/1993	8	1	49	SP MIN	100	contraction
Mečiar	11/1993	03/1994	4	2	59	MP MWC	89	expansion
Moravčík	03/1994	10/1994	7	3	33	MP MIN	39	wholesale alternation
Mečiar	12/1994 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1998	45	3	55	MP MWC	68	wholesale alternation
Dzurinda	10/1998 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2002	47	4	62	MP OVC	45	wholesale alternation
Dzurinda	10/2002 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2006	44	4	52	MP MWC	39	partial alternation
Fico	07/2006 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2010	47	3	57	MP MWC	67	wholesale alternation
Radičová	07/2010 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2012	20	4	53	MP MWC	33	wholesale alternation
Fico	04/2012 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2016	47	1	55	SP MAJ	79	wholesale alternation
Fico	04/2016 <sup>pe</sup>	08/2016	4	4	57	MP MWC	60	expansion
Fico	08/2016	03/2018	19	3	53	MP MWC	60	contraction
Pellegrini	03/2018			3	53	MP MWC	60	non-alternation
SLOVENIA								
Drnovšek	01/1993 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1994	15	4	61	MP OVC	38	..
Drnovšek	04/1994	01/1996	22	3	69	MP OVC	44	contraction
Drnovšek	01/1996	11/1996	9	2	53	MP MWC	50	contraction

(Continued)



APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region									
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government	
Drnovšek	02/1997 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2000	40	3	54	MP MWC	37	partial alternation	
Bajuk	06/2000	10/2000	4	3	50.0	MP MIN	35	partial alternation	
Drnovšek	11/2000 <sup>pe</sup>	12/2002	25	4	64	MP OVC	60	partial alternation	
Rop	12/2002	10/2004	22	4	64	MP OVC	47	non-alternation	
Janša	12/2004 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2008	45	4	54	MP MWC	56	partial alternation	
Pahor	11/2008 <sup>pe</sup>	12/2011	37	4	56	MP MWC	26	partial alternation	
Janša	02/2012 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2013	13	5	56	MP OVC	38	partial alternation	
Bratušek	03/2013	05/2014	14	4	58	MP OVC	38	partial alternation	
Bratušek	05/2014	07/2014	2	5	58	MP OVC	31	expansion	
Cerar	09/2014 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2018	45	3	58	MP OVC	59	partial alternation	
Šarec	09/2018 <sup>pe</sup>			5	48	MP MIN	29	expansion	
SPAIN									
Suárez	07/1977 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1979	20	1	47	SP MIN	95	...	
Suárez	03/1979 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1981	23	1	48	SP MIN	92	non-alternation	
Calvo Sotelo	02/1981	10/1982	10	1	48	SP MIN	100	non-alternation	
González	12/1982 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1986	42	1	58	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation	
González	07/1986 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1989	41	1	53	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
González	12/1989 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1993	42	1	50.0	SP MIN	84	non-alternation	
González	06/1993 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1996	33	1	45	SP MIN	67	non-alternation	
Aznar	05/1996 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2000	46	1	45	SP MIN	80	wholesale alternation	
Aznar	04/2000 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2004	47	1	52	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	

Rodríguez Zapatero	04/2004 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2008	47	1	47	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Rodríguez Zapatero	04/2008 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2011	43	1	48	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Rajoy	12/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	12/2015	48	1	53	SP MAJ	79	wholesale alternation
(acts as a caretaker government after the December 2015 election through the June 2016 election)								
Rajoy	10/2016 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2018	19	1	39	SP MIN	86	non-alternation
Sánchez	06/2018			1	24	SP MIN	61	wholesale alternation
Basque Country								
Garaicoetxea	04/1980 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1984	46	1	42	SP MIN	100	..
Garaicoetxea	04/1984 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1984	8	1	43	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Ardanza	01/1985	11/1986	22	1	43	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Ardanza	02/1987 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1990	32	2	48	MP MIN	50	expansion
Ardanza	02/1991 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1991	7	3	49	MP MIN	64	partial alternation
Ardanza	09/1991	10/1994	37	2	51	MP MWGC	60	partial alternation
Ardanza	12/1994 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1998	42	3	56	MP MWC	55	expansion
Ardanza	07/1998	10/1998	4	2	40	MP MIN	73	contraction
Ibarretxe	12/1998 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2001	29	2	36	MP MIN	73	non-alternation
Ibarretxe	07/2001 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2001	2	2	44	MP MIN	73	non-alternation
Ibarretxe	09/2001	04/2005	43	3	48	MP MIN	67	expansion
Ibarretxe	06/2005 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2009	45	3	43	MP MIN	67	non-alternation
López	05/2009 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2012	41	1	33	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Urkullu	12/2012 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2016	45	1	36	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Urkullu	11/2016 <sup>pe</sup>			2	49	MP MIN	75	expansion
Catalonia								
Pujol	04/1980 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1984	48	1	32	SP MIN	100	..
Pujol	05/1984 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1987	33	2	57	MP OVC	92	expansion

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region										
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government		
Cataluña	Pujol	02/1987	05/1988	15	1	530	SP MAJ	100	contraction	
	Pujol	06/1988 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1992	45	1	51	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
	Pujol	04/1992 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1995	43	1	52	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
	Pujol	12/1995 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1999	46	1	44	SP MIN	100	non-alternation	
	Pujol	11/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2003	48	1	41	SP MIN	100	non-alternation	
	Maragall	12/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2006	29	3	55	MP MWC	53	wholesale alternation	
	Maragall	05/2006	11/2006	6	2	38	MP MIN	87	contraction	
	Montilla	11/2006 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2010	48	3	52	MP MWC	53	expansion	
	Mas	12/2010 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2012	23	1	46	SP MIN	67	wholesale alternation	
	Mas	12/2012 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2015	30	1	37	SP MIN	85	non-alternation	
	Mas	06/2015	09/2015	3	1	30	SP MIN	85	contraction	
	Puigdemont	01/2016 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2017	21	2	46	MP MIN	57	expansion	
	[executive suspended]									
	Torra	06/2018 <sup>pe</sup>			2	49	MP MIN	50	non-alternation	
SWEDEN										
Erlander	10/1946	09/1948	23	1	50.0	SP MIN*	92	non-alternation		
Erlander	10/1948 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1951	35	1	49	SP MIN*	84	non-alternation		
Erlander	09/1951	09/1952	12	2	62	MP MWC	56	expansion		
Erlander	09/1952 <sup>pe</sup>	09/1956	48	2	59	MP MWC	56	non-alternation		
Erlander	09/1956 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1957	13	2	54	MP MWC	53	non-alternation		
Erlander	10/1957	06/1958	8	1	46	SP MIN*	87	contraction		

Erlander	06/1958 <sup>re</sup>	09/1960	27	1	48	SP MIN*	93	non-alternation
Erlander	10/1960 <sup>re</sup>	10/1964	48	1	49	SP MIN*	93	non-alternation
Erlander	10/1964 <sup>re</sup>	09/1968	47	1	48	SP MIN*	100	non-alternation
Erlander	09/1968 <sup>re</sup>	10/1969	13	1	54	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Palme	10/1969	09/1970	11	1	54	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Palme	09/1970 <sup>re</sup>	09/1973	36	1	47	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Palme	10/1973 <sup>re</sup>	09/1976	35	1	45	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Fälldin	10/1976 <sup>re</sup>	10/1978	24	3	52	MP MWC	45	wholesale alternation
Ullsten	10/1978	09/1979	11	1	11	SP MIN	95	contraction
Fälldin	10/1979 <sup>re</sup>	05/1981	19	3	50.1	MP MWC	38	expansion
Fälldin	05/1981	09/1982	16	2	29	MP MIN	56	contraction
Palme	10/1982 <sup>re</sup>	09/1985	35	1	48	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Palme	10/1985 <sup>re</sup>	02/1986	4	1	46	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Carlsson	03/1986	09/1988	30	1	46	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Carlsson	09/1988 <sup>re</sup>	02/1990	17	1	45	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Carlsson	02/1990	09/1991	19	1	45	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Bildt	10/1991 <sup>re</sup>	09/1994	35	4	49	MP MIN	38	wholesale alternation
Carlsson	10/1994 <sup>re</sup>	03/1996	17	1	46	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Persson	03/1996	09/1998	30	1	46	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Persson	10/1998 <sup>re</sup>	09/2002	47	1	38	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Persson	10/2002 <sup>re</sup>	09/2006	47	1	41	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Reinfeldt	10/2006 <sup>re</sup>	09/2010	47	4	51	MP MWC	50	wholesale alternation
Reinfeldt	10/2010 <sup>re</sup>	09/2014	47	4	49.6	MP MIN	54	non-alternation
Löfven	10/2014 <sup>re</sup>	09/2018	47	2	40	MP MIN	75	wholesale alternation

\* Note: Until 1970 Sweden was bicameral, and in the combined upper and lower houses – which met jointly to pass financial bills – the governing Social Democrats had a continuous majority.

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region											
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government			
SWITZERLAND											
	12/1947 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1951	46	4	83	MP OVC	43				non-alternation
	12/1951 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1953	24	4	86	MP OVC	43				non-alternation
	12/1953	10/1955	22	3	61	MP MWC	43				contraction
	12/1955 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1959	46	3	59	MP MWC	43				non-alternation
	12/1959 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1963	46	4	86	MP OVC	29				expansion
	12/1963 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1967	46	4	87	MP OVC	29				non-alternation
	12/1967 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1971	46	4	83	MP OVC	29				non-alternation
	12/1971 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1975	46	4	80	MP OVC	29				non-alternation
	12/1975 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1979	46	4	85	MP OVC	29				non-alternation
	12/1979 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1983	46	4	85	MP OVC	29				non-alternation
	12/1983 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1987	46	4	83	MP OVC	29				non-alternation
	12/1987 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1991	46	4	79	MP OVC	29				non-alternation
	12/1991 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1995	46	4	73	MP OVC	29				non-alternation
	12/1995 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1999	46	4	81	MP OVC	29				non-alternation
	12/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2003	46	4	87	MP OVC	29				non-alternation
	12/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2007	46	4	86	MP OVC	29				non-alternation
	12/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2008	11	4	84	MP OVC	29				non-alternation
	11/2008	01/2009	2	4	55	MP OVC	29				partial alternation
	01/2009	10/2011	33	5	84	MP OVC	29				expansion
	12/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2015	46	5	84	MP OVC	29				non-alternation
	12/2015 <sup>pe</sup>			4	84	MP OVC	29				contraction

Note: Switzerland has no prime minister.

# TURKEY – FIRST REPUBLIC

Menderes	05/1950 <sup>pe</sup>	48	1	84	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation
Menderes	05/1954 <sup>pe</sup>	41	1	93	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Menderes	11/1957 <sup>pe</sup>	30	1	70	SP MAJ	95	non-alternation

[military coup in 1960]

# TURKEY – SECOND REPUBLIC

Inönü	11/1961 <sup>pe</sup>	6	2	74	MP MWGC	50	wholesale alternation
Inönü	06/1962	18	3	65	MP MWC	48	partial alternation
Inönü	12/1963	14	1	38	SP MIN	87	contraction
Ürgüplü	02/1965	8	4	62	MP MWC	39	wholesale alternation
Demirel	10/1965 <sup>pe</sup>	48	1	53	SP MAJ	100	contraction
Demirel	11/1969 <sup>pe</sup>	16	1	57	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation

[military coup in 1971]

Ecevit	01/1974 <sup>pe</sup>	8	2	52	MP MWC	72	wholesale alternation
Irmak	11/1974	4	(non-partisan caretaker government)				
Demirel	03/1975	27	4	47	MP MIN	53	wholesale alternation
Ecevit	06/1977 <sup>pe</sup>	2	1	47	SP MIN	94	wholesale alternation
Demirel	08/1977	4	3	51	MP MWC	55	wholesale alternation
Ecevit	01/1978	21	3	48	MP MIN	88	wholesale alternation
Demirel	11/1979	10	1	42	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation

[military coup in 1980]

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region									
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government	
TURKEY – THIRD REPUBLIC									
Özal	12/1983 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1987	47	1	53	SP MAJ	91	..	
Özal	12/1987 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1989	23	1	65	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Akbulut	11/1989	06/1991	19	1	65	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Yilmaz	06/1991	10/1991	4	1	65	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Demirel	10/1991 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1993	19	2	59	MP MWC	62	wholesale alternation	
Çiller	06/1993	12/1995	30	2	59	MP MWC	62	non-alternation	
Yilmaz	03/1996 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1996	2	2	49	MP MIN	55	partial alternation	
Erbakan	06/1996	06/1997	12	2	53	MP MWC	50	partial alternation	
Yilmaz	06/1997	11/1998	17	3	39	MP MIN	53	wholesale alternation	
Ecevit	01/1999	04/1999	3	1	14	SP MIN	88	contraction	
Ecevit	06/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2002	41	3	64	MP MWC	36	expansion	
Gül	11/2002 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2003	4	1	66	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation	
Erdoğan	03/2003	07/2007	52	1	66	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Erdoğan	09/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2011	45	1	62	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Erdoğan	07/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	08/2014	37	1	59	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Davutoğlu	08/2014	06/2015	10	1	59	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Davutoğlu	08/2015 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2015	3	(interim all-party pre-election government)				expansion	
Davutoğlu	11/2015 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2016	6	1	58	SP MAJ	100	contraction	
Yıldırım	05/2016	06/2018	25	1	58	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	

## UNITED KINGDOM

Attlee	07/1945 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1950	55	1	61	SP MAJ	100	partial alternation
Attlee	02/1950 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1951	20	1	50.4	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Churchill	11/1951 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1955	41	1	51	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation
Eden	04/1955	05/1955	1	1	51	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Eden	05/1955 <sup>pe</sup>	01/1957	20	1	55	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Macmillan	01/1957	10/1959	33	1	55	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Macmillan	10/1959 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1963	48	1	58	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Douglas-Home	10/1963	10/1964	12	1	57	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Wilson	10/1964 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1966	17	1	50.3	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation
Wilson	04/1966 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1970	50	1	58	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Heath	06/1970 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1974	44	1	52	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation
Wilson	03/1974 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1974	7	1	47	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Wilson	10/1974 <sup>pe</sup>	04/1976	18	1	50.2	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Callaghan	04/1976	05/1979	37	1	49.6	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Thatcher	05/1979 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1983	49	1	53	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation
Thatcher	06/1983 <sup>pe</sup>	06/1987	48	1	63	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Thatcher	06/1987 <sup>pe</sup>	11/1990	41	1	58	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Major	11/1990	04/1992	17	1	57	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Major	04/1992 <sup>pe</sup>	12/1996	56	1	52	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Major★	12/1996	05/1997	5	1	49.8	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Blair	05/1997 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2001	49	1	64	SP MAJ	100	wholesale alternation
Blair	06/2001 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2005	47	1	63	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Blair	05/2005 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2007	26	1	55	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Brown	06/2007	05/2010	34	1	55	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Cameron	05/2010 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2015	60	2	56	MP MW/C	78	wholesale alternation
Cameron	05/2015 <sup>pe</sup>	07/2016	14	1	51	SP MAJ	100	contraction
May	07/2016	06/2017	11	1	51	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
May	06/2017 <sup>pe</sup>			1	49	SP MIN	100	non-alternation

★ loss of parliamentary majority.

(Continued)



APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region									
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government	
Northern Ireland									
Brooke	07/1945 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1949	43	1	63	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Brooke	03/1949 <sup>pe</sup>	10/1953	55	1	71	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Brooke	10/1953 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1958	53	1	73	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Brooke	03/1958 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1962	50	1	71	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Brooke	06/1962 <sup>pe</sup>	03/1963	9	1	65	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
O'Neill	03/1963	11/1965	32	1	65	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
O'Neill	12/1965 <sup>pe</sup>	02/1969	38	1	69	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
O'Neill	03/1969 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1969	2	1	69	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Chichester-Clark	05/1969	03/1971	22	1	69	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
Faulkner	03/1971	03/1972	12	1	69	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation	
[executive suspended]									
Faulkner	01/1974 <sup>pe</sup>	05/1974	4	3	65	MP OVC	55	expansion	
[executive suspended]									
Trimble	11/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2000	3	4	83	MP OVC	33	..	
[executive suspended]									
Trimble	05/2000	07/2001	14	4	83	MP OVC	33	non-alternation	
Empey	07/2001	11/2001	3	4	83	MP OVC	33	non-alternation	
Trimble	11/2001	10/2002	11	4	83	MP OVC	33	non-alternation	
[executive suspended]									
Paisley	05/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2008	13	4	91	MP OVC	42	non-alternation	

Robinson	06/2008 <sup>pe</sup>	01/2010	19	4	91	MP OVC	42	non-alternation
Foster	01/2010	02/2010	1	4	91	MP OVC	36	non-alternation
Robinson	02/2010	04/2010	2	4	91	MP OVC	42	non-alternation
Robinson	04/2010	05/2011	13	5	97	MP OVC	38	expansion
Robinson	05/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	09/2015	52	5	97	MP OVC	38	non-alternation
Foster	09/2015	10/2015	1	4	82	MP OVC	36	contraction
Robinson	10/2015	01/2016	3	4	82	MP OVC	46	non-alternation
Foster	01/2016	05/2016	4	4	82	MP OVC	46	non-alternation
Foster	05/2016 <sup>pe</sup>	03/2017	10	2	61	MP MWGC	50	contraction
Scotland								
Dewar	05/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	10/2000	17	2	57	MP MWC	82	..
McLeish	10/2000	11/2001	13	2	57	MP MWC	83	expansion
McConnell	11/2001	05/2003	18	2	57	MP MWC	82	contraction
McConnell	05/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2007	48	2	52	MP MWC	75	non-alternation
Salmond	05/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2011	48	1	36	SP MIN	100	wholesale alternation
Salmond	05/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	11/2014	42	1	53	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Sturgeon	11/2014	05/2016	18	1	53	SP MAJ	100	non-alternation
Sturgeon	05/2016 <sup>pe</sup>			1	49	SP MIN	100	non-alternation
Wales								
Michael	05/1999 <sup>pe</sup>	02/2000	9	1	47	SP MIN	100	..
Morgan	02/2000	05/2003	39	2	57	MP MWC	78	expansion
Morgan	05/2003 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2007	48	1	50.0	SP MIN	100	contraction
Morgan	05/2007 <sup>pe</sup>	06/2007	1	1	43	SP MIN	100	non-alternation

(Continued)

APPENDIX TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

COUNTRY / Region								
Prime Minister or equivalent	Government In (month/year)	Government Out (month/ year)	number of months in power	number of parties	Parliamentary base	cabinet type	cabinet dominance	change in party composition of government
Morgan	06/2007	12/2009	30	2	68	MP MWGC	67	expansion
Jones	12/2009	05/2011	17	2	68	MP MWGC	67	non-alternation
Jones	05/2011 <sup>pe</sup>	05/2016	60	1	50.0	SP MIN	100	contraction
Jones	05/2016 <sup>pe</sup>			2	50.0	MP MIN	88	expansion

pe = post-election SP MAJ = single party majority SP MIN = single party minority MP MIN = multiparty minority (coalition) MP MWGC = multiparty minimal winning coalition MP MWGC = multiparty minimal winning grand coalition ★ MP OVC = multiparty oversized coalition MP OVGC = multiparty oversized grand coalition \*\* a “grand coalition” involves the top two parties in terms of seats and which are historical ideological rivals, and only these two parties.

*Note:* new would-be governments that failed their vote of investiture are not included, though they may serve in a caretaker capacity.

## PART II

# Individual case analyses of longstanding democratic polities

In this part of the book descriptions are given of the party systems of each of the 48 cases where democracy has lasted for at least four straight elections (and usually for decades). The sections follow a set format, in that first we note the party pattern of each election and the party systems where these exist using a smoothing technique and the classifications from Chapter 2 in Part I. Then a brief historical overview of the polity is given. Then the electoral system(s) is/are explained. This is followed by a discussion of the main parties and political divisions, sometimes first in terms of traditional divisions (or early divisions for post-communist systems) and then the effects of realignment including more recent parties, and finally there are some comments on the general nature of governments and which parties have led these. For each case at least two data tables are provided: the first (or first ones) gives the results of all elections (postwar or since democratization) – or in a couple cases most elections to save space – in terms of both percentage of the total vote [%V] and the number of seats won [#S]. It also classifies wherever possible every party or grouping into the party family [PF] indicated in Chapter 1. In selected cases schematic diagrams illustrate the relative positions of parties. The last table lists all governments, giving for each: the month the government passed its investiture vote and/or took power; the prime minister (or equivalent); the number of ministers in the government [#M]; of these the number of independents [(I)], if any; the parties in the government; and in some cases the parties providing external support. Finally, all of the party acronyms of the parties discussed are listed alphabetically.



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# ANDORRA

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1993	highly multi-party
1997	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (UL)</i>
2001	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (PLA)</i>
2005	two-and-a-half-party
2009	two-and-a-half-party
2011	two-party, <i>with a single-party super-majority (DA)</i>
2015	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (DA)</i>

## Party systems (with smoothing)

2005–2015 inclusive      two-and-a-half-party system

## History

Andorra, a landlocked country in the Pyrenees, retains the Spain bishop of Urgell and the French president of the day as joint co-princes (heads of state). Their roles are symbolic. Internal democracy came quite late, though, with the constitution of 1993 which amongst other changes finally allowed for political parties (previously these had been banned). Indeed, executive and legislative powers had only been divided the previous decade, with the first prime minister being appointed in 1982.

## Electoral system

Andorra uses a parallel electoral system. Half of the 28 seats are elected in a majoritarian fashion: two seats are given to each of the seven parishes, with the plurality

party in each parish winning both seats. The other 14 seats are allocated by nation-wide proportional representation using the Hare quota and largest remainder formula.

Political parties and cleavages

The initial plurality party was the progressive **National Democratic Grouping (AND)**. However, they were soon surpassed as the dominant force by right-wing Liberals – namely the **Liberal Union (UL)**, founded in 1992, which in 2001 would become the **Liberal Party of Andorra (PLA)** and then more broadly in 2009 the **Reformist Coalition (CR)** and since 2011 the **Democrats for Andorra**

ELECTIONS IN ANDORRA SINCE 1993

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1993</i>		<i>1997</i>		<i>2001</i>		<i>2005</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
VA	3			–	–	–	–	–	–	3.5	0
AND				26.4	8	28.3	6	–	–	–	–
ND	4			19.1	5	17.6	2	–	–	–	–
PS	4			–	–	–	–	30.0	6	38.0	12
RD	5			–	–	–	–	–	–	6.2	0
PD/CDA-S21	8 then 10			–	–	–	–	23.8	5	11.0	2
UL/PLA	9			22.0	5	42.2	18	46.1	17	41.2	14
CNA				17.2	2	–	–	–	–	–	–
IDN				15.3	2	11.8	2	–	–	–	–
independents					6						
TOTAL SEATS					28		28		28		28

		<i>PF</i>		<i>2009</i>		<i>2011</i>		<i>2015</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
VA	3			3.2	0	3.4	0	(with PS)	
PS	4			45.0	14	34.8	6	23.5	3
ApC	5			18.9	3	6.7	0	–	–
SDP	5			–	–	–	–	11.7	2
Liberals	9			–	–	–	–	27.7	8
CR/DA	10			32.3	11	55.1	22	37.0	15
UL	21				(with CR)		(with CR)	–	–
others				0.6	0	–	–	–	–
TOTAL SEATS					28		28		28

(DA). Since 2001 their main rival has been the **Social Democratic Party (PS)**, which arose out of the split-up of the AND. In the political centre have been various parties – the **Democratic Party (PD)** which also arose out of the break-up of AND, the **Andorran Democratic Centre (CDA)**, **Democratic Renewal (RD)**, and **Andorra for Change (ApC)** – but none have proved durable.

## Governments

Governments in Andorra have always been single-party.

### ANDORRAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1994

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
01/1994	Ribas i Reig, O. (AND)	?	AND
12/1994	Forné i Molné, M. (UL)	?	UL
03/1997	Forné i Molné, M. (PLA)	?	PLA
04/2001	Forné i Molné, M. (PLA)	?	PLA
05/2005	Pintat, A. (PLA)	11	PLA
06/2009	Bartumeu, J. (PS)	?	PS
05/2011	Martí, A. (DA)	10 (4)	DA
04/2015	Martí, A. (DA)	10 (3)	DA

## Acronyms

AND	National Democratic Grouping
ApC	Andorra for Change
CDA-S21	Andorran Democratic Centre–Century 21
CNA	Andorran National Coalition
CR	Reformist Coalition
DA	Democrats for Andorra
IDN	National Democratic Initiative
ND	New Democracy
PD	Democratic Party
PS	Social Democratic Party
RD	Democratic Renewal
SDP	Social Democracy and Progress
UL	Liberal Union
VA	Greens of Andorra



# AUSTRIA

## **The party pattern in each election, *with additional components***

1945	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (ÖVP)</i>
1949	two-and-a-half-party
1953	two-and-a-half-party
1956	two-and-a-half-party
1959	two-and-a-half-party
1962	two-and-a-half-party
1966	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (ÖVP)</i>
1970	two-and-a-half-party
1971	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (SPÖ)</i>
1975	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (SPÖ)</i>
1979	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (SPÖ)</i>
1983	two-and-a-half-party
1986	two-and-a-half-party
1990	moderately multi-party
1994	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (SPÖ, ÖVP, and FPÖ)</i>
1995	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (SPÖ, ÖVP, and FPÖ)</i>
1999	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (SPÖ, FPÖ, and ÖVP)</i>
2002	two-and-a-half-party
2006	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (SPÖ and ÖVP)</i>
2008	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (SPÖ, ÖVP, and FPÖ)</i>

- 2013 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (SPÖ, ÖVP, and FPÖ)*
- 2017 moderately multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (ÖVP, SPÖ, and FPÖ)*

### Party systems (with smoothing)

- 1945–1986 inclusive two-and-a-half-party system
- 1990–2008 inclusive moderately multi-party system

### History

Centuries of imperial rule gave way at the end of World War One to the first Austrian Republic, which was characterized by extreme polarization between Socialists and Christian Socials. The country often seemed on the brink of civil war, and a brief civil war did actually occur in 1934. This conflict was followed by an authoritarian Catholic regime, and then annexation into Nazi Germany in 1938. After World War Two Austria, like Germany, was divided between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. Full sovereignty was not restored until the Austrian State Treaty of 1955. The second Austrian Republic had, however, been set up in 1945. Within the country, a conscious effort was made after the war to avoid the mistakes of the interwar period. As such, the political system became consociational, with the two main parties (ÖVP and SPÖ) governing together. Austria also became known for its strong corporatism and labour peace, institutionalized in various commissions and bodies. Opposition to such consociational arrangements, or more specifically the *Proporz* system of proportional allocation of positions to the two main parties, fuelled the rise of the populist radical right from the late 1980s. Austria joined the European Union in 1995.

### Electoral system

Since 1970, Austria has used a tiered system of party list proportional representation with the d'Hondt formula for the nation-wide calculation. The cut-off to receive seats is 4 percent of the national vote. Initially there were 25 lower-tier districts; in 1970 these were merged into nine districts, these being the nine provinces (*Länder*). Then in 1992 the initial calculation became based on 43 local districts (to increase accountability of deputies), with the provinces becoming a second tier and then a third country-wide tier.

### Cleavages, political parties, and electoral change

The postwar Austrian party system was one of the most stable in Europe, based as it was on deeply rooted subcultures, two of which were central. The first

of these *Lager* (camps) was the Catholic-conservative *Lager*, represented by the **Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)**, founded in 1945. The ÖVP has been the party of Catholics, but also farmers and business people. Indeed, these economic interests have had specific representation within the ÖVP organization. The other main *Lager* has the socialist one, represented primarily by the **Socialist Party of Austria (SPÖ)**, founded in 1889, but also for a time after the war by the **Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ)**, founded in 1918. In contrast to the ÖVP, the SPÖ has been the party of industrial workers as well as secular white-collar employees. There was also a third, much smaller *Lager* of secular pan-German nationalists, who were not allowed by the allies to form such a party in the first election of 1945, but who would be represented ultimately by the **Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)**, formed in 1955, and now known as the **Freedom Movement**. From 1945 to 1947, the ÖVP, SPÖ, and the tiny KPÖ formed an all-party coalition, which gave way to a long-lasting ÖVP-SPÖ Grand Coalition.

In the 1945 election, the communists were the third force, but a very distant third, and third only because the nationalist camp was not allowed to compete. With the onset of the Cold War the KPÖ lost its relevance. In contrast, the **League of Independents (VdU)** and from 1956 the FPÖ would become the third force in Austria's two-and-a-half-party politics. Up through 1962, the ÖVP was normally slightly stronger than the SPÖ, but the spread between these two parties was never very big during this period. In the 1966 election, however, the ÖVP won an absolute majority and formed a single-party government. After the 1970 election there was a brief SPÖ minority – the only minority government in postwar Austria – followed by three straight SPÖ majorities in 1971, 1975, and 1979. These majorities were in part due to the personal popularity of the Socialist Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. From 1966 until the 1983 election, then, there were thus single-party governments and a very concentrated party system.

In the 1980s realignment became evident in the emergence of various Green parties, first the **United Greens of Austria (VGÖ)**, founded in 1982, and then the **Green Alternative (GA)**, founded in 1986. These two parties have a working electoral alliance. Although the Greens did not win any seats in 1983 (as they have since 1986), they took enough votes away from the SPÖ in that year to cost the socialists their majority. The SPÖ thus formed a coalition with the FPÖ. This coalition collapsed in 1986 after the national FPÖ was taken over by Jörg Haider, who would take the party in a far-right populist direction. Thus in 1987 a Grand Coalition was reformed – initially though under an SPÖ chancellor – which continued until 2000. Jörg Haider's strategy first largely hurt the ÖVP, so that after 1990 the ÖVP was no longer clearly one of two main parties. Yet by the 1990s the FPÖ was also able to make inroads into the SPÖ's blue-collar base, especially amongst younger workers. More liberal-minded members of the FPÖ broke away in 1993 to form the **Liberal Forum (LF)**, which would win parliamentary seats in 1994 and 1995 and then carry on until allying with and then merging into the liberal

**New Austria (NEOS)**, which had been formed in 2012. A mixture of personality conflicts and ideological differences led in 2005 to the breakaway from the FPÖ of the **Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)**. Lastly, in 2012 the Austrian-Canadian businessman Frank Stronach would form a separate populist radical right party, **Team Stronach**.

Over the postwar period up through the 1990s, there was thus a clear shift in the plurality/majority party from the ÖVP to the SPÖ. There seems to have been three main reasons for this (see Müller and Steininger 1994). First, the ÖVP was affected more than the SPÖ by social structural changes. Its core group of farmers and other self-employed shrunk greatly, and like most religious parties the ÖVP was hurt by secularization. In contrast, Austria remained a highly industrialized country, and trade union density as a share of the total labour force remained around 50 percent. This preserved the SPÖ until Jörg Haider began to target blue-collar workers. Secondly, although aware of its problems, attempts to modernize the organization and image of the ÖVP were unsuccessful until quite recently. Third and finally, the ÖVP has had weaker and certainly less popular leaders and “chancellor-candidates” than the SPÖ. It is thus not surprising that whereas the ÖVP monopolized the chancellorship until 1970, the SPÖ has provided the chancellor most of the time since then.

#### ELECTIONS IN AUSTRIA SINCE 1945

	PF	1945		1949		1953		1956	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
KPÖ	1	5.4	4	5.1	5	5.3	4	4.4	3
SPÖ	4	44.6	76	38.7	67	42.1	73	43.0	74
ÖVP	8	49.8	85	44.0	77	41.3	74	46.0	82
VdU/FPÖ	11	—	—	11.7	16	10.9	14	6.5	6
others		0.2	0	0.5	0	0.4	0	0.1	0
TOTAL SEATS			165		165		165		165

	PF	1959		1962		1966		1970	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
KLS/KPÖ	1	3.3	0	3.0	0	0.4	0	1.0	0
SPÖ	4	44.8	78	44.0	76	42.6	74	48.4	81
ÖVP	8	44.2	79	45.4	81	48.3	85	44.7	78
FPÖ	11	7.7	8	7.0	8	5.4	6	5.5	6
Others		0.1	0	0.5	0	3.3	0	0.4	0
TOTAL SEATS			165		165		165		165

(Continued)

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1971</i>		<i>1975</i>		<i>1979</i>		<i>1983</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
KPÖ	1			1.4	0	1.2	0	1.0	0	0.7	0
SPÖ	4			50.0	93	50.4	93	51.0	95	47.6	90
ÖVP	8			43.1	80	42.9	80	41.9	77	43.2	81
FPÖ	11 then 9			5.5	10	5.4	10	6.1	11	5.0	12
others				0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	3.5	0
TOTAL SEATS				183		183		183		183	

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1986</i>		<i>1990</i>		<i>1994</i>		<i>1995</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Greens	3			4.8	8	4.8	10	7.3	13	4.8	9
SPÖ	4			43.1	80	42.8	80	34.9	65	38.1	71
ÖVP	8			41.3	77	32.1	60	27.7	52	28.3	52
LF	9			–	–	–	–	6.0	11	5.5	10
FPÖ	9 then 12			9.7	18	16.6	33	22.5	42	21.9	41
Others				1.1	0	3.7	0	1.6	0	1.4	0
TOTAL SEATS				183		183		183		183	

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1999</i>		<i>2002</i>		<i>2006</i>		<i>2008</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Greens	3			7.4	14	9.5	17	11.1	21	10.4	20
SPÖ	4			33.2	65	36.5	69	35.3	68	29.3	57
ÖVP	8			26.9	52	42.3	79	34.3	66	26.0	51
LF	9			3.6	0	1.0	0	(with SPÖ)		2.1	0
BZÖ	11			–	–	–	–	4.1	7	10.7	21
FPÖ	12			26.9	52	10.0	18	11.0	21	17.5	34
others				2.0	0	0.8	0	4.2	0	4.0	0
TOTAL SEATS				183		183		183		183	

		<i>PF</i>		<i>2013</i>		<i>2017</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Greens	3			12.4	24	3.8	0
Peter Pilz List	3			–	–	4.4	8
SPÖ	4			26.8	52	26.9	52
ÖVP	8			24.0	47	31.5	62
NEOS	9			5.0	9	5.3	10
BZÖ	11			3.5	0	–	–
FPÖ	12			20.5	40	26.0	51
Team Stronach	12			5.7	11	–	–
others				2.1	0	2.1	0
TOTAL SEATS				183		183	

## Governments

Austria has mainly been governed by the Grand Coalitions of the ÖVP and SPÖ. In part this has been because the third largest party, the FPÖ, has often not been seen as an acceptable coalition partner; it has though been a junior coalition partner to both main parties. In the 1970s the SPÖ set a European record of a sorts by winning three straight earned majorities.

### AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1945

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Chancellor (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
12/1945	Figl, L. (ÖVP)	15 (1)	ÖVP SPÖ KPÖ
11/1947	Figl, L. (ÖVP)	15 (1)	ÖVP SPÖ
11/1949	Figl, L. (ÖVP)	11	ÖVP SPÖ
04/1953	Raab, J. (ÖVP)	11	ÖVP SPÖ
06/1956	Raab, J. (ÖVP)	12	ÖVP SPÖ
07/1959	Raab, J. (ÖVP)	12	ÖVP SPÖ
04/1961	Gorbach, A. (ÖVP)	12	ÖVP SPÖ
03/1963	Gorbach, A. Ö(VP)	12	ÖVP SPÖ
04/1964	Klaus, J. (ÖVP)	12	ÖVP SPÖ
04/1966	Klaus, J. (ÖVP)	13 (1)	ÖVP
04/1970	Kreisky, B. (SPÖ)	13 (1)	SPÖ
11/1971	Kreisky, B. (SPÖ)	14 (2)	SPÖ
10/1975	Kreisky, B. (SPÖ)	14 (2)	SPÖ
06/1979	Kreisky, B. (SPÖ)	14 (1)	SPÖ
05/1983	Sinowatz, F. (SPÖ)	16	SPÖ FPÖ
06/1986	Vranitzky, F. (SPÖ)	17	SPÖ FPÖ
01/1987	Vranitzky, F. (SPÖ)	15 (1)	ÖVP SPÖ
12/1990	Vranitzky, F. (SPÖ)	17 (1)	ÖVP SPÖ
11/1994	Vranitzky, F. (SPÖ)	18 (1)	ÖVP SPÖ
03/1996	Vranitzky, F. (SPÖ)	16 (1)	SPÖ ÖVP
01/1997	Klima, V. (SPÖ)	15 (1)	ÖVP SPÖ
02/2000	Schüssel, W. (ÖVP)	14 (1)	ÖVP FPÖ
02/2003	Schüssel, W. (ÖVP)	14 (1)	ÖVP FPÖ/BZÖ
01/2007	Gusenbauer, A. (SPÖ)	14	ÖVP SPÖ
12/2008	Faymann, W. (SPÖ)	14	ÖVP SPÖ
12/2013	Faymann, W. (SPÖ)	14 (2)	SPÖ ÖVP
05/2016	Kern, C. (SPÖ)	14 (3)	SPÖ ÖVP
12/2017	Kurz, S. (ÖVP)	14 (1)	ÖVP FPÖ

## Acronyms

BZÖ	Alliance for the Future of Austria
FPÖ	Freedom Party of Austria
GA	Green Alternative
KPÖ	Communist Party of Austria

LF	Liberal Forum
NEOS	New Austria
ÖVP	Austrian People's Party
SPÖ	Socialist Party of Austria (since 1991 Social Democratic Party of Austria)
VdU	League of Independents
VGÖ	United Greens of Austria

## Reference

Müller, Wolfgang C., and Barbara Steininger (1994), "Christian Democracy in Austria: The Austrian People's Party", in David Hanley, ed., *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective* (London: Pinter Publishers), pp. 87–100.

# BELGIUM

## **The party pattern in each election, with additional components**

- 1946 moderately multi-party, *with two main parties (Catholics and Socialists)*
- 1949 two-and-a-half-party
- 1950 two-and-a-half-party, *with a single-party majority (Catholics)*
- 1954 two-and-a-half-party
- 1958 two-and-a-half-party
- 1961 two-and-a-half-party
- 1965 moderately multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (Catholics, Socialists, and Liberals)*
- 1968 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (Catholics, Socialists, and Liberals)*
- 1971 highly multi-party
- 1974 highly multi-party
- 1977 highly multi-party
- 1978 highly multi-party
- 1981 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top five parties (CVP, PS, PVV, SP, and PRL)*
- 1985 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (CVP, PS, SP)*
- 1987 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top five parties (CVP, PS, SP, VLD, and PRL)*
- 1991 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top five parties (CVP, PS, SP, PVV, and PRL)*
- 1995 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top five parties (CVP, PS, PVV, SP, and PRL)*



- 1999 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top six parties (PVV, CVP, PS, PRL, VB, and SP)*
- 2003 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top six parties (PS, VLD, MR, SP.A, CDE&V, and VB)*
- 2007 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top five parties (CDE&V, MR, PS, VLD, and VB)*
- 2010 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top four parties (N-VA, PS, MR, and CDE&V)*
- 2014 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top four parties (N-VA, PS, MR, and CDE&V)*

### Party systems (with smoothing)

- 1949–1961 inclusive two-and-a-half-party system
- 1968–2014 inclusive highly multi-party system

### History

Belgium became independent from the Netherlands in 1830. It was established as a religiously homogeneous Catholic polity. With universal male suffrage in 1919, the two main political forces became the Christian Socials and the Socialists, each of which was backed up by a social “pillar”, that is, an institutionalized subculture, of schools, trade unions, media, sports associations, and so forth. In part because Belgium was a “pillarized” society, the language conflict between the Dutch-speaking Flemish and the dominant French was rather latent. With the decline of the pillars and the rise of nationalist parties, the language issue has been at the centre stage of Belgian politics since the 1960s. On no less than four occasions – 1970, 1980, 1988, and 1993 – the constitutional was amended, so that since 1993 Belgium has been a federal state. It was a founding member of the then-European Community.

### Electoral system

Belgium uses proportional representation based on the d'Hondt system in multi-member districts. With the 1993 constitutional reforms, the number of seats in the House of Representatives was cut from 212 to 150. The number of districts has also shrank, going from 30 to 20 before the 1995 election and then to 11 before the 2003 election – at which point a 5 percent threshold at the district level was introduced. Voting is compulsory.

### Political parties and cleavages

The Belgian party system was relatively straightforward right after World War Two. Religiosity and social class were what determined one's vote. The largest party – to the point of winning an outright majority in 1950 – was the **Catholic Party**,

dating back to 1888, with constituent parties going back earlier. Its views were typical of European Christian democratic parties, stressing Christian personalism, cross-class solidarity, and social conservatism.

In the nineteenth century Belgium was one of the most industrialized countries in Europe, and in 1885 the **Belgian Labour Party (POB)** was formed. In 1946, after World War Two, the POB was relaunched as the **Belgian Socialist Party (PSB)**. The PSB was strongest in the heavy industry areas of Wallonia. Right after the war, it faced a strong rival on the left in the form of the **Communist Party of Belgium (PCB in French, KPB in Flemish)**, formed in 1921. However, the Communist vote would drop steadily through the late 1940s and 1950s.

The Catholics and Socialists were the two main parties in what was a two-and-a-half party system. The “half” was that of the **Liberal Party (PL)**. Dating back to 1846, it was the oldest of the Belgian parties. It was supported by the largely Francophone middle class, and was particularly strong in Brussels. At various times the Liberals formed a secular alliance with the Socialists. For example, the 1954–1958 Socialist-Liberal government reduced subsidies to Catholic schools and increased the number of state schools – despite massive Catholic opposition. However, after increasingly class conflicts and the formation of a Catholic-Socialist government in 1961, the Liberals decided to reformulate themselves, becoming less militant in their secularism and stressing more free market economics. This was done under the name of the **Party of Liberty and Progress (PLP in French, PVV in Flemish)**, and almost doubled their vote.

Flemish nationalists were first elected to parliament in 1919, and were particularly successful in the late 1930s. However, collaboration with the Nazi occupiers destroyed their credibility, and it would be a few years after the war before a new Flemish party would be again in parliament. This party, the *Volksunie* or **People’s Union (VU)**, was formed in 1954. Clearly right of centre initially, the party was for a time the sole proponent of Flemish autonomy in a decentralized Belgium. Its participation in government in the 1970s, and the resulting compromises on constitutional matters, led hardliners to break away in 1977 and form the **Flemish Bloc (VB)**. Over time the Flemish Bloc would become a radical right party as well as a nationalistic one. As for the VU, in the 1990s tensions arose between its socially progressive leadership and its more traditional members, ultimately leading to a party split in 2001. From this the most important component would be the centre-right **New Flemish Alliance (N-VA)**, which in 2010 and even more in 2014 would be the largest party in Belgium (in 2007, it was in an electoral cartel with the CD&V). Its opposite component, the social liberal **SPIRIT**, as of 2008 the **Social Liberal Party (SLP)**, would ally briefly with the Flemish Socialists and then at the end of 2009 join the Flemish Greens. (A third component of the VU would join the Flemish Liberals.) Lastly, in 2007 there was a more libertarian splinter from the N-VA in the form of the List Dedecker after its founder Jean-Marie Dedecker; since 2011 it has been known as **Libertarian, Direct, Democratic (LDD)**.

The rise of nationalist parties in Flanders led to similar parties being formed in the French-speaking parts of Belgium. Of these, the most important have been

the **Francophone Democratic Front (FDF)**, formed in 1965 largely to protect the Francophone majority in Brussels, and the **Wallon Gathering (RW)**, which formed in 1968 and fragmented in 1981. In contrast to the rightism of the Flemish nationalist parties, the FDF has been centrist, and the RW was on the centre left.

The rise of the nationalist parties was largely ‘checked’, at least in Wallonia, by the linguistic fragmentation of the traditional national parties. The first such division was that of the Catholics, who in 1968 split into the **Christian People’s Party (CVP)** – from 2001, the **Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V)** party – in Flanders, and the **Christian Social Party (PSC)** – from 2002, the **Humanist Democratic Centre (CDH)** – in the French-speaking areas. In 1972, the liberals followed suit and divided: in Flanders they were still the **Party of Liberty FREEDOM and Progress (PVV)**, then from 1992 the **(Open) Flemish Liberals and Democrats (VLD)**. Whereas in Brussels and Wallonia the liberals were split into many evolving forces, some of which were allied with regional parties, until in 1979 a unified **Liberal Reform Party (PRL)** was formed – since 2002, the **Reformist Movement (MR)**. Finally, in 1978 the Socialists split into a French **Socialist Party (PS)** and a Flemish **Socialist Party (SP)**, the latter becoming in 2001 the **Socialist Party Differently (SP.A)** to emphasize progressivism as much as socialism. Overall, by the late 1970s, nobody was pretending that Belgium could have a national (state-wide) party any more. Indeed, right from their creation two linguistically distinct Green parties were set up: the Flemish **Agalev** (“Live Differently”) in 1977, renamed **Groen!** (Green!) in 2003, and the French **Ecolo** in 1978.

It is important to stress that the formerly national parties are not merely organizationally distinct, but that they have become somewhat ideologically different from each other as well. For example, on economic affairs the Flemish SP/SP.A is more moderate than the French PS, yet in the 1980s the SP stood out for its strong opposition to the deployment of new nuclear missiles. Also, the French PSC is seen as more flexible than the Flemish CVP. Perhaps the key difference is relative size: in Flanders, which has always been more religious, the CVP/CD&V and later the N-VA have been the largest party, and these have achieved a largely “catch-all” nature. In contrast, in Wallonia with its traditional heavy industry (as opposed to the high tech of Flanders), it is the PS which is the main party. Moreover, the PS has become such a clear exponent of Wallonia’s interests that Wallon-named parties have been marginalized.

## Governments

Belgian governments have almost always been coalitions, and since the 1970s multi-party coalitions. The Catholics and their successor parties have almost always been in government, more so that either the Socialists and their successor parties or the Liberals and their successor parties. The main regional parties – initially VU, FDF, RW, and now N-VA – have been in government as well. The Green parties have been in government but once, in 1999.

**SELECTED ELECTIONS IN BELGIUM SINCE 1946**

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1946</i>		<i>1950</i>		<i>1954</i>		<i>1958</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Communists	1	12.7	23	4.7	7	3.6	4	1.9	2
Socialists	4	32.8	69	35.8	77	38.8	86	37.3	84
Catholics	8	42.5	92	47.7	108	41.1	95	46.5	104
Liberals	9	9.3	17	11.8	20	12.7	25	11.7	21
Volksunie	21	—	—	—	—	2.2	1	2.0	1
others		2.7	1	0.1	0	1.5	1	0.7	0
TOTAL SEATS			202		212		212		212

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1961</i>		<i>1965</i>		<i>1968</i>		<i>1974</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Communists	1	3.1	5	4.6	6	3.4	5	3.2	4
Socialists	4	36.7	84	28.8	64	28.0	59	26.7	59
Catholics	8	41.5	96	34.4	77	27.2	69	32.4	72
Liberals	9	12.3	20	21.6	48	20.9	47	15.2	30
Volksunie	21	3.5	5	6.7	12	9.8	20	10.2	22
FDF+RW	21	—	—	1.9	5	5.9	12	10.9	25
others		2.9	2	2.1	0	4.9	0	1.5	0
TOTAL SEATS			212		212		212		212

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1978</i>		<i>1981</i>		<i>1985</i>		<i>1987</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Agalev	3	0.9	0	2.3	2	3.7	4	4.5	6
Ecolo	3	0.8	0	2.2	2	2.5	5	2.6	3
PS	4	13.0	32	12.7	35	13.8	35	15.6	40
SP	4	12.4	26	12.4	26	14.6	32	14.9	32
CVP	8	26.1	57	19.3	43	21.3	49	19.5	43
PSC	8	10.1	25	7.2	18	8.0	20	8.0	19
PRL	9	5.3	15	8.6	24	10.2	24	9.4	23
PVV/VLD	9	10.3	22	12.9	28	10.8	22	11.6	25
VB	12	1.4	1	1.1	1	1.4	1	1.9	2
VU	21	7.0	14	9.8	20	7.9	16	8.1	16
FDF+RW	21	7.1	15	4.2	8	1.2	3	1.2	3
others		5.6	5	7.3	5	4.6	1	2.7	0
TOTAL SEATS			212		212		212		212

*(Continued)*

	PF	1991		1995		1999		2003	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
Agalev	3	4.9	7	4.4	5	7.0	9	2.5	0
Ecolo	3	5.1	10	4.0	6	7.3	11	3.2	4
PS	4	13.5	35	11.9	21	10.1	19	12.9	25
SP/SPA	4	12.0	28	12.6	20	9.6	14	15.5	23
CVP/CD&V	8	16.8	39	17.2	29	14.1	22	12.7	21
PSC/CDH	8	7.7	18	7.7	12	5.9	10	5.5	8
PRL/MR	9	8.1	20	10.3	18	10.1	18	12.2	24
PVV/VLD	9	12.0	26	13.1	21	14.3	23	15.4	25
VB	12	6.6	12	7.8	11	9.9	15	11.3	18
VU/N-VA	21	5.9	10	4.7	5	5.6	8	3.1	1
FDF+RW	21	1.5	3	(with PRL)		(with PRL)		–	–
others		5.9	4	6.3	2	6.1	1	5.7	1
TOTAL SEATS			212		150		150		150

	PF	2007		2010		2014	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
Groen	3	3.6	4	4.4	5	5.3	6
Ecolo	3	5.8	8	4.8	8	3.3	6
PS	4	10.2	20	13.7	26	11.7	23
SPA	4	10.0	14	9.2	13	8.8	13
CD&V	8	19.4	30	10.9	17	11.6	18
CDH	8	5.9	10	5.5	9	5.0	9
MR	9	12.3	23	9.3	18	9.6	20
VLD	9	12.4	18	8.6	13	9.8	14
VB	12	11.9	17	7.8	12	3.7	3
List Dedeker / LDD	12	4.0	5	2.3	1	0.4	0
N-VA	21		(with CD&V)	17.4	27	20.3	33
others		4.5	1	6.1	1	10.5	5
TOTAL SEATS			150		150		150

Belgium requires there to be an equal number of Dutch- and French-speaking cabinet ministers excluding the prime minister (and a cap of 15 on the total cabinet size), which through 2007 normally meant both ‘sister parties’ from each language group being in the government. That symmetry is no longer the case, and indeed the government formed in 2014 had but one Francophone party, the MR. This government was also ideologically cohesive, being on the centre-right.

# BELGIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1946

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
04/1946	van Acker, A. (BSP)	23 (3)	BSP PL PCB/KPB
08/1946	Huysmans, C. (BSP)	20 (3)	BSP PL PCB/KPB
03/1947	Spaak, P.H. (BSP)	20 (2)	BSP CVP/PSC
08/1949	Eyskens, G. (CVP)	20	CVP/PSC PL
06/1950	Duvieusart, J. (CVP)	17 (1)	CVP/PSC
08/1950	Pholien, J. (CVP)	17 (1)	CVP/PSC
01/1952	van Houtte, J. (CVP)	17 (1)	CVP/PSC
04/1954	van Acker, A. (BSP)	17 (2)	BSP PL
06/1958	Eyskens, G. (CVP)	16	CVP/PSC
11/1958	Eyskens, G. (CVP)	21	CVP/PSC PL
09/1960	Eyskens, G. (CVP)	20	CVP/PSC PL
04/1961	Lefèvre, T. (CVP)	21	CVP/PSC BSP
07/1965	Harmel, P. (CVP)	25	CVP/PSC BSP
03/1966	Vandenboeynants, P. (CVP)	22	CVP/PSC PLP/PVV
06/1968	Eyskens, G. (CVP)	29	CVP/PSC BSP
01/1972	Eyskens, G. (CVP)	21	BSP CVP PSC
01/1973	Leburton, E. (BSP)	22	BSP CVP PSC PLP/PVV
04/1974	Tindemans, L. (CVP)	25	CVP PSC PLP PVV
06/1974	Tindemans, L. (CVP)	26	CVP PSC PLP PVV RW
12/1976	Tindemans, L. (CVP)	31	CVP PSC PLP PVV FDF
06/1977	Tindemans, L. (CVP)	30	BSP CVP PSC FDFVU
10/1978	Vandenboeynants, P. (CVP)	29	CVP SP PSC PS FDFVU
04/1979	Martens, W. (CVP)	32	CVP PS SP PSC FDF
01/1980	Martens, W. (CVP)	31	CVP PS PSC SP
05/1980	Martens, W. (CVP)	33	CVP PS PVV PSC SP PRL
10/1980	Martens, W. (CVP)	36	PS CVP PSC SP
04/1981	Eyskens, G. (CVP)	33	CVP PS PSC SP
12/1981	Martens, W. (CVP)	24	PRL CVP PSC PVV
11/1985	Martens, W. (CVP)	25	PRL CVP PSC PVV
10/1987	Martens, W. (CVP)	25	PRL CVP PSC PVV
05/1988	Martens, W. (CVP)	27	PS CVP SP PSC VU PW
09/1991	Martens, W. (CVP)	16	CVP PS SP PSC
02/1992	Dehaene, J.-L. (CVP)	16	CVP PS SP PSC
06/1995	Dehaene, J.-L. (CVP)	15	CVP PS SP PSC
07/1999	Verhofstadt, G. (VLD)	15	VLD PRL PS SP Agalev Ecolo
07/2003	Verhofstadt, G. (VLD)	15	PS SPVLD MR
12/2007	Verhofstadt, G. (VLD)	14	CD&V MR PSVLD CDH
03/2008	Leterme, Y. (CD&V)	15	CD&V VLD MR PS CDH
01/2009	Van Rompuy, H. (CD&V)	15	CD&V MR PSVLD CDH
11/2009	Leterme, Y. (CD&V)	15	CD&V MR PSVLD CDH
12/2011	Di Rupo, E. (PS)	13	MR PS CD&V SP.A VLD CDH
10/2014	Michel, C. (MR)	14	MR N-VA CD&V VLD

## Acronyms

Agalev	“Live Differently” (Flemish ecologists)
CD&V	Christian Democratic and Flemish
CDH	Humanist Democratic Centre (French)
CVP	Christian People’s Party (Flemish)
Ecolo	Ecologists (French)
FDF	Francophone Democratic Front (French)
KPB	Communist Party of Belgium
LDD	Libertarian, Direct, Democratic (Flemish)
MR	Reformist Movement (French)
N-VA	New Flemish Alliance
PCB	Communist Party of Belgium
PL	Liberal Party
POB	Belgian Labour Party
PRL	Liberal Reform Party (French)
PS	Socialist Party (French)
PSB	Belgian Socialist Party
PSC	Christian Social Party (French)
PVV	Party of Liberty and Progress (Flemish)
RW	Wallon Gathering (French)
SP	Socialist Party (Flemish)
SPA	Socialist Party Differently (Flemish)
VB	Flemish Bloc
VLD	Flemish Liberals and Democrats
VU	People’s Union (Flemish)

# FLANDERS

## **The party pattern in each election, *with additional components***

- 1995 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (CVP, VLD, and SP)*
- 1999 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top four parties (CVP, VLD, VB, and SP)*
- 2004 moderately multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top four parties (CVP, VB, SP, and VLD)*
- 2009 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top five parties (CVP, VB, VLD, and SP.A)*
- 2014 moderately multi-party

## **Party systems (with smoothing)**

1995–2009 inclusive highly multi-party system

## **History**

In 1995 various directly elected regional assemblies were created in Belgium to handle cultural matters (based on language) and economic development et cetera (based on region); in Flanders these were quickly merged into one Flemish Assembly. The Assembly serves a fixed five-year term with no possibility of early dissolution.

## **Electoral system**

Of the 124 members of the Flemish parliament, 118 are elected from five constituencies in Flanders proper using a system of party list proportional representation



with the d'Hondt formula, and with a 5 percent threshold in each constituency. The remaining six members are elected from the bilingual Brussels-capital region by voters who voted for a Dutch-speaking party therein. These six members only vote on cultural community matters, not regional economic ones.

Political parties and cleavages

The same parties that run federally in Flanders also run in the region with similar support levels. One can note that not just the VB, VU, and N-VA but also the CD&V have been more nationalistic than the greens, liberals, and socialists. The one additional grouping in Flanders is the small **Union of Francophones (UF)**, which is an electoral list of the various francophone parties.

ELECTIONS IN FLANDERS SINCE 1995

	1995		1999		2004		2009	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
Agalev/Groen!	7.1	7	11.6	12	7.6	6	6.8	7
SP/SPA	19.4	26	15.0	20	19.7	25	15.3	19
VLD/OpenVLD	20.2	27	22.0	27	19.8	25	15.0	21
CVP/CD&V	26.8	37	22.1	30	26.1	35	22.9	31
UF	1.2	1	0.9	1	1.1	1	1.2	1
VU	9.0	9	9.3	12	—	—	—	—
SPIRIT/SLP	—	—	—	—	(with SPA)		1.1	0
N-VA	—	—	—	—	(with CD&V)		13.1	16
LDD	—	—	—	—	—	—	7.6	8
VB	12.3	17	15.5	22	24.1	32	15.3	21
Others	4.1	0	3.6	0	1.6	0	1.7	0
TOTAL SEATS		124		124		124		124

	2014	
	% V	# S
Groen!	8.7	10
SPA	14.0	18
Open VLD	14.2	19
CD&V	20.5	27
UF	0.8	1
N-VA	31.9	43
VB	5.9	6
Others	4.0	0
TOTAL SEATS		124

## Governments

Since 1995 Flemish minister-presidents have come from different parties, and Flemish coalitions have likewise involved differing combinations. Until 2014 the one constant was the inclusion of the relatively smaller Socialists in government. The maximum size of the cabinet is 11 members.

### FLEMISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1995

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Minister-president (party)</i>	<i>#M</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
06/1995	Van den Brande, L. (CVP)	9	CVP SP
07/1999	Dewael, P. (VLD)	9	VLD Agalev SPVU
07/2003	Somers, B. (VLD)	10	VLD Groen! SP.A Spirit
07/2004	Leterme, Y. (CD&V)	9	CD&V SP.A VLD
06/2007	Peeters, K. (CD&V)	9	CD&V SP.A VLD
06/2009	Peeters, K. (CD&V)	9	CD&V SP.A N-VA
07/2014	Bourgeois, G. (N-VA)	9	N-VA CD&V Open VLD

## Acronyms

(mostly see under Belgium)

UF    Union of Francophones

# BULGARIA

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1990	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (BSP)</i>
1991	two-and-a-half-party
1994	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (BSP)</i>
1997	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (ODS)</i>
2001	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (NDSV)</i>
2005	highly multi-party
2009	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (GERB)</i>
2013	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (GERB and BSP)</i>
2014	highly multi-party
2017	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (GERB and BSP)</i>

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1990–1997 inclusive	two-and-a-half-party system
2001–2017	moderately multi-party system

## History

Bulgaria achieved independence from the Ottoman Empire following the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–78, but the country did not gain full independence until 22 September 1908. In the period following 1878 there was initially a party system comprised of two main parties – “liberals” and “conservatives”; however by the early 1880s a multi-party system began to develop. By 1906 there were 10 parties,

and by the start of World War One the number of parties and factions increased rapidly to the point where there were 15 parties represented in the National Assembly. In 1934 a royal dictatorship ushered in a period of non-party administration, after which only selected parties were revived, including the **Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP)**. After World War Two most of the political parties formed the Fatherland Front which took over government and established a communist-dominated People's Republic in December 1947. During this period all other parties were banned. Communist rule lasted until 1989, after which multi-party democracy returned. Bulgaria would join the European Union in 2007.

## Electoral system

For the 1990 election the Bulgarian National Assembly consisted of 400 members elected by a mixed system, with half the seats being elected in single-member districts and half elected by closed party list proportional representation and the d'Hondt method. Since 1991 the National Assembly has always comprised 240 members and with one exception has always involved straight party list proportional representation. That one exception was the 2009 election which also was a mixed system, though with only 31 seats elected in single-member districts. The electoral threshold for list seats has always been 4 percent of the national vote. The electoral formula was the d'Hondt method until 2009; since then it has been Hare-Niemeyer.

## Parties and cleavages

Bulgarian party politics has often had two main parties, but the specific parties have changed. What has been constant is the ongoing presence of the **Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)**. The BSP is the successor of the Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party – the former ruling Communist party. After its name change in 1990 the BSP was the first party to form a government following the end of the communist regime, and has held power a further two times. The BSP describes itself as a modern socialist party, and its policies do espouse the ideas of democratic socialism and the social market economy, but at the same time it has pandered to its traditional communist membership and has been somewhat socially conservative. Consequently, it is better seen as having gone from being a communist party to being a national populist social democratic party. In 1997 the BSP ran as part of a broader **Democratic Left (DL)**, but also lost support to the social democratic **Bulgarian Euro-Left (BEL)**, which was formed by former members of the BSP. The BEL won seats in 1997 but was eliminated from parliament in 2001.

The BSP's opponents on the centre-right have been changing and often internally unstable. That was certainly the case for the **Union of Democratic Forces (SDS)**, which had a composition which changed from election to election. Originally formed in December 1989, the SDS was a political union of around 10 independent organizations – involving intellectual, environmental, trade union, and

other groups. Throughout its history, membership in the SDS has been unstable even at the best of times, leading to much internal strife and conflict within the SDS as a result. This resulted in three distinct SDS lists being presented in the 1991 election: the main SDS-Movement, the SDS-Centre, and the SDS-Liberals; the SDS-Movement was however the only one to gain seats. In 1996, at the behest of its smaller components, the SDS transformed itself from a coalition into a single party. In terms of its policies, the SDS was pro-democratic, anti-Communist, committed to fast market reform, and pro-Western in orientation.

Whereas the SDS was a post-communist creation, the **Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BZNS)** dates back to 1899 as an interest group and to 1901 as a political party. After World War One the BZNS formed a democratic government, but was overthrown in a military coup in 1923. After 1945 the party underwent a gradual suppression and forced integration into the communist-dominated Fatherland Front. The BZNS won seats in 1990 but not in 1991. Consequently for the 1994 election the BZNS formed the **People's Union (NS)** with the **Democratic Party (DP)**, which was the 1990 continuation of the historic conservative Christian party of the same name founded in 1896. Though successful in winning seats in 1994, the NS was a one-off alliance. Opposition to the 1995 BSP government led to the creation in 1996 of the **United Democratic Forces (ODS)**, led by the SDS but also involving the BZNS, the DP, and others. The ODS would win a majority in 1997 and continue in 2001 and 2005, though with less support each time. For 2009 the SDS led a slightly different grouping, the **Blue Coalition (SK)**. Running on its own in 2013, the SDS would be eliminated from parliament. A new centre-right electoral coalition, the **Reformist Bloc (RB)** (see later), was then formed at the end of 2013. The final, briefer force on the right in the mid-to-late 1990s was the **Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB)**, a populist radical right, pro-market party. It advocated the transformation of Bulgaria into a tariff- and tax-free zone.

The other consistent force from the start of democratic elections in Bulgaria was the Turkish **Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS)**, formed in 1990 and representing the interests of Bulgaria's Turkish minority. The DPS served as the 'swing party' after the 1991 election, giving their support to the SDS government which was formed and then one year later bringing down the government by withdrawing that support. Weakened from 1993 onwards by defections, splits, and mass immigration of Bulgaria's Turkish population to Turkey, the DPS formed the **Union of National Salvation (ONS)** for the 1997 election (only) with other, smaller monarchist and centrist groups. In the mid-2000s the DPS would grow in support again. Starting in 2001 it has served as a junior partner in governments.

Since 2001 the Bulgarian party system has been dominated by two centrist or centre-right personalist parties. The first of these was the **National Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV)** which was formed in 2001 by Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the last monarch of Bulgaria as Simeon II (under a regency) who fled the country in 1946 and returned in 1996. The NDSV won the election of 2001, and came second in 2005, but then imploded. More durable has been the

**Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB)**, formed in 2006 by the then-mayor of Sofia, Boyko Borisov. GERB is conservative and pro-European Union. GERB has been the plurality party in the four elections from 2009 through 2017. Other right-of-centre parties or groupings in recent years have been less stable. These have included the **Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB)**, formed in 2004 as a split-off from the ODS; the centre-right **Reformist Bloc (RB)** alliance, formed in 2013 and which included the **Bulgaria for Citizens Movement (DBG)**, itself arising out of the remnants of the NDSV; and the conservative **Bulgaria Without Censorship (BBT)** party, formed for the 2014 election and which wanted to restore the monarchy.

There have also been various populist radical right and/or far-right parties in recent Bulgarian elections. Of these, the most durable has been the extreme right-wing **Attack (ATAKA)**, formed in 2005 and the fourth largest party until 2014. Nationalist and/or populist radical right parties that have won seats in specific elections (but not continuously) have been: the **VMRO – Bulgarian National Movement (VMRO-BND)** founded in 1999, which for the 2005 election formed the **Bulgarian People's Union (BNS)** electoral alliance; **Order, Law, and Justice (RZS)**, formed in 2005; and the **National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB)**, formed in 2011. In 2014 the VMRO-BND and the NFSB formed the nationalist right-wing **Patriotic Front (PF)** electoral alliance. In 2016 with the inclusion of ATAKA this became the populist radical right **United Patriots (OP)** electoral alliance, which backed a common candidate in that year's presidential election. The 2017 election also saw seats won by a separate populist radical right party, **Will (Volya)**.

The only recent new seat-winning party that is left-of-centre was the **Alternative for Bulgarian Revival (ABV)** formed in 2014 as a split-off from the BSP. It was eliminated from parliament in 2017.

#### ELECTIONS IN BULGARIA SINCE 1990

<i>PF</i>		<i>1990</i>		<i>1991</i>		<i>1994</i>		<i>1997</i>	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
BSP/DL	1	47.2	211	33.1	106	43.4	125	22.1	58
BEL	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	5.5	14
BZNS/NS	7	8.0	16	3.9	0	6.5	18		(in ODS)
SDS	9	37.8	144	34.4	110	24.1	69		(in ODS)
ODS	10	–	–	–	–	–	–	52.3	137
BBB	12	–	–	1.3	0	4.7	13	4.9	12
DPS/ONS	21	6.0	23	7.6	24	5.4	15	7.6	19
others		0.9	5	19.7	0	15.8	0	7.6	0
TOTAL			400		240		240		240
SEATS									

(Continued)

		<i>PF</i>		<i>2001</i>		<i>2005</i>		<i>2009</i>		<i>2013</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
BSP	1 then 6			17.1	48	31.0	82	17.7	40	26.6	84
BEL	4			1.0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
NDSV/DBG	7			42.7	120	19.9	53	3.0	0	3.3	0
ODS/SK/SDS	10			18.2	51	7.7	20	6.8	15	1.4	0
DSB	10			—	—	6.4	17	(in SK)		2.9	0
GERB	10			—	—	—	—	39.7	116	30.5	97
VMRO- BND/BNS	11			3.6	0	5.2	13	—	—	1.9	0
NFSB	11			—	—	—	—	—	—	3.7	0
RZS	12			—	—	—	—	4.1	10	1.7	0
ATAKA	13			—	—	8.1	21	9.4	21	7.3	23
DPS	21			7.5	21	12.8	34	14.5	38	11.3	36
Others				9.9	0	8.9	0	4.8	0	9.4	0
TOTAL SEATS					240		240		240		240

		<i>PF</i>		<i>2014</i>		<i>2017</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
BSP	6			15.4	39	27.9	80
ABV	6			4.2	11	1.6	0
RB	9			8.9	23	3.1	0
GERB	10			32.7	84	33.5	95
BBT	10			5.7	15	—	—
PF/OP	11 then 12			7.3	19	9.3	27
Volya	12			—	—	4.3	12
ATAKA	13			4.5	11	(in OP)	
DPS	21			14.8	38	9.2	26
Others				6.5	0	11.1	0
TOTAL SEATS					240		240

## Governments

Governments in Bulgaria initially alternated between SDS and BSP leadership with independent-led governments filling in between these. None of the initial governments lasted a full term. The 1997 election ushered in more stable governments, as the ODS had a clear majority and its successor in government after the 2001 election, the NDSV, had half the seats. Since 2009 most of the time the government has been led by the GERB. However, since 2013 there has been instability in terms of short government duration. Caretaker governments have also been used during election campaigns.

**BULGARIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1990**

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
09/1990	Lukanov, A. (BSP)	19	BSP	
12/1990	Popov, D. (ind.)	18 (5)	BSP SDS BZNS	
11/1991	Dimitrov, F. (SDS)	19	SDS	DPS
12/1992	Berov, L. (ind.)	15 (12)	(non-partisan technocratic government)	BSP SDS
10/1994	Indzhova, R. (ind.)	17 (17)	(non-partisan caretaker government)	
01/1995	Videnov, Z. (BSP)	17 (2)	BSP	
02/1997	Sofianski, S. (SDS)	17 (10)	ODS	
05/1997	Kostov, I. (SDS)	17	ODS	
07/2001	Sakskoburggotski, S. (NDSV)	17 (2)	NDSV DPS	
08/2005	Stanishev, S. (BSP)	18 (1)	BSP NDSV DPS	
07/2009	Borisov, B. (GERB)	17 (1)	GERB	
03/2013	Raykov, M. (ind.)	17 (17)	(non-partisan caretaker government)	
05/2013	Oresharski, P. (ind.)	18 (11)	BSP DPS	ATAKA
08/2014	Bliznashki, G. (ind.)	18 (18)	(non-partisan caretaker government)	
11/2014	Borisov, B. (GERB)	19	GERB RB ABV	PF
05/2016	Borisov, B. (GERB)	19 (1)	GERB RB	PF
01/2017	Gerdzhikov, O. (ind.)	20 (20)	(non-partisan caretaker government)	
05/2017	Borisov, B. (GERB)	21 (3)	GERB OP	Volya

**Acronyms**

ABV	Alternative for Bulgaria
ATAKA	Attack
BBB	Bulgarian Business Bloc
BBT	Bulgaria Without Censorship
BEL	Bulgarian Euro-Left
BKP	Bulgarian Communist Party
BNS	Bulgarian People's Union
BSP	Bulgarian Socialist Party
BZNS	Bulgarian Agrarian National Union
DBG	Bulgaria for Citizens Movement
DL	Democratic Left
DP	Democratic Party
DPS	Movement for Rights and Freedoms
DSB	Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria
GERB	Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria



NFSB	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria
NDSV	National Movement for Stability and Progress
NS	People's Union
OP	United Patriots
ODS	United Democratic Forces
ONS	Union for National Salvation
PF	Patriotic Front
RB	Reformist Bloc
RZS	Order, Law, and Justice
SDS	Union of Democratic Forces
SK	Blue Coalition
VMRO-BND	IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement
Volya	Will

# CROATIA

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

Note: The 1992 and 1995 elections were not fully free and fair.

1992	highly multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (HDZ)</i>
1995	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (HDZ)</i>
2000	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SDP with HSLS)</i>
2003	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (HDZ)</i>
2007	two-and-a-half-party
2011	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (SDP-led alliance)</i>
2015	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (HDZ and SDP-led alliance)</i>
2016	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (HDZ and SDP-led alliance)</i>

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1995–2003 inclusive    moderately multi-party system

## History

In the twelfth century Croatia came under the personal rule of the Hungarian monarch. From 1526 to the early eighteenth century it was under Turkish rule. In 1918, Croatia became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929. An independent Croatian state under Nazi tutelage was established in 1941. In 1945 Croatia was again part of the (People's Republic of) Yugoslavia. In 1991, Croatia (and Slovenia) became independent from Yugoslavia. Croatia fought a war with the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People's Army,

which occupied a third of the country until finally driven out by Croat forces in 1995. As noted, Croatia's 1992 and 1995 elections were not fully free and fair, so democratization is best dated from 2000.

## Electoral system

The 1992 and 1995 elections to the Croatian parliament used a mixed system which combined single-member plurality districts and multi-member proportional representation districts using the d'Hondt method and a 3 percent threshold in 1992 increased to 5 percent in 1995. Since 1999 all elections have used straight party list proportional representation for a base 140 members using the d'Hondt method in 10 districts each with 14 members. Any list winning less than 5 percent of the votes is excluded from the distribution of the seats in a district. A further three deputies (since 2011) are chosen by proportional representation and the d'Hondt method to represent Croatians residing abroad, but from 2000 to 2007 these ranged from four to six deputies depending on the total number of such votes. Moreover, in 1995 there were 12 such members. Representatives of national minorities have always had additional seats but initially these were part of the party list seats. Since 2003 these minority seats have been separate, numbering eight and chosen by simple plurality.

It should be noted that the 12 seats elected from abroad in 1995 were particularly open to abuse. Votes were cast abroad in various polling stations established by Croatian embassies – often in churches, consular missions, clubs, and in one case a bowling alley. To say the least, these votes were hardly cast in a manner conforming to any strict procedural regulations concerning privacy and legitimacy. The results were then telephoned to the government in Croatia. Not surprisingly, all 12 of these seats were won by the HDZ (see later) in both 1992 and 1995. That said, lack of privacy and intimidation also occurred in polling stations in Croatia proper then.

One can also note that the number of votes cast abroad was estimated in 1995 at around 97,000. If these votes had been added to the total number of votes received nationally and then used to determine seats as part of the national party lists, the HDZ would only have received one extra seat, thereby reducing the number of seats it received in total from 75 to 64 and giving it only a 50 percent share of the total seats instead of the 60 percent it in fact had.

## Political parties and cleavages

There are two main party political groupings in Croatia, on the centre-right and the left. The centre-right grouping has at its core the **Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)**, founded by Franjo Tudjman in 1989. The party began as a populist radical right party, and benefitted in the 1990s from certain unfair electoral advantages, especially concerning out-of-country voters as noted previously. By 2002 the HDZ had become more of a mainstream conservative party. Usually allied with the HDZ have been a couple newer regionalist parties: the **Croatian Democratic Alliance**

of Slavonia and Baranja (HDSSB) founded in 2006, and the **Bridge of Independent Lists (MOST)** founded in 2012. A separate right-wing nationalist party has been the **Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)** with seats through 2007, whose military wing was heavily involved in ethnic conflict during the war.

The initial opposition to the HDZ was made by a group of parties which formed the **Joint List (ZL)** bloc for the 1995 election. The ZL included the **Croatian Peasant Party (HSS)**, founded in 1904 and restored in 1991, and committed to pacifism, localism and economic privatization; the **Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS)**, founded in 1990, which represents ethnic Italians and other minorities in Istria and advocates the creation of a trans-border region encompassing Croatian, Slovenia, and Italian areas; and the **Croatian People's Party (HNS)**, an anti-traditionalist liberal party committed to political pluralism and a free market economy founded in 1990. Of these parties the HNS and the HSS contested and won seats in the 1992 election as individual parties.

As of the 2000 election the main opposition to the HDZ has been the centre-left **Social Democratic Party (SDP)**, founded in 1990. Allied to it have been the following parties: HNS; IDS; the **Liberal Party (LS)**, which existed from 1998 to 2006, initially as part of ZL; the liberal splinter party **LIBRA**, which existed from 2002 to 2005 as a breakaway from the HSLS (see later); and the **Croatian Labourists (HL)**, founded in 2010.

The main hinge party is the **Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS)**, founded in 1989, which is a traditional European liberal grouping committed to a free market economy and speedy reforms. It has served in both HDZ- and SDP-led governments. So too has the HSS. Independent of both blocs has been the populist **Human Shield (ZZ)**, founded in 2011, which fights foreclosures and evictions. Lastly Croatia has various ethnic parties competing for the eight ethnic seats, of which the **Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS)**, founded in 1997, has won all three Serb seats in every election since 2003 and has served in government.

#### ELECTIONS IN CROATIA SINCE 1992

	PF	1992		1995		2000		2003	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
SDP	4	5.5	11	8.9	10	[ 40.8	46	22.6	43
HSLS/DC	9	17.7	14	11.6	12	[	25	4.1	3
HNS	5	6.7	6	—	—	(in ZL)		8.0	11
HSS	7	4.3	3	—	—	(in ZL)		7.2	9
LS	9	—	—	—	—	(in ZL)		(with SDP)	
HSP	11	7.1	5	5.0	4	5.3	5	6.4	8
HDZ	12 then 10	44.7	85	45.2	75	24.4	46	33.9	66
IDS	21	3.2	6	(with ZL)		(in ZL)		(with SDP)	
ZL		—	—	18.3	18	15.6	25	—	—

(Continued)

**202 Individual case analyses of longstanding democracies**

<i>PF</i>		<i>1992</i>		<i>1995</i>		<i>2000</i>		<i>2003</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
HSU	31	–	–	–	–	1.9	0	4.0	3
ethnic minorities		–	–	–	–	–	–		8
others		10.8	8	11.0	8	12.0	4	13.8	1
TOTAL SEATS		138		127		151		152	

<i>PF</i>		<i>2007</i>		<i>2011</i>		<i>2015</i>		<i>2016</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
HL	2	–	–	5.2	6	(with SDP)			
SDP	4	30.8	56	[ 40.7	61	[ 33.8	56	[ 33.4	54
HNS	5	6.7	7	[	13	[		[	
HSU	31	4.0	1	[	3	[		[	
IDS	21	1.5	3	[	3	1.9	3	2.3	3
HDZ	10	36.0	66	34.6	47	[ 34.0	59	[ 36.6	61
HSLS	9	[ 6.4	2	3.1	0	[		[	
HSS	7	[	6	3.0	1	[		(with SDP)	
ZZ	12	–	–	–	–	4.3	1	6.2	8
HDSSB	21	1.8	3	2.9	6	1.4	2	1.2	1
MOST	21	–	–	–	–	13.8	19	9.8	13
ethnic minorities			8		8		8		8
others		12.8	1	10.5	3	10.8	3	10.5	3
TOTAL SEATS		153		151		151		151	

*Note:* The main parties are normally the lead parties of coalitions, with the totals shown being for the coalition.

*Note:* The 1992 and 1995 elections were unfair.

**Governments**

Governments in Croatia have always been led by either the HDZ or the SDP. The HDZ formed single-party majorities in the 1990s given that they won majorities in flawed elections. Since 2003 ethnic minority MPs have supported the various governments.

## CROATIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1992

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Parties in support</i>
12/1992	Šarinić, H. (HDZ)	25	HDZ	
04/1993	Valentić, N. (HDZ)	26	HDZ	
11/1995	Mateša, Z. (HDZ)	24	HDZ	
01/2000	Račan, I. (SDP)	24	SDP HSLS HSS HNS IDS LS	
07/2002	Račan, I. (SDP)	24	SDP HSS HNS LIBRA LS	
12/2003	Sanader, I. (HDZ)	15	HDZ DC	HSLS, ethnic minority MPs
12/2008	Sanader, I. (HDZ)	18	HDZ HSS HSLS SDSS	ethnic minority MPs
07/2009	Kosor, J. (HDZ)	20	HDZ HSS HSLS SDSS	ethnic minority MPs
12/2011	Milanović, Z. (SDP)	22	SDP HNS IDS	HSU, ethnic minority MPs
01/2016	Orešković, T. (ind.)	23 (7)	HDZ MOST	ethnic minority MPs
10/2016	Plenković, A. (HDZ)	21 (4)	HDZ MOST	HDSSB, ethnic minority MPs

## Acronyms

HDSSB	Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
HL	Croatian Labourists
HNS	Croatian People's Party
HSLS	Croatian Social Liberal Party
HSP	Croatian Party of Rights
HSS	Croatian Peasant Party
IDS	Istrian Democratic Assembly
LS	Liberal Party
MOST	Bridge of Independent Lists
SDSS	Independent Democratic Serb Party
SDP	Social Democratic Party
ZL	Joint List
ZZ	Human Shield

# CYPRUS (GREEK)

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1976	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (DIKO)</i>
1981	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (AKEL and DISY)</i>
1985	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (DISY, DIKO, and AKEL)</i>
1991	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (DISY and AKEL)</i>
1996	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (DISY and AKEL)</i>
2001	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (AKEL and DISY)</i>
2006	moderately multi-party
2011	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (DISY and AKEL)</i>
2016	highly multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1976–2011 inclusive      moderately multi-party system

## History

Cyprus was a British colony until 1960. Upon independence, a consociational institutional structure was planned to recognize the division between the Greek majority and the Turkish minority on the island. The president was to be Greek, the vice-president Turkish, and other positions distributed in a 7:3 ratio. However, tensions and sporadic violence persisted between the communities, leading to the arrival of UN peacekeepers. A 1974 attempt to unite the island with Greece led

to the invasion of the northern, Turkish part of the island by the armed forces of Turkey. The two communities have been de facto separate political entities ever since. As a consequence of this de facto division, some 200,000 Greek Cypriots fled south. Cyprus joined the European Union in 2004.

For our purposes, Cyprus (Greek) is thus analyzed from the mid-1970s onward.

## Electoral system

In 1976 Cyprus used a multi-member plurality system which was highly biased. For all subsequent elections Cyprus has used a proportional representation system in multi-member districts. Voting is compulsory. Although the assembly has 56 members, technically there are 80; the remainder are unfilled Turkish Cypriot seats.

## Political parties and cleavages

The **Democratic Rally (DISY)** was formed in 1976. The party has a strongly pro-Western orientation, supports free enterprise, and espouses traditional liberal economic policies. The party is generally regarded as the furthest to the right of the country's political parties. In terms of the issue of the TRNC the party has at times adopted a more conciliatory position than the hard-line positions taken by other parties. The party has enjoyed a fairly broad base of support.

The **Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL)** is Cyprus' main left-of-centre party. AKEL originated as the Communist Party of Cyprus in 1941 and is therefore the only party to have a history that predates independence. While this history has meant that the party's rhetoric has been rather orthodox, in practice the party has supported more pragmatic and revisionist policies. The party is strongly tied to Cyprus' labour movement and this is therefore a large base of support for the party. Like the DISY, the AKEL has avoided hard-line rhetoric on the issue of the TRNC, and has supported talks on reunification through the efforts supervised by the UN.

The **Democratic Party (DIKO)** is the last of Cyprus' three main parties. The DIKO was founded in 1976 as a centre-right grouping originally known as the Democratic Front. The party has never been strong on ideology and has instead relied on the popularity of personalities within the party. Still, as of 2003 it moved from being right liberal to centrist.

Consistently the fourth party in Cyprus politics, the **United Democratic Union of the Centre (EDEK)**, founded in 1969, and since 2000 the **Movement for Social Democracy** (also **EDEK**), began as an anti-imperialist Third World socialist party but became a moderate left-of-centre party which has supported a unified and independent Cyprus. Because of the AKEL's domination of the left, the EDEK has been largely unable to secure electoral success.

Beyond these four parties have been others, usually more fleeting. The left-liberal **United Democrats (EDI)** was formed in 1993 as the **Movement of Free Democrats (KED)** and had modest success before supporting AKEL in



2011. A green party, the **Ecological and Environment Movement (KOP)**, was formed in 1996 and renamed the **Movement of Ecologists – Citizens’ Co-operation (KO-SP)** in 2016. The nationalist right-wing **European Party (EVROKO)** was formed in 2005 and took a hard-line stance towards Turkish Cyprus and reunification. In 2016 EVROKO dissolved to merge into the similar **Solidarity Movement (KA)**. A federal Cyprus is also rejected by the anti-austerity **Citizens’ Alliance (SP)**, formed in 2013. Lastly, the extreme right-wing **National Popular Front (ELAM)** was formed in 2008 and entered parliament in 2016. It has close links with the Greek Golden Dawn party.

ELECTIONS IN CYPRUS SINCE 1976

	PF	1976		1981		1985		1991	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
DP		71.2	34	–	–	–	–	–	–
of which:									
AKEL	1	25.0	9	32.8	12	27.4	15	30.6	18
EDEK	4	19.5	4	8.2	3	11.1	6	10.9	7
DIKO	9	26.8	21	19.5	8	27.6	16	19.5	11
DISY	9	27.6	0	31.9	12	33.6	19	35.8	20
independents		1.2	1	0.2	0	0.3	0	0.2	0
other parties		–	–	7.4	0	–	–	3.0	0
TOTAL FILLED SEATS			35		35		56		56

	PF	1996		2001		2006		2011	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
AKEL	1	33.0	19	34.7	20	31.1	18	32.7	19
KOP	3	1.0	0	2.0	1	2.0	1	2.2	1
EDEK	4	8.1	5	6.5	4	8.9	5	8.9	5
KED/EDI	5	3.7	2	2.6	1	1.6	0	(with AKEL)	
DIKO	9 then 7	16.4	10	14.8	9	17.9	11	15.8	9
DISY	9	34.5	20	34.0	19	30.3	18	34.3	20
EVROKO	11	–	–	–	–	5.8	3	3.9	2
ELAM	13	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.1	0
Independents		–	–	0.2	0	0.3	0	0.1	0
Other parties		3.3	0	5.2	2	2.1	0	1.0	0
TOTAL FILLED SEATS			56		56		56		56

	<i>PF</i>	<i>2016</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
AKEL	1	25.7	16
KO-SP	3	4.8	2
EDEK	4	6.2	3
SP	4	6.0	3
DIKO	7	14.5	9
DISY	9	30.7	18
KA	11	5.2	3
ELAM	13	3.7	2
Independents		0.3	0
Other parties		2.9	0
TOTAL FILLED SEATS			56

*Note:* DISY and AKEL are two larger parties, opposite poles (never have been in government together).

*Note:* In 1976, party vote shares of the alliance are based on shares of the total votes produced by cross-voting.

## Governments

Cyprus is a presidential system. As such, even though members of political parties sit in cabinet, parliamentary elections as such do not determine the composition of the government.

### CYPRUS GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1974

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>President (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
12/1974	Archbishop Makarios III	10 (10)	(non-partisan government)
08/1977	Kyprianou, S. (DIKO) (acting)	10 (10)	(non-partisan government)
02/1978	Kyprianou, S. (DIKO)	13 (6)	DIKO AKEL EDEK
02/1983	Kyprianou, S. (DIKO)		DIKO AKEL EDEK
02/1988	Vasilou, G. (ind.)		AKEL
02/1993	Clerides, G. (DISY)	12 (5)	DISY DIKO
11/1997	Clerides, G. (DISY)	12 (7)	DISY
02/1998	Clerides, G. (DISY)	11 (2)	DISY EDEK KED
01/1999	Clerides, G. (DISY)	11 (3)	DISY KED
02/2003	Papadopoulos, T. (DIKO)	11 (2)	AKEL DIKO EDEK
07/2007	Papadopoulos, T. (DIKO)	11 (6)	DIKO EDEK
02/2008	Christofias, D. (AKEL)	11 (1)	AKEL DIKO EDEK
03/2010	Christofias, D. (AKEL)	11 (3)	AKEL DIKO
08/2011	Christofias, D. (AKEL)	11 (6)	AKEL
02/2013	Anastasiades, N. (DISY)	13 (3)	DISY DIKO EVROKO

(Continued)

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>President (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
03/2014	Anastasiades, N. (DISY)	13 (6)	DISY EVROKO
03/2018	Anastasiades, N. (DISY)	12 (7)	DISY <i>KO-SP in support</i>

*Note:* The president is not counted as a minister.

*Note:* For Cyprus presidential elections always produce a new government, but parliamentary ones on their own do not.

## Acronyms

AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working People
DIKO	Democratic Party
DISY	Democratic Rally
EDEK	United Democratic Union of the Centre/Movement for Social Democracy
EDI	United Democrats
ELAM	National Popular Front
EVROKO	European Party
KA	Solidarity Movement
KED	Movement of Free Democrats
KOP	Ecological and Environmental Movement
KO-SP	Movement of Ecologists – Citizens’ Co-operation
SP	Citizens’ Alliance

# TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS

**The party pattern in each election, *with additional components***

1976	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (UBP)</i>
1981	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (UBP and TKP)</i>
1985	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (UBP)</i>
1990	two-party
1993	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (UBP, DP, and CTP)</i>
1998	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (UBP)</i>
2003	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (CTP and UBP)</i>
2005	two-and-a-half-party
2009	two-and-a-half-party
2013	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (CTP)</i>
2018	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (UBP)</i>

**Party systems (with smoothing)**

1976–2003 inclusive      moderately multi-party system

**History**

In June of 1964 Turkish Cypriots withdrew from participation in the government of the Republic of Cyprus. That same year UN peacekeepers began their mission on Cyprus. In 1967 a provisional government was established to provide services in Turkish areas in the north. In 1975 an autonomous state was established

on February 13th following the Greek army coup and the subsequent Turkish military occupation of the north. An independent republic was declared on 15 November 1983, but this regime has been recognized only by Turkey. Nevertheless, a new 'TRNC' constitution was approved on 6 May 1985 in a referendum, and the Republic clearly functions as a *de facto* state.

## Electoral system

There are now five electoral districts in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus; previously there had been three. The details of the electoral system were different in each of the elections up to and including 1990. In 1976 proportional representation using a split-ticket and the d'Hondt method of distribution with seats also automatically going to any candidate to win 50 percent of the votes in a given constituency. In 1981 all seats were allocated using the d'Hondt method. In 1985 an 8 percent threshold for representation was introduced. The number of seats in the assembly was also increased from 40 to 50. Finally in 1990 the option of splitting one's vote (for either party or candidate) was eliminated.

## Political parties and cleavages

The **National Unity Party (UBP)** won the plurality of votes in each election held in the 'TRNC' through 1998. The party was formed in 1975 as an outgrowth of the National Solidarity Movement which strived for an independent northern Turkish state in Cyprus. Despite its history, the party was initially committed to the establishment of a bi-communal federal state but gradually moved away from this position to encompass a less conciliatory position regarding the Greek Cypriot population. This increasingly extreme position adopted by the party caused internal division and led to the secession of party members to newly formed breakaway parties. These parties in turn drained much of the support for the UBP and explain the latter's failure in the 1993 election to win the plurality of seats. The party is considered to be on the right-wing of the political spectrum.

The **Democratic Party (DP)** was formed in 1992 by dissidents of the much larger UBP. The founding members of the DP advocated a more conciliatory posture in regard to the inter-communal talks with the Greek population as compared with the more extreme position taken by the party mainstream of the UBP. In the first election it contested the party won the same number of seats as the UBP and subsequently entered into a governing coalition with the CTP.

The **Republican Turkish Party (CTP)** was originally formed in 1970 as a Marxist formation. The party campaigned against the 1985 constitution because of its alleged repressive and militaristic content. For the 1990 election the party organized an electoral coalition with the TKP (see later) and the **New Dawn Party (YDP)** of settlers from Turkey (this party would later merge into the DP) in order to compete with the UBP under the new changes in the electoral law; this coalition being named the **Democratic Struggle Party (DMP)**. The government

coalition formed with the DP following the 1993 election collapsed and was resurrected two more separate times.

Joining the CTP to form the DMP for the 1990 election was the **Communal Liberation Party (TKP)**. The TKP was a left-of-centre party which was founded in 1976 and originally supported a federal solution the Cyprus problem. In the 2003 election it ran with the **Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH)**. These two parties ran separately in 2005, then merged in 2007 to form the **Communal Democracy Party (TDP)**. An even more leftist and pro-unification party is the **United Cyprus Party (BKP)** founded in 2003 which however has yet to clear the electoral threshold (5 percent) to win seats. To this end, in 2018 it ran with a TDP split-off of historical TKP members in the **Alliance of Change and Liberation (DKİ)**. Conversely, quite successful in its first attempt in 2018 (coming third) was the anti-corruption, centrist **People's Party (HP)**. Also elected that year was the nationalist **Rebirth Party (YDP)**, ultimately a continuation of the New Dawn Party (also YTP) and likewise focussed on settlers from Turkey.

#### ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN CYPRUS SINCE 1976

	1976		1981		1985		1990	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
UBP	53.7	30	42.5	18	36.7	24	54.7	34
CTP	12.9	2	15.1	6	21.4	12		(in DMP)
AHP	11.8	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
DHP	—	—	8.1	2	7.4	0	—	—
TKP	20.2	6	28.5	13	15.8	10		(in DMP)
YDP	—	—	—	—	8.8	4		(in DMP)
DMP	—	—	—	—	—	—	44.5	16
Other parties	1.4	0	5.8	1	9.9	0	0.8	0
TOTAL SEATS		40		40		50		50

	1993		1998		2003		2005	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
UBP	29.9	16	40.3	24	32.9	18	31.7	19
CTP	24.2	13	13.4	6	35.2	19	44.5	24
TKP	13.3	5	15.4	7		(in BDH)	2.4	0
BDH	—	—	—	—	13.2	6	5.8	1
DP	29.2	16	22.6	13	12.9	7	13.5	6
Other parties	3.5	0	8.3	0	5.8	0	2.1	0
TOTAL SEATS		50		50		50		50

(Continued)

	2009		2013		2018	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
UBP	44.1	26	27.3	14	35.6	21
CTP	29.1	15	38.4	21	20.9	12
DP	10.7	5	23.2	12	7.8	3
TDP	6.9	2	7.4	3	8.7	3
ÖRP	6.2	2	—	—	—	—
BKP/DKİ	2.4	0	3.1	0	2.7	0
HP	—	—	—	—	17.0	9
YDP	—	—	—	—	7.0	2
Other parties	0.5	0	—	—	—	—
Independents	0.1	0	0.6	0	0.3	0
TOTAL SEATS		50		50		50

*Note:* The 1990 election did not meet democratic standards of fairness.

## Governments

Until 1993, the UBP (National Unity Party) enjoyed effective one-party dominance, inasmuch as it either formed single-party governments or was the dominant player in a coalition. After the 1993 election, a series of three shaky coalitions were formed between the DP and the CTP. After the last of these collapsed in 1996, the UBP returned to power, supported by the president. Since 1996 governments have been led either by the UBP or by the CTP. These two parties did form a brief grand coalition in 2015.

### NORTHERN CYPRUS GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1976

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
07/1976	Konuk, N. (UBP)	11	UBP
04/1978	Örek, O. (UBP)	10	UBP
12/1978	Çagatay, M. (UBP)	10	UBP
08/1981	Çagatay, M. (UBP)	9	UBP
03/1982	Çagatay, M. (UBP)	11	UBP DHP TBP
11/1983	Konuk, N. (UBP)	11 (4)	UBP DHP
07/1985	Eroğlu, D. (UBP)	11	UBP TKP
09/1986	Eroğlu, D. (UBP)	11	UBP YDP
05/1988	Eroğlu, D. (UBP)	11 (1)	UBP
06/1990	Erolu, D. (UBP)	11	UBP
01/1994	Atun, H. (DP)	11	DP CTP
06/1995	Atun, H. (DP)	11	DP CTP
12/1995	Atun, H. (DP)	11	DP CTP
08/1996	Eroğlu, D. (UBP)	11	UBP DP

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
01/1999	Eroğlu, D. (UBP)	11	UBP TKP
01/2004	Talat, M.A. (CTP)	11	CTP DP
04/2004 ★	Talat, M.A. (CTP)	11	CTP DP
03/2005	Talat, M.A. (CTP)	11	CTP DP
05/2005	Soyer, F.S. (CTP)	11	CTP DP
09/2005	Soyer, F.S. (CTP)	11	CTP ÖRP
05/2009	Eroğlu, D. (UBP)	11	UBP
04/2010	Özgürün, H. (UBP) [interim]		UBP
05/2010	Küçük, İ. (UBP)	11	UBP
06/2013	Siber, S. (CTP) [interim]		CTP DP TDP
09/2013	Yorgancıoğlu, Ö. (CTP)	11	CTP DP
07/2015	Kalyoncu, Ö. (CTP)	11	CTP UBP
04/2016	Özgürün, H. (UBP)	11	UBP DP
02/2018	Erhürman, T. (CTP)	11	CTP HP DP TDP

★ loss of parliamentary majority

## Acronyms

BDH	Peace and Democracy Movement
BKP	United Cyprus Party
CTP	Republican Turkish Party
DKİ	Alliance of Change and Liberation
DMP	Democratic Struggle Party
DP	Democratic Party
HDP	Free Democratic Party
HP	People's Party
TDP	Communal Democracy Party
TKP	Communal Liberation Party
UBP	National Unity Party
YDP	New Dawn Party (1980s) Rebirth Party (2010s)



# THE CZECH REPUBLIC

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

990	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (OF)</i>
1992	highly multi-party
1996	moderately multi-party
1998	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (ČSSD and ODS-KDS)</i>
2002	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (ČSSD, ODS, and KSČM)</i>
2006	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (ODS and ČSSD)</i>
2010	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (ČSSD, ODS, and TOP 09)</i>
2013	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (ČSSD, ANO 2011, KSČM, and TOP 09)</i>
2017	highly multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1990–2010 inclusive      moderately multi-party system

## History

The first Czechoslovak republic lasted from 1918 to 1938. It was the only Eastern European nation to experience a continuous democracy between the wars, until it was dismantled by the Munich agreement of 1938. This democracy was

a multi-party system using PR to elect members of parliament. What was called the “Petka” – a five party coalition – was the dominant form of cabinet. After World War Two, the communists finally achieved full control of the government by February 1948. Massive pro-democratic protests starting in November 1989 led to the first non-communist dominated government in 41 years being sworn in on 10 December 1989. Czechoslovakia itself was peacefully dissolved by the leaders of the Czech Republic and Slovakia at the end of 1992 – what was called the “velvet divorce”. What follows pertains to the Czech lands within Czechoslovakia from 1990 and then the independent Czech Republic from 1993.

### Electoral system

The Czech Chamber of Deputies has always contained 200 members elected by party list proportional representation. From 1990 there has been an electoral threshold of 5 percent for single parties, and from 1992 thresholds for coalitions – these being 7 percent for coalitions of two parties, 9 percent for coalitions of three parties, and 11 percent for a coalition of four or more parties. From 1990 through 1998 there were only eight electoral districts. Then in 2000 the two largest parties set out to intentionally lessen proportionality by increasing the number of electoral districts to 35, something which was struck down by the Constitutional Court. The number of districts was then increased to 14 in a 2002 reform. Also in this reform, the previous two-tier allocation was changed to a single tier, and the previous Droop formula was changed to d’Hondt.

### Political parties and cleavages

The **Civic Forum (OF)**, launched with Vaclav Havel as its leader in November 1989, precipitated the downfall of the communist regime and was the first party with which the communists entered talks to turn over power. The Civic Forum was a broad social movement, and won 49.5 percent of the vote and 62 percent of the seats in the 1990 National Council election. The OF then split off into various parties prior to the highly fragmented 1992 election. (Such fragmentation was mocked by the brief **Friends of Beer Party (SPP)**, which did not itself win seats unlike its Polish counterpart in 1991.) Left liberal elements of the OF formed the **Civic Movement (OH)**, but this narrowly failed to win representation in the 1992 election.

The **Civic Democratic Party (ODS)** was one of two conservative parties to form from the breakup of the OF. A conservative centre-right party and intensely anti-Communist, the ODS led every government in the Czech Republic until the caretaker government of December 1997. The ODS was the driving force behind the period of economic and political transition from 1992 to 1996. In 1996 the ODS formally absorbed its long-time electoral ally the **Christian Democratic**

**Party (KDS)** into the ODS rubric; the ODS did likewise in 1997 with the ODA (see later). However the domineering leadership of Vaclav Klaus eventually proved too much for some ODS members, who broke away at the start of 1998 to form the Czech **Freedom Union (US)** which won seats that year, and then merged with the Democratic Union in 2001 to form the **Freedom Union–Democratic Union (US-DEU)**. In 2002 the US-DEU allied successfully with the KDU–ČSL (see later), but joining a centre-left government caused its decline. The party would dissolve at the start of 2011.

The second of the two conservative parties to form from the OF was the **Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA)**, which was slightly to the right of the ODS. It supported the creation of the Czech state and like the ODS was pro-market. One issue that distinguished the ODA from the ODS was the fact that the ODA put greater emphasis on regional self-government. The ODA had been a minor partner in the three ODS governments. In November 1997 it merged into the ODS.

The **Christian Democratic Union–Czech People's Party (KDU–ČSL)** is the descendent of the historic Czechoslovak People's Party which was founded in 1918 and banned in 1938. That party was then revived in 1945 as a component of the communist-dominated National Front. The party participated in the 1990 election as part of the Christian and Democratic Union alliance and then in April of 1992 formally adopted the KDU–ČSL rubric. The KDU–ČSL is a pro-reform Christian-Democratic party which supports a social market economy. Until 1993 the KDU–ČSL advocated for the autonomy of Moravia, a region from which it gets disproportionate support. The KDU–ČSL has proved to be a valuable coalition partner and has had ministers in almost all partisan Czech governments.

On the left of the Czech political spectrum one finds the **Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)**. An orthodox Communist party that works within the existing parliamentary structure, it is descendent from the **Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ)** which was founded in 1921 by the pro-Bolshevik wing of the ČSSD. The KSČ was the only Eastern European Communist party to retain its legal status in the 1930s – until it was banned in 1938. The KSČM was re-launched in 1990 one year before the KSČ officially dissolved. The KSČM resisted the breakup of the Czechoslovak federation. In the 2017 election the party fell below 10 percent of the vote for the first time.

The other traditional left-of-centre party is the **Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)**. The ČSSD was the plurality party of Czechoslovakia's first parliamentary election in 1920 but went underground in 1939. The ČSSD was forced to merge into the KSČ in 1948. In 1989 it re-emerged as a separate party occupying a left-centrist position in favour of reform towards a social and ecological market economy. It initially argued against the "velvet divorce", instead wanting a confederal system, but soon came to accept the separation. In February of 1993 the party officially replaced the 'Czechoslovak' in its party name with 'Czech'. From 1996 through 2013 inclusive the ČSSD was always one of the two largest parties. It was aided in this regard by having no real rivals on the centre-left

during this time. A **Green Party (SZ)** was founded in 1990, but would not win seats on its own until 2006, and only in that election. The **Czech Pirate Party (ČPS)** was founded in 2009 and importantly would jump up to third place in 2017, surpassing the ČSSD.

On the populist radical right was the **Association for the Republic–Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ)**. The party was founded in 1990 but did not get any seats in parliament until 1992, and then it peaked in 1996. The party advocated the return of capital punishment, economic protectionism, drastic cuts in the state bureaucracy, and non-participation in international organizations. It also argued that ‘measures’ should be taken against groups such as the Roma. The party was also anti-German. The SPR-RSČ was weakened by series of defections, and was eliminated from parliament after the 1998 election. The populist radical right in the Czech Republic re-emerged first with **Dawn of Direct Democracy (Dawn)** in 2013, which ran just in that year and stressed direct democracy and a presidential system. Dawn fragmented, and its main splinter is **Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD)**, founded in 2015 and which emphasizes more a hard Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant/anti-Muslim views. Both parties were founded by Tomio Okamura, himself born in Japan.

Initially regional parties within the Czech Republic were successful, specifically the **Movement for Autonomous Democracy–Society for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS)**, formed in 1990. The HSD-SMS won representation in both the 1990 and 1992 National Council elections. In 1994 the HSD-SMS changed its name to the **Czech-Moravian Centre Party (ČMSS)** but would win no seats in 1996. The party, under both names, argued for Moravian autonomy. The 2006 election would prove to be the peak of the ODS–ČSSD duopoly, with the two parties having 155 of the 200 seats between them. Afterwards support for the ČSSD fell off, though it still remained the largest party in 2010 and 2013. For its part, the ODS lost support more quickly and would implode especially after the 2013 Czech political corruption scandal which led to the resignation of ODS Prime Minister Petr Nečas. The former voters of the ODS have since supported various new parties on the right and centre: the populist anti-corruption right liberal **Public Affairs (VV)**, founded in 2001 as a party focussing on municipal politics in Prague which ran nationally in 2013 and only then (ultimately dissolving in 2015); the conservative **Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09 (TOP 09)**, founded obviously in 2009 which came third in 2010 and declined in each election thereafter; and the **Mayors and Independents (STAN)** party, founded in 2004 to promote municipal interests and which ran with TOP 09 in 2010 and 2013. Most importantly, though, the key party on the centre-right would ultimately be the populist but basically centrist **Political Movement ANO 2011** founded in 2012 by the billionaire Andrej Babiš. The party began in 2011 as the anti-corruption movement **Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO)**; ‘ano’ meaning ‘yes’ in Czech. ANO came a close second in 2013 and was the clear winner in 2017.

ELECTIONS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC SINCE 1990

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1990</i>		<i>1992</i>		<i>1996</i>		<i>1998</i>	
				<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
KSČ/KSČM	1			13.2	33	14.1	35	10.3	22	11.0	24
ČSSD	4			—	—	6.5	16	26.4	61	32.3	74
LSU alliance	5 and 3			—	—	6.5	16	—	—	—	—
OH	5			—	—	4.6	0	—	—	—	—
US	9			—	—	—	—	—	—	8.6	19
KDU-ČSL	10			8.4	20	6.3	15	8.1	18	9.0	20
OF				49.5	124	—	—	—	—	—	—
ODS-KDS	10			—	—	29.7	76	29.6	68	27.7	63
ODA	10			—	—	5.9	14	6.4	13		
SPR-RSČ	12			—	—	6.0	14	8.0	18	3.9	0
HSD-SMS/ČMSS	21			10.0	23	5.9	14	0.5	0	—	—
SPP	41			0.6	0	1.3	0	—	—	(merged into ČSSD)	
Others				18.2	0	13.2	0	10.7	0	7.4	0
TOTAL SEATS					200		200		200		200

		<i>PF</i>		<i>2002</i>		<i>2006</i>		<i>2010</i>		<i>2013</i>	
				<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
KSČM	1			18.5	41	12.8	26	11.3	26	14.9	33
SZ	3			2.4	0	6.3	6	2.4	0	3.2	0
ČSSD	4			30.2	70	32.3	74	22.1	56	20.5	50
ČPS	5			—	—	—	—	0.8	0	2.7	0
ANO 2011	★★			—	—	—	—	—	—	18.7	47
TOP 09	9			—	—	—	—	16.7	41	12.0	26
US-DEU	9				10	0.3	0	—	—	—	—
KDU-ČSL	10			14.3	21	7.2	13	4.4	0	6.8	14
ODS	10			24.5	58	35.4	81	20.2	53	7.7	16
VV	11			—	—	—	—	10.9	24	—	—
Dawn	12			—	—	—	—	—	—	6.9	14
Others				10.1	0	5.7	0	11.2	0	6.6	0
TOTAL SEATS					200		200		200		200

		<i>PF</i>		<i>2017</i>	
				<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
KSČM	1			7.8	15
SZ	3			1.5	0
ČSSD	4			7.3	15
ČPS	5			10.8	22

ANO 2011	**	29.6	78
TOP 09	9	5.3	7
STAN	9	5.2	6
KDU-ČSL	10	5.8	10
ODS	10	11.3	25
SPD	12	10.6	22
Others		4.8	0
TOTAL SEATS		200	

\*\* liberal populist

Note: The 1990 and 1992 elections were to the Czech National Council within then-Czechoslovakia.

## Governments

With one exception, Czech governments have been multi-party coalitions. From 1992 through the 2017 election these were always led by either the ODS or the ČSSD. Neither of these two parties served with each other, indicating a clear bipolarity in Czech governments. A hinge role though was played by the KDU-ČSL which served with both main parties and consequently has been in more Czech governments than any other party.

That said, since 2006 government formation in the Czech Republic has become more difficult, with longer formation times, a couple governments that failed to be invested on their first attempt, and two non-partisan governments.

### CZECH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1990

<i>In power date (M/Y) *</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
06/1990	Pithart, P. (OF)	21 (8)	OF KDU-ČSL HDS-SMS	
07/1992	Klaus, V. (ODS)	19	ODS KDU-ČSL ODA KDS	
07/1996	Klaus, V. (ODS)	16	ODS KDU-ČSL ODA	
01/1998	Tošovský, J. (ind.)	17 (7)	ODS KDU-ČSL ODA	US
08/1998	Zeman, M. (ČSSD)	19 (1)	ČSSD	
08/2002	Špidla, V. (ČSSD)	17	ČSSD KDU-ČSL US	
08/2004	Gross, S. (ČSSD)	18 (1)	ČSSD US KDU-ČSL	
05/2005	Paroubek, J. (ČSSD)	18 (4)	ČSSD KDU-ČSL US	
01/2007	Topolánek, M. (ODS)	18	ODS KDU-ČSL SZ	
06/2009	Fischer, J. (ind.)	18 (18)	(non-partisan technocratic government)	ČSSD ODS SZ
08/2010	Nečas, P. (ODS)	15	ODS TOP 09 VV	
08/2013	Rusnok, J. (ind.)	15 (14)	(non-partisan caretaker government)	
02/2014	Sobotka, B. (ČSSD)	17	ČSSD ANO 2011 KDU-ČSL	
07/2018	Babiš, A. (ANO 2011)	15	ANO 2011 ČSSD	KSČM

## Acronyms

ANO 2011	Yes 2011
ČMSS	Czech–Moravian Centre Party
ČPS	Czech Pirate Party
ČSSD	Czech Social Democratic Party
HSD–SMS	Movement for Autonomous Democracy–Society for Moravia and Silesia
KDS	Christian Democratic Party
KDU–ČSL	Christian Democratic Union–Czech People’s Party
KSČ	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
KSČM	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
LSU	Liberal Social Union
ODA	Civic Democratic Party
ODS	Civic Democratic Alternative
OF	Civic Forum
OH	Civic Movement
SPD	Freedom and Direct Democracy
SPP	Friends of Beer Party
SPR–RSC	Association for the Republic–Republican Party of Czechoslovakia
STAN	Mayors and Independents
SZ	Green Party
TOP 09	Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09
US	Freedom Union
US–DEU	Freedom Union–Democratic Union
VV	Public Affairs

# DENMARK

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1945	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (SD, V, and KF)</i>
1947	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (SD and V)</i>
1950	moderately multi-party
1953 Apr	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SD)</i>
1953 Sep	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SD)</i>
1957	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SD)</i>
1960	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SD)</i>
1964	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SD)</i>
1966	moderately multi-party
1968	moderately multi-party
1971	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SD)</i>
1973	highly multi-party
1975	highly multi-party
1977	highly multi-party
1979	highly multi-party
1981	highly multi-party
1984	highly multi-party
1987	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (SD, KF, and SF)</i>
1988	highly multi-party
1990	highly multi-party
1994	highly multi-party



1998	highly multi-party
2001	highly multi-party
2005	highly multi-party
2007	highly multi-party
2011	highly multi-party
2015	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (SD, DF, and V)</i>

**Party systems (with smoothing)**

1945–1971 inclusive	moderately multi-party system
1973–2015 inclusive	highly multi-party system

**History**

Denmark has been an independent monarchy for centuries. It was a great power from the fourteenth century onwards, with control over Southern Sweden (for a time), Norway, and Iceland. Royal absolutism was installed in 1660, but in 1849 elections were introduced. Fully responsible government came in 1901. Denmark joined the then-European Community in 1973.

Denmark is effectively a unitary state/united realm in which the Faroe Islands have been a federacy since 1948 when home rule was granted, and Greenland – which is geographically in North America – was a federacy from 1979 when home rule was granted until 2009 when it received the right to self-determination. Both regions (or “autonomous constituent countries”) have representation in the Danish parliament. Neither region is in the European Union, however. The Faroe Islands have never been, as noted specifically in the Rome Treaties. Greenland did join the then-European Community in 1973 as part of Denmark. However, in a 1982 referendum it voted to leave the European Union, which occurred in 1985.

**Electoral system**

There are 179 seats in the Danish Folketing. Of these, 175 seats are elected from “mainland” Denmark, and these seats only are the focus of our analysis. There are, however, two addition seats each for the Faroe Islands and for Greenland.

Of the 175 seats elected in Denmark proper, 135 are elected in 10 multi-member constituencies (since 2006; previously 17), and the remaining 40 are national “top-up” seats. To qualify for these additional seats, a party must either have won a constituency seat or receive 2 percent of the national vote. This 2 percent threshold is the lowest legal threshold in Europe, and not surprisingly it hardly limits the number of parties.

## Political parties and cleavages

Traditionally the largest political party in Denmark, the **Social Democratic Party (SD)** was formed in 1871. The party is a pragmatic social democratic party and like many of its Scandinavian and West European counterparts emphasizes the importance of social welfare, economic planning, and environmental policies. From the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s the party polled near or more than 40 percent of the popular vote. Since this period, however, the party has stayed below the 40 percent vote level, and indeed since 2001 has stayed below the 30 percent vote level. Nevertheless, up through 1998 the SD was always the plurality of party in terms of Denmark's post-World War Two electoral history – a position it regained again in 2015.

The **Centre Democrats (CD)** were formed in 1973 by members of the SD who opposed that party's more progressive stance on moral and social issues, but in particular stressed the interests of suburban blue-collar workers. The Centre Democrats leaned slightly right-of-centre although they participated in both right-led and SD-led governments. Overall the CD was quite unique, lacking any counterparts (certainly in the Nordic countries). The party exited the Folketing in 2001, did not run in 2007, and dissolved in 2008.

The **Socialist People's Party (SF)** was formed in 1958 when members of the **Communist Party of Denmark (DKP)** split in protest over that party's support of the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956. From its inception the SF presented itself as a party which supported far-left positions but which wanted these to be independent of the Moscow line. The party is opposed to both NATO and the European Union and gets support mainly from disenchanted social democrats and left-wing intellectuals. In 1967 the SF suffered its own split when members left to form the **Left Socialist Party (VS)**.

In 1989 the previously mentioned Communist and Left Socialist parties, along with the Socialist Workers' Party, formed the far left **Red-Green Unity List**. The party's main goals have been to work for socialist democracy in Denmark and to solve environmental problems facing Denmark and Europe.

Until the late 1960s, and once again since the 1990s, the main opposition party to the SD has been the **Liberal Party (V)** which was founded in 1876. The party was originally formed to serve the interests of the country's rural and agrarian population. The party supports a traditional liberal position on economic policies and has called for further liberalization of the national economy. The Liberals have also argued for more personal freedoms. The party is still supported most strongly by those who live in small towns and in rural areas of the country. From the 2001 through the 2011 election the V was the largest party in parliament.

The **Radical Liberal Party (RV)** (also known as the Social Liberal Party) was founded in 1905 by less conservative members of the Liberal Party. The RV supports traditional liberal economic policies and has been gradually more supportive of the European Union in recent years. The party's main source of support comes

from intellectuals and small landholders. Despite being unable to match the electoral success of the Liberal party, the Radical Liberals have been members of Social Democrat-led governments. Indeed, in much of the postwar period through the 1990s the RV was the “hinge” party of Denmark containing the median MP in a left-right sense. In 2013 two MPs split off to form **The Alternative (A)**, a green party.

During the 1980s the position of dominance on the centre-right was claimed by the **Conservative People’s Party (KF)** which was founded in 1916. Despite maintaining traditional centre-right positions on various policies both social and economic, such as lower taxes, the Conservatives have given their support to the concept of the welfare state. The KF receives its strongest electoral support from business and financial groups. During the mid-1970s levels of popular support for the party dropped below 10 percent, and hit a then-historic low of 5.5 percent in 1975. This slump was in large part due to the emergence of the newly formed Progress Party. Support for the KF would bottom out again in 2011 and 2015.

The **Progress Party (FP)** was founded in 1972 as a protest party with a strong anti-tax platform. The party argued for the gradual but complete dissolution of personal income tax in Denmark. It is no coincidence that the leader of the party was convicted for tax evasion in the early 1980s. The party also argues for a smaller governmental bureaucracy and tougher laws regulating immigration. On two separate occasions, in 1973 and 1977, the party managed to win the second highest number of votes after the Social Democrats, but since then the FP has seen its levels of popular support fall behind many of the other right-of-centre parties. In 1995, more conservative members of the FP split from the party and formed the populist **Danish People’s Party (DF)**. The Danish People’s Party adopted a platform staunchly opposing immigration, increases in taxes and what the party sees as European rapprochement. This split took further votes away from the FP, which exited the parliament in the 2001 election and ceased to run for it thereafter.

The **Christian People’s Party (KrF)** was formed in 1970 in response to what some conservatives saw as a decline in the morals of Danish society, the specific proof of which, they argued, was the liberalization of abortion and pornography laws. The party received support mainly from members of religious groups but lost strength as the issues on which it was founded became less relevant. In 2003 it changed its name to the **Christian Democrats (KD)**, but has remained unsuccessful in all Folketing elections since then.

In 2007 a new centrist liberal party was launched, the **New Alliance (NA)**, which in 2008 became the **Liberal Alliance (LA)**. The LA is much clearer ideologically as a right liberal party, even more free market oriented and libertarian than V.

Other smaller parties in Denmark include the anti-EU **Justice Party (JP)** which was founded as the **Single-Tax Party** in 1919. The party was at its strongest during the late 1940s and 1950s but since has only managed to win representation in three elections.

SELECTED ELECTIONS IN DENMARK SINCE 1945

<i>PF</i>		<i>1945</i>		<i>1947</i>		<i>1950</i>		<i>April 1953</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
DKP	1	12.5	18	6.8	9	4.6	7	4.8	7
SD	4	32.8	48	40.0	57	39.6	59	40.4	61
Single-Tax Party	4	1.9	3	4.5	6	8.2	12	5.6	9
RV	5	8.1	11	6.9	10	8.2	12	8.6	13
V	9	23.4	38	27.6	49	21.3	32	22.1	33
KF	10	18.2	26	12.4	17	17.8	27	17.3	26
Others		3.1	4	1.8	0	0.3	0	1.2	0
TOTAL SEATS			148		148		149		149

<i>PF</i>		<i>September 1953</i>		<i>1957</i>		<i>1960</i>		<i>1964</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
DKP	1	4.3	8	3.1	6	1.1	0	1.2	0
SF	2	—	—	—	—	6.1	11	5.8	10
SD	4	41.3	74	39.4	70	42.1	76	41.9	76
Single-Tax Party	4	3.5	6	5.3	9	2.2	0	1.3	0
RV	5	7.8	14	7.8	14	5.8	11	5.3	10
V	9	23.1	42	25.1	45	21.1	38	20.8	38
KF	10	16.8	30	16.6	30	17.9	32	20.1	36
Others		3.2	1	2.7	1	3.7	7	3.6	5
TOTAL SEATS			175		175		175		175

<i>PF</i>		<i>1966</i>		<i>1968</i>		<i>1971</i>		<i>1973</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
DKP	1	0.8	0	1.0	0	1.4	0	3.6	6
SF	2	10.9	20	6.1	11	9.1	17	6.0	11
VS	2	—	—	2.0	4	1.6	0	1.5	0
Single-Tax Party	4 then 2	0.7	0	0.7	0	1.7	0	2.9	5
SD	4	38.2	69	34.2	62	37.3	70	25.6	46
RV	5	7.3	13	15.0	27	14.4	27	11.2	20
CD	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	7.8	14
V	9	19.3	35	18.6	34	15.6	30	12.3	22
KRF	10	—	—	—	—	2.0	0	4.0	7
KF	10	18.7	34	20.4	37	16.7	31	9.2	16
FP	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	15.9	28
Others		4.1	4	2.0	0	0.2	0	0.0	0
TOTAL SEATS			175		175		175		175

(Continued)

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1977</i>		<i>1981</i>		<i>1984</i>		<i>1987</i>	
				<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
DKP	1			3.7	7	1.1	0	0.7	0	0.9	0
SF	2			3.9	7	11.3	21	11.5	21	14.6	27
VS	2			2.7	5	2.7	5	2.7	5	1.4	0
Single-Tax Party	2			3.3	6	1.4	0	1.5	0	0.5	0
SD	4			37.0	65	32.9	59	31.6	56	29.3	54
RV	5			3.6	6	5.1	9	5.5	10	6.2	11
CD	7			6.4	11	8.3	15	4.6	8	4.8	9
V	9			12.0	21	11.3	20	12.1	22	10.5	19
KrF	10			3.4	6	2.3	4	2.7	5	2.4	4
KF	10			8.5	15	14.5	26	23.4	42	20.8	38
FP	12			14.6	26	8.9	16	3.6	6	4.8	9
Others				0.9	0	0.2	0	0.2	0	3.8	4
TOTAL SEATS					175		175		175		175

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1990</i>		<i>1994</i>		<i>1998</i>		<i>2001</i>	
				<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
SF	2			8.3	15	7.3	13	7.6	13	6.4	12
Red- Greens	2			1.7	0	3.1	6	2.7	5	2.4	4
SD	4			37.4	69	34.6	62	35.9	63	29.1	52
RV	5			3.5	7	4.6	8	3.9	7	5.2	9
CD	7			5.1	9	2.8	5	4.3	8	1.8	0
V	9			15.8	29	23.3	42	24.0	42	31.2	56
KrF	10			2.3	4	1.9	0	2.5	4	2.3	4
KF	10			16.0	30	15.0	27	8.9	16	9.1	16
FP	12			6.4	12	6.4	11	2.4	4	0.5	0
DF	12			—	—	—	—	7.4	13	12.0	22
Others				3.5	0	1.0	1	0.4	0	0.0	0
TOTAL SEATS					175		175		175		175

		<i>PF</i>		<i>2005</i>		<i>2007</i>		<i>2011</i>		<i>2015</i>	
				<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
SF	2			6.0	11	13.0	23	9.2	16	4.2	7
Red- Greens	2			3.4	6	2.2	4	6.7	12	7.8	14
A	3			—	—	—	—	—	—	4.8	9
SD	4			25.8	47	25.5	45	24.8	44	26.3	47

RV	5	9.2	17	5.1	9	9.5	17	4.6	8
CD	7	1.0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
V	9	29.0	52	26.2	46	26.7	47	19.5	34
NA/LA	9	—	—	2.8	5	5.0	9	7.5	13
KD	10	1.7	0	0.9	0	0.8	0	0.8	0
KF	10	10.3	18	10.4	18	4.9	8	3.4	6
DF	12	13.3	24	13.9	25	12.3	22	21.1	37
Others		0.3	0	0.0	0	0.1	0	0.1	0
TOTAL SEATS			175		175		175		175

*Note:* mainland Denmark only

## Governments

Until 1982 the most common Danish government was a single-party minority of the Social Democrats. However, Social Democratic control was never as complete as in Norway and Sweden, and only from 1966 to 1968 was there a clearly leftist government in the sense of the SD relying for support on the SF. Since 1982 non-socialist governments have been the more common type, and SD-led governments have always been coalitions (and always including the RV). Minority governments definitely remain the norm, although since 1982 these have almost always been multi-party minorities. Bipolarity is also a defining feature of governments in Denmark, as only in 1988 was there a partial alternation of the cabinet.

### DANISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1945

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
11/1945	Kristensen, K. (V)	15 (1)	V	RV
11/1947	Hedtoft, H. (SD)	16 (1)	SD	RV
09/1950	Hedtoft, H. (SD)	15 (1)	SD	
10/1950	Eriksen, E. (V)	15	KFV	
05/1953	Eriksen, E. (V)	15	KFV	
09/1953	Hedtoft, H. (SD)	16	SD	
02/1955	Hansen, H.C. (SD)	16	SD	RV
05/1957	Hansen, H.C. (SD)	20	SD	RV JP
02/1960	Kampmann, V. (SD)	20	SD	RV JP
11/1960	Kampmann, V. (SD)	17	SD	RV
09/1962	Krag, J.O. (SD)	17	SD	RV
09/1964	Krag, J.O. (SD)	17	SD	RV SF
11/1966	Krag, J.O. (SD)	21	SD	SF
02/1968	Baunsgaard, H. (RV)	20	KF RVV	
10/1971	Krag, J.O. (SD)	21 (1)	SD	
10/1972	Jørgensen, A. (SD)	21 (1)	SD	

(Continued)

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
12/1973	Hartling, P. (V)	18	V	
02/1975	Jørgensen, A. (SD)	20	SD	RV SF DKP
02/1977	Jørgensen, A. (SD)	20	SD	
08/1978	Jørgensen, A. (SD)	22	SD V	
10/1979	Jørgensen, A. (SD)	20	SD	
12/1981	Jørgensen, A. (SD)	20	SD	
09/1982	Schlüter, P. (KF)	23	V KF CD KrF	
01/1984	Schlüter, P. (KF)	23	V KF CD KrF	
09/1987	Schlüter, P. (KF)	23	KFV CD KrF	
06/1988	Schlüter, P. (KF)	22	KFV RV	
12/1989	Schlüter, P. (KF)	21	KFV	
12/1990	Schlüter, P. (KF)	19	KFV	
01/1993	Rasmussen, P.N. (SD)	24	SD CD RV KrF	
09/1994	Rasmussen, P.N. (SD)	20	SD RV CD	
12/1996	Rasmussen, P.N. (SD)	20	SD RV	
03/1998	Rasmussen, P.N. (SD)	21	SD RV	
11/2001	Rasmussen, A.F. (V)	18	V KF	DF
02/2005	Rasmussen, A.F. (V)	19	V KF	DF
11/2007	Rasmussen, A.F. (V)	19	V KF	DF
04/2009	Rasmussen, L.L. (V)	19	V KF	DF
10/2011	Thorning-Schmidt (SD)	23	SD RV SF	
02/2014	Thorning-Schmidt (SD)	20	SD RV	SF
06/2015	Rasmussen, L.L. (V)	17	V	DF KF LA
11/2016	Rasmussen, L.L. (V)	22	V LA KF	DF

## Acronyms

A	The Alternative
CD	Centre Democrats
DF	Danish People's Party
DKP	Communist Party of Denmark
FP	Progress Party
JP	Justice Party
KD	Christian Democrats
KF	Conservative People's Party
KrF	Christian People's Party
LA	Liberal Alliance
NA	New Alliance
RV	Radical Liberal Party
SD	Social Democrats
SF	Socialist People's Party
V	Liberal Party
VS	Left Socialist Party

# FAROE ISLANDS

**The party pattern in each election, with additional components**

1945	moderately multi-party, with a dominant party (FF)
1946	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties (FF, SB, and JF)
1950	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties (FF, SB, and JF)
1954	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (SB, FF, TF, and JF)
1958	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (JF, SB, TF, and FF)
1962	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (JF, FF, SB, and TF)
1966	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (JF, FF, SB, and TF)
1970	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (JF, SB, TF, and FF)
1974	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (JF, TF, FF, and SB)
1978	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (JF, SB, FF, and TF)
1980	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (SB, JF, FF, and TF)
1984	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (JF, FF, SB, and TF)



1988	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (FF, JF, SB, and TF)</i>
1990	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (JF, FF, and SB)</i>
1994	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (SB, FF, JF, and TF)</i>
1998	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (FF, TF, JF, and SB)</i>
2002	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (SB, TF, FF, and JF)</i>
2004	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (TF, FF, JF, and SB)</i>
2008	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (T, FF, SB, and JF)</i>
2011	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (FF, SB, JF, and T)</i>
2015	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (JF, T, FF, and SB)</i>

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1954–2015 inclusive      highly multi-party system

## History

The Faroe Islands were under first Norwegian then Danish rule, and along with Iceland and Greenland remained part of Denmark when Norway was transferred to Sweden in the 1814 Treaty of Kiel. During World War Two the Faroe Islands were occupied by the United Kingdom. In September 1946 a referendum on independence very narrowly passed (with 50.7 percent of valid votes in favour) and independence was declared. Denmark did not recognize this outcome, however, and instead annulled the declaration and dissolved the Faroese parliament. Pressure for constitutional change led to the granting in 1948 of home rule administered by a Faroese cabinet. Regional powers were expanded in a 2005 Act. A referendum is currently planned on a new constitution which if passed would grant the Faroe Islands the right to self-determination à la Greenland. The Faroe Islands have never been part of the European Union; there is however a free trade agreement with the European Union.

## Electoral system

Elections to the Faroe Islands parliament (Løgting) have always involved proportional representation, however the number of seats and even more the number of

electoral districts has changed. The first postwar decades used a system with 20 members elected in districts, and up to 10 supplementary or compensatory seats. In 1977 this was changed to a system with 27 members elected directly across seven electoral districts via the d'Hondt method, and up to five supplementary seats using the largest remainder method. However, the very small district magnitudes of the smaller districts led to less than proportional results (for example, in 2004 the third party in votes came first in seats), even with the five supplementary seats – which were always used. Consequently, in 2007 a new electoral law replaced the seven multi-member districts with one national district using the d'Hondt method, and the number of seats was set at 33.

### Political parties and cleavages

Political divisions in the Faroe Islands have always involved both the left-right divide and issues of independence/relations with Denmark. The four main parties of today – People's, Republic, Social Democratic, and Union – date from the late 1940s or earlier. The 1906 election in the Faroe Islands was the first with both universal male suffrage and a secret ballot. It led to the creation that year of the first two political parties, the **Self-Government Party (SF)** and the **Union Party (SB)**. Both were classically liberal, but differed over whether there should be local autonomy. In 1939 more pro-autonomy elements of the SF left and merged with business interests to form the conservative **People's Party (FF)**. By the 1990s the FF was supporting outright independence. The SB has remained in support of being part of Denmark. As for the SF, in recent decades it shifted from an autonomist to a pro-independence position. In 2015 it became **New Self-Government (NS)**, which is socially liberal.

The People's Party itself suffered splits. In 1955 dissidents established the **Progress Party (FB)**, which in 1984 became the **Christian People's Party (KrF)**. Secular, fisher-based elements of the KrF broke away in 1986 to form the **Progressive Party (FrF)** which took the KrF's seat in cabinet but could not win representation in 1988. The KrF itself would disband in 2000, after losing all its seats in 1998. Then in 2011 right liberal elements would break away from the FF to form **Progress (F)**. A separate but overlapping Christian Democratic party would form in 1992, the **Centre Party (MF)** which is socially conservative and more pro-independence.

On the centre-left of the ideological spectrum the **Social Democratic Party (JF)** was founded in 1925; it has always been supportive of union with Denmark though not as single-issue as the Union Party. In the 1990s a brief split-off of trade unionists from the JF led to the existence of the **Workers' Union (VMF)**. Finally, in 1948 the **Republican Party (TF)** was founded as a reaction against the failure to achieve independence. It was clearly leftist as well as pro-independence. In 2007 it became just **Republic (T)**.

ELECTIONS IN THE FAROE ISLANDS SINCE 1945

	1945		1946		1950		1954	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
TF	—	—	—	—	9.8	2	23.8	6
SB	24.4	6	28.7	6	27.3	7	26.0	7
FF	43.4	11	40.9	8	32.3	8	20.9	6
JF	22.8	6	28.1	4	22.4	6	19.8	5
SF	9.4	0	(with JF)	2	8.2	2	7.1	2
Independents			2.3	0			2.5	1
TOTAL SEATS		23		20		25		27

	1958		1962		1966		1970	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
TF	23.9	7	21.6	6	20.0	5	21.9	6
SB	23.7	7	20.3	6	23.7	6	21.7	6
FF	17.8	5	20.2	6	21.6	6	20.0	5
JF	25.8	8	27.5	8	27.0	7	27.2	7
SF	5.9	2	5.9	2	4.9	1	5.6	1
FB	2.9	1	4.4	1	2.8	1	3.5	1
TOTAL SEATS		30		29		26		26

	1974		1978		1980		1984	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
TF	22.5	6	20.3	6	19.0	6	19.5	6
SB	19.1	5	26.3	8	23.9	8	21.2	7
FF	20.5	5	17.9	6	18.9	6	21.6	7
JF	25.8	7	22.3	8	21.7	7	23.4	8
SF	7.2	2	7.2	2	8.4	3	8.5	2
FB/KrF	2.5	1	6.1	2	8.2	2	5.8	2
Independents	2.5	0						
TOTAL SEATS		26		32		32		32

	1988		1990		1994		1998	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
TF	19.2	6	14.7	4	13.7	4	23.8	8
SB	21.2	7	18.9	6	23.4	8	18.0	6
FF	23.2	8	21.9	7	16.0	6	21.3	8

JF	21.6	7	27.5	10	15.4	5	21.9	7
MF	—	—	—	—	5.8	2	4.1	1
SF	7.1	2	8.8	3	5.6	2	7.7	2
KrF	5.5	2	5.9	2	6.3	2	2.5	0
VMF	—	—	—	—	9.5	3	0.8	0
FrF	2.1	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other parties			2.3	0	4.3	0		
Independents	0.0	0						
TOTAL SEATS		32		32		32		32

	2002		2004		2008		2011	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
TF/T	23.7	8	21.7	8	23.3	8	18.3	6
SB	26.0	8	23.7	7	21.0	7	24.7	8
FF	20.8	7	20.6	7	20.1	7	22.5	8
F	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.3	2
JF	20.9	7	21.8	7	19.3	6	17.8	6
MF	4.2	1	5.2	2	8.4	3	6.2	2
SF	4.4	1	4.6	1	7.2	2	4.2	1
Other parties			2.4	0	0.7	0		
TOTAL SEATS		32		32		33		33

	2015	
	% V	# S
T	20.7	7
SB	18.7	6
FF	18.9	6
F	7.0	2
JF	25.1	8
MF	5.5	2
NS	4.1	2
Other parties		
TOTAL SEATS		33

## Governments

Governments in the Faroe Islands have always been coalitions, either centre-right or centre-left, although in 1991 JF and FF combined in a grand coalition. The only wholesale alternation of government was the most recent one in 2015, from a right-of-centre government to a left-centre one.

**FAROESE GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1948**

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	
05/1948	Samuelsen, A. (SB)	4	SB JF SF	
12/1950	Djurhuus, K. (SB)	3	FF SB	
12/1954	Djurhuus, K. (SB)	3	FF SB SF	
01/1959	Dam, P.M. (JF)	4	SB JF SF	
01/1963	Djurhuus, H. (FF)	4	TF FF SF	<i>FB in support</i>
01/1967	Dam, P.M. (JF)	3	JF SB SF	
11/1968	Djurhuus, K. (SB)	4	JF SB SF	
12/1970	Dam, A. (JF)	5	JF SB SF	
01/1975	Dam, A. (JF)	6	FF JF TF	
01/1979	Dam, A. (JF)	6	FF JF TF	
01/1981	Ellefsen, P. (SB)	5	FF SB SF	
01/1985	Dam, A. (JF)	6	JF TF KrF SF	
04/1988	Dam, A. (JF)	6	JF TF FrF SF	
01/1989	Sundstein, J. (FF)	6	FF TF KrF SF	
06/1989	Sundstein, J. (FF)	6	FF SB TF	
01/1991	Dam, A. (JF)	7	JF FF	
02/1993	Petersen, M. (JF)	6	FF JF	
04/1993	Petersen, M. (JF)	6	JF TF SF	
09/1994	Joensen, E. (SB)	6	SB JF SF VMF	
06/1996	Joensen, E. (SB)	7	SB FF SF VMF	
05/1998	Kallsberg, A. (FF)	8	FF TF SF	
06/2002	Kallsberg, A. (FF)	9	FF TF MF SF	
02/2004	Eidesgaard, J. (JF)	7	FF JF SB	
02/2008	Eidesgaard, J. (JF)	8	T JF MF	
09/2008	Johannesen, K.L. (SB)	9	FF JF SB	
11/2011	Johannesen, K.L. (SB)	8	FF SB MF SF	
09/2013	Johannesen, K.L. (SB)	7	FF SB MF	
09/2015	Johannesen, A. (JF)	8	JF T F	

**Acronyms**

F	Progress
FB	Progress Party
FF	People's Party
FrF	Progressive Party
KrF	Christian People's Party
JF	Social Democratic Party
MF	Centre Party
NS	New Self-Government
SB	Union Party
SF	Self-Government Party
T	Republic
TF	Republican Party
VMF	Workers' Union

# ESTONIA

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1992	moderately multi-party
1995	highly multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (KMÜ/EK)</i>
1999	highly multi-party
2003	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (K, RP, and RE)</i>
2007	moderately multi-party
2011	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (RE, K, IRL, and SDE)</i>
2015	moderately multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

2003–2015 inclusive	moderately multi-party system
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## History

In the late medieval period Estonia was ruled by Livonian Knights. From the fifteenth century to 1700 the country was ruled by Sweden until the Swedes were defeated by Peter the Great. Estonia was under Russian rule until 1917 when Estonia was granted local autonomy, but it was then occupied by Germany in 1918. The country was granted sovereign status in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Democracy would be replaced by an authoritarian regime in 1934. In 1940 Estonia came under Soviet rule. From 1941 to 1945 it was temporarily under German

occupation once again. In 1989, the Estonian Supreme Soviet unilaterally annulled the 1940 annexation by the Soviet Union, and in 1990 it abolished provisions in the constitution that gave a “leading role” to the Communist Party. In August 1991 Estonia made a declaration of independence which was accepted by the Soviet Union in September of that same year. Estonia would join the European Union in 2014. It leads the world in electronic voting, and this has been available in national elections since 2007.

## Electoral system

Estonia uses open party list proportional representation with the distribution of seats in three rounds of counting according to a simple electoral quotient; the distribution of leftover “compensation mandates” taking place on the basis of a modified d’Hondt method. Mandates not assigned at the district level are distributed as national “compensation mandates” on the basis of a modified d’Hondt method amongst those parties and electoral coalitions whose candidates obtained at least 5 percent of the national vote.

## Political parties and cleavages

The political parties of Estonia can be divided along rural/urban lines as well as how anti-Communist they are. There are also some parties who support national minorities – most particularly the Russian minority. Electoral coalitions were the norm in the first two elections, but these have largely transformed themselves into cohesive parties.

Most Estonian parties are on the centre-right, and targeted at the ethnic Estonian majority. Estonia’s first modern conservative party was the **Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP)** which was officially (but still illegally) formed in 1988. At the time it was the only non-Communist party in the entire Soviet Union. The party declined to participate in the 1990 election to the Estonian Supreme Soviet but was nevertheless given a position in the body which drafted Estonia’s new constitution. In the 1992 election the party campaigned on its own and won enough seats to enable it to become a partner in the first post-independence government. Following the election the party was given the opportunity to join forces more officially with the **Pro Patria** (Fatherland) group but declined. The party then suffered from infighting and the formation of splinter parties. For the 1995 election, the ERSP did join with Pro Patria in an electoral alliance. Then in December of that same year the ERSP and Pro Patria officially merged to form the **Pro Patria Union** or **Fatherland Union (IL)**. Separately, the conservative **Res Publica (RP)**, which was led initially by the internationally known political scientist Rein Taagepera, was established as a party in 2001. It would only run in the 2003 election when it tied for first in terms of seats. In 2006 Res Publica would join with Pro Patria in the **Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL)**. More recent right-wing parties have been the populist radical right **Estonian Conservative**

**People's Party (ERKE)** founded in 2012 and the conservative **Estonian Free Party (EVA)** founded in 2014.

**Pro Patria** itself began in 1992 as an electoral alliance of five smaller parties known as the **Pro Patria National Coalition (RKEI)**; these five parties being two Christian parties, a small conservative party, a liberal democratic party, and a republican party which had all formed in 1989 or 1990. The alliance was a right-centre grouping which advocated a complete break with the communist era. This grouping was formed into a unified party following the 1992 election.

The main right liberal party has been the **Estonian Reform Party (RE)**, which was founded in 1994 as a self-described "liberal-rightist" party. The party includes a breakaway faction of the RKEI which withdrew from the Pro Patria-led coalition government to protest the leadership style of the then-prime minister.

Also right-of-centre but more nationalist is the **Estonian Centre Party (K)** which was formed in 1991 as the Estonian People's Centre Party (ERK) as an offshoot of the Popular Front movement. Despite its nationalism, K in fact draws its main support from the Russian-speaking minority. More clearly nationalist was the **Better Estonia and Estonian Citizen (PE-EK)** bloc, which ran in the first two elections. The Russian minority in Estonia was also the target of the **Estonian United People's Party (EÜRP)** formed in 1994 and clearly supported by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. The EÜRP won seats in two elections but would become marginal and in 2008 merged with another tiny leftist party.

More centrist and rural-oriented was the **Estonian Coalition Party (EK)**, which was formed in 1991 by former managers of small- and medium-size state enterprises but which only ran on its own in the 1999 election and then disbanded in 2001. Mostly it was part of the **Coalition Party and Country People's Union (KMÜ)** alliance. The KMÜ and EK were broadly conservative in orientation and still contained many former members of the Communist party. The KMÜ itself was created for the 1995 election and campaigned on a platform of agricultural subsidies and increased social expenditure. Allied with the KMÜ was the **Estonian Rural People's Party (EME)**; this was founded in 1994 and for a time helped rally agrarian support to the KMÜ. In 1999 the EME became the **Estonian People's Union (ERL)**, which would lose all its seats in the 2011 election and then merge before merging into the ERKE.

The political left is weak in Estonia. The main party on the Estonian centre-left has been the **Moderates (M)**, from 2004 known as the **Social Democrats (SDE)**. In the first two democratic elections there also was the left liberal **Estonian Citizens Party (EK)**. The **Moderates** were formed in 1990 as an electoral coalition of three smaller parties. They would then run as a single party from the 1999 election.

Two groupings which won several seats in the 1992 election but then withered were the frivolous/humorous **Independent Royalist Party (SK)** and the left liberal **Estonian Citizen** alliance. So too did the Green alliance, which won one seat in 1992. The Greens would merge into the Centre Party in 1998. A new **Estonian Greens (ER)** would be formed in 2006 and win seats in the 2007 election but none since then.



## ELECTIONS IN ESTONIA SINCE 1992

	PF	1992		1995		1999		2003	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
Greens	3	2.6	1	(with SK)		–	–	–	–
M	4	9.7	12	6.0	6	15.2	17	7.0	6
KMÜ/EK	7	13.6	17	32.2	41	7.6	7	–	–
EME/ERL	7	–	–	–	–	7.3	7	13.0	13
RE	9	–	–	16.2	19	15.9	18	17.7	19
RKEI/IL	10	22.0	29	7.9	8	16.1	18	7.3	7
RP	10	–	–	–	–	–	–	24.6	28
K	11	12.2	15	14.2	16	23.4	28	25.4	28
PE-EK	11	6.9	8	3.6	0	–	–	–	–
ERSP	12	8.8	10	(with RKEI)		–	–	–	–
EÜRP	21	–	–	5.9	6	6.1	6	2.2	0
SK	41	7.1	8	0.8	0	–	–	–	–
Others		17.1	1	13.2	5	8.4	0	2.8	0
TOTAL SEATS			101		101		101		101

	PF	2007		2011		2015	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
ER	3	7.1	6	3.8	0	0.9	0
SDE	4	10.6	10	17.1	19	15.2	15
RE	9	27.8	31	28.6	33	27.7	30
IRL	10	17.9	19	20.5	23	13.7	14
EVA	10	–	–	–	–	8.7	8
K	11	26.1	29	23.3	26	24.8	27
ERL/ERKE	12	7.1	6	2.1	0	8.1	7
EÜRP	21	1.0	0	0.9	0	(in SDE)	
Others		2.4	0	3.7	0	0.9	0
TOTAL SEATS			101		101		101

## Governments

Ranging from single-party minorities to multi-party minimal winning coalitions, governments in Estonia have not shown a clear pattern – other than none has lasted a full parliamentary term. Likewise, which particular parties coalesce with each other has been fairly fluid.

## ESTONIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1992

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
10/1992	Laar, M. (RKEI)	14 (4)	RKEI ERSP M
11/1994	Tarand, A. (ind.)	14 (4)	RKEI ERSP M
04/1995	Vähi, T. (KMÜ)	14 (4)	KMÜ K
11/1995	Vähi, T. (KMÜ)	14 (4)	KMÜ RE
12/1996	Vähi, T. (KMÜ)	14 (5)	KMÜ
03/1997	Siimann, M. (KMÜ)	15 (6)	KMÜ
03/1999	Laar, M. (IL)	15	RE IL M
01/2002	Kallas, S. (RE)	14	K RE
04/2003	Parts, J. (RP)	14	RP RE ERL
04/2005	Ansip, A. (RE)	14	RE K ERL
04/2007	Ansip, A. (RE)	14	RE IRL SDE
05/2009	Ansip, A. (RE)	13	RE IRL
04/2011	Ansip, A. (RE)	13	RE IRL
03/2014	Rõivas, T. (RE)	14	RE SDE
04/2015	Rõivas, T. (RE)	15	RE IRL SDE
11/2016	Ratas, J. (K)	15	K IRL SDE

## Acronyms

EK	Estonian Coalition Party
EME	Estonian Rural People's Party
ER	Estonian Greens
ERL	Estonian People's Union
ERKE	Estonian Conservative People's Party
ERSP	Estonian National Independence Party
EK	Estonian Citizens Party
EÜRP	Estonian United People's Party
EVA	Estonian Free Party
IL	Fatherland Union
IRL	Pro Patria and Res Publica Union
K	Centre Party
KMÜ	Coalition Party and Country People's Union
PE-EK	Better Estonia and Estonian Citizen
RE	Estonian Reform Party
RKEI	Pro Patria National Coalition
RP	Res Publica
SDE	Social Democratic Party
SK	Independent Royalists

# FINLAND

## **The party pattern in each election, with additional components**

- 1945 highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties (SSDP, SKDL, and AF)
- 1948 highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (AF, SSDP, SKDL, and Kok)
- 1951 highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties (SSDP, AF, and SKDL)
- 1954 highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties (SSDP, AF, and SKDL)
- 1958 highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties (SKDL, SSDP, and AF)
- 1962 highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (AF, SKDL, SSDP, and Kok)
- 1966 highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties (SSDP, KP, and SKDL)
- 1970 highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (SSDP, Kok, KP, and SKDL)
- 1972 highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (SSDP, SKDL, KP, and Kok)
- 1975 highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (SSDP, SKDL, KP, and Kok)
- 1979 highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties (SSDP, Kok, KP, and SKDL)
- 1983 highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties (SSDP, Kok, and KP)

- 1987 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (SSDP, Kok, and Kesk)*
- 1991 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (Kesk, SSDP, and Kok)*
- 1995 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (SSDP, Kesk, and Kok)*
- 1999 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (SSDP, Kesk, and Kok)*
- 2003 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (Kesk, SSDP, and Kok)*
- 2007 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (Kesk, Kok, and SSDP)*
- 2011 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top four parties (Kok, SSDP, PS, and Kesk)*
- 2015 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top four parties (Kesk, PS, Kok, and SSDP)*

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1945–2015 inclusive      highly multi-party system

## History

Finland was a province of Sweden until 1809, and to this day there are Swedish speakers on its western and southern coasts, and in the Åland Islands. From 1809 to 1917, Finland was a usually autonomous Grand Duchy of Russia. In 1906 universal suffrage (for both sexes) was introduced, and Finland thus became the first European country to enfranchise women. With universal suffrage, the number of parties sharply expanded. Independence from Imperial Russia was followed quickly by a civil war between “Reds” and “Whites”, with the latter being victorious. The new constitution of 1919 established a republic, and also a semi-presidential system in which the president had a key role in government formation (and, during the Cold War, in foreign policy as well). Political tensions in the interwar period led to right radical attempts to overthrow the regime; democracy did survive but the Communists were banned from 1930 to 1945. In the Cold War decades after World War Two, Finnish foreign policy was constrained by the presence of the Soviet Union. Finland would join the European Union in 1995.

## Electoral system

Finland uses a straightforward system of proportional representation in 14 multi-member districts (15 in 1954) to elect all but one of its 200-member parliament (*Eduskunta*), with calculations using the d'Hondt method. The remaining seat is the

constituency of the Swedish-speaking Åland Islands, which uses single-member plurality.

## Political parties and cleavages

In recent decades the traditional socialist versus non-socialist ideological division in Finland has lost relevance as parties have more frequently reached across the traditional left-right spectrum to form coalitions. The urban/rural cleavage is still relevant however.

The **Finnish Social Democratic Party (SSDP)** was originally formed as the Workers' Party in 1899 and adopted its present name in 1903. Early on the party was divided between more radical and reform-minded members. In 1918 the radical element within the party left to form the Finnish Communist Party. Divisions within the party did not vanish after this schism however, and in the 1950s further splits resulted in the creation of smaller breakaway parties, most notably the **Social Democratic Union of Workers and Smallholders (TPSL)**, which opposed the increasing catch-all policies of the SSDP. Since then though the SSDP has remained a predominantly left-of-centre party committed to traditional social democratic ideals such as maintaining the welfare state and increasing employee rights. The party is more heavily supported in southern urban areas as opposed to rural areas. Unlike Scandinavian social democratic parties, the SSDP is overwhelmingly pro-European Union.

Communists and their front or successor parties were historically quite strong in Finland, at least until the end of the Cold War. The most recent such creation is the anti-EU **Left-Wing Alliance (Vas or VAS)**. The Vas was formed in 1990 as a coalition of left-Socialist and Communist groups and political parties, the most prominent of which was the Finnish Communist Party (SKP). The SKP, which was formed by hard-line Social Democrats in 1918, never competed in elections as the Communist Party and instead, once it became legal in 1944, created the **Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL)** under whose banner Communist candidates would run. The SKDL, which was supported by the industrial working class in the south and some disadvantaged groups in rural areas, argued for a "Finnish road to democratic socialism" which advocated the nationalization of some industry but not an orthodox communist platform. As a result, the party was not considered radical enough for some socialists and was in turn weakened by hard-line defections and towards the end the creation of breakaway parties which contested the 1987 election together as the **Democratic Alternative (Deva)**, founded in 1986. Deva would disintegrate in 1990, however, with its members joining Vas.

The Communists saw their electoral performance rise and fall. The party even challenged the SSDP for preeminent status on the left in the early postwar elections but lost strength through the 1970s due to defections and the creation of smaller parties. The low reached in 1987, when the party polled less than 10 percent, was the worst showing ever for the Communists and was due in large part to the creation of the Democratic Alternative.

The non-socialist side of Finland's political spectrum has had even more parties than the left. The **National Coalition Party (Kok)** is the main conservative party. The party came into being in 1918 when several smaller monarchist forces consolidated into one party. While the party has at times throughout its history been associated with more hard-right attitudes the party has for decades been very much a moderate party, and maintains a commitment to the concept of a social market economy.

The **Finnish Christian Union (SKL)** was founded in 1958 and is a party committed to advocating Christian ideals and supporting conservative and agrarian interests. The party was against EU membership and this position resulted in its withdrawal from the government coalition in 1994. In 2001 they renamed themselves the **Christian Democrats (KD)**.

The **Finnish Rural Party (SMP)** was founded in 1959 by ex-members of the Agrarian Union who had split from that party. The SMP achieved a major breakthrough in the 1970 election. The party appealed to what it called 'forgotten Finland', or the periphery of society who did not enjoy effective representation in Finnish politics. The party enjoyed support as a protest party but nevertheless participated in governments. The party suffered from its own splinter in 1972 when members left the party to form the **Finnish People's Unity Party (SKYP)**, which would win one seat in 1975. The SMP was against Finland's membership in the European Union, which occurred in 1995.

After its collapse in the 1995 election, when the SMP fell to one seat, the party reformed as the **True Finns (PS)** – as of 2011 formally known in English as **The Finns**. Like the SMP, the PS is a populist radical right party but a much more successful one, jumping in support after the 2008 economic crisis to become one of the three largest parties in parliament. However, in June 2017 the co-founder of the party, Timo Soini, stepped down after two decades as party leader and was replaced as such by the strongly anti-immigrant Jussi Halla-aho. The PS then split with its moderate faction – including Soini and all other cabinet ministers – leaving to become the **New Alternative (UV)** parliamentary group which remained in government. The New Alternative was the basis of the **Blue Reform (ST)** party which quickly formed thereafter.

The **Finnish Centre (Kesk)** was originally formed as the **Agrarian Union (AF)** in 1906, was renamed the **Centre Party (KP)** in 1965, and adopted its current name in 1988. Despite the name changes, which were an attempt to broaden the party's appeal, Kesk still relies most heavily on support from Finland's rural population. The party has attempted to present itself as a party without a strong ideology and has actively criticized both communism and capitalism. This stance has in part been adopted in order to make the party more attractive to potential coalition partners. In the early postwar elections the Agrarian Union was the largest party on the centre-right but this position has been contested since the 1970s by the National Coalition Party due to demographic shifts.

Liberal parties in Finland have been fluid in the postwar period. The **National Progressive Party (KE)** was founded in 1918 as the republican opposition to the

monarchist Kok. KE dissolved in 1951 and most of its members joined the new **Finnish People's Party (SKP)** but a minority formed the **Liberal Union (VL)**. These two parties would reunite in 1965 as the **Liberal People's Party (LKP)**. The LKP last won a seat in 1991, renamed itself the Liberals in 2001, and dissolved in 2011.

Swedish speakers in Finland have political representation through the **Swedish People's Party of Finland (SFP)** which was founded in 1906. The main purpose of the party has been to protect the rights of the Swedish-speaking community within the country. Because of the party's non-ideological *raison d'être* the party has advocated a wide range of economic and social policies over the decades, but has generally been centre-right. More liberal (and republican) elements existed early on and these finally broke away in 1931 to form the **Swedish Left (SV)**, which ran through the 1945 election and rejoined the SFP in 1950. Normally sitting with the SFP in parliament is the deputy of the **Åland Coalition (ÅS)**, an alliance of the main political parties in the Åland Islands. The ÅS first ran in the 1948 election and has held that seat ever since.

The main green party in Finland is the **Green Union (VIHR)** which was formed as an alliance of several environmental organizations. They were first elected to parliament in 1983, the first such electoral success in the Nordic region. Since 1991 they have been the largest of the smaller parties in Finland.

ELECTIONS IN FINLAND SINCE 1945

	PF	1945		1948		1951		1954	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
SKDL	1	23.5	49	20.0	38	21.6	43	21.6	43
SSDP	4	25.1	50	26.3	54	26.5	53	26.2	54
AF	7	21.4	49	24.2	56	23.3	51	24.1	53
KE	9	5.2	9	3.9	5	—	—	—	—
VL	9	—	—	—	—	0.3	0	0.3	0
SKP	9	—	—	—	—	5.7	10	7.9	13
Kok	10	15.0	28	17.0	33	14.6	28	12.8	24
SV	21	0.5	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
SFP (and ÅS)	21	7.9	14	7.7	14	7.6	15	7.0	13
Others		1.4	0	0.9	0	0.4	0	0.1	0
TOTAL SEATS			200		200		200		200

	PF	1958		1962		1966		1970	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
SKDL	1	23.2	50	22.0	47	21.1	41	16.6	36
TPSL	2	1.7	3	4.4	2	2.6	7	1.4	0

SSDP	4	23.1	48	19.5	38	27.2	55	23.4	52
AF/KP	7	23.1	48	23.0	53	21.2	49	17.1	36
SKP	9	5.9	8	6.3	13		(into LKP)	—	—
VL	9	0.3	0	0.5	1		(into LKP)	—	—
LKP	9	—	—	—	—	6.5	9	5.9	8
Kok	10	15.3	29	15.1	32	13.8	26	18.0	37
SKL	10	—	—	—	—	0.4	0	1.1	1
SMP	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	10.5	18
SFP (and ÅS)	21	6.8	14	6.4	14	6.0	12	5.7	12
Others		0.6	0	2.8	0	1.2	1	0.3	0
TOTAL SEATS			200		200		200		200

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1972</i>		<i>1975</i>		<i>1979</i>		<i>1983</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
SKDL	1	17.0	37	18.9	40	17.9	35	13.5	26
SSDP	4	25.8	55	24.9	54	23.9	52	26.7	57
KP	7	16.4	35	17.6	39	17.3	36	17.6	38
LKP	9	5.2	7	4.3	9	3.7	4	(with Keski)	
Kok	10	17.6	34	18.4	35	21.7	47	22.1	44
SKL	10	2.5	4	3.3	9	4.8	9	3.0	3
SMP	12	9.2	18	3.6	2	4.6	7	9.7	17
SFP (and ÅS)	21	5.4	10	5.0	10	4.5	10	4.9	11
Others		0.9	0	4.0	2	1.6	0	2.5	4
TOTAL SEATS			200		200		200		200

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1987</i>		<i>1991</i>		<i>1995</i>		<i>1999</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
SKDL/VAS	1 then 2	9.4	16	10.1	19	11.2	22	10.9	20
Deva	1	4.2	4	—	—	—	—	—	—
VIHR	3	4.0	4	6.8	10	6.5	9	7.3	11
SSDP	4	24.1	56	22.1	48	28.3	63	22.9	51
Keski	7	17.6	40	24.8	55	19.4	44	22.4	48
LKP	9	1.0	0	0.8	1	0.6	0	0.2	0
Kok	10	23.1	53	19.3	40	17.9	39	21.0	46
SKL	10	2.6	5	3.1	8	3.0	7	4.2	10
SMP/PS	12	6.3	9	4.8	7	1.3	1	1.0	1
SFP (and ÅS)	21	5.6	13	5.8	12	5.5	12	5.5	12
Others		2.1	0	2.4	0	6.3	3	4.6	1
TOTAL SEATS			200		200		200		200

(Continued)



	PF	2003		2007		2011		2015	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
VAS	2	9.9	19	8.8	17	8.1	14	7.1	12
VIHR	3	8.0	14	8.5	15	7.3	10	8.5	15
SSDP	4	24.5	53	21.4	45	19.1	42	16.5	34
Kesk	7	24.7	55	23.1	51	15.8	35	21.1	49
KD	8	5.3	7	4.9	7	4.0	6	3.5	5
Kok	10	18.6	40	22.3	50	20.4	44	18.2	37
PS	12	1.6	3	4.1	5	19.1	39	17.7	38
SFP (and ÅS)	21	4.8	9	5.0	10	4.6	10	5.2	10
Others		2.6	0	1.9	0	1.6	0	2.2	0
TOTAL SEATS			200		200		200		200

## Governments

Governments in postwar Finland have normally been broad multi-party ones, although caretaker governments also occurred fairly frequently up through the 1970s. The requirement until 1992 of super-majorities to pass lasting economic legislation was a strong incentive for broad coalitions (and co-operation with opposition parties). As well, during the first few postwar decades Finnish governments tended to be short lived. Since 1983, however, governments have tended to last longer. During the Cold War, Soviet pressure normally kept the Kok out of government. The government formed in 1995 and reformed in 1999 illustrated the breadth of Finnish governments, as it ranged from left socialists and Greens to conservatives. Overall, the SFP has clearly been in government more than any other party.

### FINNISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1945

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
04/1945	Paasikivi, J.K. (ind.)	18 (4)	SSDP SKDL AF KE SFP
07/1945	Paasikivi, J.K. (ind.)	18 (2)	SSDP SKDL AF SFP
03/1946	Pekkala, M. (SKDL)	18 (1)	SKDL SSDP AF SFP
07/1948	Fagerholm, K. (SSDP)	17 (1)	SSDP
03/1950	Kekkonen, U. (AF)	15	AF SFP KE
01/1951	Kekkonen, U. (AF)	17 (1)	AF SSDP KE SFP
09/1951	Kekkonen, U. (AF)	17 (1)	AF SSDP SFP
07/1953	Kekkonen, U. (AF)	14 (3)	AF SFP
11/1953	Tuomioja, S. (VL)	15 (2)	Kok AF SFP SKPVL
05/1954	Törngren, R. (SFP)	14 (1)	AF SSDP SFP
10/1954	Kekkonen, U. (AF)	14 (1)	SSDP AF

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
03/1956	Fagerholm, K. (SSDP)	15 (1)	SSDP AF SKP SFP
05/1957	Sukselainen, V.J. (AF)	14 (1)	AF SKP SFP
07/1957	Sukselainen, V.J. (AF)	13 (1)	AF SKP
09/1957	Sukselainen, V.J. (AF)	16 (2)	AF TPSL SKP
11/1957	von Fieandt, R. (ind.)	13 (13)	(non-partisan caretaker government)
04/1958	Kuuskoski, R. (ind.)	14 (14)	(non-partisan caretaker government)
08/1958	Fagerholm, K. (SSDP)	15	SSDP AF Kok SKP SFP
01/1959	Sukselainen, V.J. (AF)	15 (1)	AF
07/1961	Miettunen, M. (AF)	15 (1)	AF
04/1962	Karjalainen, A. (AF)	15 (3)	AF Kok SKP SFP
12/1963	Lehto, R.R. (ind.)	15 (15)	(non-partisan caretaker government)
09/1964	Virolainen, J. (AF)	15 (1)	AF Kok SKP SFP
05/1966	Paasio, R. (SSDP)	15	SSDP KP SKDL TPSL
03/1968	Koivisto, M. (SSDP)	16	SSDP KP SKDL TPSL SFP
05/1970	Aura, T. (ind.)	14 (14)	(non-partisan caretaker government)
07/1970	Karjalainen, A. (AF)	17 (1)	SSDP KP SKDL LKP SFP
03/1971	Karjalainen, A. (AF)	17 (1)	SSDP KP LKP SFP
10/1971	Aura, T. (ind.)	16 (16)	(non-partisan caretaker government)
02/1972	Paasio, R. (SSDP)	17	SSDP
09/1972	Sorsa, K. (SSDP)	16 (1)	SSDP KP SFP LKP
06/1975	Liinamaa, K. (ind.)	18 (18)	(non-partisan caretaker government)
11/1975	Miettunen, M. (KP)	18 (2)	SSDP KP SKDL SFP LKP
09/1976	Miettunen, M. (KP)	16 (1)	KP LKP SFP
05/1977	Sorsa, K. (SSDP)	15 (1)	KP SSDP SKDL LKP SFP
03/1978	Sorsa, K. (SSDP)	15 (1)	KP SSDP SKDL LKP
05/1979	Koivisto, M. (SSDP)	17 (1)	KP SSDP SKDL SFP
02/1982	Sorsa, K. (SSDP)	17 (1)	KP SSDP SKDL SFP
12/1982	Sorsa, K. (SSDP)	17 (1)	SSDP KP SFP
05/1983	Sorsa, K. (SSDP)	17	SSDP KP SFP SMP
04/1987	Holkeri, H. (Kok)	18	SSDP Kok SFP SMP
09/1990	Holkeri, H. (Kok)	17	SSDP Kok SFP
04/1991	Aho, E. (Kesk)	17	Kesk Kok SFP SKL
04/1995	Lipponen, P. (SSDP)	18 (1)	SSDP Kok SFP Vas VIHRR
04/1999	Lipponen, P. (SSDP)	18 (1)	Kok SSDP SFP Vas VIHRR
05/2002	Lipponen, P. (SSDP)	18	Kok SSDP SFP Vas
04/2003	Jäätteenmäki, A. (Kesk)	19	SSDP Kesk SFP
06/2003	Vanhanen, M. (Kesk)	19	SSDP Kesk SFP
04/2007	Vanhanen, M. (Kesk)	20	Kok Kesk SFP VIHRR
06/2010	Kiviniemi, M. (Kesk)	20	Kok Kesk SFP VIHRR
06/2011	Katainen, J. (Kok)	19	Kok SSDP SFP Vas VIHRR KD
04/2014	Katainen, J. (Kok)	17	Kok SSDP SFP VIHRR KD
06/2014	Stubb, A. (Kok)	17	Kok SSDP SFP VIHRR KD
09/2014	Stubb, A. (Kok)	17	Kok SSDP SFP KD
06/2015	Sipilä, J. (Kesk)	14	Kesk Kok PS
06/2017	Sipilä, J. (Kesk)	14	Kesk Kok UV/ST

## Acronyms

AF	Agrarian Union
Deva	Democratic Alternative
KE	National Progressive Party
Kesk	Centre
KD	Christian Democrats
Kok	National Coalition Party
KP	Centre Party
LKP	Liberal People's Party
PS	True Finns/The Finns
SFP	Swedish People's Party of Finland
SKDL	Finnish People's Democratic League
SKL	Finnish Christian Union
SKYP	Finnish People's Unity Party
SKP	Finnish People's Party
SMP	Finnish Rural Party
SSDP	Finnish Social Democratic Party
ST	Blue Reform
SV	Swedish Left
TPSL	Social Democratic Union of Workers and Smallholders
UV	New Alternative
Vas	Left-Wing Alliance
VIHR	Green Union
VL	Liberal Union
ÅS	Åland Coalition

*Note:* All acronyms are from Finnish except for SFP, SV, and ÅS, where the Swedish acronym is the standard.

# FRANCE

## General History

Long a united polity, France was Europe's major power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The French Revolution of 1789 created a contested legacy, in that various claimants to the throne had definite support even into the twentieth century. Since 1789, France has had no less than 12 political regimes, of which the Third Republic from 1875 to 1940 was the longest lasting. This analysis looks first at the Fourth Republic (1940–1958) and then the Fifth Republic (since 1958). France was a founding member of the then-European Community.

## THE FRENCH FOURTH REPUBLIC

### The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1945	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (PCF, MRP, SFIO, and conservatives)</i>
1946 Jun	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (MRP, PCF and SFIO)</i>
1946 Nov	moderately multi-party
1951	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top six parties (RPF, PCF, SFIO, conservatives, MRP, and Radicals plus UDSR)</i>
1956	highly multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

None.

## History

After liberation in 1944, General Charles de Gaulle more or less personally ran the country until the end of the war. In an October 1945 referendum, 96 percent of the population indicated that they did not wish a simple return to the prewar Third Republic. Consequently elections were held for a constituent assembly. Its first proposal, for a unicameral parliamentary system, was narrowly rejected by the voters. A subsequent proposal, with an upper house and thus a constitution not greatly different from the Third Republic, did pass, but only by nine million votes to eight million, with a further eight million abstentions. The Fourth Republic thus hardly had the strong support of the population, or of all political elites.

## Electoral system

Initially a fairly straightforward system of proportional representation in small multi-member districts was used. However, in 1951 the system was manipulated to favour the pro-regime parties. This manipulation involved keeping Paris (where the anti-regime Gaullists and Communists were strong) proportional, but for the rest of the country allowing alliances – not necessarily the same ones – to be formed in each department. If and when any alliance collectively won over 50 percent of the vote in the department, the alliance won *all* of the seats, to be then distributed proportionally amongst its components.

## Political parties and cleavages/divisions

French politics in the Fourth Republic was structured along two main ideological divisions – attitudes to the Fourth Republic itself and left versus right – as well as the cleavage of religiosity. These divisions yielded six main parties, of which the first three discussed were normally larger than the rest.

The **French Communist Party (PCF)** was founded in 1920. It was opposed to the Fourth Republic (and indeed to the democratic order), extremely leftist, and secular. The PCF benefited greatly from its role in the resistance, and had a certain following amongst intellectuals. Mainly, of course, it was the party of French workers, and thus strongest in the industrial areas of the north, the east, and the suburbs of Paris. It also had support in secular rural areas of the centre and south.

The PCF had in fact broken away from the Socialist Party, or more precisely the **French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO)**, founded in 1905. The SFIO was also leftist and secular, but definitely pro-regime. Given the strength of the Communists, manual workers were only a minority of the Socialist electorate, and these were primarily from smaller industries. The majority of SFIO support came from secular white-collar workers, especially in the public sector.

The third main party of the French Fourth Republic was a new one, the Christian democratic **Popular Republican Movement (MRP)**, founded in 1944. Like the Socialists, the MRP was very pro-regime. It was also left leaning in socio-economic policy. On the other hand it was clearly a religious party, and was thus limited to the more religious areas of France in the east and west. Indeed, most of its voters supported it on religious grounds, and did not share its progressive socio-economic goals. As an explicitly cross-class party, it drew from a variety of economic groups.

The MRP would to some extent be the key hinge party in the Fourth Republic. In the Third Republic, however, that role had been filled very clearly by the Radicals, or more precisely the **Radical Socialist Republican Party (PRSR)**, which was founded in 1901 but whose roots went back earlier. There was actually nothing socialist about this party. It was on the centre-right economically, militantly secular, pro-regime, and a classic office-seeking party as opposed to an ideological one. Its support was mainly found in small towns. The Radicals were hurt after the war by their collaboration during the Nazi occupation. Moreover, women – who had received the vote in 1944 – avoided the party, which perhaps ‘served it right’ for opposing female suffrage. Consequently the Radicals were a smaller force than they had been. In the Fourth Republic the Radicals also had a junior partner in the form of the **Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance (UDSR)**, now known chiefly because one of its leaders (and cabinet ministers) was the future Fifth Republic president François Mitterrand.

The Fourth Republic also featured a disparate group of conservatives, or **Moderates**, who were pro-regime, right of centre, and somewhat more religious than not. They thus differed from the MRP primarily on economics. Despite their generally religious nature, however, the conservatives had perhaps more in common with the Radicals, especially as the conservatives were also discredited by their collaboration. Of the Moderates, the biggest single party was the **National Centre of Independents and Peasants (CNIP)**, founded in 1948.

All of these parties or groups contested each election in the Fourth Republic. In addition, there were two ephemeral anti-system parties on the right. Of these two, the more important was the Gaullist **Rally of the French People (RPF)**. General Charles de Gaulle had opposed the creation of the Fourth Republic, preferring instead a presidential regime. Some pro-Gaullists candidates ran, but only in 1947 did Charles de Gaulle agree to the establishment of a national organization, the RPF. (Charles de Gaulle always saw parties as divisive forces, and thus the RPF did not contain the name party but instead was more of a national movement.) The RPF did extraordinarily well in the municipal elections of 1947, but as it turned out the 1951 national election were the only ones Charles de Gaulle seriously contested. The Gaullist appeal was based on nationalism and institutional change, and was thus catch-all in nature. Nevertheless, the RPF electorate was basically religious, and its voters came largely from the MRP.

Finally, in the 1956 election there was a flash far-right anti-system protest party called the **Poujadists** after its leader Pierre Poujade. The party was anti-establishment and anti-Semitic, and appealed to small shopkeepers and others hurt by economic modernization.

ELECTIONS IN THE FRENCH FOURTH REPUBLIC (MÉTROPOLE)

	PF	1945			June 1946			November 1946			1951		
		% V	# S		% V	# S		% V	# S		% V	# S	
PCF	1	26.1	148		26.2	146		28.6	166		26.7	97	
SFIO	4	23.8	134		21.1	115		17.9	90		14.5	94	
Radicals + UDSR	5	11.1	35		11.5	39		12.4	55		10.0	77	
MRP	8	24.9	141		28.1	160		26.3	158		12.5	82	
Conservatives	10	13.3	62		12.8	62		12.8	70		14.0	87	
RPF	11	—	—		—	—		1.6	5		21.7	107	
Others		0.9	2		0.4	0		0.3	0		0.7	0	
TOTAL SEATS			522			522			544			544	

	PF	1956		
		% V	# S	
PCF	1	25.9	147	
SFIO	4	15.2	88	
Radicals + UDSR	5	15.2	73	
MRP	8	11.1	71	
Conservatives	10	15.3	95	
RPF	11	4.0	16	
<i>Poujadistes</i>	12	11.7	51	
Others		1.7	3	
TOTAL SEATS			544	

Note: The 1945 and June 1946 elections were for a constituent assembly.

Governments

Governments in the French Fourth Republic were notoriously unstable. From 1947, when the Communists were expelled from the government, until 1958, when Charles de Gaulle returned to power, the pro-regime parties monopolized the cabinet table, but also used it to play an ongoing game of “musical chairs”.

FRENCH FOURTH REPUBLIC GOVERNMENTS

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
01/1946	Gouin, F. (SFIO)	20 (1)	SFIO MRP PCF
06/1946	Bidault, G. (MRP)	23 (1)	MRP SFIO PCF PRSR
12/1946	Blum, L. (SFIO)	17	SFIO
01/1947	Ramadier, P. (SFIO)	26 (2)	SFIO PCF MRP PRSR Cons UDSR

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I) Parties in Cabinet</i>
05/1947	Ramadier, P. (SFIO)	26 (3) SFIO MRP PRSR Cons UDSR
10/1947	Ramadier, P. (SFIO)	12 SFIO MRP PRSR Cons
11/1947	Schuman, R. (MRP)	15 MRP SFIO PRSR UDSR Cons
07/1948	Marie, A. (MRP)	19 MRP SFIO PRSR Cons
09/1948	Schuman, R. (MRP)	15 MRP SFIO PRSR Cons
09/1948	Queuille, H. (PRSR)	15 MRP SFIO PRSR UDSR CNIP
10/1949	Bidault, G. (MRP)	18 MRP SFIO PRSR UDSR CNIP
02/1950	Bidault, G. (MRP)	17 MRP PRSR CNIP UDSR
07/1950	Queuille, H. (PRSR)	21 MRP PRSR CNIP UDSR
07/1950	Pleven, R. (UDSR)	22 MRP PRSR SFIO CNIP UDSR
03/1951	Queuille, H. (PRSR)	22 MRP SFIO PRSR UDSR CNIP
08/1951	Pleven, R. (UDSR)	24 PRSR CNIP MRP UDSR
01/1952	Faure, E. (PRSR)	26 PRSR MRP CNIP UDSR
03/1952	Pinay, A. (CNIP)	17 CNIP PRSR MRP UDSR
01/1953	Mayer, R. (PRSR)	23 PRSR CNIP MRP UDSR
06/1953	Laniel, J. (CNIP)	22 CNIP MRP PRSR UDSR
06/1954	Mendès-France, P. (PRSR)	16 (1) PRSR CNIP RPF UDSR
02/1955	Faure, E. (PRSR)	19 PRSR CNIP MRP RPF
02/1956	Mollet, G. (SFIO)	14 (1) SFIO PRSR UDSR
06/1957	Bourgès-Maunoury, M. (PRSR)	14 PRSR SFIO UDSR
11/1957	Gaillard, F. (PRSR)	17 PRSR SFIO MRP CNIP RPF UDSR
05/1958	Pflimlin, P. (MRP)	22 PRSR MRP SFIO CNIP UDSR
06/1958	de Gaulle, C. (RPF)	24 (9) RPF CNIP MRP PRSR SFIO

## THE FRENCH FIFTH REPUBLIC

### **The party pattern in each election, *with additional components***

- 1958 highly multi-party
- 1962 highly multi-party, *with a dominant party (UNR)*
- 1967 moderately multi-party, *with a dominant party (UNR)*
- 1968 moderately multi-party, *with a predominant party (UDR)*
- 1973 highly multi-party
- 1978 moderately multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top four parties (RPR, UDF, PS, and PCF)*
- 1981 moderately multi-party, *with a predominant party (PS)*
- 1986 moderately multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (PS, RPR, and UDF)*
- 1988 moderately multi-party
- 1993 two-and-a-half-party



1997	moderately multi-party
2002	moderately multi-party
2007	two-and-a-half-party
2012	two-and-a-half-party
2017	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (LRM)</i>

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1967–2002 inclusive      moderately multi-party system

## History

The Fourth Republic ultimately proved unable to deal with the uprising in Algeria, and Charles de Gaulle used this crisis as a means to return to power. As part of his demands, a new semi-presidential constitution was drawn up and overwhelmingly approved by the voters in a September 1958 referendum. Thus in January 1959 Charles de Gaulle became the first president of the new Fifth Republic. He was in fact chosen by an electoral college; however, a referendum in October 1962 approved the direct election of the president, the first of which occurred in 1965. The Fifth Republic president has broad powers, including the ability to dissolve the National Assembly once a year.

## Electoral system

With the exception of the 1986 election, which used proportional representation, all National Assembly elections in the Fifth Republic have used what is called the single-member majority-plurality system. Under this system, all deputies are elected in single-member constituencies. If any candidate wins an absolute majority on the first ballot, s/he is elected right away. If not, there is a second ballot held a week later, in which a candidate need only win a plurality to get elected. However, since 1976 participation in this second ballot has been limited to candidates the first ballot votes of which are at least 12.5 percent of the constituency's *registered voters* (electorate) – in practice, about 18 percent of the first ballot vote. (This threshold began modestly in 1958 as 5 percent of total first ballot valid votes, then in 1966 became 10 percent of the constituency's electorate.) Such a threshold thus eliminates all the smaller candidates. Moreover, parties that are allied tend to practice what is known as *désistement* (withdrawal), in which everyone stands down except for the highest placed candidate on the first ballot. This avoids splitting the votes of one side, given that the second ballot is a plurality one. To some extent, then, the first ballot plays the role of a primary.

As of the 2022 election, however, the plan is for France to have a parallel system in which some 15 percent of deputies are elected by proportional representation. This share will provide a boost to smaller parties but obviously not make the system

fully proportional. Moreover, the total number of deputies will be cut by almost a third, thus making the remaining single-member districts much larger.

Deputies in the Fifth Republic have always been elected not just from France proper (the *métropole*) but from overseas territories of France and in 1958 from Algeria and the Sahara. The number of such seats involved is given in the following table. Furthermore, following from the 2008 reform to the French constitution, French citizens resident abroad have been represented in the National Assembly (based on constituencies of regions of the world). Eleven such constituencies were created in the 2010 redistricting, with effect as of the 2012 National Assembly election. However, it is important to note that until recently French election results themselves were normally given in terms of Metropolitan France only. To be consistent, that is the approach taken herein – including calculating such results through 2017. These results are thus the ones used for the calculations in Chapter 2 in Part I. Other deputies are included in the parliamentary groups table below.

#### FRANCE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SEATS SINCE 1958

<i>Election</i>	<i>Metropolitan France</i>	<i>Algeria and the Sahara</i>	<i>Overseas France</i>	<i>FéhdF</i>	<i>Total</i>
1958	465	71	16		552
1962	465		17		482
1967	470		17		487
1968	470		17		487
1973	473		17		490
1978	474		17		491
1981	474		17		491
1986	556		21		577
1988	555		22		577
1993	555		22		577
1997	555		22		577
2002	555		22		577
2007	555		22		577
2012	539		27	11	577
2017	539		27	11	577

FéhdF = Français établis hors de France (French established outside France).

### Political parties and cleavages

French presidential elections and the popularity of a given president are often crucial factors in the outcome of a given French *parliamentary* election. Moreover, the electoral system encouraged the formation of two broad groupings of the centre-right and the left, at least until 2017. Nevertheless, the party system remained multi-party, and underlying cleavages such as social class and religiosity remained at least until 2017 when education, urbanization, and LEC-TAN divisions became more central.

On the centre-right of the political spectrum, the **Gaullists** quickly (by 1962) became the dominant force. The Gaullists stressed nationalism and selective economic interventionism. Especially when Charles de Gaulle himself was president in the 1960s, the Gaullists were a true “catch-all” party, garnering a proportionate share of the working-class vote. Since the 1970s, though, the Gaullist electorate has been more clearly conservative, white collar or farmer, and/or religious. One often uses the phrase “the Gaullists” to describe the party largely because it has changed its name so frequently: it was the RPF in the Fourth Republic, and in the Fifth Republic it was the **Union for the New Republic (UNR)** from 1958 to 1968, the **Union for the Defence of the Republic (UDR)** from 1968 to 1971, the **Union of Democrats for the Republic (also UDR)** from 1971 to 1976, and the **Rally for the Republic (RPR)** from 1976 to 2002. At that point it became the broader **Union for the Presidential Majority (UMP)** in support of President Jacques Chirac in his second term and then President Nicolas Sarkozy. Once in opposition, Nicolas Sarkozy reformed the party in 2015 as **The Republicans (LR)**. All these names have been interesting in two ways, though: they initially always referred to the (Fifth) Republic, and they never contain the word “party”, which – as noted earlier – Charles de Gaulle saw as a divisive concept.

Although initially the MRP and the traditional conservatives and for a longer time the Moderates carried over into the Fifth Republic, they were much weaker as the Gaullists took over many of their voters and as they were squeezed by the single member electoral system. Moreover, most centre-right voters wanted a party that supported Charles de Gaulle, even if it was not actually the Gaullists as such. Nevertheless, those Catholic deputies who were suspicious of Charles de Gaulle and wanted a clear centrist expression formed the **Democratic Centre (CD)** in 1966, which became **Progress and Modern Democracy (PDM)** in 1968, the **Democratic and Social Centre (CDS)** in 1976, the **Union of the Centre (UDC)** in 1988, and finally the **Democratic Force (FD)** in 1995. The MRP itself was dissolved in 1967. A competing pro-Gaullist centrist force, the **Centre for Democracy and Progress (CDP)**, was established in 1969.

The Radical Party persisted into the early 1970s, but was pulled between its right-of-centre and more progressive tendencies. Despite differences of religiosity, right-wing Radicals were part of the CD in 1966. Radicals and some Christian Democrats were also briefly united as the **Reform Movement (MR)** for the 1973 election. Also, independent conservatives continued to be elected to the National Assembly. The main other party on the centre-right besides the Gaullists, though, was the creation of the ambitious and well-groomed politician Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had entered parliament as a member of the CNIP in the late 1950s, and supported Charles de Gaulle and his new constitution. He did not, however, want to become a Gaullist proper. Sensing the limited prospects of the CNIP, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing left the party with his followers in 1962, and set up the **Independent Republicans (RI)**, which became the **Republican Party (PR)** in 1977, and **Liberal Democracy (DL)** in 1997. DL would become part of the broad UMP in 2002.

In the 1974 presidential election, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing surpassed a weak Gaullist candidate to become the main centre-right candidate and ultimately the president. Within the government side in parliament, however, the Gaullists remained strong, as Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's Independent Republicans were only a tiny force. In order to provide more balance, in 1978 Valéry Giscard d'Estaing created the **Union for French Democracy (UDF)** out of the Republicans, the CDS, and most of the Radicals. The UDF was first and foremost an electoral alliance – its component parts did not run against each other. It also had a certain ideological cohesion, in particular it always was more pro-European than the Gaullists. However, the separate component parties remained as separate parties, with national leaders. Indeed, in 1998 DL would break away from the UDF. Usually the UDF formed one group in the parliament, but at times specific component parties chose to sit separately. Finally, in terms of demographics there was very little to distinguish UDF voters from Gaullist voters.

The RPR and the UDF worked closely together, practising mutual *désistement* and at times even having one joint candidate on the first ballot of parliamentary elections. Together they comprised the centre-right or the moderate right. However, the creation of the UMP was meant to produce one main party on the centre-right. This did not quite happen. A good part of the UDF, certainly the more conservative elements, did merge with the RPR and the DL into the UMP. However, the more centrist elements around François Bayrou – the UDF's presidential candidate in 2002 – stayed in the UDF. A further division arose after the 2007 presidential election, with the **New Centre (NC)** breaking off from the UDF to support newly elected President Nicolas Sarkozy. What remained of the UDF became the **Democratic Movement (MoDem)**. Conversely, the Radical Party would leave the UMP to run separately in 2012, right after which it, the NC, and a couple tiny groups would form the **Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI)**.

On the populist radical right is the **National Front (FN)**, formed in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen as a gathering of fascists, Poujadistes, ultranationalists, xenophobes, and such. The FN went nowhere in the 1970s, but in the 1980s it took off in the context of growing unemployment and social unrest, and the weakening of the Communist Party – which it basically replaced as the party of protest. The electoral system (except for 1986) has kept the FN out of the National Assembly; however it increasingly has enough support to stay on for second ballots, even if this until recently only served the role of a “spoiler”. His daughter Marine Le Pen took over in 2011, and made it to the run-off of the 2017 presidential election. Support for the party fell off sharply in the subsequent parliamentary election and although it was able to elect eight deputies this was clearly less than hoped. In 2018, the party renamed itself the **National Rally (RN)**.

The left of the French party system in the Fifth Republic had much greater continuity with the Fourth Republic than did the right. The PCF (Communist Party)'s traditional fifth of the vote held through the 1960s and 1970s, but dropped in the 1980s as the still pro-Moscow party was seen as increasingly out of touch and limited to an aging electorate which still remembered its role in the resistance.

Although in the 1990s it has (finally) become more flexible, it still retains the communist name. Left of the communists have been Trotskyist parties classified as extreme left such as the **Workers' Struggle (LO)**. For the 2012 election the PCF would ally with some of these parties in the **Left Front (FG)**. A more significant new force on the left came with the left populist **France Unbowed (LFI)**, founded in 2016. Building on leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon's strong fourth-place finish in the presidential election of 2017, it won enough seats in the subsequent parliamentary election to form its own group.

The SFIO carried on through the 1960s, but in 1969 François Mitterrand founded a new **Socialist Party (PS)**, which was still supported by public sector workers but which began to make inroads (back) into the working class at the expense of the communists. François Mitterrand, as president from 1981 to 1995, would transform the PS into the overwhelmingly dominant force on the political left and at times the main party of government. The party was and is quite factionalized, but François Mitterrand was able to keep overall discipline. A more nationalist and socialist PS factional leader, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, did quit the party in 1993 to form the left-nationalist **Citizens' Movement (MdC)**, which became a broader **Republican Pole** in support of Chevènement's run for president in 2002. Losing all its seats in the 2002 parliamentary election, it renamed itself in 2003 the **Citizen and Republican Movement (MRC)**. The MdC/MRC has been sceptical of European integration, unlike the PS. Still, the MRC has been allied with the PS in recent elections and parliaments. Generally situated between the Communists and the Socialists was the **Unified Socialist Party (PSU)** which existed from 1960 to 1990. The PSU had a central emphasis on workers' self-determination (*autogestion*).

Closely allied with the PS since 1972 have been left radicals, who joined the Union of the Left with the Socialists and Communists. The left radicals were for a long time (from 1973) known as the **Movement of Radicals of the Left (MRG)**, and since 1998 has been the **Radical Party of the Left (PRG)**.

Finally, France has had multiple green parties, the main one being the **Greens** who formed in 1984, and the second one being **Ecology Generation (GE)**, which formed in 1991. Personal rivalries between their respective leaders were a big part of the difference. By the late 1990s, the Greens were positioning themselves clearly on the centre-left and willing to work with the Socialists as part of the plural left (and winning seats in return). In 2010, the Greens merged with Europe Ecology to form **Europe Ecology–The Greens (EELV)**.

As noted earlier, the centre was squeezed out in the Fifth Republic as compared to the Fourth Republic, due to the bipolarization of presidential elections and the single-member electoral system for the National Assembly. The Reform Movement (MR) did achieve a brief equidistance from the left and the right in the 1973 parliamentary election, but its components would become part of the UDF which was on the centre-right (allied with the RPR) not the centre. Another centrist attempt was MoDem, but it won very few seats in 2007 and 2012 running separate from and ultimately in competition with the UMP. Indeed, MoDem leader François

Bayrou lost his own seat in 2012 (which he had first won in 1986) when the UMP candidate stayed on the ballot in the run-off.

All of this bipolarization changed with the victory of liberal centrist Emmanuel Macron of **En Marche!** ("On the Move!") in the 2017 presidential election, whose movement had only been founded the previous year. For the subsequent parliamentary election of 2017, his party became **The Republic on the Move! (LRM)**. As the plurality party in that election, it almost always made the run-off ballot against a candidate to its left or right (sometimes far left or far right). LRM thus won a (very) manufactured majority of seats, and its MoDem allies (for which certain seats were reserved) also won significantly. In addition to gender balance, LRM itself intentionally chose half its parliamentary candidates from civil society rather than traditional parties, but those from the latter as well as its ministers included some major names who switched from the Socialist Party or the Republicans.

#### ELECTIONS IN THE FRENCH FIFTH REPUBLIC SINCE 1958 (MÉTROPOLE)

<i>PF</i>		<i>1958</i>		<i>1962</i>		<i>1967</i>		<i>1968</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Extreme left	1	—	—	0.0	0	0.1	0	0.1	0
PCF	1	18.9	10	21.9	41	22.5	72	20.0	33
PSU	2	—	—	2.0	2	2.1	3	3.9	0
SFIO	4	15.5	44	12.4	64	(in FGDS)		(in FGDS)	
PRSR	5	9.5	23	7.4	41	(in FGDS)		(in FGDS)	
FGDS	4 and 5	—	—	—	—	18.9	118	16.5	57
MRP/CD/ PDM	8	11.1	57	7.9	37	14.1	38	10.5	26
RI	9	—	—	2.3	18	5.5	41	8.4	64
Conservatives	10	5.8	16	4.2	20	1.9	7	1.2	8
CNIP	10	14.2	117	7.3	12	—	—	—	—
Gaullists	11	20.6	198	33.7	230	33.0	191	38.0	282
Extreme right	12	2.6	0	0.8	0	0.6	0	0.1	0
Others		1.8	0	0.1	0	1.3	0	1.3	0
TOTAL SEATS		465		465		470		470	

<i>PF</i>		<i>1973</i>		<i>1978</i>		<i>1981</i>		<i>1986</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Extreme left	1	1.3	0	2.2	0	0.5	0	1.5	0
PCF	1	21.4	73	20.6	86	16.1	43	9.7	32
PSU	2	2.0	1	1.1	0	0.7	0	—	—
Greens	3	—	—	2.0	0	1.1	0	1.2	0
PS	4	19.1	89	22.8	102	36.3	268	31.2	198

(Continued)

<i>PF</i>		<i>1973</i>		<i>1978</i>		<i>1981</i>		<i>1986</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
MRG	5	1.7	12	2.2	10	1.5	14	1.2	13
CDP	8	3.9	22			—	—	—	—
MR	8	13.2	35			—	—	—	—
RI	9	7.2	53			—	—	—	—
Moderates	10	3.4	12			—	—	—	—
UDF	8, 9, and 10	—	—	23.9	132	21.7	66	20.6	128
Other right	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.4	4
Gaullists/RPR	11	25.9	176	22.8	144	21.2	83	22.3	146
Extreme right/ FN	12	0.5	0	0.6	0	0.4	0	9.9	35
Others		0.4	0	1.8	0	0.5	0	1.0	0
TOTAL SEATS		473		474		474		556	

<i>PF</i>		<i>1988</i>		<i>1993</i>		<i>1997</i>		<i>2002</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Extreme left	1	0.4	0	1.7	0	2.6	0	2.9	0
PCF	1	11.2	24	9.1	23	9.9	35	4.8	20
MdC/Rep. Pole	2	—	—	—	—	1.0	7	1.2	0
Greens	3	0.4	0	4.1	0	3.7	7	4.6	3
GE	3	—	—	3.7	0	—	—	—	—
Other ecologists	3	—	—	3.2	0	3.3	0	1.2	0
PS	4	36.4	260	19.2	55	23.8	246	24.6	137
Other allied left	4	—	—	—	—	1.6	0	0.8	4
MRG/PRG	5	1.2	9	1.0	6	1.5	14	1.6	7
UDF	8, 9, and 10	18.8	130	19.3	212	14.4	109	5.0	27
Other right	10	2.5	8	4.5	20	6.3	5	4.7	10
RPR/UMP	11 then 10	19.2	123	20.3	238	15.5	130	33.9	347
MNR	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.1	0
FN	12	9.8	1	12.7	0	15.2	1	11.7	0
Others		0.2	0	1.1	1	1.2	1	1.9	0
TOTAL SEATS		555		555		555		555	

<i>PF</i>		<i>2007</i>		<i>2012</i>		<i>2017</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Extreme left	1	3.5	0	1.0	0	0.8	0
PCF/FG	1	4.4	15	7.1	10	2.8	10

	PF	2007		2012		2017	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
FI	2	—	—	—	—	11.2	17
Greens/EELV	3	3.3	4	5.5	16	4.3	1
Other ecologists	3	0.8	0	1.0	0	(in others)	
PS	4	25.0	181	29.5	264	7.5	27
Other allied left	4	1.4	9	2.9	15	1.1	3
PRG	5	1.4	6	1.7	11	0.5	2
MoDem	7	7.7	3	1.7	1	4.1	40
LRM	7	—	—	—	—	28.6	298
AC	7	—	—	0.6	2	(in UDI)	
NC	8	1.6	17	2.2	12	(in UDI)	
PR	9	(in UMP)		1.3	6	(in UDI)	
UDI	9	—	—	—	—	3.0	15
UMP/LR	10	39.9	307	27.5	190	15.9	107
Other right	10	4.2	13	3.1	9	2.3	4
FN	12	4.4	0	14.0	2	13.6	8
Other extreme right	12	0.4	0	0.4	1	0.3	1
Regionalists	21	0.2	0	0.3	0	0.7	3
Others		1.8	0	0.2	0	3.3	3
TOTAL SEATS		555		539		539	

## Parties in Parliament

France in particular stands out in Europe for having a parliamentary composition slightly different from the election results. This is partly because a certain number of non-party but clearly left-wing or right-wing deputies have gotten elected, especially in recent decades. (These are listed as ‘other right’, ‘other left’, or ‘other allied (to the PS) left’ in the elections table, although these categories also include tiny parties). This divergence is also because the threshold for forming a parliamentary group was initially set at 30 deputies, although this was lowered to 20 in 1988 and then 15 in 2009. So for example the **Democratic and Republican Left (GDR)** parliamentary group was able to continue in 2012, comprised as it was of 10 members of the PCF and allies from metropolitan France and five leftist deputies from overseas.

The following table thus provides the parliamentary groups formed after each election. In contrast to the previous table, data are given not just for deputies from Metropolitan France but also other French territories and, since 2012, French citizens established (resident) outside of France (abroad).



**PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS IN THE FRENCH FIFTH REPUBLIC SINCE 1959**

MF = Metropolitan France  
 A+S = Algeria and the Sahara  
 OF = Overseas France  
 F  hdF = Fran  ais   tablis hors de France (French established outside France)

	PF	1959			
		MF	A+S	OF	TOTAL
SFIO	4	41	1	2	44
Radicals and allies	5	36	2	1	39
MRP	8	55		1	56
CNIP	10	116		2	118
Gaullists	11	198	12	6	216
Unity of the Republic	21		47		47
Non-Inscrits		19	9	4	32
TOTALS		465	71	16	552

	PF	1973			1978			1981		
		MF	OF	TOTAL	MF	OF	TOTAL	MF	OF	TOTAL
PCF	1	73		73	86		86	43	1	44
PS(��MRG)	4 and 5	102		102	112	3	115	279	6	285
MR	8	32	2	34						
CDP	8	28	2	30						
RI	9	54	1	55						
UDF	8, 9, and 10				119	4	123	60	3	63
Gaullists/RPR	11	173	10	183	145	9	154	83	5	88
Non-Inscrits		11	2	13	12	1	13	9	2	11
TOTALS		473	17	490	474	17	491	474	17	491

	PF	1986			1988			1993		
		MF	OF	TOTAL	MF	OF	TOTAL	MF	OF	TOTAL
PCF	1	32	3	35	24	1	25	22	1	23
PS	2	207	5	212	268	7	275	53	4	57
UDF (and Centre)	8, 9, and 10	128	3	131	127	3	130	212	3	215

RPR	11	146	9	155		126	6	132		247	10	257
FN	12	35		35		–	–	–		–	–	–
Non-Inscrits		8	1	9		10	5	15		21	4	25
TOTALS		556	21	577		555	22	577		555	22	577

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1997</i>				<i>2002</i>				<i>2007</i>		
		<i>MF</i>	<i>OF</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>		<i>MF</i>	<i>OF</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>		<i>MF</i>	<i>OF</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
PCF/GDR	1 and 2	35	1	36		22		22		22	2	24
Radical – Citizen– Green	2, 3, and 5	30	3	33		–	–	–		–	–	–
PS/SRC	2, 4, and 5	245	5	250		136	5	141		193	11	204
UDF/NC	8, 9, and 10	111	2	113		29		29		23	0	23
RPR/UMP	11 to 10	131	9	140		350	14	364		312	8	320
Non-Inscrits		3	2	5		18	3	21		5	1	6
TOTALS		555	22	577		555	22	577		555	22	577

	<i>PF</i>	<i>2012</i>					<i>2017</i>			
		<i>MF</i>	<i>OF</i>	<i>FéhdF</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>		<i>MF</i>	<i>OF</i>	<i>FéhdF</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
GDR	1 and 2	10	5		15		11	5		16
FI	2	–	–	–	–		16	1		17
Ecologists	3	16		1	17		–	–	–	–
SRC/NG	4	280	12	5	297		27	4		31
RRDP	5	13	3		16		–	–	–	–
MoDem	7	–	–	–	–		43	3	1	47
LRM	7	–	–	–	–		301	4	9	314
UDI/LC	9 and 10	24	5	1	30		29	5	1	35
UMP/LR	10	190	1	4	195		95	5		100
Non-Inscrits		6	1		7		17			17
TOTALS		539	27	11	577		539	27	11	577

*Note:* Affiliated members are included.

## Governments

French governments have thus gone through four main stages. Initially they were dominated by the Gaullists. Then during the Valéry Giscard d'Estaing presidency of 1974–1981 there was more of a centre-right internal balance. Finally, from 1981 – as noted previously – until 2017 there was a continuous alteration between Socialist-led leftist governments and those of the centre-right. 2017 would then produce centrist governments based on LRM, and thus an ending of the bipolarity of the first three stages.

### FRENCH FIFTH REPUBLIC GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1959

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
01/1959	Debré, M. (UNR)	21 (7)	UNR MRP CNIP PRSR
04/1962	Pompidou, G. (UNR)	22 (8)	UNR MRP CNIP PRSR
05/1962	Pompidou, G. (UNR)	20 (8)	UNR RI
12/1962	Pompidou, G. (UNR)	22 (7)	UNR RI
04/1967	Pompidou, G. (UNR)	22 (4)	UNR RI
07/1968	Couve de Murville, M. (UDR)	19 (3)	UDR RI
06/1969	Chaban-Delmas, J. (UDR)	19	UDR CDP RI
07/1972	Messmer, P. (UDR)	20	UDR CDP RI
04/1973	Messmer, P. (UDR)	22 (3)	UDR RI CDP
05/1974	Chirac, J. (UDR)	16 (4)	UDR RI CDP PRSR
08/1976	Barre, R. (ind.)	18 (5★★)	UDR RI PRSR CDP
04/1978	Barre, R. (UDF)	20 (5★★)	UDF RPR
05/1981	Mauroy, P. (PS)	31 (1)	PS MRG
06/1981	Mauroy, P. (PS)	36 (1)	PS PCF MRG
07/1984	Fabius, L. (PS)	23	PS MRG
03/1986	Chirac, J. (UDR)	25 (3)	RPR UDF
05/1988	Rocard, M. (PS)	25 (5)	PS MRG
06/1988	Rocard, M. (PS)	33 (9)	PS MRG
05/1991	Cresson, E. (PS)	30 (3)	PS MRG GE
04/1992	Bérégovoy, P. (PS)	21 (3)	PS MRG
03/1993	Balladur, E. (RPR)	24 (1)	RPR UDF
05/1995	Juppé, A. (RPR)	29 (1)	RPR UDF
06/1997	Jospin, L. (PS)	17	PS PCF Greens MDC PRG
05/2002	Raffarin, J.-P. (UMP)	22 (5)	UMP UDF
06/2002	Raffarin, J.-P. (UMP)	27 (7)	UMP UDF
05/2005	de Villepin, D. (UMP)	31 (3)	UMP
05/2007	Fillon, F. (UMP)	16 (1)	UMP NC
06/2007	Fillon, F. (UMP)	16 (1)	UMP NC
05/2012	Ayrault, J.-M. (PS)	34	PS Greens PRG
06/2012	Ayrault, J.-M. (PS)	37	PS PRG Greens
03/2014	Valls, M. (PS)	17	PS PRG
08/2014 ★	Valls, M. (PS)	17 (1)	PS PRG
02/2016	Valls, M. (PS)	18 (1)	PS PRG PE

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
12/2016	Cazeneuve, B. (PS)	18 (1)	PS PRG PE
05/2017	Philippe, I. (dissident LR)	19 (8)	MoDem LRM LR PS PRG dissidents
06/2017	Philippe, I. (dissident LR)	20 (5)	LRM MoDem PS LR PRG dissidents

\* loss of parliamentary majority

\*\* Formally independents, but were in fact considered part of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's "presidential majority".

## Acronyms – Fourth and Fifth Republics

CD	Democratic Centre
CDP	Centre for Democracy and Progress
CDS	Democratic and Social Centre
CNIP	National Centre of Independents and Peasants
DL	Liberal Democracy
EELV	Europe Ecology–The Greens
FD	Democratic Force
FG	Left Front
FN	National Front
GDR	Democratic and Republican Left parliamentary group
GE	Ecology Generation
LO	Workers' Struggle
LR	The Republicans
LRM	The Republic on the Move!
MdC	Citizens' Movement
MoDem	Democratic Movement
MR	Reform Movement
MRC	Citizen and Republican Movement
MRG	Movement of Radicals of the Left
MRP	Popular Republican Movement
NC	New Centre
PCF	French Communist Party
PDM	Progress and Modern Democracy
PR	Republican Party
PRG	Radical Party of the Left
PRSR	Radical Socialist Republican Party
PS	Socialist Party
PSU	Unified Socialist Party
RI	Independent Republicans

RN	National Rally
RPF	Rally of the French People
RPR	Rally for the Republic
RRDP	Radical, Republican, Democratic, and Progressist parliamentary group
SFIO	French Section of the Workers' International
SRC	Socialist, Republican, and Citizen parliamentary group
UDC	Union of the Centre
UDF	Union for French Democracy
UDI	Union of Democrats and Independents
UDR	Union for the Defence of the Republic/Union of Democrats for the Republic
UDSR	Democratic and Social Union of the Resistance
UMP	Union for the Presidential Majority
UNR	Union for the New Republic

# CORSICA

## **The party pattern in each election, *with additional components***

2015	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant alliance (FaC)</i>
2017	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant alliance (FaC)</i>

## **Party systems (with smoothing)**

None.

## **History**

Corsica was a territory of the Republic of Genoa from 1284. In 1755 independence was proclaimed and the Genoese were largely driven from the island. In 1768, sensing that they would never again be able to subjugate Corsica, the Genoese sold their claim to the French, who then invaded and ultimately conquered Corsica though only with a large number of reinforcements. France then annexed Corsica in 1770, although French did not replace Italian as the official language until 1852. The Corsican language (Corsu) itself, which is close to Italian, was marginalized but has recovered in recent decades.

As part of the decentralization of France in 1982, Corsica became a territorial collectivity of France with its own status including certain additional powers such as over culture, transportation, and related taxation. A Corsican Assembly (more significant than a regional council) was created, with control over the Corsican Executive Council (with incompatibility of membership in both). Following from a 2014 vote of the Corsican Assembly which was then supported by the government

of France, as of 1 January 2018 Corsica became a single territorial collectivity with the hitherto two departments of Upper Corsica and South Corsica being dissolved. A similar proposal had been very narrowly defeated in a 2003 referendum in Corsica. An early election was held in 2017 for an expanded Corsican Assembly. Election results and analysis are given from 2015.

Electoral system

Elections in Corsica involve a two-round system of modified party list proportional representation in which the first round serves to determine which lists (parties) can stand in the second round (unless a list wins 50 percent in the first round which is then decisive). Lists with at least 7 percent of the vote qualify for the second round; lists with between 5 and 7 percent of the vote may merge with a qualifying list (of course there is no certainty of this occurring); lists below 5 percent are eliminated. Qualify lists themselves may merge. Proportionality is modified by a seat bonus given to the winning list of 11 seats (nine seats through 2015).

Political parties, cleavages/divisions, and governments

In addition to the main French parties which run for the Corsican Assembly, there are local nationalist Corsican parties which vary in the demands for autonomy. Seeking more regional autonomy but not independence is **We Make Corsica (FC)**, founded in 2010. Seeking independence are the leftist **Free Corsica (CL)**, founded in 2009, and **National Renewal (RN)**, which as a movement dates back to 1998 and which was a founding component of CL but then left it in 2012. FC and CL merged after the first round in 2015 to run as **For Corsica (PaC)**, and then formed the government. This alliance continued in 2017. PaC is not campaigning for independence, as reflects its stronger FC component, but is pushing for official bilingualism and constitutional recognition of Corsica.

ELECTIONS IN CORSICA SINCE 2015

	2015			2017			
	% V 1		% V 2	# S	% V 1	% V 2	# S
FC	17.6	]		(17)			(in PaC)
CL	7.7	]		(7)			(in PaC)
PaC		]	35.3	24	45.4	56.5	41
Regionalist Right	–		–	–	15.0	18.3	10
LREM	–		–	–	11.3	12.7	6
LR and allies	13.2	]			12.8	12.6	6
Diverse right	12.7	]			–	–	–
		]	27.1	11			
Diverse left	18.4	]			–	–	–

	2015			2017		
	% V 1		% V 2 # S	% V 1	% V 2	# S
FG/PCF and allies	5.6	]		5.7		
		]	28.5 12			
RN	2.6			6.7		
FN	10.6		9.1 4	3.3		
Others	11.6					
TOTAL SEATS			51			63

% V 1 = first round vote percentage

% V 2 = second round vote percentage

#### **CORSICAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 2015**

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>President of the executive (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
12/2015	Simeoni, G. (FC)	9	FC CL
01/2018	Simeoni, G. (FC)	11	FC CL

#### **Acronyms**

CL	Free Corsica
FC	We Make Corsica
FG	Left Front
FN	National Front
LR	The Republicans
LREM	The Republic on the Move!
PaC	For Corsica
PCF	French Communist Party
RN	National Renewal



# GERMANY

## **The party pattern in each election, *with additional components***

1949	highly multi-party, <i>with two main parties (CDU/CSU and SPD)</i>
1953	two-and-a-half-party
1957	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (CDU/CSU)</i>
1961	two-and-a-half-party
1965	two-and-a-half-party
1969	two-and-a-half-party
1972	two-and-a-half-party
1976	two-and-a-half-party
1980	two-and-a-half-party
1983	two-and-a-half-party
1987	two-and-a-half-party
1990	two-and-a-half-party
1994	two-and-a-half-party
1998	two-and-a-half-party
2002	two-and-a-half-party
2005	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (CDU/CSU and SPD)</i>
2009	moderately multi-party
2013	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (CDU/CSU)</i>
2017	moderately multi-party

## **Party systems (with smoothing)**

1953–2002 inclusive	two-and-a-half-party system (CDU/CSU and SPD)
2005–2017 inclusive	moderately multi-party system

## History

The Federal Republic of Germany dates from 1949. Germany was unified in 1871, and Imperial Germany (1871–1918) saw full party competition, although for a parliament with only limited powers. The Weimar Republic (1919–1933) had a very polarized party system, with the National Socialists ultimately becoming the largest party and Adolf Hitler being appointed chancellor in January 1933. All other parties were banned during the Nazi era. After the defeat of Germany, political parties reappeared but these had to be approved by the allied occupiers. Nazi-like parties were definitely not permitted, although the Communist Party was. The occupation ended in 1949. To this day, however, the Federal Constitutional Court retains the power to ban anti-democratic parties.

The four-power occupation gave way to the formal division of Germany into West Germany and East Germany. West Germany was a founding member of the then-European Community. The East German regime collapsed in 1989 and by 1990 the two Germanies were reunited. This involved the eastern parts joining into the Federal Republic of Germany, and thus was accomplished with very little formal constitutional change. The number of component states (*Länder*) has increased to 16. The powerful upper house (the *Bundesrat* or Council of States) continues to represent the governments of the *Länder*. Our concerns are the elections to the *Bundestag* or lower house.

## Electoral system

Germany has a complicated electoral system. Since 1953, each voter has two votes – the first for a local constituency candidate and the second for a (regional) party list. Essentially one half of the deputies are elected each way. The second vote is the most important one, as the intention of the system is that the total number of seats won by a party should be proportional to its national second vote. For this the d'Hondt method was used initially, then the Hare-Niemeyer method was used from the 1987 through the 2005 election, and finally the Sainte-Laguë method as of 2009. (The vote shares listed later thus always refer to the second vote.) To achieve such proportionality the seats (however many) a party wins on the first vote are “topped-up” by seats taken from the regional lists so as to reach the proper total. If however a party wins excess mandates on the first ballot it gets to keep these “overhang seats” (*Überhangmandate*), and the *Bundestag* is expanded. Though modest in number through the 1980s, the number of “overhang seats” increased sharply after reunification – reaching 24 (all won by the CDU/CSU) in the 2009 election. Given the increasing numbers here, and the fact that almost all such seats go to parties that wind up in government, eventually the Constitutional Court ruled (after the 2009 election) the distortion involved to be unconstitutional. Consequently, starting with the 2013 election “overhang seats” have been balanced by “compensation seats” (*Ausgleichmandate*) to keep the overall seat numbers proportional. Of course, these “compensation seats” also expand the size of the *Bundestag*. The total number of seats thus can and does vary from election to election, independent of

the base number of seats. Of course, the expansion of the country did increase the base number of seats, from 496 in 1957 (after the Saarland joined to “complete” West Germany) to 656 with reunification in 1990; the base number then being lowered to 598 as of the 2002 election.

Crucially, there are (alternative) hurdles to be cleared for a party to win these additional seats. In 1949, this was one direct mandate (from the first vote) or 5 percent in any *Land*. This led to a proliferation of regional parties so in 1953 this requirement was changed to either one direct mandate or 5 percent of the national vote. In 1956 this was then changed to three direct mandates or 5 percent of the national vote. (If a party wins for example only two direct mandates and 4 percent of the national vote, it would keep these two seats but not get any more. In practice, almost every single direct mandate is won by one of the two main parties.) Finally, for the 1990 reunification election – but only for this – the calculation was done separately for each of the former West and the former East Germany. This was done so as to not discriminate against the East. As of 1994, however, the 1956 rules apply to the entire country. In summary, then, the 5 percent threshold (cut-off) has been an important method of keeping down the number of parties in parliament, as was its intention.

## Parties and cleavages

The Christian Democratic parties have almost always been the leading force in German elections. Various regional Christian parties were formed in 1945 and Konrad Adenauer soon became their effective leader. As the first postwar chancellor in 1949, Konrad Adenauer was able to unite from the top-down almost all of these regional parties into the **Christian Democratic Union (CDU)**, founded in 1950. One exception was the Bavarian **Christian Social Union (CSU)**, founded in 1946, which has remained separate. These two parties campaign together, back a common chancellor-candidate (except in 1980 and 2002, always from the CDU), and sit together in parliament. The CDU does not run candidates in Bavaria, whereas the CSU only runs there (although it tried, unsuccessfully, to break into Eastern Germany in 1990). The CSU is also clearly more conservative than most of the CDU, especially on social issues (see Figure 21.1).

The CDU builds on the Catholic Centre Party of Weimar Germany, but was established to be a party for all Christians. Nevertheless, it does do better amongst Catholics, and obviously amongst religious voters generally. Its core supporters tend to be small town or rural, female, and/or the old middle class of professionals and farmers. That being said, it has a broad range of appeal as a “catch-all” party (in German, a *Volkspartei* or Peoples Party). On socio-economic issues the CDU (but not the CSU) prefers to see itself as a centrist rather than a conservative force. Finally, following standard practice, the CDU/CSU is considered one party for electoral purposes, and for all calculations in this book.

The **Social Democratic Party (SPD)** was founded in 1863, and is indeed the only German party with a clear prewar continuity. Founded to defend the specific interests of workers, it was also – most crucially during the Weimar Republic – a

strong pro-democratic force. After 1945, under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher, it continued to aim essentially just at working-class voters. This orientation, combined with its neutralist views in foreign affairs, saw its support stagnate in the 1950s. Party reformers, frustrated at the party being stuck in what they saw as a “30 percent ghetto”, finally triumphed at the 1959 Bad Godesberg convention. Thereafter the SPD would also aim for a broad, catch-all appeal. However, its core supporters still remain manual workers, especially non-religious ones. One relative postwar advantage enjoyed by the SPD was that its historic leftist rival, the **Communist Party of Germany (KPD)**, formed in 1919, was so tainted by its association with the Soviet Union that it quickly withered and was a spent force before it was banned in 1956.

German liberalism had traditionally been divided into nationalistic liberal and left-liberal parties. In 1948, a single liberal party was formed, this being the **Free Democratic Party (FDP)**. Never intending to be a catch-all force, its appeal has been centred on educated, secular, urban professionals and white-collar workers. Civil servants and dentists are stereotypical FDP voters. Unlike the other smaller parties of the early years, the FDP not only survived but played (at least until 1998) a key “hinge” role. That is, it normally had enough seats to determine which of the two main parties would govern, for which its price was a disproportionate (to its vote) amount of cabinet seats. It also acted as a moderate force in such coalitions, and thus appealed to voters as an anti-extremist party. The FDP also usually benefited from supporters of its larger coalition partner “loaning” it second votes so that it could clear the 5 percent hurdle. That said, since 1998 the FDP has been clearly on the right rather than alternating between right liberalism and left liberalism.

In the 1949 and 1953 elections other centre-right parties were elected, but these other parties did not last. These non-lasting parties tended to have either explicit regional appeals – the **Bavarian Party (BP)** – or implicit regional appeals – the **Centre Party (Z)** to Catholics in the Rhineland, the **German Party (DP)** to northern, Protestant conservatives, and the **Refugee Party (BHE)** to those who had fled from the east to settle in the north. The aforementioned changes to the electoral system thus squeezed out these parties, almost totally to the benefit of the CDU/CSU. The Christian Democrats had three other strengths in the 1950s: (i) Konrad Adenauer was personally more popular than Schumacher; (ii) Konrad Adenauer’s pro-Western foreign policy was more popular than the SPD’s neutralism; and (iii) the German economy was booming in its postwar “economic miracle”. Thus by 1957 the Christian Democrats had slightly over half the vote, the only time since 1949 that (effectively) one party has won an outright national majority (although the CDU/CSU still kept the German Party in government).


Until the 1980s the three core parties of CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP overwhelmingly dominated German politics, and indeed from 1961 through 1980 inclusive they were the only party to win seats in the federal parliament. There were points of commonality and difference across each pair, for example the SPD and the FDP were secular parties whereas the CDU/CSU was religious, and the SPD and the CDU each supported the welfare state much more than the FDP.

Although in the early 1970s well-educated younger people were highly supportive of the Willy Brandt government (and Willy Brandt himself), the more conservative style and policies of Helmut Schmidt left a space in the “post-materialist” part of the electorate which was filled by various regional environmental and alternative parties. At the national level the **Greens** were formed in 1980, and have been in almost all national parliaments since 1983. They finally entered the national government after the 1998 election. Their supporters are very clearly young, secular, well educated, and based in cities or university towns. Lack of interest in German reunification caused them to just fall below the separate 5 percent hurdle for Western Germany established for 1990. In 1993 the West German Greens merged with the intellectually based East German **Alliance 90 (B 90)** party, and in 1994 the Alliance '90/Greens as they are now called easily returned to the *Bundestag* – making them the first party in postwar Germany to come back after falling below the 5 percent threshold. A **Pirate Party Germany (Piraten)** was formed in 2006 and did enter four state parliaments at its peak in 2011–2012.

East Germany itself had been governed by the Socialist Unity Party, which was created in 1946 as a forced merger of the eastern SPD with the communists. In early 1990, with reunification on the horizon, this party renamed itself the **Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)**. In 2005 the PDS merged with WASG, a left-wing splinter from the SPD, to form **Die Linke (The Left)**. Although in theory now running everywhere in Germany, its appeal is almost exclusively amongst those former East Germans who benefitted from or who are nostalgic about the old regime, or those who simply wish to cast a protest vote against West German dominance. Both the Greens and Die Linke are in the same left-LEC part of the spectrum as the SPD, although Die Linke is more leftist and the Greens are more LEC-oriented than the SPD (see Figure 21.1).

The 1960s would also see the rise of the extreme right-wing **National Democratic Party (NPD)**, formed in 1964, which gained the protest votes of dissatisfied conservatives, including CDU/CSU supporters who disliked the 1966–1969 Grand Coalition. Although winning seats in most *Länder*, the NPD failed to clear the 5 percent threshold in 1969, and weakened considerably thereafter. The populist radical right yielded other small parties starting in the 1980s such as the **German People's Union (DVU)** formed in 1987 (though not running nationally until 1998), which ultimately would merge with the NPD in 2011; and **The Republicans (REP)** formed in 1983 and first running nationally in 1990. Neither the DVU nor the Republicans have come close to the 5 percent hurdle nationally, although they have occasionally done so in *Länder* elections.

A different reality is that of the **Alternative for Germany (AfD)**, founded in 2013. It began as a nationalist right-wing party whose central policy was opposition to the euro. It had support from various prominent economists and business leaders. As such, it took votes away from the FDP. Indeed, in the 2013 election both the FDP and the AfD fell just below the 5 percent threshold. Notably this was the first time the FDP was excluded from the federal parliament. In 2015 the more populist



**FIGURE 21.1** Germany: 2014 placement of parties on socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions.

Source: Polk, Jonathan, et al. (2017) “Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data”, *Research & Politics*, Volume 4: 1 (January-March), pp. 1–9. (with calculation of LEC-TAN).

elements of the AfD gained predominance. The AfD thus became a populist radical right party, focussing on opposition to immigration and Islam.

Figure 21.1 illustrates the seat-winning German parties as of 2014 in terms of socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions:

**Governments**

German governments have been relatively stable, in that there have only been eight chancellors since 1949. These have always been from either the Christian Democratic Union or the Social Democratic Party. The very dominant first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer of the CDU, was in fact forced to step aside by 1963 (in the middle of the parliamentary term) due to the wishes of his junior coalition partner the

ELECTIONS IN GERMANY SINCE 1949

<i>PF</i>		<i>1949</i>		<i>1953</i>		<i>1957</i>		<i>1961</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
KPD	1	5.7	15	2.2	0	(banned)		(banned)	
SPD	4	29.2	131	28.8	151	31.8	169	36.2	190
CDU/CSU	8	31.0	139	45.2	243	50.2	270	45.3	242
Z	8	3.1	10	0.8	3	0.9	0	]	–
BP	21	4.2	17	1.7	0				–
FDP	9	11.9	52	9.5	48	7.7	41	12.8	67
DP	10	4.0	17	3.3	15	3.4	17		]
BHE	11	–	–	5.9	27	4.6	0	2.8	0
Others		10.9	21	2.7	0	1.5	0	2.9	0
TOTAL SEATS			402		487		497		499

<i>PF</i>		<i>1965</i>		<i>1969</i>		<i>1972</i>		<i>1976</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
SPD	4	39.3	202	42.7	224	45.8	230	42.6	214
CDU/CSU	8	47.6	245	46.1	242	44.9	225	48.6	243
FDP	9 then 5	9.5	49	5.8	30	8.4	41	7.9	39
NPD	13	2.0	0	4.3	0	0.6	0	0.3	0
Others		1.6	0	1.1	0	0.3	0	0.6	0
TOTAL SEATS			496		496		496		496

<i>PF</i>		<i>1980</i>		<i>1983</i>		<i>1987</i>		<i>1990</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
PDS	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	2.4	17
Greens	3	1.5	0	5.6	27	8.3	42	3.9	0
B 90	3 and 5	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.2	8
SPD	4	42.9	218	38.2	193	37.0	186	33.5	239
FDP	5 then 9	10.6	53	7.0	34	9.1	46	11.0	79
CDU/CSU	8	44.5	226	48.8	244	44.3	223	43.8	319
REP	12	–	–	–	–	–	–	2.1	0
NPD	13	0.2	0	0.2	0	0.6	0	0.3	0
Others		0.3	0	0.2	0	0.7	0	1.8	0
TOTAL SEATS			497		498		497		662

<i>PF</i>		<i>1994</i>		<i>1998</i>		<i>2002</i>		<i>2005</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
PDS + WASG	2	4.4	30	5.1	36	4.0	2	8.7	54
B 90/ Greens	3	7.3	49	6.7	47	8.6	55	8.1	51
SPD	4	36.4	252	40.9	298	38.5	251	34.2	222
CDU/CSU	8	41.5	294	35.1	245	38.5	248	35.2	226
FDP	9	6.9	47	6.2	43	7.4	47	9.8	61
REP	12	1.9	0	1.8	0	0.6	0	0.6	0
DVU	12	–	–	1.2	0	–	–	(with NPD)	
NPD	13	–	–	0.3	0	0.4	0	1.6	0
Others		1.6	0	2.7	0	2.0	0	1.8	0
TOTAL SEATS			672		669		603		614

<i>PF</i>		<i>2009</i>		<i>2013</i>		<i>2017</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
The Left	2	11.9	76	8.6	64	9.2	69
B 90/ Greens	3	10.7	68	8.4	63	8.9	67
SPD	4	23.0	146	25.7	193	20.5	153
Piraten	5	2.0	0	2.2	0	0.4	0
CDU/CSU	8	33.8	239	41.5	311	32.9	246
FDP	9	14.6	93	4.8	0	10.7	80
AfD	11 then 12	–	–	4.7	0	12.6	94
REP	12	0.4	0	0.2	0	–	–
DVU	12	0.1	0	–	–	–	–
NPD	13	1.5	0	1.3	0	0.4	0
Others		2.0	0	2.6	0	4.4	0
TOTAL SEATS			622		631		709

FDP (which had campaigned in 1961 on maintaining the coalition but replacing him). Aside from a couple very brief periods the federal governments have always been coalitions following one of the following four patterns: centre-right of the CDU/CSU and a smaller party (always the FDP since 1961) or parties, comprising over half the time since 1949; left-centre of the SPD and FDP (1969–1982); red-green of the SPD and Greens (1998–2005); and grand coalitions of the Christian



Democrats and Social Democrats (1966–1969, 2005–2009, and since 2013). Grand coalitions have become more likely as the party system became more deconcentrated starting in 2005. (One new variant that has occurred in certain Länder has been a coalition of the Christian Democrats and Greens.) Overall, while the CDU/CSU has been in government the longest since 1949, the traditionally pivotal Free Democratic Party is a close second – and it was never out of government for that long in the entire period until 1998.

#### GERMAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1949

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Chancellor (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
09/1949	Adenauer, K. (CDU)	14	CDU/CSU FDP DP
10/1953	Adenauer, K. (CDU)	16	CDU/CSU FDP DP BHE
07/1955	Adenauer, K. (CDU)	15	CDU/CSU FDP DP
03/1956	Adenauer, K. (CDU)	18	CDU/CSU FVP DP
10/1957	Adenauer, K. (CDU)	18	CDU/CSU DP
07/1960	Adenauer, K. (CDU)	18	CDU/CSU
11/1961	Adenauer, K. (CDU)	21	CDU/CSU FDP
11/1962	Adenauer, K. (CDU)	16	CDU/CSU
12/1962	Adenauer, K. (CDU)	21	CDU/CSU FDP
10/1963	Erhard, L. (CDU)	21	CDU/CSU FDP
10/1965	Erhard, L. (CDU)	22	CDU/CSU FDP
10/1966	Erhard, L. (CDU)	18	CDU/CSU
12/1966	Kiesinger, K.G. (CDU)	20	CDU/CSU SPD
10/1969	Brandt, W. (SPD)	16 (1)	SPD FDP
12/1972	Brandt, W. (SPD)	18	SPD FDP
05/1974	Schmidt, H. (SPD)	16	SPD FDP
12/1976	Schmidt, H. (SPD)	16	SPD FDP
11/1980	Schmidt, H. (SPD)	17	SPD FDP
09/1982	Schmidt, H. (SPD)	13	SPD
10/1982	Kohl, H. (CDU)	17	CDU/CSU FDP
03/1983	Kohl, H. (CDU)	17	CDU/CSU FDP
03/1987	Kohl, H. (CDU)	19	CDU/CSU FDP
10/1990	Kohl, H. (CDU)	20	CDU/CSU FDP
11/1994	Kohl, H. (CDU)	18	CDU/CSU FDP
10/1998	Schröder, G. (SPD)	16 (1)	SPD Greens
10/2002	Schröder, G. (SPD)	14	SPD Greens
11/2005	Merkel, A. (CDU)	16	CDU/CSU SPD
10/2009	Merkel, A. (CDU)	16	CDU/CSU FDP
12/2013	Merkel, A. (CDU)	16	CDU/CSU SPD
03/2018	Merkel, A. (CDU)	16	CDU/CSU SPD

**Acronyms**

AfD	Alternative for Germany
B 90	Alliance [19]90
BHE	“League of those expelled from their homeland and those deprived of their rights”
BP	Bavaria Party
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CSU	Christian Social Union (Bavaria)
DP	German Party
DVU	German People’s Union
FDP	Free Democratic Party
KPD	Communist Party of Germany
NPD	National Democratic Party of Germany
PDS	Party of Democratic Socialism
Piraten	Pirate Party Germany
REP	The Republicans
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
Z	Centre Party

# GREECE

## The party pattern in each election, with additional components

1974	moderately multi-party, with a predominant party (and with a single-party super-majority) (ND)
1977	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (ND)
1981	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (PASOK)
1985	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (PASOK)
1989 Jun	two-and-a-half-party
1989 Nov	two-and-a-half-party
1990	two-and-a-half-party
1993	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (PASOK)
1996	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (PASOK)
2000	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (PASOK)
2004	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (ND)
2007	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (ND)
2009	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (PASOK)
2012 May	highly multi-party
2012 Jun	highly multi-party, with a dominant party (SYRIZA)
2015 Jan	highly multi-party, with a dominant party (SYRIZA)
2015 Sep	highly multi-party, with a dominant party (SYRIZA)

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1977–2009 inclusive    two-and-a-half-party system (ND and PASOK)

## History

Modern Greece became independent in 1827, and a monarchy was established in 1831. Crete and part of Macedonia were added after the 1912 Balkan War. In the interwar period, Greece was bitterly divided between anti- and pro-monarchists, and suffered frequent military interventions. An authoritarian system was eventually established by General Ioannis Metaxas, who ruled from 1936 until German and Italian conquest in 1941. After the war a civil war occurred between communists and nationalist monarchists. The latter used the army and aid from Britain and the United States to defeat the communists, and from 1950 onwards a stable parliamentary system existed, although the Communist Party was banned and the monarch intervened actively in politics. Fears of an electoral swing to the left led the military to stage a coup d'état in 1967. Failed intervention in Cyprus in 1974 would lead to the collapse of the military regime. Since 1974 Greece has been fully democratic. A December 1974 referendum established a republic. The constitution of 1975 was modified in 1986 to make the president a pure figurehead. Greece joined the European Community in 1981. A government debt crisis that began in late 2009 produced multiple bailouts from a troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF at the price of sharp economic retrenchment which amounted to an economic depression; consequent social unrest; and a restructuring of the party system.

## Electoral system

Greece has a complicated, multi-tiered electoral system. In its longstanding version there were six single-member constituencies and 50 multi-member constituencies for a total of 288 seats. The multi-member seats use a single round of voting in accordance with the Hagenbach-Bischoff system of "reinforced" proportional representation, with voting for party lists. Remaining seats after this distribution are allocated in 13 principal electoral districts according to the same system. The remaining 12 members are allocated from one multi-member national constituency. The threshold for representation is 3 percent of the national vote. The overall effect was a form of proportional representation biased towards the largest party, given small district magnitudes.

A key change occurred in 2004 (effective as of the 2007 election) which gave a bonus of 40 seats to the largest party to aid it in getting a majority. The remaining 260 seats thus followed the established calculation. This seat bonus was increased to 50 seats in 2008 (effective as of the May 2012 election).

## Political parties and cleavages

**New Democracy (ND)** represents Greece's conservative tradition. The party was formed in 1974 as a centre-right, anti-socialist force. The party is largely a

pragmatic one; it has put emphasis on free enterprise and social justice, it has advocated an independent foreign policy, and it has attempted to distance itself from the extreme right since the period of the dictatorship. The party enjoys a fairly broad base of support. After democratization in 1974, New Democracy's main opponent was initially the liberal-radical **Centre Union (EDHK)**. The EDHK had risen in the 1960s to win an absolute majority in the 1964 election, but its leader was then forced out of office by the king. In the 1970s EDHK was quickly outflanked on the left by the Socialists, and barely made it into the 1980s.

New Democracy has suffered various breakaways, only the first of which had no permanent effects. This was in 1993; after Antonis Samaras was dismissed as foreign minister over his hardline stance on the name of Macedonia, he formed **Political Spring (PA)** to the right of New Democracy. PA would run in a couple of elections. By 2000 Antonis Samaras was back to supporting New Democracy, and in 2004 he rejoined that party – and indeed would become party leader in 2009. In contrast, differing MPs who were later kicked out of ND would go on to found the populist radical right **Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)** in 2000, and the **Independent Greeks (ANEL)** founded in 2012.

The **Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)** was founded in 1974. The party advocated for the socialization of the Greek economy by way of its theory of the “third road” to socialism. The party regarded this path as less radical than that of the communists but more committed to the ideals of socialism than most other social democratic parties. The party, as a result, was highly critical of many European social democratic parties and admonished them for not being radical enough. Over time some critics argued that the party was in fact far from the radical group they saw themselves as, and instead labelled the party a populist left-centrist one which had long abandoned the Marxist ideology it earlier espoused. The party did in fact officially distance itself from its more radical rhetoric in the early 1990s. In terms of foreign policy the party once argued for the dissolution of European military alliances, for Greek control of US bases and installations in Greece, and for the renegotiating of Greek membership in the European Community. But as part of its modernization, the party began to adopt a less hostile position and called for Greece to play a more constructive role within NATO and the EC. A splinter party of PASOK, the **Democratic Social Movement (Dikiki)**, was formed in 1995 and claimed to be representative of PASOK's true socialist heritage. It lasted for three elections. More recently PASOK has adopted an even more pro-European position in foreign policy and what may even be described as enthusiasm for the European Union. The economic crisis that began in Greece in 2009, however, caused support for PASOK to collapse, turning it into a small party, with SYRIZA (see later) becoming the main party on the left.

The far left of Greek politics has seen many parties come and go, several different electoral coalitions formed, and as a result has been a somewhat confused collection of political entities. The party furthest to the left, and which has had the most stable existence, relatively speaking, has been the **Communist Party of Greece (KKE)**. The party is Greece's historic orthodox communist party which was originally founded in 1918 and revived in 1974 after 27 years of non-existence.

The party is opposed both to the European Union and NATO and has called for the removal of US military installations in Greece. The KKE was hurt by defections following its support of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A breakaway party was formed in 1968 called the **Communist Party of Greece-Interior (KKEs)**. The KKEs would run jointly with the KKE in the first election of 1974, but then ran on its own until in 1989 it formed the **Left and Progress Coalition (SYR)**. It was a coalition of various socialist, communist, and far left parties in Greece, which unified as a single party in 1991. In turn, SYR was the largest party of the **Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)** created in 2004. SYRIZA would jump to second place in the election of May 2012 and consolidate this position as a close second in the election of June 2012. In 2013 SYRIZA became a single party. The election of January 2015 would see SYRIZA become the largest party and lead a government, something confirmed in the September 2015 election. However, prior to that election dissident leftist MPs who objected to the terms of Greece's third bailout from the European Union split off and formed the **Popular Unity (LAE)** party, which just failed to reach the 3 percent threshold in said election.

On the extreme right is **Golden Dawn (ChA)**, founded in 1980. It first ran in the 1996 election but then not again until 2009 (still insignificant then); however it jumped in support to 7.0 percent in the May 2012 election and has remained at that level since. As per an extreme right party, ChA has paramilitary groups which frequently turn violent, and several key leaders of these have been on trial for forming a criminal organization.

Finally in the current polarized Greek political spectrum some parties have arisen or become relevant on the centre-left and centre to make things more centripetal. **Democratic Left (DIMAR)** was founded in 2010 by breakaway moderate members of SYRIZA who in 2012 were joined by six MPs from PASOK. After supporting the Antonis Samaras ND government of 2012–2013, DIMAR's vote share would collapse below 1 percent in the January 2015 election and it would then ally with PASOK in the September 2015 election. **The River (To Potami)**, a socially liberal pro-European party was founded in 2014 by a television journalist. Lastly, the **Union of Centrists (EK)**, also pro-European, was founded in 1992 but would first win seats in the September 2015 election. Then in 2018 PASOK, DIMAR, To Potami, and other small social democratic parties all merged into the centre-left **Movement of Change (KA)**.

## Governments

The economic crisis which started in 2009 changed the nature of Greek governments as well. Until 2011 all governments were single-party majorities, either of ND or PASOK; the only exceptions (coalitions or caretaker governments, and repeated elections) came in 1989–1990 when there were hung parliaments in the context of strong polarization. Since 2011 two-party coalitions have been the norm (from 2015 this has involved a populist alliance between SYRIZA and ANEL). After the May 2012 election (Greece's most fragmented result) no government was able to be formed, leading to an immediate new election in June.

ELECTIONS IN GREECE SINCE 1974

<i>PF</i>		<i>1974</i>			<i>1977</i>		<i>1981</i>		<i>1985</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
KKE	1	9.4	8	]	9.3	11	10.9	13	9.9	12
KKEs	1			]	2.7	2	1.3	0	1.8	1
PASOK	4	13.6	12		25.3	93	48.1	172	45.8	161
EDHK	7 then 5	20.5	60		11.9	16	0.4	0	—	—
ND	10	54.3	220		41.8	171	35.9	115	40.8	126
Others		2.2	0		9.0	7	3.6	0	1.6	0
TOTAL SEATS		300			300		300		300	

<i>PF</i>		<i>June 1989</i>			<i>November 1989</i>		<i>1990</i>		<i>1993</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
KKE	1	(with SYN)			(with SYN)		(with SYN)		4.5	9
SYN	2	13.1	28		11.0	21	10.3	19	2.9	0
PASOK	4	39.1	125		40.7	128	38.6	123	46.9	170
ND	10	44.3	145		46.2	148	46.9	150	39.3	111
PA	11	—	—		—	—	—	—	4.9	10
Others		3.5	2		2.1	3	4.2	8	1.5	0
TOTAL SEATS		300			300		300		300	

<i>PF</i>		<i>1996</i>			<i>2000</i>		<i>2004</i>		<i>2007</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
KKE	1	5.6	11		5.5	11	5.9	12	8.2	22
Dikki	1	4.4	9		2.6	0	1.8	0	—	—
SYN/SYRIZA	2 then 1	5.1	10		3.2	6	3.3	6	5.0	14
PASOK	4	41.5	162		43.8	158	40.6	117	38.1	102
ND	10	38.1	108		42.7	125	45.4	165	41.8	152
PA	11	2.9	0		—	—	—	—	—	—
LAOS	12	—	—		—	—	2.2	0	3.8	10
Others		2.4	0		2.2	0	0.8	0	3.1	0
TOTAL SEATS		300			300		300		300	

<i>PF</i>		<i>2009</i>			<i>May 2012</i>		<i>June 2012</i>		<i>January 2015</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
KKE	1	7.5	21		8.5	26	4.5	12	5.5	15
SYRIZA	1	4.6	13		16.8	52	26.9	71	36.3	149
PASOK	4	43.9	160		13.2	41	12.3	33	4.7	13
DIMAR	4	—	—		6.1	19	6.3	17	0.5	0
To Potami	5	—	—		—	—	—	—	6.0	17

	<i>PF</i>	<i>2009</i>		<i>May 2012</i>		<i>June 2012</i>		<i>January 2015</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
ND	10	33.5	91	18.9	108	29.7	129	27.8	76
ANEL	12	—	—	10.6	33	7.5	20	4.7	13
LAOS	12	5.6	15	2.9	0	1.6	0	1.0	0
ChA (Golden Dawn)	13	0.3	0	7.0	21	6.9	18	6.3	17
Others		4.6	0	16.0	0	4.3	0	7.1	0
TOTAL SEATS			300		300		300		300

	<i>PF</i>	<i>September 2015</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
KKE	1	5.6	15
SYRIZA	1	35.5	145
LAE (Popular Unity)	1	2.9	0
PASOK	4	6.3	17
DIMAR	4		(with PASOK)
To Potami	5	4.1	11
EK (Union of Centrists)	5	3.4	9
ND	10	28.1	75
ANEL	12	3.7	10
ChA (Golden Dawn)	13	7.0	18
Others		3.4	0
TOTAL SEATS			300

#### GREEK GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1974

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
12/1974	Karamanlis, C. (ND)	20	ND	
12/1977	Karamanlis, C. (ND)	22	ND	
05/1980	Rallis, G. (ND)	24	ND	
11/1981	Papandreou, A. (PASOK)	21	PASOK	
06/1985	Papandreou, A. (PASOK)	22	PASOK	
07/1989	Tzannetakis, T. (ND)	22	ND KKE	
10/1989	Grivas, I. (ind.)	21 (15)	(non-partisan caretaker government)	
12/1989	Zolotas, X. (ind.)	21 (7)	ND PASOK SYN	

(Continued)



<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
02/1990	Zolotas, X. (ind.)	22 (15)	(non-partisan caretaker government)	
04/1990	Mitsotakis, K. (ND)	21	ND	
10/1993	Papandreou, A. (PASOK)	19	PASOK	
02/1996	Simitis, K. (PASOK)	20	PASOK	
10/1996	Simitis, K. (PASOK)	20	PASOK	
04/2000	Simitis, K. (PASOK)	21	PASOK	
03/2004	Karamanlis, K. (ND)	20	ND	
10/2007	Karamanlis, K. (ND)	18	ND	
10/2009	Papandreou, G. (PASOK)	17	PASOK	
11/2011	Papademos, L. (ind.)	18 (3)	PASOK ND LAOS	
02/2012	Papademos, L. (ind.)	18 (3)	PASOK ND	
05/2012	Pikrammenos, P. (ind.)	17 (14)	(non-partisan caretaker government)	
07/2012	Samaras, A. (ND)	18 (5)	ND	PASOK DIMAR
06/2013	Samaras, A. (ND)	21 (1)	ND PASOK	
02/2015	Tsipras, A. (SYRIZA)	15 (2)	SYRIZA ANEL	
08/2015	Thanou-Christophilou, V. (ind.)	13 (12)	(non-partisan caretaker government)	
10/2015	Tsipras, A. (SYRIZA)	15 (3)	SYRIZA ANEL	

## Acronyms

ANEL	Independent Greeks
ChA	Golden Dawn
Dikki	Democratic Social Movement
DIMAR	Democratic Left
EAR	Greek Left
EDHK	Centre Union
EK	Union of Centrists
LAE	Popular Unity
LAOS	Popular Orthodox Rally
KA	Movement of Change
KKE	Communist Party of Greece
KKEs	Communist Party of Greece – Interior
ND	New Democracy
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PA	Political Spring
SYR	Left and Progress Coalition
SYRIZA	Coalition of the Radical Left

# HUNGARY

## The party pattern in each election, with additional components

1990	moderately multi-party, with a dominant party ( <i>MDF</i> )
1994	moderately multi-party, with a predominant party ( <i>MSZP</i> )
1998	moderately multi-party, with two main parties ( <i>Fidesz</i> and <i>MSZP</i> )
2002	two-and-a-half-party
2006	two-and-a-half-party
2010	moderately multi-party, with a predominant party ( <i>Fidesz-MPSz</i> )
2014	moderately multi-party, with a predominant party ( <i>Fidesz-MPSz</i> )
2018	moderately multi-party, with a predominant party ( <i>Fidesz-MPSz</i> )

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1990–1998 inclusive	moderately multi-party system
2010–2018 inclusive	moderately multi-party system, with a predominant party ( <i>Fidesz-MPSz</i> )

## History

Historically Hungary was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and largely autonomous after 1867. Independent after World War One, interwar Hungary was authoritarian. The country was occupied by Soviet forces in late 1944. In a free election held in 1945 the communists got only 17 percent of the vote, whereupon the communists backed by the Soviets seized de facto control of the country. The

Hungarian People's Republic was formally established in 1948. The 1956 anti-communist uprising was brutally crushed by Soviet forces. In 1962, the communist government shifted towards a more pragmatic domestic policy. In 1985, around 45 independents were elected in the last "one-party" election. Despite various reforms, the 1988–1989 period was one of communist decay and the rise of the opposition, leading to the first multi-party election in 1990. Hungary joined the European Union in 2004.

## Electoral system

Hungary has always had a complicated, tiered electoral system, which can either be described as mixed-member partially compensatory or mixed-member majoritarian as it is clearly biased in favour of the largest party. The current system dates from 2011 and has two tiers with each voter having two votes, one for a local candidate and one for a party list. Of the 199 seats, 106 are elected by plurality in single-member districts. The other 93 current seats are elected from party lists in a single national tier using the d'Hondt method. In the past there were 386 seats, and the single-member seats usually had a second round. The threshold for representation is 5 percent for a single party, but 10 percent for a coalition of two parties and 15 percent for a coalition of three or more parties. Alternatively, as of 2014 ethnic minority party lists can win a single seat on a much lower threshold. The relevant votes for the national tier are the total second votes but also remainder votes from the single-member seats – these being both all the votes from unsuccessful candidates but also the surplus votes beyond those needed to elect individual single-member district candidates. In the past the list votes and the remainder votes were calculated in two separate tiers. Vacancies arising between general elections are filled through by-elections (in single-member constituencies), while vacancies of national list seats are filled by the party concerned from amongst the candidates on its original list.

## Political parties and cleavages

Unlike many of its post-communist neighbours, Hungary skipped the umbrella movement stage and went straight to a viable party system. However, a relatively low number of voters actually identified with a particular party, and there were usually a high percentage of undecided voters leading up to elections. Ideological views on both economics and nationalism have structured the Hungarian party system, with the latter now clearly predominant.

For the first two decades, the Hungarian party system had a clear bipolarity between the centre-right and the liberal left. Initially the key party on the centre-right was the **Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF)**; this was founded in 1987 as a nationalist-populist movement occupying a centrist position between the communists and the radical opposition. In 1989 the party dropped its populist nature and built up a Christian democratic image. The party was pro-market but wanted market reform at a slower pace. The party was strongly pro-Hungarian and

was very concerned with the status of Hungarians in other countries. Nevertheless, the MDF was in support of Western integration. Initially there were also some elements of anti-Jewish and anti-Roma sentiments within the party. Divisions within the party on such issues led to expulsion in June 1993 of the leading nationalist István Csurka. That November, István Csurka formed the populist radical right **Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP)**, which would ultimately win seats in one election, that of 1998. That election would also see the MDF lose its leadership role on the centre-right to Fidesz (see later), with whom it would ally in 2002. From 2006 the MDF would run on its own again; however, it would fall below the electoral threshold in 2010 and was dissolved in 2011.

On the right of centre along with the MDF lay the **Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP)**. The KDNP claims to be the revival of the Popular Democratic Party which was the leading opposition party in the immediate post-World War Two period. The party's positions have been very similar to those of the MDF: pro-market but at a more cautious pace, strongly Christian and pro-Hungarian, and with some policies which are either anti-Jewish or anti-Roma. The KDNP fell below the electoral threshold in both 1998 and 2002; since 2006 it has been in an electoral alliance with Fidesz.

Like the KDNP, the agrarian **Independent Smallholders' Party (FKgP)** is descended from an historic Hungarian party. The FKgP is the 1989 revival of the party which dominated Hungary's first postwar election in 1945. The party is conservative and somewhat populist in nature. Strongly pro-Hungarian, the FKgP has been accused, like the two parties mentioned previously, of being anti-Jewish and anti-Roma. The party is, however, anti-Western unlike the MDF and the KDNP. The FKgP last won seats in 1998 but still exists.

The **Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz)** was, like the SzDSz later, initially a member of the Liberal International. As well Fidesz was both pro-market and pro-Western. The difference is that until 1993 Fidesz limited membership to those below the age of 36. In April of that year the party abandoned the age restriction and in 1995 adopted the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party (**Fidesz-MPP**) rubric, more generally shifting from a libertarian to a conservative orientation and occupying the space that had been filled by the MDF. Its leader, Viktor Orbán, did manage to become prime minister in 1998 at the age of 35. Orbán would shift the party to the populist radical right in the mid-2000s. In 2003 the party modified its name to Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Union (**Fidesz-MPSZ**). The party remains clearly dominated by Orbán, who has governed since 2010 in an openly illiberal manner.

On the political left, the **Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP)** was originally formed in 1948 as the **Hungarian Workers' Party (MMP)** and was a merger of Hungary's communist and social democratic parties. In 1956 following the Soviet invasion the party was renamed the **Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSzMP)**. In 1989 the party renounced Marxism and adopted its current name. In 1994 the MSzP became an affiliate of the Socialist International. The party supports state intervention in the market economy. The MSzP is one of the least nationalist of

all Hungarian parties. In late 2006, a speech surfaced in which MSzP Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány admitted that the party had lied repeatedly to the voters in the election campaign of that year. The resulting scandal, followed by the economic crisis of 2008 onwards, led to a collapse in party support. In 2011 Gyurcsány left the MSzP to form the **Democratic Coalition (DK)**. In 2014 the MSzP ran under a broader anti-Fidesz **Unity** alliance with the DK, the **Hungarian Liberal Party (MLP)** which was formed in 2013 by a former SzDSz leader, and the social liberal **Together**, but this alliance was not much more successful.

A pro-market force which formed in opposition to the communists is the **Federation of Free Democrats (SzDSz)**. The SzDSz was founded in 1988 as the Network of Free Initiatives by a grouping of dissident intellectuals and human rights activists and was regrouped as a formal political party the following year. The party is a member of the Liberal International and is pro-Western in orientation. The party is socially liberal and non-nationalist. It thus became the junior coalition partner of the MSzP, inasmuch as the LEC-TAN division has been the central one in Hungary, much more so that economic left-right (or ex-communist versus ex-opposition). Though quitting the highly unpopular MSzP-led coalition in 2008, SzDSz could not maintain support and was forced to run with the MDF in 2010 and in the Unity alliance in 2014. A green liberal party, **Politics Can Be Different (LMP)**, was created in 2009 and has won seats in both elections since then.

A third pole in the Hungarian party system arose with the creation of the extreme right **Movement for a Better Hungary** in 2003. The party is known by its acronym **Jobbik**, or “right choice” which has a double meaning of both ‘better choice’ and politically right-wing choice. The party in fact was essentially neo-fascist, including forming a paramilitary force in 2007. Jobbik had little success in its first election of 2006 but then jumped to become the third largest party in 2010. In the mid-2010s it began to aim for a less extremist image and indeed in the run-up to the 2018 election argued that it was (relatively) more moderate than Fidesz-MPSZ, with which it can now be classified as populist radical right.

## Governments

The first two governments in Hungary were led by the MDF and included both the FKgP and the KDNP. These parties formed a natural alliance. All were nationalistic and all harboured somewhat anti-minority attitudes. Both the KDNP and MDF were Christian conservatives, both were pro-Western, and both supported a more cautious programme of reform. The FKgP was included because of the rural base of support it shared with the MDF and to a lesser extent with the KDNP. The government formed following the 1994 election in contrast contained somewhat unlikely allies. The MSzP had a majority of seats on its own but chose to include the SzDSz to lend legitimacy to the party’s commitment to democracy and to bolster its pro-Western platform. After the swing back to the right in 1998, the Fidesz-MPP formed a government with all the two other centre-right parties that had

## ELECTIONS IN HUNGARY SINCE 1990

<i>PF</i>		<i>1990</i>		<i>1994</i>		<i>1998</i>		<i>2002</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
MSzP	4	10.9	33	33.0	209	32.3	134	42.1	178
FkgP	7	11.8	44	8.8	26	13.8	48	0.8	0
SzDSz	9	21.4	92	19.7	69	7.9	24	5.6	20
Fidesz	9	8.9	22	7.0	20	28.2	148	[ 41.1	165
MDF	10	24.7	164	11.7	38	3.1	17	[	23
KDNP	10	6.5	21	7.0	22	2.6	0	3.9	0
MIÉP	12	—	—	1.6	0	5.6	14	4.4	0
Others		15.8	10	11.2	2	6.5	1	2.1	0
TOTAL SEATS		386		386		386		386	

<i>PF</i>		<i>2006</i>		<i>2010</i>		<i>2014</i>		<i>2018</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
LMP	3	—	—	7.5	16	5.4	5	7.1	8
MSzP	4	43.2	191	19.3	59			] 11.9	20
DK	5	—	—	—	—			] 5.4	9
Together	5	—	—	—	—			] 0.7	1
SzDSz/MLP	9	6.5	20	(with MDF)				] —	—
Unity		—	—	—	—	25.7	38	] —	—
FkgP	7	(with Jobbik)		0.0	0	0.2	0	—	—
MDF	8	5.0	11	2.7	0	—	—	—	—
KDNP	10	[	23	[	36	[	16		]
Fidesz-MPSz	9 then 12	[ 42.0	141	[ 52.7	227	[ 45.0	117	49.3	133 ]
MIÉP	12			] 0.1	0	—	—	—	—
Jobbik	13 then 12	2.2	0	] 16.7	47	20.3	23	19.3	26
German minority party	21	—	—	—	—	0.2	0	0.5	1
Others		1.1	0	1.0	1	3.2	0	6.0	1
TOTAL SEATS		386		386		199		199	

*Note:* The Fidesz-MPSz and KDNP alliance is considered one party for all calculation purposes in Chapter 2, but formally as a two-party coalition in terms of governments.

been in opposition. From 2002 to 2010 the MSzP again led to government, supported by the SzDSz through 2008 – the year of a major scandal which decimated the MSzP. From 2010 the Fidesz-KDNP alliance has won comfortable majorities in polarized elections.

## HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1990

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
05/1990	Antall, J. (MDF)	21 (3)	MDF FKgP KDNP	
12/1993	Boross, P. (MDF)	16	MDF FKgP KDNP	
06/1994	Horn, G. (MSzP)	15	MSzP SzDSz	
07/1998	Orbán, V. (Fidesz-MPP)	16 (2)	Fidesz-MPP FKgP MDF	
05/2002	Medgyessy, P. (MSzP)	19 (6)	MSzP SzDSz	
09/2004	Gyurcsány, F. (MSzP)	18 (4)	MSzP SzDSz	
06/2006	Gyurcsány, F. (MSzP)	16 (5)	MSzP SzDSz	
05/2008	Gyurcsány, F. (MSzP)	16 (8)	MSzP	SzDSz
04/2009	Bajnai, G. (MSzP)	15 (8)	MSzP	
05/2010	Orbán, V. (Fidesz-MPSZ)	11 (4)	Fidesz-MPSZ KDNP	
06/2014	Orbán, V. (Fidesz-MPSZ)	14 (3)	Fidesz-MPSZ KDNP	
05/2018	Orbán, V. (Fidesz-MPSZ)	14 (6)	Fidesz-MPSZ KDNP	

## Acronyms

DK	Democratic Coalition
Fidesz	Federation of Young Democrats
Fidesz-MPP	Federation of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Party
Fidesz-MPSZ	Federation of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Union
FkgP	Independents Smallholders' Party
Jobbik	Movement for a Better Hungary
KDNP	Christian Democratic People's Party
LMP	Politics Can Be Different
MDF	Hungarian Democratic Forum
MIÉP	Hungarian Justice and Life Party
MLP	Hungarian Liberal Party
MMP	Hungarian Workers' Party
MszMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
MszP	Hungarian Socialist Party
SzDSz	Federation of Free Democrats

# ICELAND

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1946	moderately multi-party
1949	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (IP and PP)</i>
1953	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (IP and PP)</i>
1956	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (IP and PP)</i>
1959 Jun	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (IP and PP)</i>
1959 Oct	moderately multi-party
1963	moderately multi-party
1967	moderately multi-party
1971	moderately multi-party
1974	moderately multi-party
1978	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (IP, PA, SDP, and PP)</i>
1979	moderately multi-party
1983	moderately multi-party
1987	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (IP, PP, and SDP)</i>
1991	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (IP)</i>
1995	moderately multi-party
1999	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (IP)</i>
2003	moderately multi-party
2007	moderately multi-party
2009	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (SDA, IP, and LGM)</i>



2013	moderately multi-party
2016	highly multi-party
2017	highly multi-party

## **Party systems (with smoothing)**

1946–2013 inclusive      moderately multi-party system

## **History**

Iceland was ruled for many centuries by Denmark. In 1918 it acquired autonomous status, and in 1944 it became fully independent. The struggle for independence thus shaped Icelandic politics until relatively recently. Additionally, Icelanders take pride in a parliamentary tradition that goes back to the tenth century. Nowadays what remains perhaps most distinctive is the ethnic–linguistic homogeneity of the population – Iceland is one the most homogeneous societies in the world, and the most such European country.

## **Electoral system**

Iceland did not fully adopt proportional representation until 1959, much later than elsewhere in Nordic Europe. Previously the fixed 52 seats included 21 single-member districts and 12 seats elected proportionally but in two-member districts. Only the eight seats in the Reykjavík district (which was very under-represented) and the 11 national compensation seats were truly proportional. Initially under party list proportional representation in 1959 there were 60 seats, with 49 elected in eight districts and still 11 allocated in a national upper tier. Since 1987 there have been 63 seats. As of the 2000 reform, the 63 seats are divided into 54 in the lower tier of six regional districts and nine in the upper tier. Both tiers use the d'Hondt method, and there is a 5 percent national threshold for the upper tier.

## **Political parties and cleavages**

Icelandic party abbreviations are rarely used in a general sense, or more precisely English language ones are more common. In what follows the English abbreviation will be given first and used, with the Icelandic acronym, where one exists, then given in square brackets.

The role of personalities is a very important one in politics. Politics are also quite localized. For these reasons most parties do not take up a very firm position on the left–right economic spectrum. The most evident cleavage dividing political parties in Iceland is a rural/urban one or alternatively a centre/periphery one. Attitudes towards NATO membership and the maintenance of US military forces

in Iceland are other issues which in the past produced sharp divisions amongst the various political parties. Nowadays there is a clear divide over joining the European Union.

Whereas in Scandinavia the social democrats were the dominant party from the 1930s, in Iceland the largest party until 2009 was the conservative **Independence Party (IP [Icelandic: SSF])** – from 1946 to 2007 it averaged about 38 percent of the vote and participated in most governments. Founded in 1929 by the union of smaller conservative and liberal groups, the Independence Party has a very broad base of support but is supported most strongly by the nation's fisher and commercial interests. The party also enjoys the highest amount of support from the high-income groups in Iceland, as well as professionals, employers, and those with a university education. In terms of the urban/rural cleavage this party is the most heavily supported party in highly populated urban areas, that is, the capital and surrounding areas. In terms of policy the party adopts a pro-NATO but clearly anti-EU position, stands for limited state intervention and espouses a liberal economic policy. However, the party does not strongly adhere to a specific ideology as such but is relatively pragmatic. The party does have a tradition of strong individualism and has as a result been difficult to manage at times and has suffered from splits and defections. Such splits have come for example in 1987 when a popular minister forced out of the Independence Party due to a lawsuit formed the short-lived **Citizens' Party (CP [BF])**, and again in 1998 when a former minister and MP founded the **Liberal Party (LP [FF])** which focussed on the needs of small fishing communities.

Iceland's second strongest party historically was the **Progressive Party (PP [FSF])**. The Progressive Party was founded in 1916 and represents largely agrarian interests and therefore does much better in rural as opposed to urban areas. The party began as a relatively conservative party but in the mid-1960s began to move to a slightly left-of-centre position on economic policy. The party is against privatization and deregulation largely because these policies would hurt farmers. The party is a qualified supporter of NATO but like the IP is opposed to EU membership.

The **Social Democratic Party (SDP [AF])** was founded in 1916 and was the weakest of the Nordic social democratic parties. Compared to other traditional political parties in Iceland, the SDP had the least firm association with any one particular interest group. It did not enjoy mass support from typical social democratic allies. Although it did get some support from workers it was particularly weak amongst public sector employees. While the SDP was initially in favour of classic social democratic policies such as state ownership of large enterprises and substantial increases in social welfare, in the latter post-World War Two period the party occupied a more centrist if not slightly right-of-centre position with respect to economic policy. This shift occurred most prominently in the 1960s and 1970s when the party abandoned its position that the government play a large role in the national economy and began to advocate for a freer

market, particularly in the agricultural sector. Of the traditional political parties in Iceland the SDP was and is the only supporter of joining the European Union. With regard to NATO the party was second only to the Independence Party in terms of the degree of its support for NATO membership. Like other traditional Icelandic parties, the SAP suffered from defections. Anti-NATO members joined with PP members of a similar view and other leftists to form the **National Preservation Party (NPP [PF])** in 1953. A similar defection from the SDP resulted in the creation of the more neutralist **Union of Liberals and Leftists (ULL [SFVM])** in the 1970s. Another such defection resulted in the creation of the short-lived populist **Alliance of Social Democrats (ASD [BJ])** in 1983, which contested two elections and only managed to win seats in the first. Then in 1994 the **National Awakening (NA [PV])** was formed in part by Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir after she lost the leadership of the SDP; in 1996 the SDP and the NA formed a joint parliamentary group.

Historically the only truly left-of-centre party in postwar Iceland was the **People's Alliance (PA [AB])**. This party first appeared in 1956 as an electoral coalition of the former **Socialist Party (SP [SF])**, which contested the first three postwar elections, and more hard-line Social Democrats who had grown disenchanted with their party's shift to the centre. The party initially advocated for radical socialist reforms but gradually softened this rhetoric. The People's Alliance however remained committed to a neutral foreign policy and maintained its call for Iceland to withdraw from NATO. The party did well in urban areas and was supported most heavily by public sector employees and intellectuals.

Another of Iceland's leftist parties was the new left **Women's Alliance (WA [SK])**. Founded in 1983 the party was the political manifestation of Iceland's modern feminist movement. The party had a very informal party structure and preferred to be referred to as a movement rather than a political party. The Women's Alliance strived for more recognition for women in Iceland but also put emphasis on environmental issues (more so than any other party then in Iceland). The Women's Alliance was, however, not explicitly opposed to NATO.

Given the centre-right nature of Icelandic politics, and in particular the dominance of the Independence Party, in 1999 the four leftist parties – SDP, PA, WA, and NA – formed the **Social Democratic Alliance (SDA [S])** as an electoral alliance; it became a single political party the following year. However, the centre-left nature of the SDA, inspired in part by the New Labour of Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, was insufficiently socialist as well as feminist and environmentalist for certain MPs of the constituent parties. Consequently, they formed the **Left-Green Movement (LGM [VG])** in 1999 in advance of the creation of the SDA. From 1999 through 2009 the SDA was one of the two main parties along with the Independence Party, against which it formed the rival pole of the party system. In 2009 the SDA would become the largest party and lead a leftist government; however, in 2013 its support would drop off considerably. In both 2016 and 2017 the LGM outpolled the SDA.

ELECTIONS IN ICELAND SINCE 1946

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1946</i>		<i>1949</i>		<i>1953</i>		<i>1956</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
SP/PA	1 then 2	19.5	10	19.5	9	16.1	7	19.2	8		
SDP	4	17.8	9	16.5	7	15.6	6	18.3	8		
NPP	4	—	—	—	—	6.0	2	4.5	0		
PP	7	23.1	13	24.5	17	21.9	16	15.6	17		
IP	10	39.4	20	39.5	19	37.1	21	42.4	19		
Others		0.2	0	0.0	0	3.3	0	0.0	0		
TOTAL SEATS			52		52		52		52		

		<i>PF</i>		<i>June 1959</i>		<i>November 1959</i>		<i>1963</i>		<i>1967</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
PA	2	15.3	7	16.0	10	16.0	9	17.6	10		
SDP	4	12.5	6	15.2	9	14.2	8	15.7	9		
NPP	4	2.5	0	3.4	0	—	—	—	—		
PP	7	27.2	19	25.7	17	28.2	19	28.1	18		
IP	10	42.5	20	39.7	24	41.4	24	37.5	23		
Others		0.0	0	0.0	0	0.2	0	1.1	0		
TOTAL SEATS			52		60		60		60		

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1971</i>		<i>1974</i>		<i>1978</i>		<i>1979</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
PA	2	17.1	10	18.3	11	22.9	14	19.7	11		
SDP	4	10.5	6	9.1	5	22.0	14	17.5	10		
ULL	5	8.9	5	4.6	2	3.3	0	—	—		
PP	7	25.3	17	24.9	17	16.9	12	24.9	17		
IP	10	36.2	22	42.7	25	32.7	20	35.4	21		
Others		2.0	0	0.4	0	2.2	0	2.5	1		
TOTAL SEATS			60		60		60		60		

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1983</i>		<i>1987</i>		<i>1991</i>		<i>1995</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
PA	2	17.3	10	13.3	8	14.4	9	14.3	9		
WA	2	5.5	3	10.1	7	8.3	5	4.9	3		
SDP	4	11.7	6	15.2	10	15.5	10	11.4	7		

(Continued)

	<i>PF</i>	<u>1983</u>		<u>1987</u>		<u>1991</u>		<u>1995</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
ASD	4	7.3	4	—	—	—	—	—	—
NA	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	7.2	4
PP	7	18.5	14	18.9	13	18.9	13	23.3	15
IP	10	38.7	23	27.2	18	38.6	26	37.1	25
CP	12	—	—	10.9	7	1.2	0	—	—
Others		1.0	0	4.4	0	3.1	0	1.8	0
TOTAL SEATS			60		63		63		63

	<i>PF</i>	<u>1999</u>		<u>2003</u>		<u>2007</u>		<u>2009</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
LGM	2	9.1	6	8.8	5	14.3	9	21.7	14
CM	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	7.2	4
SDA	4	26.8	17	31.0	20	26.8	18	29.8	20
PP	7	18.4	12	17.7	12	11.7	7	14.8	9
LP	9	4.2	2	7.4	4	7.3	4	2.2	0
IP	10	40.7	26	33.7	22	36.6	25	23.7	16
Others		0.8	0	1.4	0	3.3	0	0.6	0
TOTAL SEATS			63		63		63		63

	<i>PF</i>	<u>2013</u>		<u>2016</u>		<u>2017</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
People's Party	1	—	—	3.5	0	6.9	4
LGM	2	10.9	7	15.9	10	16.9	11
Dawn	2	3.1	0	1.7	0	0.1	0
SDA	4	12.9	9	5.7	3	12.1	7
BF	5	8.2	6	7.2	4	1.2	0
Pirates	5	5.1	3	14.5	10	9.2	6
PP	7	24.4	19	11.5	8	10.7	8
RP	9	—	—	10.5	7	6.7	4
IP	10	26.7	19	29.0	21	25.2	16
Centre Party	11	—	—	—	—	10.9	7
Others		8.7	0	0.5	0	0.2	0
TOTAL SEATS			63		63		63

## New parties in the past decade

The financial crisis that began in 2008 hit Iceland particularly hard inasmuch as its banks had become massive in size relative to the economy and with large foreign debts, leading ultimately to their failure and an economic depression. Public

reaction to this crisis led to the creation of various new parties (as well as support for a new bottom-up constitution). The first such newer party was the **Citizens' Movement (CM [BJ])** in 2009; its parliamentary caucus quickly imploded and in 2012 the party, most of its former MPs, and the Liberal Party formed the left populist **Dawn [D]**, which focussed on citizen participation in decisions but has failed to reach the electoral threshold. 2012 also saw the creation of two new social liberal parties in Iceland: the strongly pro-EU **Bright Future (BF)** and the **Pirate Party (Pirates [P])**. The Icelandic Pirate Party, as per its nature, sought to fight against copyright laws and information restrictions, but also wanted constitutional change. The Icelandic party has been one of the most successful of the European Pirate parties, and specifically was the first such party anywhere to win seats in a national election. (It even led the public opinion polls from April 2015 to April 2016.) 2016 would see two more new parties form. The first, the **Reform Party (RP [V])** or alternatively **Regeneration (R)** split from the IP, with the new party being pro-EU and highly free market oriented. The second was the left populist **People's Party [FF]**, which emphasized better conditions for the poor and disabled. Lastly, in 2017 the **Centre Party (CP [MF])** was formed by former Progressive Party Prime Minister Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, who resigned as such in 2016 after being implicated in the Panama Papers. The Centre Party has a populist orientation, and draws support not only from former PP supporters but former supporters of the IP and liberal parties. The following diagram contrasts the Icelandic parties that won parliamentary seats in 2016 and/or 2017 in terms of socio-economic left-right ideology and attitudes to the European Union:

**ICELANDIC PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT IN 2016 AND/OR 2017 BY LEFT-RIGHT POSITION AND ATTITUDES TO THE EUROPEAN UNION**

	<i>Socio-economic left-right</i>			
	<i>Left</i>	<i>Centre-left</i>	<i>Centre-right</i>	<i>Right</i>
Attitudes to EU:				
pro-EU		BF SDA		RP
neutral		Pirates		
anti-EU	LGM		PP	IP
populist anti-EU	People's Party		Centre Party	

## Governments

Although until 2009 it always was the plurality party in terms of votes, the Independence Party could not be considered a strong party in terms of cabinet formation, in the sense of it always being in government if it so wished. In fact, a wide

range of coalitions occurred in Iceland, one of which (in 1980) even included both the Independence Party and the People's Alliance. In the late 1990s, however, a clearer left-right polarization (at least in terms of party strategy) led in 1999 to the first ever re-election of a right-centre government, which occurred again in 2003. Conversely, 2009 saw the first and so far only all-leftist government, of the SDA and the LGM. A left-right government returned in November 2017, under the first-ever LGM (and first female) prime minister.

#### ICELANDIC GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1946

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
07/1946	Thors, O. (IP)	6	IP SP SDP	
02/1947	Stefánsson, S.J. (SDP)	6	SDP IP PP	
12/1949	Thors, O. (IP)	5	IP	
03/1950	Steinthórsson, S. (PP)	6	PP IP	
09/1953	Thors, O. (IP)	6	IP PP	
07/1956	Jónasson, H. (PP)	6	PP PA SDP	
12/1958	Jónsson, E. (SDP)	4	SDP	
07/1959	Jónsson, E. (SDP)	4	SDP	
11/1959	Thors, O. (IP)	7	IP SDP	
11/1963	Benediktsson, B. (IP)	7	IP SDP	
06/1967	Benediktsson, B. (IP)	7	IP SDP	
07/1970	Hafstein, J. (IP)	7	IP SDP	
07/1971	Jóhannesson, O. (IP)	7	PP PA ULL	
08/1974	Hallgrímsson, G. (IP)	8	IP PP	
09/1978	Jóhannesson, O. (IP)	9	PP PA SDP	
10/1979	Gröndal, B. (SDP)	6	SDP	
02/1980	Thoroddsen, G. (IP)	10	PP IP PA	
05/1983	Hermannsson, S. (PP)	10	IP PP	
07/1987	Pálsson, T. (IP)	11	IP PP SDP	
09/1988	Hermannsson, S. (PP)	9	PP PA SDP	
09/1989	Hermannsson, S. (PP)	11	PP PA SDP CP	
04/1991	Oddsson, D. (IP)	10	IP SDP	
04/1995	Oddsson, D. (IP)	10	IP PP	
05/1999	Oddsson, D. (IP)	12	IP PP	
05/2003	Oddsson, D. (IP)	12	IP PP	
09/2004	Ásgrímsson, H. (PP)	12	IP PP	
06/2006	Haarde, G. (IP)	12	IP PP	
05/2007	Haarde, G. (IP)	12	IP SDA	
01/2009	Sigurðardóttir, J. (SDA)	10(2)	SDA LGM	PP
05/2009	Sigurðardóttir, J. (SDA)	12(2)	SDA LGM	
05/2013	Gunnlaugsson, S.D. (PP)	9	IP PP	
04/2016	Jóhannsson, S.I. (PP)	10	IP PP	
01/2017	Benediktsson, B. (IP)	11	IP RP BF	
11/2017	Jakobsdóttir, K. (LGM)	11	IP LGM PP	

## English acronyms

ASD	Alliance of Social Democrats
BF	Bright Future
CM	Citizens' Movement
CP	Citizens' Party (1987–1994); Centre Party (2017–)
IP	Independence Party
LGM	Left-Green Movement
LP	Liberal Party
NA	National Awakening
PA	People's Alliance
PP	Progressive Party
RP	Reform Party
SDA	Social Democratic Alliance
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SP	Socialist Party
ULL	Union of Liberals and Leftists
WA	Women's Alliance

## Icelandic acronyms

AF	Social Democratic Party
AB	People's Alliance
B	Citizens' Movement
BF	Citizens' Party Bright Future
BJ	Alliance of Social Democrats
D	Dawn
FF	Liberal Party People's Party
FSF	Progressive Party
MF	Centre Party
P	Pirates
S	Social Democratic Alliance
SF	Socialist Party
SFVM	Union of Liberals and Leftists
SK	Women's Alliance
SSF	Independence Party
ÞV	National Awakening
V	Reform Party
VG	Left-Green Movement



# REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1948	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (FF)</i>
1951	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (FF)</i>
1954	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (FF and FG)</i>
1957	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (FF)</i>
1961	two-and-a-half-party
1965	two-and-a-half-party
1969	two-and-a-half-party
1973	two-and-a-half-party
1977	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (FF)</i>
1981	two-and-a-half-party
1982 Feb	two-and-a-half-party
1982 Nov	two-and-a-half-party
1987	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (FF)</i>
1989	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (FF and FG)</i>
1992	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (FF)</i>
1997	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (FF and FG)</i>
2002	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (FF)</i>
2007	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (FF)</i>
2011	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (FG)</i>
2016	moderately multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1957–1982	inclusive two-and-a-half-party system (FF and FG)
1987–2016	inclusive moderately multi-party system

## History

Centuries of British control of the island of Ireland gave way in 1922 to independence for most of the island as the Irish Free State – but only after a bloody struggle. In 1937 a new constitution proclaimed the Irish Republic, a status finally accepted by Britain in 1949. The terms of the independence settlement and the desire to have Irish sovereignty over the entire island traditionally shaped strongly Irish party politics.

## Electoral system

The Republic of Ireland uses the single transferable vote (STV) form of proportional representation. STV tends to use smaller multi-member districts, and indeed in Ireland these range from three to five members. Since Ireland does not have a large number of electoral parties, STV does not produce much distortion as opposed to party list proportional representation.

In both 1959 and 1968 a referendum was held to change the electoral system from STV to a single-member electoral system (SNTV in 1959; SMP in 1968). In each case the referendum was introduced by the *Fianna Fáil* (see later) government of the day; neither was successful although the 1959 vote was close (48.2 percent yes versus 51.8 percent no).

## Political parties and cleavages

Political parties in Ireland do not easily fit on a traditional left-right spectrum. Social factors such as the largely rural population of Ireland and the influence of the Catholic Church meant that parties were forced to develop in response to a largely rural, morally conservative voting public. And factors such as the divisions over partition with Northern Ireland and the 1921 Treaty with Britain have meant that where ideological divisions did exist they were not necessarily ideological but rather historical. Politics are also very localized.

Throughout the post-World War Two period of Irish elections (in fact from 1932) through 2007 one party consistently won the plurality of both seats and votes, that party being **Fianna Fáil (FF)**. The origins of the party stem from the element within Sinn Féin (see later) which refused to accept the Treaty with Britain in 1921 and therefore took no part in the parliament that was subsequently formed for the first few years. Because of its origins as a party formed in protest of an historical event the party never developed a firm ideology which can be described in left-right terms. If an ideology does exist some have argued that this would be “Republicanism” as the party has consistently rejected partition. On economic issues the party has at times had a left-leaning approach; they have supported government expenditures to promote economic development and have resisted cuts to welfare. The party has at other times also presented a more liberal policy on economics calling for reduced government spending and lower taxes. When it comes to social issues, the party occupies a much more consistent and conservative

position and has very close ties to the Catholic Church. The party until recently enjoyed the widest base of support amongst all Irish political parties.

Supporters of the Treaty with Britain in 1921 formed their own party and that was **Fine Gael (FG)**. Like Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael has a broad base of support but does best amongst the upper-middle class in urban areas as well as middle and large farm owners. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the party made a concerted effort to increase their support amongst lower income groups but this was not entirely successful. Until 2011 the party never managed to poll more than their main rivals, Fianna Fáil, but it has formed governments in coalition with other parties. Fine Gael advocates a less conservative position on social issues as compared with Fianna Fáil, and that was clearly shown in the 2018 referendum on ending the constitutional ban on abortion.

The **Labour Party** was founded in 1912 as the political wing of the Trade Union Congress and became a separate entity in 1930. It traditionally was the third-place finisher in Ireland's post-World War Two elections. The party has been very weak compared with other left-wing parties in the rest of Europe principally because the demographics until recently have not existed in Ireland to provide sufficient support for the left-wing policies of traditional Labour parties. This has not necessarily prevented the Irish Labour Party from calling for public ownership of many industries and expanded social welfare but it has meant that the party has had to refocus attention in non-traditional areas. The party for example has argued for expansion in the agriculture industry in order to appeal to the rural vote. The party has also been forced to tone down rhetoric and make compromises on policy stances in order for it to participate in coalition governments with the other more conservative parties.

Consequently, when there was a shift to the left in Ireland after the 2008 economic crash the ultimate beneficiary was not Labour (which did come second in 2011) but the left populist **Sinn Féin (SF)**. SF was first formed in 1905 and was the party of Irish independence, splitting into pro- and anti-treaty parties. A second version of Sinn Féin would contest elections as of the 1950s and win seats in 1957 but then not again until 1997. The party stands for a united socialist Ireland. It jumped to a clear fourth place in 2011, and then third place in 2016.

In 1970 Sinn Féin split into two factions, one of which became the Marxist-Leninist **Workers' Party (WP)**. The WP won representation in all five elections of the 1980s, but not since then. After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe more moderate members (and most deputies), having narrowly failed to reform the WP, left and formed the **Democratic Left (DL)**. The DL was committed to democratic socialism and in 1994 was a member of the so-called rainbow-coalition government with the Labour Party and Fine Gael. In 1999 the DL merged into the Labour Party.

After the war the two most important smaller parties were the small farmers-based **'Party of the Land' (CnT)**, founded in 1939 and dissolved in 1965, and the nation-alistic **'Party of the Republic' (CnP)**, founded in 1946 and likewise dissolved in 1965. Both parties were part of the postwar anti-FF coalition governments.

Perhaps the most relevant smaller party was the **Progressive Democrats (PD)**. The right liberal Progressive Democrats were founded in 1985 by ex-members of

Fianna Fáil and did very well in their first election in 1987, when the party won 14 seats thus finishing in third place. The party was formed largely as an option from the more amorphous traditional parties and firmly positioned itself on the right advocating tax reform, tax cuts, and support for private enterprise but also social liberalism. FF would adopt some of its lower tax policies leading to a drop in support for the PDs. The Progressive Democrats did form the government with Fianna Fáil following the 1997 election and remained in coalition with them until 2009 when the party – then down to two seats – dissolved.

For its part, the **Green Party (GP)**, was founded in 1981 as the Ecology Party and adopted its current name in 1987. It won its first seat in 1989 and has been in parliament consistently since then, except for 2011.

The past couple of elections have seen additional leftist groupings win seats: the **United Left Alliance (ULA)** formed for the 2011 election, the **Anti-Austerity Alliance–People Before Profit (AAA-PBP)** grouping formed in 2015 with most of the same components as the ULA, and the **Social Democrats (SD)** also formed in 2015.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that postwar Ireland has elected more independents to parliament than the rest of Western Europe combined. These were in double digits in the first two postwar elections, bottomed out at one independent elected in 1969, and have been quite numerous again in three of the last four elections. The success of independents in Ireland is not just due to the STV electoral system (no independents are elected in Malta) but due to an STV system in Ireland that emphasizes individual candidates on the ballot, the importance of constituency focus for voters, little policy polarization between the two main parties, and hurdles in creating new parties.

#### ELECTIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND SINCE 1948

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1948</i>		<i>1951</i>		<i>1954</i>		<i>1957</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
WP	1	–	–	–	–	0.1	0	5.3	4
Labour	4	8.7	14	11.4	16	12.1	19	9.1	12
National Labour	4	2.6	5	–	–	–	–	–	–
C na P	4	13.2	10	4.1	2	3.1	3	1.7	1
C na T	7	5.6	7	2.9	6	3.8	5	2.4	3
FG	8	19.8	31	25.8	40	32.0	50	26.6	40
FF	11	41.9	68	46.3	69	43.4	65	48.3	78
Other parties		1.1	1	0.0	0	0.2	0	0.6	0
Independents		7.2	11	9.6	14	5.3	5	5.9	9
TOTAL SEATS			147		147		147		147

(Continued)

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1961</i>		<i>1965</i>		<i>1969</i>		<i>1973</i>	
				<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
WP	1			3.1	0	–	–	–	–	1.1	0
Labour	4			11.6	16	15.4	22	17.0	18	13.7	19
C na P	4			1.1	1	0.8	1	–	–	–	–
C na T	7			1.5	2	–	–	–	–	–	–
FG	8			32.0	47	34.1	47	34.1	50	35.1	54
FF	11			43.8	70	47.7	72	45.7	75	46.2	69
Other parties				1.2	2	0.0	0	0.0	0	1.0	0
Independents				5.6	6	2.1	2	3.2	1	2.9	2
TOTAL SEATS					144		144		144		144

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1977</i>		<i>1981</i>		<i>February 1982</i>		<i>November 1982</i>	
				<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
WP	1			1.7	0	1.7	1	2.3	3	3.3	2
Labour	4			11.6	17	9.9	15	9.1	15	9.4	16
FG	8			30.5	43	36.5	65	37.3	63	39.2	70
FF	11			50.6	84	45.3	78	47.3	81	45.2	75
Other parties				0.1	0	2.9	3	1.2	0	0.7	0
Independents				5.5	4	3.7	4	2.8	4	2.3	3
TOTAL SEATS					148		166		166		166

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1987</i>		<i>1989</i>		<i>1992</i>		<i>1997</i>	
				<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
WP	1			3.8	4	5.0	7	0.7	0	0.4	0
SF	1			1.9	0	1.2	0	1.6	0	2.5	1
Green Party	3			0.4	0	0.6	1	1.4	1	2.8	2
Labour	4			6.4	12	9.5	15	19.3	33	10.4	17
DL	4			–	–	–	–	2.8	4	2.5	4
FG	8			27.1	51	29.3	55	24.5	45	27.9	54
PD	9			11.8	14	5.5	6	4.7	10	4.7	4
FF	11			44.1	81	44.1	77	39.1	68	39.3	77
Other parties				0.5	1	1.5	1	0.2	0	2.6	1
Independents				4.0	3	3.3	4	5.8	5	6.9	6
TOTAL SEATS					166		166		166		166

	PF	2002		2007		2011		2016	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
SF	1	6.5	5	6.9	4	9.9	14	13.8	23
ULA/AAA-PBP	2	—	—	—	—	2.7	5	3.9	6
Green Party	3	3.8	6	4.7	6	1.8	0	2.7	2
Labour	4	10.8	21	10.1	20	19.4	37	6.6	7
SD	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.0	3
FG	8	22.5	31	27.3	51	36.1	76	25.5	50
PD	9	4.0	8	2.7	2	—	—	—	—
FF	11 then 10	41.5	81	41.6	78	17.4	20	24.3	44
Other parties		1.5	1	1.5	0	0.4	0	4.3	4
Independents		9.5	13	5.2	5	12.2	14	15.9	19
TOTAL SEATS			166		166		166		158

Note: % V is first preferences.

## Governments

Until 1989 there were only two types of governments in Ireland. On the one hand there were single-party governments of Fianna Fáil, and on the other hand there were coalitions of the remaining relevant parties. Initially this ‘anti-FF’ alliance involved Fine Gail, the Labour Party, the CnT, and (briefly) the CnP. By the 1960s only Fine Gail and Labour remained, and they would form a stable alternative government. However in 1989 Fianna Fáil broke its historic vow of “no coalitions”; since then, it has governed with the Progressive Democrats, Labour, and the Greens as junior partners. Independents have at times served in government or supported the government; their presence in cabinet has been particularly important since the 2016 election.

### REPUBLIC OF IRELAND GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1948

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Formal support from independents</i>
02/1948	Costello, J. (FG)	13 (1)	FG CnP Labour CnT National Labour alliance of six independents	
06/1950	Costello, J. (FG)	13 (1)	FG Labour CnP CnT alliance of six independents	

(Continued)

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Formal support from independents</i>
06/1951	de Valera, E. (FF)	12	FF	
06/1954	Costello, J. (FG)	14	FG Labour CnT	
03/1957	de Valera, E. (FF)	12	FF	
06/1959	Lemass, S. (FF)	14	FF	
10/1961	Lemass, S. (FF)	15	FF	
04/1965	Lemass, S. (FF)	15	FF	
11/1966	Lynch, J. (FF)	15	FF	
07/1969	Lynch, J. (FF)	14	FF	
03/1973	Cosgrove, L. (FG)	15	FG Labour	
07/1977	Lynch, J. (FF)	15	FF	
12/1979	Haughey, C. (FF)	15	FF	
06/1981	Fitzgerald, G. (FG)	15	FG Labour	
03/1982	Haughey, C. (FF)	15	FF	two independents
12/1982	Fitzgerald, G. (FG)	15	FG Labour	
01/1987	Fitzgerald, G. (FG)	11	FG	
03/1987	Haughey, C. (FF)	15	FF	
07/1989	Haughey, C. (FF)	15	FF PD	
02/1992	Reynolds, A. (FF)	15	FF PD	
11/1992	Reynolds, A. (FF)	13	FF	
01/1993	Reynolds, A. (FF)	15	FF Labour	
11/1994	Reynolds, A. (FF)	9	FF	
12/1994	Bruton, J. (FG)	15	FG Labour DL	
06/1997	Ahern, B. (FF)	15	FF PD	three then four independents
06/2002	Ahern, B. (FF)	15	FF PD	
06/2007	Ahern, B. (FF)	15	FF GP PD	
05/2008	Cowen, B. (FF)	15	FF GP PD	
11/2009	Cowen, B. (FF)	15 (1)	FF GP	
01/2011	Cowen, B. (FF)	7	FF	
03/2011	Kenny, E. (FG)	15	FG Labour	
05/2016	Kenny, E. (FG)	15 (3)	FG	six other independents
06/2017	Varadkar, L. (FG)	15 (3)	FG	four other independents <i>co-operation agreement with FF</i>

## Acronyms

AAA-PBP	Anti-Austerity Alliance—People Before Profit
CnP	Party of the Republic
CnT	Party of the Land
DL	Democratic Left
FF	Fianna Fáil
FG	Fine Gael
PD	Progressive Democrats
SD	Social Democrats
SF	Sinn Féin
ULA	United Left Alliance
WP	Workers' Party



# ITALY

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1946	moderately multi-party
1948	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (DC)</i>
1953	highly multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (DC)</i>
1958	highly multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (DC)</i>
1963	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (DC)</i>
1968	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (DC)</i>
1972	highly multi-party, <i>with two main parties (DC and PCI)</i>
1976	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (DC and PCI)</i>
1979	highly multi-party, <i>with two main parties (DC and PCI)</i>
1983	highly multi-party, <i>with two main parties (DC and PCI)</i>
1987	highly multi-party, <i>with two main parties (DC and PCI)</i>
1992	highly multi-party
1994	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (LN, PDS, AN, and FI)</i>
1996	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (PDS, FI, and AN)</i>
2001	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (FI, DS, and AN)</i>
2006	highly multi-party
2008	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (PdL and PD)</i>
2013	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (PD)</i>
2018	moderately multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

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1953–1968 inclusive	no party system, <i>but ongoing DC dominance</i>
1976–1987 inclusive	highly multi-party system, <i>with two main parties (DC and PCI)</i>
1992–2006 inclusive	highly multi-party system
2008–2018 inclusive	moderately multi-party system

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## History

Italy was finally unified in 1870 as a secular monarchy. Until World War One, the anti-clerical liberals dominated politics based on a limited franchise. After the war, with universal male suffrage, a fragmented and multi-party system soon developed. This included the Catholic Popular Party, since the pre-World War One Papal prohibition of Catholic involvement in the politics of secular Italy was lifted. Growing polarization and instability set the stage for Benito Mussolini's seizure of power in 1922. By 1925, he had consolidated his regime.

Defeat in World War Two and allied occupation paved the way for another attempt at democratization, this time permanent. A referendum abolished the monarchy in 1946, and another referendum in 1948 approved a new constitution. Under this, voters have the right to repeal legislation through referenda, although the enabling legislation did not pass until 1970. Increasing secularization of Italian society would be evidenced in the 1971 legalization of divorce and the 1978 limited legalization of abortion. Italy was a founding member of the then-European Community.

The strength of the Communist Party in Italy and the related political polarization meant that the ending of the Cold War had a particularly strong effect both on Italian party politics and its available government options.

## Electoral system

Postwar Italy used a very proportional party list proportional representation system; with no national percentage threshold to win seats, many minor and often quite small parties not only won seats but played an important role in national politics. Opposition to political fragmentation and to the entrenched power of the traditional parties – what the Italians called *partitocrazia* or “partyocracy” – led to a growing movement in the early 1990s for electoral reform to allow more decisive elections in which voters could throw out governments. Although certain political parties favoured a shift to the French single-member majority-plurality system, the decision was made to move largely to British-style single-member plurality. The term “largely” is used because, in order to preserve some powers of traditional party

elites, the electoral law for the lower house adopted in 1993 (the “Mattarellum”) provided for about three-quarters (475) of the 630 seats to be elected by single-member plurality, but about one quarter (155) by proportional representation in 26 multi-member districts – albeit with a 4 percent national threshold. Voters had two votes under this additional member electoral system.

The allocation of the proportional representation seats in this additional member system was complicated: this was neither fully compensatory as in Germany or a completely separate calculation. Instead, it was somewhat compensatory in that parties winning plurality seats paid a “price” when it came to determining PR seats. This price, called the *scorporo* (“unbundling” or “separation”), worked as follows in the Chamber of Deputies: in each multi-member district, for each plurality seat won, the party had its total PR votes reduced by the number of votes received by the *second-placed* candidate in the specific single-member plurality constituency, plus one (vote). Only the PR votes remaining after the *scorporo* for each plurality seat were used to calculate the consistency PR seats. Compensation was thus greatest for parties with close losses in the single-member seats. A referendum was held in April 1999 on whether to remove these PR seats, and thus make the system entirely single-member plurality. Supporters of the remaining proportional seats (mainly the smaller parties), seeing the overall public approval for the change, endeavoured to keep the voter turnout down so as to make the vote invalid. In other words, those people who did want to retain some proportionality deliberately did not vote. Consequently, even though the overwhelming majority of actual voters supported removing these seats, the turnout just fell under the 50 percent threshold for validity.

The electoral law (the “Porcellum”) of 2005 (effective as of the 2006 election) changed the Italian electoral system to full proportional representation but with a majoritarian bonus in that the party or electoral coalition with the most votes (plurality) would receive 340 seats (54 percent) if it did not win this many directly, with the remaining 277 “domestic” seats awarded to the other parties or electoral coalitions proportionally amongst them. A separate 12 party list seats were allocated to four overseas constituencies, and the bilingual (French-Italian) Aosta Valley has a single seat. This bonus feature was struck down by the Constitutional Court in December 2013. The follow-up electoral law (the “Italicum”) of 2015 (effective 2016) was a system with a similar majoritarian bonus but only if and when a single party (not coalition) won 40 percent of the vote, otherwise there would be a follow-up ballot between the top two parties (only) in which the winner would get this bonus. (San Marino has had such a run-off since 2008 though for coalitions; see San Marino.) There was also a 3 percent national electoral threshold and the party lists were open not closed. No change was made to the electoral system for the powerful Italian Senate, as this was planned to be an indirectly elected and much weaker body. However, the proposed changes to the Senate and related matters were voted down in the referendum of December 2016. Given this referendum outcome and a Constitutional Court ruling against the run-off vote, another electoral law (the “Rosatellum”) was passed in 2017 which applied to both houses. For the Chamber of Deputies, this law keeps the 12 overseas constituencies and divides

the rest between 232 seats elected by single-member plurality and 386 seats elected by proportional representation (though in fact one of these is a single-member constituency) with a 3 percent national threshold using the largest remainder method and closed lists. The ratio between the two domestic components of this parallel system is thus 37.5:62.5. There is no majority bonus; however multiple allied parties can jointly endorse an individual candidate in each single-member districts. Nor is there any *scorporo*; the two components are calculated separately in terms of totals.

## Political parties and cleavages through 1992

Without a doubt, the main party of postwar Italy was the **Christian Democrats (DC)**, founded in September 1943. The party dominated government, providing every prime minister until 1981. Intended as a broad catch-all party, the DC certainly succeeded in this vein, attracting the support of industrialists and Catholic workers, shopkeepers and housewives, and above all small farmers. This being said, the party was basically on the centre-right, supporting social programmes as well as capitalism, although some of its factions went further left or further right. The appeal of the DC was basically threefold. First, of all the parties in Italy, it was the only explicitly religious one; thus, it gained the votes of practising Catholics. Second, it was seen as a centrist, democratic force in a country with both communists and neo-fascists. In this sense voting for the DC was more of an “anti-” vote in which one voted against the extremes. Third and finally, the DC was the most important party of clientelism, especially towards farmers and the poorer South. It monopolized key patronage ministries such as agriculture and public works. Allied with the DC was the regional **South Tyrolean People’s Party (SVP)**, founded in 1945 in that mostly German-speaking region.

The other two key, albeit small, parties on the centre-right were the **Italian Liberal Party (PLI)** and the **Italian Republican Party (PRI)**, both of which were clearly secular – in contrast to the Christian Democrats. The Liberals dated back to 1848 and, as noted previously, dominated Italian politics before World War One. Their collaboration with Benito Mussolini discredited them after World War Two. The Republicans, for their part, dated back to 1897. In postwar Italy these parties were back by key industrialists and business leaders. Of the two, the Liberals were generally more clearly to the right of the DC on economics.

To the right of the DC on most everything was the neo-fascist **Italian Social Movement (MSI)**, founded in 1946. Strongest in Southern Italy, the MSI looked back to the Benito Mussolini era and called for social and economic ultra-conservatism and heavy defence spending. With one brief exception in 1960, it was considered an unacceptable pariah by the regime parties. Also strongest in Southern Italy were monarchist parties: a **National Monarchist Party (PNM)** was founded in 1946. A split in 1954 would lead to a separate, more moderate **People’s Monarchist Party (PMP)**. Both parties would reunite in 1959, ultimately as the **Italian Democratic Party of Monarchist Unity (PDIUM)**. In the 1960s the PDIUM lost support to the PLI, and finally in 1972 the PDIUM merged into the MSI.

On the left of the political spectrum there were initially only two parties in postwar Italy: the **Italian Socialist Party (PSI)**, founded in 1892, and the **Communist Party of Italy (PCI)**, founded in 1921. The Communists benefited from their role in the resistance, and in the 1946 election would get almost as much support as the Socialists. Both the Socialists and the Communists participated in the basically all-party coalitions that governed Italy from 1945 until early 1947. However, with the Cold War intensifying, the PCI was kicked out of the DC-led government. The majority of the Socialists chose to join the Communists in opposing strongly the DC-led regime. Indeed, in 1948 the two parties ran jointly as the **People's Democratic Front (FDP)**. However, not all Socialists wished to ally with the Communists. Encouraged by the United States, a third of the PSI split off in 1947 to form the **Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI)**. The PSDI and the PSI would link up once, in 1968, but otherwise remained two parties.

Although the PSI and the PCI remained allies until 1956, they competed separately in the 1953 election. The Communists, having gained control of the main leftist organs (newspapers, trade unions, and so on), gained almost twice the support of the Socialists. Starting in 1953, then, the PCI would always be the second largest party and the PSI the third largest. The PCI was strongest in the north-central part of Italy, where it built up a clear subculture. As the main opposition party (except from 1976 to 1979, when it supported a DC government in an attempt to produce an "historic compromise" between the two parties), the PCI benefited from the protest vote in an increasingly stagnant system. It also moderated its ideology and distanced itself from the Soviet Union, so that by the 1970s it was the paradigm of Eurocommunism. The PCI grew steadily in support from 1958 to 1976, peaking in the latter election at just over a third of the vote. However, it then went into a slow decline, in part because of the success with younger voters of the libertarian **Radical Party (PR)**, founded in 1976 and lasting until 1989, and later on the **Green Federation (FdV)**, founded in 1987.

Given that the Communists were essentially the party of the non-(practising) Catholic working class, the Socialists were left without a clear base. From 1956 onwards they moved towards the centre-left, and re-entered government as junior partners of the Christian Democrats in 1963. Like the DC, the PSI soon proved adept at colonizing part of the state apparatus, and thus acquiring votes through clientelism. With the two larger parties becoming ever closer in support, the PSI's position as number three put in ever more clearly into the kingmaker position, and ultimately put Bettino Craxi, its leader as of 1976, into the prime minister's office in 1983.

The Italian party system would however be completely shaken up by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. The PCI now wished to be seen explicitly as a social democratic party (in the broader West European sense). In 1991, therefore, it reformed itself as the **Democratic Party of the Left (PDS)**. However, a hardline minority within the party opposed this evolution, and thus broke away to form the **Communist Refoundation Party (PRC)**. In 1998 the PRC itself would suffer a split-off in the form of the **Party of Italian Communists (PdCI)**. The DC

was also affected by the evolving situation on the left: without its “anti-communist card”, its support fell off in the north to the **Northern League (LN)**, founded in 1991 but following from the 1987 **Lombard League (LL)**. These regional protest parties targeted Italians angry about corruption and the waste of their tax dollars on spending elsewhere in the country. In contrast, in the clientelistic-based South, the DC vote held through the 1992 election.

#### ELECTIONS IN ITALY, 1946–1992

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1946</i>		<i>1948</i>		<i>1953</i>		<i>1958</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
PCI	1	18.9	104		(in FDP)	22.6	143	22.7	140
PSI	4	20.7	115		(in FDP)	12.7	75	14.2	84
FDP	1 and 4	—	—	31.0	183	—	—	—	—
US/PSDI	7	—	—	7.1	33	4.5	19	4.5	22
DC	8	35.2	207	48.5	304	40.1	263	42.4	273
PRI	9	4.4	23	2.5	9	1.6	5	1.4	6
PLI	9	6.8	41	3.8	19	3.0	13	3.5	17
PNM + PMP	11	—	—	2.8	14	6.9	40	4.9	25
UQ Front	12	5.3	30		(with PLI)	—	—	—	—
MSI	13	—	—	2.0	6	5.8	29	4.8	24
SVP	21	—	—	0.5	3	0.5	3	0.5	3
Others		8.7	36	1.8	3	2.3	0	1.1	2
TOTAL SEATS			556		574		590		596

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1963</i>		<i>1968</i>		<i>1972</i>		<i>1976</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
PCI	1	25.3	166	26.9	177	27.1	179	34.4	227
PSIUP	1	—	—	4.5	23	1.9	0	—	—
PSI	4	13.8	87		(in PSU)	9.6	61	9.6	57
PSU	4	—	—	14.5	91	—	—	—	—
PR	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.1	4
PSDI	7	6.1	33		(in PSU)	5.1	29	3.4	15
DC	8	38.3	260	39.1	266	38.7	266	38.7	263
PRI	9	1.4	6	2.0	9	2.9	15	3.1	14
PLI	9	7.0	39	5.8	31	3.9	20	1.3	5
PDUM	11	1.7	8	1.3	6		(into MSI)	—	—
MSI	13	5.1	27	4.5	24	8.7	56	6.1	35
SVP	21	0.5	3	0.5	3	0.5	3	0.5	3
Others		0.8	1	1.0	0	1.6	1	1.8	7
TOTAL SEATS			630		630		630		630

(Continued)

	PF	1979		1983		1987		1992	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
RC	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.6	35
PCI/PDS	1 then 2	30.4	201	29.9	198	26.6	177	16.1	107
FdV	3	—	—	—	—	2.5	13	2.8	16
PSI	4	9.8	62	11.4	73	14.3	94	13.6	92
PR	5	3.5	18	2.2	11	2.6	13	1.2	7
PSDI	7	3.8	20	4.1	23	2.9	17	2.7	16
DC	8	38.3	262	32.9	225	34.3	234	29.6	206
PRI	9	3.0	16	5.1	29	3.7	21	4.5	27
PLI	9	1.9	9	2.9	16	2.1	11	2.9	17
MSI	13	5.3	30	6.8	42	5.9	35	5.4	34
SVP	21	0.5	4	0.5	3	0.5	3	0.5	3
LL/LN	21	—	—	—	—	0.5	0	8.6	55
Others		3.5	8	4.2	12	4.1	12	6.5	15
TOTAL SEATS		630		630		630		630	

Note: The 1946 election was for a constituent assembly.

### Political realignment and the party system since 1993

Starting just before the 1992 election, but intensifying after them, an investigation into bribery and kickbacks in Milan soon discredited most of the PSI, which began to disintegrate. The rot then spread into the other governing parties, especially the DC. By early 1993, the leaders of the PSI, the PLI, and the PSDI had all resigned. The DC leadership initially held firm, but a well-known reformer within the party, Mario Segni, broke away. The DC vote dropped in the June 1993 local elections, and then almost vanished in other local elections later in the year. The party thus dissolved itself at the start of 1994. Two parties would quickly arise out of the ashes of the DC: the **Italian People's Party (PPI)** and the **Christian Democratic Centre (CCD)**, which was actually more right-of-centre. As for the SVP, it ended its loose alliance with the DC after 1992, and indeed by 1995 was part of the broader centre-left. In South Tyrol's neighbouring province of Trentino, the **Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party (PATT)** formed in 1988; since 1992 it has been allied nationally with the SVP.

To sum up at this point, by 1993 the traditional governing parties – DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI, and PLI – had all been discredited, whereas those parties that had not been part of postwar Italian governments – PDS, PR, Greens, MSI, and the relatively new LN – survived the corruption scandals as intact forces. In the local elections of 1993 leftist candidates, backed by but not always members of the PDS, thus did very well, winning many key mayoralty races. Of course, outside of Northern Italy where the LN ran, the main opposition candidate was likely from the MSI, so for some voters certainly a leftist mayor was the lesser of two evils.

Nevertheless, the left did look like it had the momentum to win the upcoming March 1994 national election. This prospect was viewed with apprehension by Silvio Berlusconi, the media magnate. Building on his business network, in late 1993 he quickly formed **Forza Italia! (FI)**, a populist right-of-centre party that was a mixture of media creation, marketing focus, and sporting club support, with Silvio Berlusconi's image being central. (The name itself translates as "Let's go Italy!" or "Come on Italy!") The FI then struck an electoral and hopefully governmental coalition – the Alliance for Freedom – with the LN in the North, and a similar coalition – the Alliance for Good Government – with the **National Alliance (AN)** in the South. The AN was the new version of the MSI, set up for the 1994 election. Its leader, Gianfranco Fini, toned down its fascist legacy and tried, fairly successfully, to present the image of a nationalist conservative party, somewhat akin to the Gaullists in France. As was the case with the PDS and RC, hardline neo-fascists opposed the change from MSI to AN; however, running separately as **The Flame**, these would get less than 1 percent of the vote in the 1994 election. Finally, the CCD joined in with Silvio Berlusconi's side, as did most of the PR, despite their leftist libertarianism.

Opposing the Alliance for Freedom/for Good Government were two other electoral alliances. In the centre there was the Pact for Italy, involving the PPI and a list around Mario Segni. The Pact for Italy thus was explicitly centrist and implicitly religious, factors which has certainly worked for the DC in the past. On the left, the PDS built a Progressive Alliance which included the Greens, what little was left of the PSI, some smaller left parties, but also the RC. The presence within the Progressive Alliance of the Refounded Communists certainly hurt its image with moderate voters.

On election day the Alliance for Freedom/for Good Government easily triumphed over the Progressive Alliance. Silvio Berlusconi had thus largely filled the political space left by the disappearance of the DC. The Pact for Italy was but a distant third, and was squeezed further by the new electoral system. Consequently, the PPI split into a pro-Silvio Berlusconi centre-right group, the **United Christian Democrats (CDU)**, which allied with the CCD, and a centre-left group which joined the Prodi list (see later). For the next few elections competition thus would be essentially between two broad – but internally shifting – alliances of centre-left and centre-right.

Still, another attempt at a centrist party would occur in 1998, when former president Francisco Cossiga attracted Christian democrats away from both the CCD and the CDU to his new **Democratic Union for the Republic (UDR)**. Whereas the CCD and CDU were both right-of-centre in terms of their alliances, the UDR was an attempt to create a truly centrist hinge force. It would in fact join in with the DS-led left-centre government formed later that year. However, four months later the UDR would break-up, with those remaining in the government becoming the **Union of Democrats for Europe (UDEUR)** and the others soon joining FI – as UDEUR would eventually do.

On the centre-left the Progressive Alliance became The Olive Tree for 1996 and 2001, The Union for 2006, and Italy. Common Good for 2013. (The centre-left



coalition had no specific name in 2008 or 2018.) The largest component of these centre-left coalitions was initially the PDS, as noted the main successor to the PCI. In 1998 the PDS merged with several minor parties to form the **Democrats of the Left (DS)**. However, in these alliances there were also centre-left Christian Democrats such as the PPI-led **Prodi List** (from which in 1996 Romano Prodi would become the prime minister of the Olive Tree coalition). In 2000 the PPI, the Dini List, and others on the centre-left formed **Democracy is Freedom (DL) – The Daisy** (commonly known just as **The Daisy**) as an electoral alliance; in 2002 it became a single political party. In 2007 DS and The Daisy merged into the **Democratic Party (PD)**, which has remained the main leftist party. Also in the centre-left alliances were the SVP and PATT, and from 2006 to 2013 the regional **Autonomy Liberty Democracy (ALD)** in the Aosta Valley.

Left liberal parties within the broader centre-left in the past couple of decades have been the anti-corruption **Italy of Values (IdV)** formed in 1998, and a new libertarian radical party, the **Italian Radicals (RI)**, formed in 2001 and primarily anti-clerical. RI has usually run in loose alliance with the PD, most recently in 2018 as part of the **More Europe (+E)** grouping of smaller pro-European liberals.

On the far left the PRC, the Greens, and others would form the **Rainbow Left (SA)** coalition for the 2008 election; separate from the main centre-left it would not win any seats. Some of its components would become the electoral coalition **Left Ecology Freedom (SEL)** in 2009 and then said party in 2010. The SEL ran as part of Italy. Common Good in 2013. The remaining components of SA would run in 2013 as **Civil Revolution (RC)**. In 2015 SEL, dissidents from the PD, and dissidents from the M5S formed the **Italian Left (SI)** parliamentary group; in 2017 this became a single political party. For the 2018 election the SI and others would form the **Free and Equal (LeU)** electoral coalition.

On the centre-right there has been more consistency, with ongoing pro-Silvio Berlusconi coalitions (named the Pole for Freedoms in 1996 and the House of Freedoms in 2001 and 2006; not specifically named from 2008). These coalitions have consisted of FI, AN, usually LN, and rightist Christian Democrats. The latter, as noted previously, consisted of the **Christian Democratic Centre (CCD)** formed in 1994 right out of the DC, and the **United Christian Democrats (CDU)** formed in 1995. The CCD and CDU ran joint lists in 1996 and 2001 and then in 2002 these two parties and another minor Christian Democratic party merged as the **Union of Christian and Centre Democrats (UDC)**.

In 2008 the UDC would be central to the creation of the broader **Union of the Centre (UdC)** which ran separately from Silvio Berlusconi in the centre, and in 2013 would support the pro-Mario Monti coalition (see later). The UdC would participate in the 2013 and 2014 PD-led governments, but would split over participating in the 2016 one, with those remaining allied with the PD becoming the **Centrists for Europe (CpE)**. Earlier, Sicilians from the UDC split off in 2005 to form the regional **Movement for Autonomy (MpA)**.

That said, from 1994 to 2013 the consistent core and largest component of the Italian centre-right was Forza Italia – from 2007 to 2013 this was the **People of Freedom (PdL)**, a joint list with the AN then in 2009 a temporary merger of the

two. In 2012 the AN itself – that is, the part wanting to be separate from FI – was reformed as the **Brothers of Italy (FdI)**. Forza Italia itself was re-established at the end of 2013, though now it was a more standard conservative party rather than a populist one.

For their part, the regionalists of the LN ran on their own in 1996. In December 2013 Matteo Salvini became leader of the LN and would shift it from a regional party to a national one, running in regional elections in the rest of Italy as **Us With Salvini (NcS)** and in the 2018 election deleting the word ‘North’ – just becoming **League (Lega)** and adding Salvini on its electoral symbol. The LN also became a clear populist radical right party, directed against foreigners (whereas previously the LN had been primarily against Southern Italians).

The 2013 election would see the end of this clear party alliance bipolarity. Partly this was due to a coalition formed around Mario Monti – a former European Commissioner who was a technocratic prime minister from 2011 to 2013 (dealing with the post-2008 economic crisis) and who then entered politics. However, the central party here, **Civic Choice (SC)** founded in 2013, would shift to the left, joining and then supporting PD-led governments.

More crucially, 2013 would see the populist **Five Star Movement (M5S)**, founded in 2009 partly by the comedian Beppe Grillo, win a quarter of the vote and become the single largest individual party in Italy proper, a feat repeated in 2018 under the leadership of Luigi Di Maio. The M5S is strongly populist, and it is called a movement not a party – but is not easily placed on the left-right spectrum due to its eclectic mix of policies which differ from populist radical right parties (such as being environmentalist). Indeed, in 2013 slightly more of its supporters had voted left rather than right previously, and in 2018 it picked up most of the lost support of the PD in the South.

## Governments

Italy is known for governmental instability, and, as noted in Chapter 5, since 1945 it has had more governments than any other European country. Nevertheless, after the broad coalitions of the immediate postwar period until the collapse of the old party political order in 1993, there were two main types of governments. The first, more common earlier on when the DC was clearly dominant, was a single-party minority of the party. The second type was a coalition including some or all of the smaller secular parties (PSDI, PRI, PLI) and/or from 1963 onwards the PSI. As the gap narrowed between the DC and the PCI (the latter having been excluded from government after 1947), and thus a left-of-DC government became mathematically possible, the “hinge” parties increased their bargaining power. Thus ultimately in the 1980s and early 1990s non-Christian Democrats became prime minister, although the DC was still central in terms of cabinet seats.

In contrast, since 1994 Italy has seen wholesale alternation between leftist and rightist governments; that is, alternations between coalitions led by the PDS/DS/PD and coalitions led by FI. Governmental instability has remained, however, and indeed there have been a couple non-partisan technocratic governments.

# ELECTIONS IN ITALY SINCE 1994

		PF		1994		1996		2001	
				% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
<i>Progressive Alliance/The Olive Tree</i>				34.4	213	43.8	319	40.5	262
of which:									
RC	1			6.0	39	8.6	35	5.0	11
PdCI	1			—	—	—	—	1.7	10
FdV	3			2.7	11	2.5	16	2.2	17
PDS/DS	4			20.4	109	21.1	171	16.6	136
PSI	4			2.2	14	—	—	—	—
Prodi List				—	—	6.8	71		
Dini List				—	—	4.3	26		
The Daisy	5			—	—	—	—	14.5	83
SVP + PATT	21				(not in the coalition)		(in Prodi List)	0.5	3
Others				3.1	40	0.4	0	0.0	2
<i>Pact for Italy</i>				15.7	46				
of which:									
PPI	8			11.1	33		(in Prodi List)	—	—
Segni Pact	8			4.6	13	—	—	—	—
<i>Pro-Silvio Berlusconi centre-right coalitions</i>				46.4	366	44.0	246	49.5	365
of which:									
CCD – CDU	8	[			29	5.8	30	3.2	40
FI	12	[	21.0		99	20.6	123	29.4	193
AN	13		13.5		109	15.7	93	12.0	99
LN	21		8.4		117		(not in the coalition)	3.9	30
Others			3.5		12	1.9	0	1.0	3
LN						10.1	59		
IdV	5		—		—	—	—	3.9	0
SVP + PATT	21		0.5		3	—	—	—	—
Others			3.0		2	2.1	6	6.1	3
TOTAL SEATS					630		630		630

	PF	2006		2008		2013	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
<i>The Union/ PD-led centre- left coalitions of which:</i>		49.7	348	37.6	247	29.6	345
RC	1	5.7	41		(in SA)		(in Civil Revolution)
PdCI	1	2.3	16		(in SA)		(in Civil Revolution)
SEL	2	—	—		(not in the coalition)	3.2	37
Greens	3	2.0	15		(in SA)		(in Civil Revolution)
Olive Tree List (DS+Daisy)/ PD	4	31.5	226	33.1	217	25.5	297
RI and allies	5	2.5	18		(with PD)	—	—
IdV	5	2.3	17	4.4	29	—	—
UDEUR	8	1.4	10	—	—	—	—
SVP + PATT	21	0.5	4		(not in the coalition)	0.4	5
ALD	21	0.1	1	0.1	1	0.0	0
Others		1.5	0	—	—	0.5	6
SA/Civil Revolution	1, 3, and 4	—	—	3.1	0	2.3	0
SVP + PATT	21		(in The Union)	0.4	2		(in PD-led coalition)
M5S	★★	—	—	—	—	25.1	109
<i>Pro-Mario Monti coalition of which:</i>						10.8	47
UdC	8	—	—	5.7	36	1.8	8
SC	9	—	—	—	—	8.5	39
Others		—	—	—	—	0.5	0
<i>Pro-Silvio Berlusconi centre- right coalitions of which:</i>		49.4	281	46.4	344	28.7	125
UDC	8	6.8	39	—	—	—	—
AN/FdI	11	12.0	71		(with PDL)	1.9	9

(Continued)

	<i>PF</i>	<u>2006</u>		<u>2008</u>		<u>2013</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
FI/PdL	12	23.6	140	37.2	276	21.3	98
LN	21	4.5	26	8.1	60	4.0	18
MpA	21		(with LN)	1.1	8	0.4	0
Others		2.5	5	–	–	1.1	0
Parties of Italians abroad	21	0.3	1	0.2	1	0.5	3
Others		0.6	0	6.7	0	3.0	1
TOTAL SEATS			630		630		630

		<u>2018</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
LeU	2	3.5	14
<i>Centre-left coalition</i>		23.2	122
of which:			
PD	4	18.9	112
+E	5	2.7	3
SVP + PATT	21	0.4	4
Others		1.2	3
M5S	★★	32.2	227
<i>Centre-right coalition</i>		36.7	265
of which:			
FI	10	13.9	106
FdI	11	4.3	31
Lega	12	17.2	124
Others		1.3	4
Parties of Italians abroad	21	0.5	2
Others		4.0	0
TOTAL SEATS			630

%V always refers to the party list component.

★★ centrist populist.

*Note:* 2018 overseas joint centre-right list votes redistributed proportionally to coalition parties.

# ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1946

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
07/1946	de Gasperi, A. (DC)	17	DC PSI PCI PRI PLI	
02/1947	de Gasperi, A. (DC)	15 (2)	DC PCI PSI	
05/1947	de Gasperi, A. (DC)	16 (5)	DC PLI	
12/1947	de Gasperi, A. (DC)	20 (5)	DC PSDI PLI PRI	
05/1948	de Gasperi, A. (DC)	20 (3)	DC PSDI PLI PRI	
01/1950	de Gasperi, A. (DC)	20	DC PRI PSDI	
07/1951	de Gasperi, A. (DC)	16	DC PRI	
07/1953	de Gasperi, A. (DC)	17	DC	PRI
08/1953	Pella, G. (DC)	17	DC	PRI PLI PMP
01/1954	Fanfani, A. (DC)	19 (1)	DC	
02/1954	Scelba, M. (DC)	21	DC PSDI PLI	PRI
07/1955	Segni, A. (DC)	21	DC PSDI PLI	PRI
05/1957	Zoli, A. (DC)	20 (1)	DC	MSI PMP
07/1958	Fanfani, A. (DC)	20	DC PSDI	PRI
02/1959	Segni, A. (DC)	21	DC	PLI PMP
03/1960	Tambroni, F. (DC)	22	DC	MSI
07/1960	Fanfani, A. (DC)	24	DC	PSDI PRI
02/1962	Fanfani, A. (DC)	24	DC PSDI PRI	PSI
06/1963	Leone, G. (DC)	23	DC	
12/1963	Moro, A. (DC)	26	DC PSI PSDI PRI	
07/1968	Leone, G. (DC)	23	DC	
12/1968	Rumor, M. (DC)	27	DC PSI PRI	
08/1969	Rumor, M. (DC)	25	DC	PSI PSDI
03/1970	Rumor, M. (DC)	27	DC PSI PSDI PRI	
08/1970	Colombo, E. (DC)	28	DC PSI PSDI PRI	
02/1971	Colombo, E. (DC)	27	DC PSI PSDI	
02/1972	Andreotti, G. (DC)	25	DC	
06/1972	Andreotti, G. (DC)	26	DC PSDI PLI	PRI
09/1973	Rumor, M. (DC)	29	DC PSI PSDI PRI	
03/1974	Rumor, M. (DC)	26	DC PSI PSDI	PRI
11/1974	Moro, A. (DC)	25	DC PRI	PSI PSDI
02/1976	Moro, A. (DC)	22	DC	PSDI
07/1976	Andreotti, G. (DC)	22 (1)	DC	
03/1978	Andreotti, G. (DC)	21 (1)	DC	PCI PSI PSDI PRI
03/1979	Andreotti, G. (DC)	21	DC PSDI PRI	
08/1979	Cossiga, F. (DC)	23 (2)	DC PSDI PLI	
04/1980	Cossiga, F. (DC)	28	DC PSI PRI	
10/1980	Forlani, A. (DC)	27	DC PSI PRI PSDI	
06/1981	Spadolini, G. (PRI)	28	DC PSI PSDI PRI PLI	
12/1982	Fanfani, A. (DC)	26	DC PSI PSDI PLI	
08/1983	Craxi, B. (PSI)	30	DC PSI PRI PSDI PLI	
04/1987	Fanfani, A. (DC)	27 (11)	DC	

(Continued)

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
07/1987	Goria, G. (DC)	31	DC PSI PRI PSDI PLI	
04/1988	De Mita, C. (DC)	30	DC PSI PSDI PRI PLI	
07/1989	Andreotti, G. (DC)	33	DC PSI PRI PSDI PLI	
04/1991	Andreotti, G. (DC)	30	DC PSI PSDI PLI	
06/1992	Amato, G. (PSI)	25 (4)	DC PSI PLI PSDI	
04/1993	Ciampi, C.A. (ind.)	26 (5)	DC PSI PDS PRI FdV PLI PSDI	
05/1993	Ciampi, C.A. (ind.)	26 (9)	DC PSI PRI PLI PSDI	
05/1994	Berlusconi, S. (FI)	26 (6)	FI LN AN	
01/1995	Dini, L. (ind.)	20 (20)	(non-partisan technocratic government)	
05/1996	Prodi, R. (PPI)	21 (3)	PDS PPI RI FdV UD	
10/1998	D'Alema, M. (PDS)	27 (2)	DS PPI UDR FdV PdCI RI PSDI	
12/1999	D'Alema, M. (PDS)	26 (2)	DS PPI DEM FdV PdCI UDEUR RI	
04/2000	Amato, G. (ind.)	25 (3)	DS PPI DEM FdV PdCI RI SDI UDEUR	
06/2001	Berlusconi, S. (FI)	25 (5)	FI AN LN CCD – CDU	
04/2005	Berlusconi, S. (FI)	25 (3)	FI AN LN UDC NPSI PRI	
05/2006	Prodi, R. (Olive Tree coalition)	27 (3)	DS Daisy FdV IdV RC RnP UDEUR	
05/2008	Berlusconi, S. (FI)	22	FI AN LN MpA	
11/2011	Monti, M. (ind.)	18 (18)	(non-partisan technocratic government)	
04/2013	Letta, E. (PD)	22 (3)	PD PdL/NCD SC RI UdC	
02/2014	Renzi, M. (PD)	17 (3)	PD NCD SC UdC	
02/2015	Renzi, M. (PD)	16 (3)	PD NCD UdC	SC
12/2016	Gentiloni, P. (PD)	19 (2)	PD NCD/AP CpE	SC
06/2018	Conte, G. (ind.)	20 (6)	M5S Lega	

## Acronyms

+E	More Europe
ALD	Autonomy Liberty Democracy
AN	National Alliance
CCD	Christian Democratic Centre

CDU	United Christian Democrats
CpE	Centrists for Europe
DC	Christian Democrats
DL	Democracy and Freedom
DS	Democrats of the Left
FdI	Brothers of Italy
FDP	People's Democratic Front
FdV	Green Federation
FI	<i>Forza Italia</i>
IdV	Italy of Values
Lega	League
LeU	Free and Equal
LL	Lombard League
LN	Northern League
M5S	Five Star Movement
MpA	Movement for Autonomy
MSI	Italian Social Movement
PATT	Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party
PCI	Communist Party of Italy
PD	Democratic Party
PdCI	Party of Italian Communists
PDIUM	Italian Democratic Party of Monarchist Unity
PdL	People of Freedom
PDS	Democratic Party of the Left
PLI	Italian Liberal Party
PMP	Popular Monarchist Party
PNM	National Monarchist Party
PPI	Italian People's Party
PR	Radical Party
PRC	Communist Refoundation Party
PRI	Italian Republican Party
PSDI	Italian Social Democratic Party
PSI	Italian Socialist Party
RI	Italian Radicals
RnP	Rose in the Fist
SA	Rainbow Left
SC	Civic Choice
SEL	Left Ecology Freedom
SI	Italian Left
SVP	South Tyrolean People's Party
UDC	Union of Christian and Centre Democrats
UdC	Union of the Centre
UDEUR	Union of Democrats for Europe
UDR	Democratic Union for the Republic



# LATVIA

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

- 1993 highly multi-party
- 1995 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top four parties (DPS, LC, TKL, and TB)*
- 1998 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top five parties (TP, LC, TB, TSP, and LSDSP)*
- 2002 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (JL, TSP, and TP)*
- 2006 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top four parties (TP, ZZS, JL, and SC)*
- 2010 moderately multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (V, SC, and ZZS)*
- 2011 moderately multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (SC, ZRP, and V)*
- 2014 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top four parties (S, V, ZZS, and NA)*
- 2018 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top five parties (S, KPL LV, JKP, AP!, and NA)*

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1993–2006 inclusive      highly multi-party system

## History

Before being absorbed by Russia in the eighteenth century, Latvia had been ruled in whole or in part by Sweden, Poland, and the Livonian branch of the Teutonic

Knights. In 1917 Latvia came under Bolshevik rule, and it was occupied by Germany in 1918. The interwar democratic government lasted until the coup of 1934. Latvia was formally incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940. On 11 January 1990 the Latvian Supreme Soviet voted to abolish clause in constitution which gave the Communist party the “leading role” in government. It also condemned the 1940 annexation by the Soviet Union. The pro-independence Popular Front movement won election in 1990 and its leader was named prime minister. Latvia declared independence in August 1991 after a referendum. The first sovereign democratic election was in 1993. Latvian was made the sole official language in 1992; a controversial referendum to add Russian (pushed by the Russian-speaking minority) was defeated overwhelmingly in 2012.

### Electoral system

Latvia uses open list proportional representation, and the Sainte-Laguë method of distributing seats amongst parties. Vacancies which occur between general elections are filled by the next-in-line candidates of the same party list.

There have always been 100 seats in the Saeima (parliament) and five electoral districts. The threshold for representation was 4 percent as of 1992 but then increased to 5 percent in 1995. The threshold is the same for coalitions as for individual parties.

### Political parties and cleavages/divisions

In Latvia, the key ideological division has been the degree to which the parties are nationalist and how they feel about the Russian minority population in Latvia. A more recent divide is between parties that emphasize the fight against corruption versus those that are more tolerant of corruption given that they have oligarchical backing.

The **Democratic Party Saimnieks (DPS)** was descended from the prewar **Democratic Centre Party (DCP)** which was re-launched in 1992 and merged with the Saimnieks parliamentary group to form the DPS in 1995. The DPS held a liberal position on economic issues and was moderately nationalist. Saimnieks means “head of farmstead” and is often translated as “in charge”. In 1996 the party absorbed the smaller **Latvian Unity Party (LVP)**. The LVP was formed by orthodox Communists of the Soviet era, and resisted rapid economic and social reform. The DPS lost all its seats in the 1998 election, and would eventually disband in 2005.

**Latvian Way (LC)** (also known as Latvia’s Way) contested the 1993 election as a grouping of ‘personalities’, including ex-communists and many Latvians which had been living abroad and therefore had experience in public service. The LC represented middle-of-the-road views and claimed to be a “non-ideological” coalition. Possessing a liberal-conservative socio-economic orientation the party, like the DPS, was non-hostile to the Latvian minority population. After falling just below the 5 percent threshold in the 2002 election, it joined with the LPP (see later).

Even more liberal in terms of attitudes towards the Russian minority was the **Harmony for Latvia and Rebirth of the National Economy (SLAT)** grouping which contested the 1993 election. SLAT would split in 1994, with the social democratic wing becoming the **National Harmony Party (TSP)** and the free market liberal wing becoming the brief **Political Union of Economists (TPA)**. The TSP would advocate a policy of coexistence between Latvians and non-Latvians and believed in entrenched rights for minority groups. In terms of foreign policy the party advocated a balanced approach between East (Russia) and West (the European Union).

In the first election of 1993 Equality or **Equal Rights (LS)** represented the interests of the non-Latvian ethnic population. The party then became the **Latvian Socialist Party (LSP)** in 1994, and tried to appeal to ethnic Latvians as well even as it urged the adoption of Russian as Latvia's second official language. The TSP, LSP, and one other hardline pro-Russian party would create the **For Human Rights in a United Latvia (PCTVL)** alliance, which was quite successful in the 1998 election and even more so in the 2002 election. The LSP left the PCTVL in 2003, and the remnants of the PCTVL would win six seats in the 2006 election and then become quite marginal. Prior to the 2014 election it would rename itself the **Latvian Russian Union (LKS)**. For its part, the LSP would become the core of the **Harmony Centre (SC)** alliance formed in 2005, which would become the single-party **Harmony (S)** in 2010. SC and then S have been the overwhelming choice of Russian-speakers in recent elections.

At the other end of the political spectrum on the nationality issue one finds the **Latvian National Conservative Party (LNNK)**. The LNNK was known as the Latvian National Independence Party from 1988 to 1994 but then changed its name. The party is ultra-nationalist and anti-Russian and has argued for more restrictive citizenship laws. In 1995 it contested the election with the **Latvian Green Party (LZP)**. Unlike traditional European Green parties, the LZP is on the right in terms of its nationalist attitudes seeing a strong ethnically Latvian country as a necessary step to better environmental conditions. In 1997 the LNNK merged with the more conservative For Fatherland and Freedom (TB) party, founded in 1993, to form **For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Conservative Party (TB/LNNK)**. For the 2010 election TB/LNNK allied with the ultra-nationalist **All For Latvia! (VL!)** and in 2011 these two parties merged as the **National Alliance (NA)**.

Sharing these types of attitudes with respect to non-Latvians was the briefly successful populist radical right **National Movement for Latvia (TKL)**, founded in 1995 by Joahims Zigerists, a wealthy Germany businessman who was born Joachim Siegerist. He claimed Latvian citizenship through his father, an ethnic German who fled Latvia at the end of World War Two. Zigerists was originally a deputy from the LNNK but was kicked out of the party for poor attendance and poor grasp of the Latvian language. The TKL was ultra-nationalist and therefore not surprisingly both anti-Russian and anti-Communist. After it lost all its seats in the 1998 election, Zigerists immediately withdrew from Latvian politics.

Taking the middle position on the nationality issue was the **Christian Democratic Union (KDS)**. Founded in 1991, the party is descended from a group a

prewar parties of similar orientation. After winning seats on its own in the 1993 election, the KDS contested the 1995 election in coalition with the LZS. The KDS ran on its own again in 1998 but was unsuccessful in getting back into parliament. Finally for the 2014 election it became part of the centrist **Latvian Association of Regions (LRA)** alliance, which did win seats. Another party that has run in modern Latvian elections but only won seats in a single election (1998) is the **Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party (LSDSP)**, founded in 1918 and in fact the most electorally successful party in interwar Latvia.

The **Latvian Farmers Union (LZS)** takes a conservative position on the nationality issue but is not as ultra-nationalist as the most hardline parties mentioned previously. The LZS is descended from the similarly named party which was founded in 1917 and disbanded in 1934. Given its size and relative position, the party had dominated Latvian politics during the interwar period – providing three of four presidents and 10 of 13 prime ministers. The party was then restarted in 1991. Since 2002 the LZS has been partnered with the LKP in the **Union of Farmers and Greens (ZZS)**.

Although it supports agricultural protectionism, the LZS can best be seen not as a farmers' party but as one of Latvia's 'oligarchical' parties, as such created by a wealthy connected individual and local mayor, Aivars Lembergs. The other such oligarchical parties in Latvia have been the **People's Party (TP)** of Andris Šķēle, and a series of parties created by Ainārs Šlesers from 1998 onwards: the **New Party (JP)**, **Latvia's First Party (LPP)**, **For a Good Latvia (PLL)**, and **United for Latvia (VL)**. Of course, all three individuals reject the term 'oligarch'. (On these individuals and their parties, see Auers 2015: 139–141.) Of the oligarchical parties, only the ZZS has remained consistently in parliament through the last few elections.

Opposition to such parties has led to new anti-corruption parties, the first of which was **New Era (JL)** founded by central banker Einars Repše. In 2011 JL merged with two other parties to form **Unity (V)**. The second main anti-corruption party was **Zatlers' Reform Party (ZRP)** – as of 2012 the **Reform Party (RP)** – of then-President Valdis Zatlers, which ran in the 2011 election he proposed in a referendum (which was approved) after parliament stalled on corruption investigations. For the 2014 election RP formed an electoral alliance with V, and then joined it in 2015. Positioning itself as an anti-corruption party in the 2014 election was the new **For Latvia From the Heart (NSL)**, however the leader's image would suffer in this regard due to her contacts both apparent and accused. The NSL faction would splinter in 2018 and the party would lose official status. Likewise formed as an anti-corruption party for the 2014 election was the **New Conservative Party (JKP)**. The JKP would have little impact in 2014 but would surge to third place in 2018.

The 2018 election, Latvia's most volatile in two decades, would see two new formations be quite successful. The first of these was **Who Owns the State? (KPV LV)**, founded in 2016, which ran a Trump-like populist campaign against the existing political elites as well as the media. The second was the **Development/For! (AP!)** political alliance created in 2018, which is both socially and economically liberal.

# ELECTIONS IN LATVIA SINCE 1993

<i>PF</i>		<i>1993</i>		<i>1995</i>		<i>1998</i>		<i>2002</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
LVP	1	0.1	0	7.2	8	0.5	0	—	—
LSDSP	4	0.7	0	4.6	0	12.9	14	4.0	0
TSP	4	—	—	5.6	6	(in PCTVL)		—	—
SLAT	5	12.0	13	—	—	—	—	—	—
DCP/DPS	5	4.8	5	15.2	18	1.6	0	—	—
LZS/ZZS	7	10.7	12	6.4	8	2.5	0	9.5	12
JP/LPP	8	—	—	—	—	7.3	8	9.6	10
LC	9	32.4	36	14.7	17	18.1	21	4.9	0
TPA	9	—	—	1.5	0	—	—	—	—
JL	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	24.0	26
KDS	10	5.0	6	(with LZS)		2.3	0	—	—
TP	10	—	—	—	—	21.3	24	16.7	20
TB/TB/ LNNK	11 then 10	5.4	6	12.0	14	14.7	17	5.4	7
LNNK	11 then 10	13.4	15	6.3	8	(with TB)		(with TB)	
TKL	12	—	—	15.0	16	1.7	0	—	—
LS/LSP	21	5.8	7	5.6	5	(in PCTVL)		—	—
PCTVL	21	—	—	—	—	14.2	16	19.1	25
Others		9.7	0	5.9	100	2.8	0	6.8	0
TOTAL SEATS			100		100		100		100

<i>PF</i>		<i>2006</i>		<i>2010</i>		<i>2011</i>		<i>2014</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
PCTVL/ LKS	2	6.0	6	1.5	0	0.8	0	1.6	0
ZZS	7	16.7	18	20.1	22	12.2	13	19.7	21
LRA	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.7	8
LPP-LC	8	8.6	10	(in PLL)		(in PLL)		—	—
JL/V	9	16.4	18	31.9	33	18.8	20	22.0	23
TP	10	19.6	23	(in PLL)		(in PLL)		—	—
TB/ LNNK/ NA	10	6.9	8	7.8	8	13.9	14	16.7	17
PLL/VL	10	—	—	7.8	8	2.4	0	1.2	0
ZRP	10	—	—	—	—	20.8	22	—	—
VL!	11	1.5	0	(with TB/ LNNK)		—	—	—	—
NSL	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.9	7
SC/S	21	14.4	17	26.6	29	28.4	31	23.2	24
Others		9.9	0	4.3	0	2.7	0	2.0	0
TOTAL SEATS			100		100		100		100

	<i>PF</i>	<i>2018</i>	
		<i>%V</i>	<i>#S</i>
LKS	2	3.2	0
AP!	5	12.1	13
ZZS	7	10.0	11
LRA	7	4.2	0
V and allies	9	6.7	8
JKP	10	13.7	16
NA	11	11.1	13
NSL	11	0.8	0
KPV LV	12	14.3	16
S	21	19.9	23
Others		4.0	0
TOTAL SEATS			100

## Governments

The Latvian governments following the 1993 election were both led by the LC and each featured just one other party in the government. However following the 1995 election, Latvia's most fragmented so far, the government coalitions involved up to six parties. Since the 1998 election the most common situation has been four parties in a government. No Latvian government has lasted a full parliamentary term. The government coalitions themselves have been right of centre or centrist rather than leftist, but more importantly they have always been highly or at least moderately nationalist in that they have never included the various 'Russian-friendly' parties. On the other hand, the TKL was also kept out of government.

### LATVIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1993

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
07/1993	Birkavs, V. (LC)	15	LC LZS
09/1994	Gailis, M. (LC)	14 (1)	LC TPA
12/1995	Šķēle, A. (DPS)	12	DPS LC LNNK TB LVP LZS
02/1997	Šķēle, A. (DPS)	13	DPS LC TB LNNK LZS
08/1997	Krasts, G. (TB/LNNK)	13 (1)	TB/LNNK LC DPS LZS
04/1998	Krasts, G. (TB/LNNK)	11 (1)	TB/LNNK LC LZS
11/1998	Krištopans, V. (LC)	15	LC TB/LNNK JP
07/1999	Šķēle, A. (DPS)	16	LC TB/LNNK TP JP

(Continued)

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
05/2000	Bērziņš, A. (LC)	14	TP TB/LNNK LC JP
11/2002	Repše, E. (JL)	19 (1)	JL LPP ZZS TB/LNNK
03/2004	Emsis, I. (ZZS)	18 (1)	LPP TP ZZS JL
12/2004	Kalvītis, A. (TP)	17 (1)	TP LPP ZZS LC
11/2006	Kalvītis, A. (TP)	18	TP ZZS LPP-LC TB/LNNK
12/2007	Godmanis, I. (LPP-LC)	18 (1)	TP ZZS LPP-LC TB/LNNK
03/2009	Dombrovskis, V. (JL)	14	ZZS JL TP TB/LNNK
11/2010	Dombrovskis, V. (V)	14	V ZZS
10/2011	Dombrovskis, V. (V)	14 (2)	V ZRP NA
01/2014	Straujuma, L. (V)	14 (2)	V ZRP ZZS NA
11/2014	Straujuma, L. (V)	14 (1)	V ZZS NA
02/2016	Kučinskis, M. (ZZS)	14	ZZS V NA

## Acronyms

AP!	Development/For!
DCP	Democratic Centre Party
DPS	Democratic Party – Saimnieks
FF/LNNK	For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Conservative Party
JKP	New Conservative Party
JL	New Era
JP	New Party
KDS	Christian Democratic Union
KPV LV	Who Owns the State?
LC	Latvia's Way
LS	Equal Rights
LKDS	Latvian Christian Democratic Union
LNNK	Latvian National Conservative Party
LKS	Latvian Russian Union
LPP	Latvia's First Party
LRA	Latvian Association of Regions
LS	Equal Rights
LSDSP	Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party
LSP	Latvian Socialist Party
LVP	Latvian Unity Party
LZP	Latvian Farmers Party
LZS	Latvian Agrarian Union
NA	National Alliance
NSL	For Latvia From the Heart
PCTVL	For Human Rights in a United Latvia
PLL	For a Good Latvia

RP	Reform Party
S	Harmony
SC	Harmony Centre
SLAT	Harmony for Latvia and Rebirth for the National Economy
TB	Fatherland and Freedom Alliance
TP	People's Party
TPA	Political Union of Economists
TKL	National Movement for Latvia
TSP	National Harmony Party
V	Unity
VL	United For Latvia
VL!	All For Latvia!
ZRP	Zatlers' Reform Party
ZZS	The Union of Farmers and Greens

## Reference

Auers, Daunis (2015), *Comparative Politics and Government of the Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the 21st Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).



# LIECHTENSTEIN

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1945	two-party
1949	two-party
1953 Feb	two-party
1953 Jun	two-party
1957	two-party
1958	two-party
1962	two-party
1966	two-party
1970	two-party
1974	two-party
1978	two-party
1982	two-party
1986	two-party
1989	two-party
1993 Feb	two-and-a-half-party
1993 Oct	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (VU)</i>
1997	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (VU)</i>
2001	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (FBP)</i>
2005	two-and-a-half-party
2009	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (FBP)</i>
2013	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (FBP and VU)</i>
2017	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (FBP and VU)</i>

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1945–1989 inclusive	two-party system (FBP and VU)
1993–2009 inclusive	two-and-a-half-party system (FBP and VU)

## History

Liechtenstein was created in 1719 as a combination of two earldoms, and its sovereignty was recognized in 1809. Until World War One Liechtenstein had close economic ties with Austria; thereafter a customs union was reached with Switzerland. Although Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy, the prince participates in the government and may veto laws. Popular referenda are also important. Liechtenstein was the last country in Europe to grant women the vote, in 1984 (at the third national referendum on the subject). It is part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

## Electoral system

The Liechtenstein Landtag has only 25 members (and through 1986 had only 15), making it the one of the smallest parliaments under study. The country has only two multi-member constituencies, one with 15 seats and one with 10. The electoral system is one of proportional representation using the highest remainder method. There is an 8 percent national threshold for representation, but this electoral threshold was no less than 18 percent until 1973. That extremely high threshold was set in 1939 to keep out radical groups. Voting is compulsory, and the fine for those without a valid excuse is up to Sfr 20 (Liechtenstein uses Swiss currency).

## Political parties and cleavages

Prior to the election of 1993 only two parties had ever won seats in Liechtenstein's parliament. Unlike in other two-party systems these two parties are very similar in outlook and breadth of support; as well they worked together to form a coalition government following every election prior to 1997. The major source of opposition to this political arrangement has therefore come from the citizens of Liechtenstein whose frequent use of referenda has blocked or amended many proposals made by the coalition.

The **Fatherland Union (VU)** was founded during World War One as the **People's Party** which relied heavily on support from the working class. These beginnings were largely forgotten however when in 1936 the party adopted the VU rubric when it merged with smaller conservative political forces. The postwar party has maintained a fairly traditional right-of-centre position. That is, the VU advocates for minimal state interference in the private sector, highlights the importance of the family and individual responsibility and has worked to limit the number

of foreigners coming into the county. The party has also come out in support of equality of pay and treatment of women, issues of particular relevance in a country where women only received the vote in 1984. Early on there was a geographic tendency for the VU to be more heavily supported in the southern constituency of the country however this difference disappeared over time. In recent years the party has also been a strong supporter of stricter environmental standards.

The country's other main party is the **Progressive Citizens' Party (FBP)** which was formed in 1918 as the more conservative alternative to the VU forerunner, the People's Party. The FBP was traditionally the more successful of the two, leading the coalition government continuously from 1928 to 1970. The party broke with tradition following the 1997 election and withdrew entirely from the government coalition for the first time ever. The party, as mentioned, is strikingly similar to the VU. It supports a free market economy while calling for adequate social security measures it puts strong emphasis on family policy, supports equality and has recently begun to be supportive of environmentally friendly policies.

The only other party to win continuous representation is the **Free List (FL)**, first elected in 1997. This party was formed for the 1986 election and is less conservative and strongly environmentalist in orientation. In the 2013 election **The Independents (DU)** on the populist radical right also broke through, indeed into third place, and remained there in 2017. Earlier parties that ran without winning seats included the **Workers' Party (UEK)** and the **Liechtenstein Non-Party List (ÜLL)**, each of which only ran in one election. More durable was the **Christian Social Party (CSP)**, founded in 1961, which contested every election held from 1962 through 1974. The CSP led a successful constitutional challenge to the 18 percent electoral threshold (its 10.1 percent in 1962 would have given it two seats), but the change came too late to benefit it.

Governments

As noted, “grand coalitions” between the two main (and often only) parties had been the norm until 1997, when the first single-party government was formed. Such grand coalitions resumed in 2005.

ELECTIONS IN LIECHTENSTEIN SINCE 1945

	PF	1945		1949		February 1953		June 1953	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
UEK	7	—	—	—	—	6.9	0	—	—
VU	8	45.3	7	47.1	7	42.6	7	49.6	7
FBP	10	54.7	8	52.9	8	50.5	8	50.4	8
TOTAL SEATS			15		15		15		15

	<i>PF</i>	<u>1957</u>		<u>1958</u>		<u>1962</u>		<u>1966</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
VU	8	47.6	7	45.5	6	42.7	7	42.8	7
CSP	8	—	—	—	—	10.1	0	8.7	0
FBP	10	52.4	8	54.5	9	47.2	8	48.5	8
TOTAL SEATS			15		15		15		15

	<i>PF</i>	<u>1970</u>		<u>1974</u>		<u>1978</u>		<u>1982</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
VU	8	49.6	8	47.3	7	49.2	8	53.5	8
CSP	8	1.6	0	2.7	0	—	—	—	—
FBP	10	48.8	7	50.1	8	50.8	7	46.5	7
TOTAL SEATS			15		15		15		15

	<i>PF</i>	<u>1986</u>		<u>1989</u>		<u>February 1993</u>		<u>October 1993</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
FL	3	7.1	0	7.6	0	10.4	2	8.5	1
VU	8	50.2	8	47.2	13	45.4	11	50.1	13
FBP	10	42.7	7	42.1	12	44.2	12	41.3	11
ÜLL	31	—	—	3.2	0	—	—	—	—
			15		25		25		25
TOTAL SEATS									

	<i>PF</i>	<u>1997</u>		<u>2001</u>		<u>2005</u>		<u>2009</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
FL	3	11.6	2	8.8	1	13.0	3	8.9	1
VU	8	49.2	13	41.3	11	38.2	10	43.5	11
FBP	10	39.2	10	49.9	13	48.7	12	47.6	13
TOTAL SEATS			25		25		25		25

	<i>PF</i>	<u>2013</u>		<u>2017</u>					
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>				
FL	3	11.1	3	12.6	3				
VU	8	33.5	8	33.7	8				
FBP	10	40.0	10	35.2	9				
DU	12	15.3	4	18.4	5				
TOTAL SEATS			25		25				

**LIECHTENSTEIN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1945**

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
05/1945	Hoop, J. (FBP)	4	FBP VU
09/1945	Frick, A. (FBP)	4	FBP VU
03/1949	Frick, A. (FBP)	4	FBP VU
03/1953	Frick, A. (FBP)	4	FBP VU
07/1953	Frick, A. (FBP)	4	FBP VU
10/1957	Frick, A. (FBP)	4	FBP VU
04/1958	Frick, A. (FBP)	4	FBP VU
04/1962	Frick, A. (FBP)	4	FBP VU
07/1962	Batliner, G. (FBP)	4	FBP VU
03/1966	Batliner, G. (FBP)	5	FBP VU
03/1970	Hilbe, A. (VU)	5	VU FBP
03/1974	Kieber, W. (FBP)	5	FBP VU
04/1978	Brunhart, H. (VU)	5	VU FBP
03/1982	Brunhart, H. (VU)	5	VU FBP
04/1986	Brunhart, H. (VU)	5	VU FBP
05/1989	Brunhart, H. (VU)	5	VU FBP
05/1993	Büchel, M. (FBP)	5	FBP VU
12/1993	Frick, M. (VU)	5	VU FBP
04/1997	Frick, M. (VU)	5	VU
04/2001	Hasler, O. (FBP)	5	FBP
04/2005	Hasler, O. (FBP)	5	FBP VU
03/2009	Tschütscher, K. (VU)	5	VU FBP
03/2013	Hasler, A. (FBP)	5	FBP VU
03/2017	Hasler, A. (FBP)	5	FBP VU

**Acronyms**

CSP	Christian Social Party
DU	The Independents
FBP	Progressive Citizens' Party
FL	Free List
UEK	Workers' Party
ÜLL	Liechtenstein Non-Party List
VU	Fatherland Union

# LITHUANIA

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1992	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (LDDP)</i>
1996	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (TS-LK)</i>
2000	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (SDK, LLS, and NS)</i>
2004	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (DP, LSDP, and TS-LK)</i>
2008	highly multi-party
2012	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (LSDP, TS-LKD, and DP)</i>
2016	moderately multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1992–2000 inclusive	moderately multi-party system
2004–2012 inclusive	highly multi-party system

## History

Lithuania was one of the leading states of medieval Europe. It merged with Poland in the sixteenth century and was absorbed by Russia in the eighteenth century, during the period of Polish partitions. Lithuania was independent between the World Wars. From 1919 to 1926 it was democratic, but a coup in 1926 established an authoritarian regime. In 1940 it was incorporated into the Soviet Union. In the

1990 Soviet election the majority of seats went to the Lithuanian Reform Movement. Lithuania was the first Soviet Republic to declare independence, which was ultimately recognized in September 1991. Lithuania joined the European Union in 2004. Unlike Estonia and Latvia, the minority populations in Lithuania are small – ethnic Lithuanians make up over 81 percent of the population – though still relevant in the case of the Poles.

## Electoral system

Lithuania uses a mixed electoral system with 141 seats in total. Just over half of the seats – 71 – are elected in single-member districts. Initially in 1992 these single-member districts required an absolute majority, otherwise there was a run-off between the top two candidates. There was also a minimum turnout requirement of 40 percent. Then for 2000 these became single-member plurality seats. As of 2004 these single-member seats once more require a majority, and if the turnout is below 40 percent in the constituency then it requires as well at least 20 percent of the electorate voting for the winning candidate. Failing this, there is a run-off of the top two candidates – though with no turnout requirement.

The remaining 70 seats are awarded proportionally in one national constituency, on the basis of the Hare quota. In order for all these seats to be valid, at least 25 percent of the electorate must have cast its vote. There is a 5 percent electoral threshold based on the proportional representation votes for parties, which goes up to 7 percent for coalitions. (These thresholds were each 4 percent for the 1992 election.)

Vacancies arising between general elections are filled through by-elections (in the single-member constituencies) or by the next-in-line candidates of the same party (in the multi-member constituency).

## Political parties and cleavages

Unlike Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania's former ruling communist party is well represented in party politics. The **Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP)** was founded in 1990 by a faction of former communist party that had initially given its support to Mikhail Gorbachev's reform programme. In 1992 the party campaigned on a programme of gradual transition to a market economy. The LDDP went on to form the government following that first election without needing to work in coalition with any other party.

The other original party on the political left was the **Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP)**. A member of the Socialist International, the LSDP was descended from the historical party of the same name which was originally founded in 1896 and then re-established in 1989. For the 2000 election the LDDP and LSDP formed the **Social Democratic Coalition (SDK)**, and then the two parties merged under the LSDP name in 2001.

The initial political opposition in Soviet Lithuania was the **Lithuanian Reform Movement–Sajudis**. This broadly based middle-of-the-road movement was

equivalent to the Popular Front in both Estonia and Latvia. Sajudis had performed well in the 1990 election to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, winning a majority of the seats, however the movement began to disintegrate in 1991 following a failed attempt to transform the movement into a political party. The main party which did arise out of it was the right-of-centre **Homeland Union–Lithuanian Conservatives (TS-LK)**. Despite its rightward leanings, the party remained open to former communists. The TS-LK had a reputation and image of a radical right-wing party; however for the 1996 election it moderated its tone and transformed itself into a pragmatic and competent Western-style party. In 2008 it merged with the LKDP (see later) and became the **Homeland Union–Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD)**.

The centre of Lithuanian politics was initially taken up by three parties. First, the **Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LKDP)** was a revival of a pre-Soviet party formed in 1905, presented a joint list in most electoral districts with two smaller parties. The LKDP ran successfully by itself in the 1996 election but then dropped off in support and had no seats after the 2000 election. In 2001 it merged with another Christian Democratic party and in 2008 it joined the TS-LK. Second, there was the right liberal **Lithuanian Centre Union (LCS)** which competed in the 1992 election under the **Lithuanian Centre Movement (LCJ)** rubric. The LCS was a pro-market centrist force which saw a sharp increase in the both votes and number of seats from the 1992 election to the 1996 one. However, in the 2000 election the LCS dropped back to its 1992 level whereas the third centrist party, the **Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLS)** formed in 1990, had a major breakthrough. Consequently, the LCS merged into the LLS to form in 2003 the **Union of Liberals and Centrists (LiCS)**. After losing all its seats in the 2012 election, the LiCS would merge with a smaller party to form the **Lithuanian Freedom Union (LLS)** in 2014.

The last original and ongoing party in Lithuania is the small party of the Polish minority, the **Polish Electoral Union (AWPL in Polish)** formed in 1994 explicitly as a political party from the political wing of the **Association of Poles in Lithuania (ZPL)** which had run in the 1992 election.

Starting with the 2000 election there has been a series of new major and minor political parties in Lithuania. In 2000 there was the social liberal **New Union (NS)** which came second in votes. By the 2004 election the NS was running with the LSDP, then it again ran on its own in 2008. Finally in 2011 it merged into the oligarch-founded social liberal **Labour Party (DP)**, which in its first election in 2004 had entered parliament as the largest party. The 2004 election also saw two other new groupings enter parliament. First, there was the **Union of Peasants and New Democratic Parties (VNDPS)** founded in 2001, which would become the **Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union (LVLS)** in 2008 and then the **Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union (LVŽS)** at the start of 2012. Second, there was the populist radical right **Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)** formed in 2002, which would become **Order and Justice (PTT)** in 2006. In the 2008 election the right liberal **National Revival Party (TPP)**, founded that year, came second



in terms of the popular vote. After internal defections, the TPP merged into the LiCS in 2011. Dissident members of the LiCS unhappy with its leader formed in 2006 the **Liberals' Movement of the Republic of Lithuania (LRLS)** which

## LITHUANIAN ELECTIONS SINCE 1992

	PF	1992		1996		2000		2004	
		%V	# S	%V	# S	%V	# S	%V	# S
LDDP	2	44.0	73	10.0	12	(in SDK)		—	—
LSDP	4	6.0	8	6.9	12	(in SDK)		20.7	31
SDK	4	—	—	—	—	31.1	51	—	—
NS	5	—	—	—	—	19.6	29	(with LSDP)	
DP	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	28.6	39
VNDPS	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.6	10
LCJ/LCS	9	2.5	2	8.7	13	2.9	2	—	—
LLS/LiCS	9	1.5	0	1.9	1	17.3	34	9.1	18
LKDP	10	12.6	18	10.4	16	3.1	2	1.4	0
TS-LK	10	21.2	30	31.3	70	8.6	9	14.6	25
LDP	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	11.4	11
ZPL/AWPL	21	2.1	4	3.1	1	1.9	2	3.8	2
Others and independents		10.1	6	27.1	12	15.5	12	3.8	5
TOTAL SEATS			141		137		141		141

	PF	2008		2012		2016	
		%V	# S	%V	# S	%V	# S
LSDP	4	11.8	26	19.2	39	15.0	17
NS	5	3.7	1	(into DP)		—	
DP	7	9.0	10	20.7	29	4.9	2
LVLS/LVŽS	7	3.7	3	4.1	1	22.5	54
LiCS/LLS	9	5.3	8	2.2	0	2.2	0
LRLS	9	5.7	11	9.0	10	9.4	14
TPP	9	15.1	16	—	—	—	—
TS-LKD	10	19.6	44	15.7	33	22.6	31
PTT	12	12.7	15	7.6	11	5.6	8
DK	12	—	—	8.3	7	0.3	0
AWPL	21	4.8	3	6.1	8	5.7	8
Others and independents		8.6	4	7.2	3	11.8	7
TOTAL SEATS			141		141		141

also entered parliament in 2008. In the 2012 and 2016 elections the LRLS would be the only successful right liberal party. Lastly, in the 2012 election there was the anti-corruption and populist **The Way of Courage (DK)**, which lost all its seats in 2016.

## Governments

The government formed after the 1992 election was a single-party government of the LDDP. All subsequent governments have been coalitions. That said, the more recent coalitions have lasted a full parliamentary term, something unique to the Baltic states.

### LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1992

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
12/1992	Lubys, B. (LDDP)	19	LDDP
03/1993	Slezevicius, A. (LDDP)	19	LDDP
02/1996	Stankevicius, L.M. (LDDP)	19	LDDP
12/1996	Vagnorius, G. (TS-LK)	17	TS-LK LCS LKDP
06/1999	Paksas, R. (TS-LK)	14 (3)	TS-LK LKDP LCS LLS
11/1999	Kubilius, A. (TS-LK)	14 (5)	TS-LK LKDP LCS
10/2000	Paksas, R. (LLS)	14 (1)	LLS NS SDK
07/2001	Brazauskas, A. (LSDP)	14 (2)	NS SDK
12/2004	Brazauskas, A. (LSDP)	14	LSDP DP NS LVZS
07/2006	Kirkilas, G. (LSDP)	14 (1)	LSDP LVZS LiCS
12/2008	Kubilius, A. (TS-LKD)	15	TS-LKD LRLS LiCS TPP
12/2012	Butkevicius, A. (LSDP)	15	LSDP DP PTT AWPL
11/2016	Skvernelis, S. (LVŽS)	14	LVŽS LSDP

## Acronyms

AWPL	Polish Electoral Union
DK	The Way of Courage
DP	Labour Party
LCJ	Lithuanian Centre Movement
LCS	Lithuanian Centre Union
LDDP	Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LKDP	Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party
LiCS	Union of Liberals and Centrists
LLS	Lithuanian Liberal Union Lithuanian Freedom Union
LRLS	Liberals' Movement of the Republic of Lithuania
LSDP	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party

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LVLS	Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union
LVŽS	Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union
NS	New Union
PTT	Order and Justice
SDK	Social Democratic Coalition
TPP	National Revival Party or National Progress Party
TS-LK	Homeland Union–Lithuanian Conservatives
TS-LKD	Homeland Union–Lithuanian Christian Democrats
VNDPS	Union of Peasants and New Democratic Parties
ZPL	Association of Poles in Lithuania

# LUXEMBOURG

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1945	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (CSV)</i>
1948–51	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (CSV and LSAP)</i>
1954	two-and-a-half-party
1959	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (CSV and LSAP)</i>
1964	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (CSV and LSAP)</i>
1968	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (CSV and LSAP)</i>
1974	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (CSV, LSAP, and DP)</i>
1979	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (CSV)</i>
1984	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (CSV and LSAP)</i>
1989	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (CSV and LSAP)</i>
1994	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (CSV, LSAP, and DP)</i>
1999	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (CSV, DP, and LSAP)</i>
2004	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (CSV)</i>
2009	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (CSV)</i>
2013	moderately multi-party
2018	highly multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1945–2013 inclusive	moderately multi-party system
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## History

Luxembourg achieved its independence in 1839, although it became part of the German tariff union. The population speaks German, French, and the local Letzeburgesch dialect. Its economic ties have been closest with Belgium: a customs union has existed since 1921, and the Luxembourg franc was set at parity to the Belgian franc (which was also legal tender). Luxembourg joined the Benelux economic union in 1947, and then was a founding member of the then-European Community. A grand duke is the ceremonial head of state.

## Electoral system

Luxembourg uses a party list proportional representation system, with seats allocated by the Hagenbach-Bischoff method. Voters may vote for a party list but also freely for specific candidates using preferential voting and panachage. The country is divided into four multi-member constituencies. Voting is compulsory for those under 75, under sanction of a fine.

From 1922 through 1951 Luxembourg held partial national elections, with the centre and north districts voting together and the south and east districts voting together three years later/earlier. Consequently individual deputies served six-year terms. However, a full election was held in 1945 after the German occupation of World War Two, as the last previous election was the partial one of 1937. In the 1950s the partial elections were ended and the parliamentary term set at five years.

## Political parties and cleavages

In Luxembourg, there is a high importance placed on individual candidates. In terms of political parties, the most successful has been the **Christian Social People's Party (CSV in German, PCS in French)**, which was formed in 1914. Since 1945 the CSV has won the plurality of votes in all but three elections but has nevertheless never failed to win the plurality of seats. The CSV has participated in nearly every government since its founding, and more importantly has provided all but two of the country's post-World War Two prime ministers. The party is pro-monarchy, supports the social market economy, is in favour of subsidies for small business and farmers, and is strongly supportive of the European Union and NATO. The party's main sources of support are farmers, Catholics and moderate conservatives.

The second largest party next to the CSV has been the **Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party (LSAP in German, POSL in French)**. The party was founded in 1902 and is a moderately left of centre party. The LSAP is pro-EU and pro-NATO and supports the concept of a mixed economy so long as the present social security net is protected and maintained. The party enjoys a fairly broad base of support but is particularly strong amongst the urban lower/middle classes and trade union members. In 1971 more conservative members split from the LSAP and created the **Social Democratic Party (SDP)** which was itself dissolved in 1983 after competing in only two elections.

The third force in Luxembourg politics have been the liberals, who date back to 1904. After liberation they formed the **Patriotic and Democratic Group (GPD in French)** with members of resistance groups. In 1952 this became simply the **Democratic Group (GD in French)** and since 1955 they have been the **Democratic Party (DP in German, PD in French)**. The party occupies a liberal centre-right position on most issues. The party supports the concepts of economic liberalism and free enterprise but is nevertheless committed to maintaining social welfare. The DP is pro-EU and pro-NATO and is mildly anti-clerical. The party is mainly supported by the upper middle-class and professionals, and its support is strongest in Luxembourg City.

The **Communist Party of Luxembourg (KPL in German, PCL in French)** was founded in 1921. The party was an orthodox communist party and called for the total nationalization of the economy. The KPL was pro-Soviet while the Soviet Union still existed and was the only Western European communist party which gave its approval of the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Prior to 1979 the party enjoyed fairly high levels of popular support, and was continuously in parliament up through 1989. The party got support from intellectuals and some of the country's urban and industrialized workers. In 1999, many party members were involved in the founding of **The Left (DL in German, LG in French)**, which was to be a uniting of militants left of social democracy rather than an actual coalition. That said, in 1999 the KPL did not run itself leaving the political left open to the new eponymous grouping. However, ongoing internal tensions within DL led to the communists presenting their own list again in 2004 (neither list winning a seat) and continuing to do so since then.

The **Green Alternative Party (GAP in German, PAV in French)** was formed in 1983 and advocated a mixture of green and leftist policies. Some of the party's campaigns have centred on calling for a 35-hour work week and developing a more ecologically friendly agricultural sector. In 1985 the **Green List, Ecological Initiative (GLEI in German, LVIÉ in French)** was formed by a prominent ex-member of the GAP who was forced out of the party. The two parties ran separate lists in the 1989 election, with each winning two seats. In 1994 they ran a joint list and then reunited the following year at which point since they have been known simply as **The Greens**. There is also a **Pirate Party Luxembourg (PPLU in German, PPL in French)** which was formed in late 2009 and first ran in 2013 then broke through to win seats in 2018.

Luxembourg's first single-issue parties represented the interests of those who were forcibly conscripted into the *Wehrmacht* in World War Two. The first such party, in the 1960s, was the **Popular Independent Movement (MIP in French)**. It won seats in 1964 (the first new postwar party to do so), but in 1968 merged into the DP. The second such party was the **Enrôlés de Force (EdF in French)**, which won a seat in 1979. In 1981 the government of Luxembourg finally recognized these conscripts as victims of Nazi Germany, thus closing this issue. Then in 1987 Luxembourg saw the creation of the **Action Committee 5/6ths Pensions for Everyone**, a special interest party argues for the introduction of an across-the-board pension plan worth five-sixths of a person's final salary, something which civil servants enjoyed. Pension equality was achieved in 1998, but the party remained and began to emphasize

Euroskepticism (it is the only such party in Luxembourg). In 2006 it adopted its current name of **Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR in German, PRAD in French)** – thus having no specific reference to pensions – and since then (if not indeed a bit earlier) it is better seen as a populist radical right party. Besides Euroskepticism, the ADR stresses economic liberalism and direct democracy.

## ELECTIONS IN LUXEMBOURG SINCE 1945 \*

	PF	1945		1954		1959		1964	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
KPL	1	11.1	5	7.3	3	7.2	3	10.4	5
LSAP	4	23.4	11	32.8	17	33.0	17	35.9	21
CSV	8	44.7	25	45.2	26	38.9	21	35.7	22
GPD/DP	9	18.0	9	12.3	6	20.3	11	12.2	6
MIP	31	–	–	–	–	–	–	5.8	2
Others		2.8	1	2.3	0	0.5	0		
TOTAL SEATS			51		52		52		56

	PF	1968		1974		1979		1984	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
KPL	1	13.1	6	8.8	5	4.9	2	4.4	2
Greens	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	4.2	2
LSAP	4	31.0	18	27.0	17	22.5	14	31.8	21
SDP	4	–	–	10.1	5	6.4	2	–	–
CSV	8	37.5	21	29.9	18	36.4	24	36.7	25
DP	9	18.0	11	23.3	14	21.9	15	20.4	14
EdF	31	–	–	–	–	4.6	1	–	–
Others		0.4	0	1.0	0	3.3	1	2.5	0
TOTAL SEATS			56		59		59		64

	PF	1989		1994		1999		2004	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
KPL	1	4.4	1	1.7	0	–	–	0.9	0
The Left	2	–	–	–	–	3.3	1	1.9	0
Greens	3	7.5	4	9.9	5	9.1	5	11.6	7
LSAP	4	26.2	18	25.4	17	22.3	13	23.4	14
CSV	8	32.4	22	30.3	21	30.1	19	36.1	24
DP	9	17.2	11	19.3	12	22.4	15	16.1	10
Action Committee 5/6	31	7.9	4	9.0	5	11.3	7	10.0	5
Others		4.4	0	4.4	0	1.5	0	0.1	0
TOTAL SEATS			60		60		60		60

	PF	2009		2013		2018	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
KPL	1	1.5	0	1.6	0	1.3	0
The Left	2	3.3	1	4.9	2	5.5	2
Greens	3	11.7	7	10.1	6	15.1	9
LSAP	4	21.6	13	20.3	13	17.6	10
PPLU	5	–	–	2.9	0	6.4	2
CSV	8	38.0	26	33.7	23	28.3	21
DP	9	15.0	9	18.3	13	16.9	12
ADR	12	8.1	4	6.6	3	8.3	4
Others		0.8	0	1.5	0	0.6	0
TOTAL SEATS			60		60		60

\* Excluding 1948 and 1951 as these were each partial elections.

## Governments

Despite the relative balance of the parties, the larger size of the CSV, combined with their centrist position, has meant, as noted previously, that the party provided all but two of the country's post-World War Two prime ministers. Coalitions from 1947 onwards were always two-party, however the 2013 government – which excluded the CSV – was the first three-party coalition.

### LUXEMBOURG GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1945

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
11/1945	Dupong, P. (CSV)	8 (1)	CSV LSAP DP KPL
03/1947	Dupong, P. (CSV)	7	CSV DP
07/1948	Dupong, P. (CSV)	7	CSV DP
07/1951	Dupong, P. (CSV)	6	CSV LSAP
12/1953	Bech, J. (CSV)	6	CSV LSAP
06/1954	Bech, J. (CSV)	8	CSV LSAP
03/1958	Frieden, P. (CSV)	8	CSV LSAP
02/1959	Werner, P. (CSV)	7	CSV DP
07/1964	Werner, P. (CSV)	8	CSV LSAP
01/1969	Werner, P. (CSV)	7	CSV DP
06/1974	Thorn, G. (DP)	8	DP LSAP
07/1979	Werner, P. (CSV)	8	DP CSV
07/1984	Santer, J. (CSV)	9	CSV LSAP
07/1989	Santer, J. (CSV)	10	CSV LSAP
07/1994	Santer, J. (CSV)	12	CSV LSAP
01/1995	Juncker, J.-C. (CSV)	12	CSV LSAP
08/1999	Juncker, J.-C. (CSV)	14	CSV DP

(Continued)



<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
07/2004	Juncker, J.-C. (CSV)	15	CSV LSAP
07/2009	Juncker, J.-C. (CSV)	15	CSV LSAP
12/2013	Bettel, X. (DP)	15	DP LSAP Greens

**Acronyms (German language)**

ADR	Alternative Democratic Reform Party
CSV	Christian Social People's Party
DL	The Left
DP	Democratic Party
GAP	Green Alternative Party
GLEI	Green List – Ecological Initiative
KPL	Communist Party of Luxembourg
LSAP	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party
PPLU	Pirate Party Luxembourg

**Acronyms (French language)**

EdF	<i>Enrôlés de Force</i>
GD	Democratic Group
GPD	Patriotic and Democratic Group
MIP	Popular Independent Movement

*Note:* the more common language is used in each case.

# MALTA

**The party pattern in each election, *with additional components***

1966	two-party
1971	two-party
1976	two-party
1981	two-party
1987	two-party
1992	two-party
1996	two-party
1998	two-party
2003	two-party
2008	two-party
2013	two-party
2017	two-party

**Party systems (with smoothing)**

1966–2017 inclusive      two-party system (MLP and PN)

**History**

At the crossroads of the Mediterranean, Malta was subjected to frequent invasions and occupations until it fell under British control. Malta became independent from Britain in 1964, and a republic within the British Commonwealth in 1974. It joined the European Union in 2004. Although there is no compulsory voting, voter

turnout in Malta is consistently above 90 percent due to intense political partisanship and strong political polarization (on turnout, see Herczy 1995).

## Electoral system

Malta uses a single transferable vote (STV) system in which the country is divided into 13 constituencies, each with five seats. A constitutional amendment in 1987 dictated that the party winning the majority of votes be given the (bare) necessary number of seats to have a (one seat) parliamentary majority, thus preventing any more “manufactured minorities” as occurred with great controversy in 1981. Such bonuses were awarded twice, in 1987 and 1996. In 1996 the constitution was again modified to ensure that – as long as only two parties won seats – the party with the plurality (not necessarily the majority) of votes would be given a parliamentary majority. Then in 2007 a broader constitutional reform sought to ensure overall proportionality in the election results, again as long as only two parties won seats – a reform that can award and has awarded extra seats to either the winning party or to the runner-up party depending on which is under-represented in terms of overall proportionality. The unsuccessful candidates with the most votes are the ones winning the seats here. Of course, this broader procedure essentially subsumes the previous reforms. These extra seats have been awarded in every election since 2008, first in 2008 to the winning party and then in 2013 and 2017 to the runner-up party to narrow the seat gap.

## Political parties and cleavages

Maltese elections are marked by intense partisanship and extremely high voting turnout absent compulsory voting (see Herczy 1995). Until 2017, post-independence Malta had a pure two-party system in terms of parliamentary seats. The **Maltese Labour Party (MLP)** has been in power following half of Malta’s 12 post-independence elections. In 2008 it became simply the **Labour Party (PL in Maltese)**. Early on the MLP adhered to a socialist domestic policy in advocating for universal education and healthcare, in engaging in nationalization, and generally in giving government a large role in the economy. In recent decades its policies have been more social democratic than outright socialist. Traditionally the MLP also supported a neutralist foreign policy in which it saw Malta’s role as one of a link between the Arab countries of North Africa and the Middle East with the countries of Europe. While encouraging close relations with EU members the MLP consistently argued against full membership of Malta in the European Union until after the country joined in 2004.

The other main party, and the only other to have governed Malta since independence, is the **Nationalist Party (PN)**. The PN advocates a more right-of-centre policy with regard to the national economy, preferring less government intervention. (The party has often run campaigns calling for cleaner government and for guarantees of human rights.) In the area of foreign policy the party has always been supportive of EU membership as well as favouring closer cooperation

with NATO. The PN is also more socially conservative. Support for the party comes mainly from white collar professionals and as well religious adherents.

There are other parties in Malta which have received a share, albeit a small one, of the popular vote. The most longstanding of these is the **Democratic Alternative (DA)**. This party was founded prior to the 1992 election mainly as a form of protest against the two-party system. In terms of policy the party is primarily concerned with ecological and environmental issues.

In 2016 a new party loosely on the centre-left, the **Democratic Party (PD)**, was formed by Marlene Farrugia who had been a Labour MP until 2015 then became an independent. Marlene Farrugia began her political career in the 1990s with the PN but then switched parties in 2003 (something which is extremely rare in Malta). For the 2017 election the PD and PN formed an electoral alliance, with PD candidates running on the PN lists but with “Of Orange” added after their names. (The DA rejected a parallel offer from the PN, and held out unsuccessfully for an umbrella opposition coalition.) In this way Marlene Farrugia won a seat, becoming the first person to be elected as a candidate outside of the two main Maltese parties since the pre-independence 1962 election – but also allowing the PN to gain a couple extra seats as per the rules, given that only two lists won seats.

Malta has also had two populist radical right parties in recent years, both centred on issues of (illegal) immigration. The first such party, **National Action (AN)**, existed between 2007 and 2010 and was led by a former Nationalist Party MP. The second and more hardline party, the **Maltese Patriots Movement (MPM)**, was founded in 2016. It is also strongly anti-establishment and anti-media.

#### ELECTIONS IN MALTA SINCE 1966

	PF	1966		1971		1976		1981	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
MLP	4	43.1	22	50.8	28	51.5	34	49.1	34
PN	8	47.9	28	48.1	27	48.5	31	50.9	31
Others		9.0	0	1.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	0
TOTAL SEATS			50		55		65		65

	PF	1987		1992		1996		1998	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
DA	3	–	–	1.7	0	1.5	0	1.2	0
MLP	4	48.9	34	46.5	31	50.7	35	47.0	30
PN	8	50.9	35	51.8	34	47.8	34	51.8	35
Others		0.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0
TOTAL SEATS			69		65		69		65

(Continued)

	<i>PF</i>	<i>2003</i>		<i>2008</i>		<i>2013</i>		<i>2017</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
DA	3	0.7	0	1.3	0	1.8	0	0.8	0
MLP/PL	4	47.5	30	48.8	34	54.8	39	55.0	37
PD	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.6	1
PN	8	51.8	35	49.3	35	43.3	30	42.1	29
AN	12	—	—	0.5	0	—	—	—	—
MPM	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	0
Others		0.0	0	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.1	0
TOTAL SEATS			65		69		69		67

*Note:* Though listed here and treated separately, PD support in 2017 was formally included in the PN totals.

\* Including 4 bonus seats to produce a parliamentary majority.

\*\* Including additional seats to make the result proportional.

## Governments

Maltese governments have always been single-party ones, either of Labour or the PN. They form quickly, and normally last a full term in office. The most important exception here occurred after the 1996 election which gave the MLP a one-seat majority. The former party leader and prime minister Dom Mintoff broke ranks in 1997 over the economic austerity measures of the government and voted against it, leading to an early election in 1998 which Labour lost.

### MALTESE GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1966

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
03/1966	Olivier, G.B. (PN)	8	PN
06/1971	Mintoff, D. (MLP)	9	MLP
09/1976	Mintoff, D. (MLP)	12	MLP
12/1981	Mintoff, D. (MLP)	14	MLP
12/1984	Bonnici, M. (MLP)	11	MLP
05/1987	Fenech Adami, E. (PN)	18	PN
02/1992	Fenech Adami, E. (PN)	13	PN
10/1996	Sant, A. (MLP)	15	MLP
09/1998	Fenech Adami, E. (PN)	13	PN
04/2003	Fenech Adami, E. (PN)	13	PN
03/2004	Gonzi, L. (PN)	15	PN
03/2008	Gonzi, L. (PN)	11	PN
03/2013	Muscat, J. (MLP)	16	MLP
06/2017	Muscat, J. (MLP)	15	MLP

## Acronyms

AN	National Action
DA	Democratic Alternative
MLP	Maltese Labour Party
MPM	Maltese Patriots Movement
PD	Democratic Party
PL	Labour Party
PN	Nationalist Party

## Reference

Hirczy, Wolfgang (1995), “Explaining Near-Universal Turnout: The Case of Malta”, *European Journal of Political Research*, Volume 27, pp. 255–272.

# MONTENEGRO

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

2002	two-and-a-half-party
2006	moderately multi-party
2009	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (DPS with SDP)</i>
2012	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (DPS with SDP)</i>
2016	highly multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (DPS)</i>

## Party systems (with smoothing)

2006–2012 inclusive   moderately multi-party system

## History

Independent from 1878 to 1918, Montenegro had become part of what would be Yugoslavia. After the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ended in 2003, Montenegro remained in a confederation with Serbia. This confederation allowed the option of independence after three years, an option chosen by Montenegro and confirmed in a referendum in 2006. The country became a member of NATO in 2017.

Multi-party politics began at the start of the 1990s as part of Yugoslavia. The Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro has been the dominance force since then, and the party itself has been led since 1997 by Milo Đukanović. In late 2015 opposition protests occurred against corruption in the government and of Milo Đukanović himself, and against what the opposition considered unfair elections. On election day in October 2016 various individuals were arrested for attempting a coup d'état. From the government's perspective the coup was a real attempt

by Russia and its supporters in Montenegro to prevent the country from joining NATO. From the opposition's perspective the coup attempt was staged by the DPS-led government as a publicity stunt; after the election the major opposition parties boycotted the parliament, although parts of the opposition took up their seats in December 2017.

## Electoral system

Montenegro uses a closed party list proportional representation electoral system. The entire country serves as one constituency for 81 seats (since 2006) using the d'Hondt method, for which there is a 3 percent threshold for representation (lesser thresholds apply to ethnic minorities).

## Cleavages and political parties

The cleavage of national identity and the related issue of independence have structured party politics in Montenegro. On one side the **Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS)**, founded in 1991, is the party of those with a Montenegrin identity. Allied to it until recently was the **Social Democratic Party of Montenegro (SDP)**, founded in 1993. The party split in 2015 over whether to continue supporting the DPS; those who did wish to do so would quickly form a new party, the **Social Democrats of Montenegro (SD)**. Also strongly pro-independence was the **Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LSCG)**, which existed from 1990 to 2005. The LSCG was additionally opposed to what it saw as the authoritarianism of the DPS. A faction expelled over a corruption affair in 2004 then formed the **Liberal Party of Montenegro (LPCG)**, which in contrast to the LSCG grew close to the DPS over time and by 2012 ran as a junior partner of the latter. Montenegrin independence was also supported by the (anti-Serbian) ethnic minorities of Albanians, Bosnians, and Croats. There are multiple small Albanian parties in Montenegro, which run in shifting alliances. Of these parties, the most important is the **Democratic Union of Albanians (DUA)**, formed in 1993; it has always been in government except when it failed to win a seat in 2012. Other key ethnic parties close to the DPS are the **Bosniak Party (BS)**, formed in 2006, and the **Croat Civic Initiative (HGI)**, formed in 2002.

Opposition to the DPS traditionally has been composed of those whose identity is Serbian rather than Montenegrin. The key initial party in this regard was the **Socialist People's Party of Montenegro (SNP)**, formed in 1997 and which sought to preserve the union with Serbia. The failure of the SNP to prevent Montenegro's independence led to much of its support going to other ethnic Serb parties as of the 2006 election. The first of these was the **Serb People's Party (SNS)**, formed in 1998. In 2006 the SNS was the core of the **Serb List (SL)** electoral alliance. In 2009 the SNS with another party formed the **New Serb Democracy (NOVA)** party. The other party to which the SNP lost support was the **Movement for Changes (PzP)**, formed in 2002 as an NGO and 2006 as a party. Though also pro-ethnic Serbs, the PzP stressed making Montenegro a European country, joining the European



Union, and opposing what it considered the “undemocratic rule” of the DPS. In 2012 NOVA, the PzP, and several other parties formed the **Democratic Front (DF)** as a broad opposition to the DPS. For its part, the SNP in 2016 formed the **Key Coalition (KK)** electoral alliance with two other parties. In 2015, a centrist faction of the SNP split and formed **Democratic Montenegro (DCG)** which would be electorally successful in 2016. Finally, in 2012 the newly formed social liberal **Positive Montenegro (PCG)** would come fourth. However in January 2016 the party would split, with a crucial minority of MPs choosing to support the government after the SDP left the cabinet. In the 2016 election the PCG would lose all its seats.

ELECTIONS IN MONTENEGRO SINCE 2002

	PF	2002		2006		2009		2012	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
DPS and SDP	4	48.0	39	48.6	41	51.9	48	46.3	39
SNP and allies	4	38.4	30	14.1	11	16.8	16	11.2	9
LSCG/LPCG	5	5.8	4	3.8	3	2.7	0	(with DPS)	
PCG	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	8.4	7
PzP	10	—	—	13.1	11	6.0	5	(in DF)	
SL/NOVA	21	(with SNP)		14.7	12	9.2	8	(in DF)	
DF	10 and 21	—	—	—	—	—	—	23.2	20
Albanian parties	21	2.4	2	3.2	3	5.1	4	3.4	2
BS	21	—	—	(with LPCG)		(with DPS)		4.2	3
HGI	21	—	—	—	—	(with DPS)		0.4	1
Other parties		5.4	0	2.5	0	8.3	0	2.9	0
TOTAL SEATS		75		81		81		81	

	PF	2016	
		% V	# S
DPS	4	41.4	36
SDP	4	5.2	4
SD	4	3.3	2
PCG	5	1.3	0
KK	5	11.1	9
DCG	7	10.0	8
DF	10 and 21	20.3	18
Albanian parties	21	2.5	1
BS	21	3.2	2
HGI	21	0.5	1
Other parties		1.2	0
TOTAL SEATS		81	

## Governments

All governments in Montenegro since 2003 have been coalitions led by the DPS, with only modest changes.

### MONTENEGREN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 2003

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
01/2003	Đukanović, M. (DPS)	19 (2)	DPS SDP DUA	
11/2006	Šturanović, Ž. (DPS)	17	DPS SDP DUA	BS HGI
02/2008	Đukanović, M. (DPS)	17	DPS SDP DUA	BS HGI
06/2009	Đukanović, M. (DPS)	23	DPS SDP BS DUA	HGI
12/2010	Lukšić, I. (DPS)	20	DPS SDP BS DUA	HGI
12/2012	Đukanović, M. (DPS)	19	DPS SDP BS HGI	
01/2016 *	Đukanović, M. (DPS)	19	DPS SD BS HGI	PCG
11/2016	Marković, D. (DPS)	21	DPS BS SD DUA HGI	

\* loss of parliamentary majority.

## Acronyms

BS	Bosniak Party
DCG	Democratic Montenegro
DF	Democratic Front
DPS	Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro
DUA	Democratic Union of Albanians
HGI	Croat Civic Initiative
KK	Key Coalition
LPCG	Liberal Party of Montenegro
LSCG	Liberal Alliance of Montenegro
NOVA	New Serb Democracy
PCG	Positive Montenegro
PzP	Movement for Changes
SD	Social Democrats of Montenegro
SDP	Social Democratic Party of Montenegro
SL	Serb List
SNP	Socialist People's Party of Montenegro
SNS	Serb People's Party

# THE NETHERLANDS

## **The party pattern in each election, with additional components**

1946	highly multi-party
1948	highly multi-party
1952	highly multi-party
1956	highly multi-party, with two main parties ( <i>PvdA and KVP</i> )
1959	highly multi-party
1963	highly multi-party
1967	highly multi-party
1971	highly multi-party
1972	highly multi-party
1977	moderately multi-party, with two main parties ( <i>PvdA and CDA</i> )
1981	highly multi-party
1982	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties ( <i>PvdA, CDA, and VVD</i> )
1986	moderately multi-party, with two main parties ( <i>CDA and PvdA</i> )
1989	moderately multi-party, with two main parties ( <i>CDA and PvdA</i> )
1994	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties ( <i>PvdA, CDA, VVD, and D66</i> )
1998	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties ( <i>PvdA, VVD, and CDA</i> )
2002	highly multi-party
2003	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties ( <i>CDA, PvdA, and VVD</i> )
2006	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top four parties ( <i>CDA, PvdA, SP, and VVD</i> )

2010	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (VVD, PvdA, PVV, and CDA)</i>
2012	highly multi-party
2017	highly multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1946–1982 inclusive	highly multi-party system
1994–2017 inclusive	highly multi-party system

## History

The modern state of the Netherlands dates from 1815. Before that time the Dutch United Provinces were more of a confederal system, which obviously did not stop them becoming a centre of trade and science in the seventeenth century. The Catholic South revolted and broke away in 1830–1831, becoming modern Belgium. However, a Catholic minority remained in the Netherlands. The predominant Dutch Reformed Church would itself suffer a schism in the late 1800s when more fundamentalist Calvinists – the so-called little men of farmers, artisans, and the lower-middle class – broke away to form the *Gereformeerde* Church. In short, the country was clearly divided on religious grounds. Responsible government was achieved in 1848, and universal suffrage was achieved by 1919. From around the turn of the twentieth century until the 1960s, the Dutch society was clearly segmented into institutional subcultures or “pillars”, each with their own schools, media, sporting teams, and political parties. The most institutionalized of these was the pillar of the Catholic minority, but there was also a Dutch Reformed pillar, a Calvinist pillar, and a socialist pillar. The secular middle class was largely outside of a clear pillar. The lack of a majority group and the division of society into top-down pillars facilitated a national “pacification settlement” amongst the groups in 1913–1917, which protected the various minorities and gave each group a favoured policy. Secularization and “depillarization” from around 1967 would see these pillars collapse. The Netherlands was a founding member of the then-European Community.

## Electoral system

The Netherlands has perhaps the simplest, and certainly the most proportional, of the European party list proportional representation electoral systems. The entire country serves as one constituency (using the d’Hondt method), and there is no legal threshold for representation beyond the effective threshold – this being the size of the legislature, which was expanded from 100 to 150 seats in 1956. This meant that a party needed only 1 percent of the vote through 1956 to win a seat, and since then needs only 0.667 percent of the vote. Voting was compulsory until 1970.

## Cleavages, political parties, and dealignment

The Netherlands has usually had a moderate number of key parties, but because of its extremely proportional electoral system it has also had many small parties as well. In the immediate postwar era, or more precisely from the 1920s to the 1960s, pillarization and the underlying cleavages of religiosity, religion, and social class produced an extremely structured party system, with very little movement of voters. It was the *Gereformeerde* subculture that had in fact formed the first national party in the Netherlands, when in 1879 it established the **Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP)**. This party opposed the French Revolution and its secular values. Issues of suffrage expansion, as well as denominational conflicts, caused the more upper-middle class Dutch Reform members to leave the ARP to the *Gereformeerden* and set up a separate party in 1908, the **Christian Historical Union (CHU)**. A specific Catholic party was not set up until 1926, the **Roman Catholic State Party (RKSP)**. After World War Two, a separate Catholic party was again formed, the **Catholic People's Party (KVP)**, with a new broader based program. The KVP contained a substantial working-class component, and was thus rather progressive in socio-economic policy.

Besides the major religious parties noted previously, there are also three smaller conservative protestant parties, each of which in fact splintered off from the ARP and/or the *Gereformeerde* Church: the **Political Reformed Party (SGP)**, formed in 1918; the **Reformed Political Union (GPV)**, which was formed in 1948 and finally won a seat in 1963; and the **Reformed Political Federation (RPF)**, which formed in 1975. Of these, the SGP has been the most orthodox, to the point of opposing both the separation of church and state and female suffrage. In 2001 the GPV and the RPF merged into the **Christian Union (CU)**. After the 2006 election, the CU became the first such conservative protestant party to be in a Dutch cabinet, and has been in further cabinets.

Historically for non-religious Dutch, the cleavage of religion was obviously not salient; instead, social class was what mattered. For the secular working class, the main historical party was the **Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP)**, which was organized in 1894. After World War Two, the Socialists (like the Catholics) thought that a new name and more flexibility would allow them to break through the pillars and pick up new voters. The party thus became the **Labour Party (PvdA)**, or more literally the "Party of Labour". Reference to socialism was thus dropped from the name, as was Marxist terminology from the programme. Nevertheless, the Labour Party did not have much appeal beyond the secular working class until the 1960s, when it began to pick up some "new politics" elements. The increasing influence of this New Left group led some moderates to break away in 1970 and form the **Democratic Socialists '70 (DS'70)**. This was more of a centrist or even centre-right force, and, although it was part of a centre-right government in 1971, it did not have much long-term durability. The DS'70 was disbanded in 1983.

Other smaller leftist parties that existed included the **Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN)**, dating back to a 1909 split from the SDAP; the anti-Cold War **Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP)**, formed in 1957; and the **Political Party Radicals (PPR)**, which was formed by leftist Catholics in 1970 and quickly became secular. However, ultimately the most electorally successful other leftist party in the Netherlands has been the **Socialist Party (SP)**, founded in 1971 as a Maoist party. It did not win its first seat until 1994, taking advantage of the PvdA's move towards the centre in the 1990s. The SP has a clear left-wing populist element, part of which involves it being somewhat Eurosceptic. Since 2006 it has been one of the four or five largest parties in the Dutch parliament, though in 2017 it fell to being tied for fifth largest.

Finally, various liberal, radical, and (secular) conservative parties had existed before World War One and between the wars. Finally in 1948 a unified liberal party, the **People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)** was established. The party has been clearly secular and free market oriented, and after its foundation was the vehicle of the secular middle class.


Starting in the late 1960s, some fundamental changes occurred in Dutch party politics. First and foremost, secularization and "depillarization" led to a drop off in support for the main religious parties, especially the KVP but also the CHU. Discussions soon arose about merging the main religious parties. The ARP, whose vote was still holding was hesitant, but the three parties agreed to present a joint list in the 1977 election as the **Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)**. In 1980 the parties would formally merge. Left-leaning members of the ARP who opposed this merger broke away and formed the **Evangelical People's Party (EVP)**. The CDA as a unified entity was able to stop the collective decline of the main religious parties, but this was in part due to the popularity in the 1980s of the CDA Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, who was able to attract even some young secular voters to the party. In the 1990s the CDA suffered a further loss in support. The CDA would recover to become again the largest party in the elections from 2002 to 2006, but then dropped off once more – indeed falling below 10 percent of the vote in the 2012 election.

Secondly, the Netherlands has seen the creation of and then increased support for post-materialist parties. Indeed, it appears that it was the Dutch who created the first of these, in 1966. This party was thus called the **Democrats '66 (D'66)**, and is now known simply as **D66**. The party was not based on a specific social group, but pushed for institutional changes such as a directly elected prime minister (to produce accountability). In its early years the D'66 often spoke of trying to "explode" the structured Dutch party system. In addition to being post-materialist, it can also be seen as the left-liberal alternative to the right-liberal VVD; certainly there has been some shifting of voters between these two parties. The other main post-materialist party is the **Green Left (GL)**, formed in 1989 as a merger of the CPN, PSP, PPR, and EVP. The GL is much more leftist on economic issues than is the D66.

Thirdly, and following from the lack of an electoral threshold in the Netherlands, there have been various single-issue parties winning seats. Mostly these have

been fleeting pensioners’ parties. In 1994 the **General Elderly Alliance (AOV)** picked up six seats while **Union 55+** won one. In the 2012 election **50 Plus** won two seats. A more durable single-issue party has been the **Party for the Animals (PvdD)** concerned with animal rights and welfare, founded in 2002 and continuously in parliament since 2006.

Fourth and finally, the Netherlands has had populist radical right parties. In the postwar period the **Farmers’ Party (BP)** first ran nationally in 1959 and was similar to the French *Poujadistes*. The BP suffered internal splits and renamed itself the **Right-Wing People’s Party (RVP)** before the 1981 election, in which it was eliminated from parliament. More significant populist radical right parties have occurred in the twenty-first century. The first such party was the **List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)**, founded in 2002 by its namesake. Pim Fortuyn had been an academic and author who had been involved with other political parties and ultimately successful with a Rotterdam municipal party. He then formed his own party three



**FIGURE 33.1** Netherlands: 2014 placement of parties on socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions.

Source: Polk, Jonathan, et al. (2017) “Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data”, *Research & Politics*, Volume 4: 1 (January-March), pp. 1–9. (with calculation of LEC-TAN).

months before the 2002 election campaigning against elitist politics, immigration, and especially Islam, and in his view for social liberalism (Pim Fortuyn himself was openly homosexual). Pim Fortuyn was assassinated nine days before the 2002 election, in which the LPF still held its support. The party was then briefly in government, but it was internally divided absent its founder and saw its support drop sharply in 2003. The LPF dissolved in 2008. The second such major party is the anti-Islam and anti-EU **Party for Freedom (PVV)**, founded in 2006 by Geert Wilders who has been its only leader. Wilders had been a member of the VVD but quit that party in 2004 due to his opposition to Turkish membership in the European Union. The party came third in the 2010 election after which it supported a centre-right government, fell in 2012, and then came second in 2017 (but had been leading the polls in the months before the election). As somewhat of a reaction to the success of the PVV, two Turkish-Dutch former Labour MPs formed the **DENK** (the imperative “Think” in Dutch; “equivalent” in Turkish) movement in 2015, which positioned itself as a party for the Muslim immigrant population. Finally, also on the populist radical right but more focussed on introducing direct democracy and opposition to the European Union is the **Forum for Democracy (FvD)**, initially a think tank which became a political party in 2016.

Figure 33.1 illustrates the key Dutch parties as of 2014 in terms of socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions:

#### ELECTIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS SINCE 1946

	PF	1946		1948		1952		1956	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
CPN	1	10.6	10	7.7	8	6.2	6	4.7	7
PvdA	4	28.3	29	25.6	27	29.0	30	32.7	50
KVP	8	30.8	32	31.0	32	28.7	30	31.7	49
ARP	8	12.9	13	13.2	13	11.3	12	9.9	15
CHU	8	7.8	8	9.2	9	8.9	9	8.4	13
VVD	9	6.4	6	7.9	8	8.8	9	8.8	13
SGP	10	2.1	2	2.4	2	2.4	2	2.3	3
Others		1.0	0	2.9	1	4.7	2	1.6	0
TOTAL SEATS			100		100		100		150

	PF	1959		1963		1967		1971	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
CPN	1	2.4	3	2.8	4	3.6	5	3.9	6
PSP	2	1.8	2	3.0	4	2.9	4	1.4	2
PPR	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.8	2
PvdA	4	30.4	48	28.0	43	23.6	37	24.6	39
D'66	5	—	—	—	—	4.5	7	6.8	11



	<i>PF</i>	<i>1959</i>		<i>1963</i>		<i>1967</i>		<i>1971</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
DS70	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.3	8
KVP	8	31.6	49	31.9	50	26.5	42	21.9	35
ARP	8	9.4	14	8.7	13	9.9	15	8.6	13
CHU	8	8.1	12	8.6	13	8.1	12	6.3	10
VVD	9	12.2	19	10.3	16	10.7	17	10.3	16
SGP	10	2.2	3	2.3	3	2.0	3	2.4	3
GPV	10	—	—	0.7	1	0.9	1	1.6	2
BP	12	—	—	2.1	3	4.8	7	1.1	1
Others		2.0	0	1.6	0	2.6	0	3.9	2
TOTAL SEATS			150		150		150		150

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1972</i>		<i>1977</i>		<i>1981</i>		<i>1982</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
CPN	1	4.5	7	1.7	2	2.1	3	1.8	3
PSP	2	1.5	2	0.9	1	2.1	3	2.3	3
PPR	3	4.8	7	1.7	3	2.0	3	1.7	2
PvdA	4	27.3	43	33.8	53	28.3	44	30.4	47
D66	5	4.2	6	5.4	8	11.1	17	4.3	6
DS70	7	4.1	6	0.7	1	0.6	0	0.4	0
KVP	8	17.7	27		(merged into CDA)	—	—	—	—
ARP	8	8.8	14		(merged into CDA)	—	—	—	—
CHU	8	4.8	7		(merged into CDA)	—	—	—	—
CDA	8	—	—	31.9	49	30.8	48	29.4	45
VVD	9	14.4	22	18.0	28	17.3	26	23.1	36
SGP	10	2.2	3	2.1	3	2.0	3	1.9	3
GPV	10	1.8	2	1.0	1	0.8	1	0.8	1
RPF	10	—	—	0.6	0	1.2	2	1.5	2
BP/RVP	12	1.9	3	0.8	1	0.2	0	0.3	0
Others		1.9	1	1.3	0	1.5	0	2.1	2
TOTAL SEATS			150		150		150		150

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1986</i>		<i>1989</i>		<i>1994</i>		<i>1998</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
SP	1	0.3	0	0.4	0	1.3	2	3.5	5
CPN	1	0.6	0		(merged into GL)	—	—	—	—
PSP	2	1.2	1		(merged into GL)	—	—	—	—
PPR	3	1.3	2		(merged into GL)	—	—	—	—
GL	2	—	—	4.1	6	3.5	5	7.3	11

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1986</i>		<i>1989</i>		<i>1994</i>		<i>1998</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
PvdA	4	33.3	52	31.9	49	24.0	37	29.0	45
D66	5	6.1	9	7.9	12	15.5	24	9.0	14
CDA	8	34.6	54	35.3	54	22.2	34	18.4	29
VVD	9	17.4	27	14.6	22	20.0	31	24.7	38
SGP	10	1.7	3	1.9	3	1.7	2	1.8	3
GPV	10	1.0	1	1.2	2	1.3	2	1.3	2
RPF	10	0.9	1	1.0	1	1.8	3	2.0	3
AOV	31	–	–	–	–	3.6	6	0.5	0
Union 55+	31	–	–	–	–	0.9	1	–	–
Others		1.6	0	1.7	1	4.2	3	2.5	0
TOTAL SEATS			150		150		150		150

	<i>PF</i>	<i>2002</i>		<i>2003</i>		<i>2006</i>		<i>2010</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
SP	1	5.9	9	6.3	9	16.6	25	9.9	15
GL	2	7.0	10	5.1	8	4.6	7	6.6	10
PvdA	4	15.1	23	27.3	42	21.2	33	19.6	30
D66	5	5.1	7	4.1	6	2.0	3	6.9	10
CDA	8	27.9	43	28.6	44	26.5	41	13.7	21
VVD	9	15.4	24	17.9	28	14.6	22	20.4	31
SGP	10	1.7	2	1.6	2	1.6	2	1.7	2
CU	10	2.5	4	2.1	3	4.0	6	3.3	5
LPF	12	17.0	26	5.7	8	–	–	–	–
PVV	12	–	–	–	–	5.9	9	15.5	24
PvdD	31	–	–	–	–	1.8	2	1.3	2
Others		2.3	2	1.3	0	1.2	0	1.1	0
TOTAL SEATS			150		150		150		150

	<i>PF</i>	<i>2012</i>		<i>2017</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
SP	1	9.7	15	9.1	14
GL	2	2.3	4	9.1	14
PvdA	4	24.8	38	5.7	9
D66	5	8.0	12	12.2	19
CDA	8	8.5	13	12.4	19
VVD	9	26.6	41	21.3	33
SGP	10	2.1	3	2.1	3
CU	10	3.1	5	3.4	5
PVV	12	10.1	15	13.1	20
FvD	12	–	–	1.8	2
DENK	21	–	–	2.1	3
PvdD	31	1.9	2	3.2	5
50 Plus	31	1.9	2	3.1	4
Others		0.9	0	1.4	0
TOTAL SEATS			150		150

## Governments

The relative balance between Dutch parties has meant that coalition negotiations take a long time, and the coalitions are often broad. Governments have tended to be either centre-left or centre-right, since from 1951 until 1994 the PvdA and the VVD would not be in government together. This situation gave a strategic advantage to the main religious parties, and later the CDA. Since 1994, however, there have been “purple” secular coalition governments which have excluded the CDA.

### DUTCH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1946

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
07/1946	Beel, L. (KVP)	16 (4)	KVP PvdA
08/1948	Drees, W. (PvdA)	15 (2)	KVP PvdA CHU VVD
03/1951	Drees, W. (PvdA)	15 (1)	KVP PvdA ARP CHU
09/1952	Drees, W. (PvdA)	16 (1)	KVP PvdA ARP CHU
10/1956	Drees, W. (PvdA)	14	PvdA KVP ARP CHU
12/1958	Beel, L. (KVP)	15	KVP CHU ARP
05/1959	de Quay, J.E. (KVP)	13	KVP VVD ARP CHU
07/1963	Marijin, V. (KVP)	13	KVP VVD ARP CHU
04/1965	Cals, J. (KVP)	14	KVP PvdA ARP
11/1966	Zijlstra, J. (KVP)	13	KVP ARP
04/1967	de Jong, P. (KVP)	14	KVP ARP VVD CHU
06/1971	Biesheuvel, B. (ARP)	16	KVP ARP VVD CHU DS70
08/1972	Biesheuvel, B. (ARP)	14	KVP ARP VVD CHU
05/1973	den Uyl, J. (PvdA)	16	PvdA KVP ARP PPR D66
12/1977	van Agt, A. (KVP)	15	KVP VVD ARP CHU
09/1981	van Agt, A. (CDA)	15	CDA PvdA D66
05/1982	van Agt, A. (CDA)	14	CDA D66
11/1982	Lubbers, R. (CDA)	14	CDA VVD
07/1986	Lubbers, R. (CDA)	14	CDA VVD
11/1989	Lubbers, R. (CDA)	14	PvdA CDA
08/1994	Kok, W. (PvdA)	14	PvdA VVD D66
08/1998	Kok, W. (PvdA)	15	PvdA VVD D66
07/2002	Balkenende, J.P. (CDA)	14	CDA LPF VVD
05/2003	Balkenende, J.P. (CDA)	16	CDA VVD D66
07/2006	Balkenende, J.P. (CDA)	16	CDA VVD
02/2007	Balkenende, J.P. (CDA)	16	CDA PvdA CU
02/2010	Balkenende, J.P. (CDA)	12	CDA CU
10/2010	Rutte, M. (VVD)	12	CDA VVD
			<i>supported by PVV until 04/2012</i>
11/2012	Rutte, M. (VVD)	13	VVD PvdA
10/2017	Rutte, M. (VVD)	16	VVD CDA D66 CU

## Acronyms

AOV	General Elderly Alliance
ARP	Anti-Revolutionary Party
BP	Farmers' Party
CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal
CHU	Christian-Historical Union
CPN	Communist Party in the Netherlands
CU	Christian Union
D'66	Democrats '66
DS'70	Democratic Socialists '70
EVP	Evangelical People's Party
FvD	Forum for Democracy
GL	Green Left
GPV	Reformed Political Union
KVP	Catholic People's Party
LPF	List Pim Fortuyn
PPR	Political Party Radicals
PSP	Pacifist Socialist Party
PvdA	Labour Party
PvdD	Party for the Animals
PVV	Party for Freedom
RKSP	Roman Catholic State Party
RPF	Reformed Political Federation
RVP	Right-Wing People's Party
SDAP	Social Democratic Workers' Party
SGP	Political Reformed Party
SP	Socialist Party
VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy

# NORWAY

**The party pattern in each election, with additional components**

1945	moderately multi-party, with a predominant party (DNA)
1949	moderately multi-party, with a predominant party (DNA)
1953	moderately multi-party, with a predominant party (DNA)
1957	moderately multi-party, with a predominant party (DNA)
1961	moderately multi-party, with a dominant party (DNA)
1965	moderately multi-party, with a dominant party (DNA)
1969	moderately multi-party, with a dominant party (DNA)
1973	moderately multi-party, with a dominant party (DNA)
1977	moderately multi-party, with a dominant party (DNA)
1981	moderately multi-party, with two main parties (DNA and H)
1985	moderately multi-party, with two main parties (DNA and H)
1989	moderately multi-party
1993	moderately multi-party, with a dominant party (DNA)
1997	highly multi-party
2001	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top five parties (DNA, H, FrP, SV, and KrF)
2005	highly multi-party
2009	moderately multi-party
2013	highly multi-party
2017	highly multi-party

**Party systems (with smoothing)**

1945–1957 inclusive	moderately multi-party system, with a predominant party (DNA)
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1961–1977 inclusive	moderately multi-party system, <i>with a dominant party (DNA)</i>
1981–1993 inclusive	moderately multi-party system
1997–2017 inclusive	highly multi-party system

## History

Norway was under Danish rule for several centuries; in 1814, this was replaced with a union with Sweden under Swedish control. Home rule was achieved in 1884, and full independence came in 1905. The many centuries of foreign domination made Norwegians wary of control from abroad, evidenced in their rejection in 1972 and again in 1994 of membership of the European Union.

## Electoral system

Norway uses a party list proportional representation electoral system, with 19 multi-member districts. The modified Sainte-Laguë formula is used. In 1989 eight national levelling seats were introduced; these were increased to 19 (one for each district) in 2005. The electoral threshold for such levelling seats is 4 percent of the national vote. A party may win a seat in a district (Oslo being the largest) and keep this even if it does not reach the threshold for levelling seats.

## Political parties and cleavages

Many of the political parties in Norway tend to be less conservative than in other countries, with there being broad agreement on maintaining the welfare state and the role of the government in the economy. The centre/periphery cleavage is still an important one, as has at times led to divisions over foreign policy such as membership in the European Union.

**The Norwegian Labour Party (DNA)** was founded in 1887 and became simply the **Labour Party (Ap)** in 2011. It has been the largest party in Norway since the 1920s, and was predominant for the first four elections after World War Two. The party initially enjoyed a fairly broad base of support amongst both urban and rural workers and has maintained close relations with the country's trade unions. DNA has advocated a fairly traditional social democratic platform and has supported NATO, environmental policies, and a nuclear-free Norway. The party was internally very divided over the EU membership issue despite the official pro-EU stance that the party ended up taking.

The **Communist Party of Norway (NKP)** was founded in 1923 out of a split in the DNA. The NKP peaked in 1945 and then became marginal during the Cold War. In 1961 a DNA splinter of those opposed to the party's pro-NATO and pro-EEC policies formed the **Socialist People's Party (SF)**. In 1973, the SF

formed the **Socialist Electoral League (SV)** with the NKP and other independent socialists. The League did very well in that year's election given the effects of the EEC referendum of the previous year. In 1975 the League then became a single party, the **Socialist Left Party (SV)**, although the majority of the NKP ultimately decided to remain a separate party. The SV is left socialist in orientation and is critical of both social democrats and orthodox communists. The party has campaigned for a more progressive tax system and is against any cuts to the social welfare state. On the very far left is now the Marxist **Red (R)** party, formed in 2007 and which first won a seat in 2017.

The **Conservative Party (H)** was formed in 1884. The party's name in Norwegian, Høyre, literally translates into "the Right". The Conservatives have traditionally been one of the largest of Norway's non-Socialist parties. The party supports a reduction in taxes, less government control of industry, and an emphasize on private investment. Despite these policy stances the party nevertheless still believes in a social market economy only with a smaller bureaucracy. The party takes a rather liberal position of social issues. The party has also given support to tougher environmental policies. The party supported the country's attempts at gaining EU membership and this stance divided the party though not as badly as other pro-EU parties.

The **Centre Party (SP)** was founded in 1920 as the **Farmers' Party (B)**. Like many other Nordic agrarian and farmers' parties, the SP adopted its current name (in 1959) in an effort to broaden its appeal outside rural areas. Despite these efforts, the party's main source of support remains farmers and Norway's rural population. The party supports regional aid and subsidies and is more conservative on social and religious issues but has leaned to the left otherwise. In recent decades the party has put emphasis on supporting environmental policies. This orientation someone pre-empted the rise of the **Environment Party The Greens (MDG)**, which formed in 1988 but which did not win a seat until 2013.

The **Christian People's Party (KrF)** was founded in 1933 to promote Christian values in public life. The party maintains conservative positions on most social issues and has been associated with Norway's temperance movement. In terms of economics however the party positions itself between the DNA and the Conservatives. One economic policy that the party has been particularly supportive of is an increase in trade with the developing nations of the world. The party is pro-NATO but campaigned against the European Union in 1993. Understandably the party is most heavily supported by churchgoers and moral conservatives.

The **Progress Party (FrP)** was founded in 1973 as a populist, libertarian, protest party called the **Anders Lange's Party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes and Public Intervention (ALP)**. The party argued for a reduction of the welfare state, lower taxes, an end to farm subsidies, and tougher immigration and crime laws. The founder of the party, Anders Lange, died in 1974 and as result the party changed its name to the Progress Party in 1977. Although most commonly seen as a populist radical right party, it must be noted that their focus has been more on economics (smaller government) than on immigration issues, with

opposition to the welfare state and labour market regulation being populist in itself in Norway.

The **Liberal Party (V)** is Norway's oldest political party by a few months, being formed at the start of 1884 as "the left" to the Conservative "Right". V (Venstre) was Norway's dominant party until the 1920s. The party maintains a moderate position on social and economic issues, and is pro-decentralization. Perhaps more so than any Norwegian party, the Liberals have been divided over EC/EU membership. At the most extreme, the party split in 1972 with the pro-EC members (and most MPs) leaving to form **The New People's Party (DNF)** which was renamed **The Liberal People's Party (DLF)** in 1980. The split did not last however, and the DLF returned into the Liberal Party fold in 1988. Recently V has emphasized environmental issues, but remains opposed to the political left.

#### ELECTIONS IN NORWAY SINCE 1945

	PF	1945		1949		1953		1957	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
NKP	1	11.9	11	5.8	0	5.1	3	3.4	1
DNA	4	41.0	76	45.7	85	46.7	77	48.3	78
V	5	13.8	20	13.1	21	10.0	15	9.7	15
B	7	8.0	10	7.9	12	9.0	14	9.3	15
KrF	10	7.9	8	8.5	9	10.5	14	10.2	12
H	10	17.0	25	18.3	23	18.8	27	18.9	29
Others		0.3	0	0.7	0	0.0	0	0.2	0
TOTAL SEATS			150		150		150		150

	PF	1961		1965		1969		1973	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
NKP	1	2.9	0	1.4	0	1.0	0	(with SF)	
SF/SV	2	2.4	2	6.0	2	3.5	0	11.2	16
DNA	4	46.8	74	43.1	68	46.5	74	35.3	62
V	5	8.9	14	10.4	18	9.4	13	3.5	2
SP	7	9.3	16	9.9	18	10.5	20	11.0	21
DNF	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.4	1
KrF	10	9.6	15	8.1	13	9.4	14	12.2	20
H	10	20.0	29	21.1	31	19.6	29	17.4	29
FrP (ALP)	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.0	4
Others		0.2	0	0.0	0	0.1	0	0.9	0
TOTAL SEATS			150		150		150		155

(Continued)



	<i>PF</i>	<i>1977</i>		<i>1981</i>		<i>1985</i>		<i>1989</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
SV	2	4.2	2	4.9	4	5.5	6	10.1	17
DNA	4	42.3	76	37.2	66	40.8	71	34.3	63
V	5	3.2	2	3.9	2	3.1	0	3.2	0
SP	7	8.6	12	6.7	11	6.6	12	6.5	11
DNF/DLF	9	1.4	0	0.5	0	0.5	0	(merged back into V)	
KrF	10	12.4	22	9.4	15	8.3	16	8.5	14
H	10	24.8	41	31.7	53	30.4	50	22.2	37
FrP	12	1.9	0	4.5	4	3.7	2	13.0	22
Others		1.2	0	1.2	0	1.1	0	2.2	1
TOTAL SEATS			155		155		157		165

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1993</i>		<i>1997</i>		<i>2001</i>		<i>2005</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
SV	2	7.9	13	6.0	9	12.5	23	8.8	15
DNA	4	36.9	67	35.0	65	24.3	43	32.7	61
V	5	3.6	1	4.5	6	3.9	2	5.9	10
SP	7	16.7	32	7.9	11	5.6	10	6.5	11
KrF	10	7.9	13	13.7	25	12.4	22	6.8	11
H	10	17.0	28	14.3	23	21.2	38	14.1	23
FrP	12	6.3	10	15.3	25	14.6	26	22.1	38
Others		3.6	1	3.3	1	5.5	1	3.1	0
TOTAL SEATS			165		165		165		169

	<i>PF</i>	<i>2009</i>		<i>2013</i>		<i>2017</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
R	1	1.3	0	1.1	0	2.4	1
SV	2	6.2	11	4.1	7	6.0	11
MDG	3	0.3	0	2.8	1	3.2	1
DNA/Ap	4	35.4	64	30.8	55	27.4	49
V	5	3.9	2	5.2	9	4.4	8
SP	7	6.2	11	5.5	10	10.3	19
KrF	10	5.5	10	5.6	10	4.2	8
H	10	17.2	30	26.8	48	25.0	45
FrP	12	22.9	41	16.3	29	15.2	27
Others		1.1	0	1.8	0	1.9	0
TOTAL SEATS			169		169		169

## Governments

The Norwegian Labour Party was traditionally the country's "natural party of government" – initially this was through the outright predominance which came from winning four straight majorities from 1945 through 1957. Thereafter DNA minority governments became the most common, if only because the non-socialist coalition governments that were their main alternative tended to break up over internal differences. However, the centre-right parties have been much more cohesive as a bloc in the last two elections. This bloc, though, does not include the SP which has supported Labour since 2005 – in contrast to its supporting only non-socialist governments up to 2000. Another important change in Norwegian governments occurred in 2013 when the FrP first entered government (having earlier first supported a centre-right government in 2001).

### NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1945

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
11/1945	Gerhardsen, E. (DNA)	14	DNA	
10/1949	Gerhardsen, E. (DNA)	14	DNA	
11/1951	Torp, O. (DNA)	13	DNA	
10/1953	Torp, O. (DNA)	13	DNA	
01/1955	Gerhardsen, E. (DNA)	13	DNA	
10/1957	Gerhardsen, E. (DNA)	15	DNA	
10/1961	Gerhardsen, E. (DNA)	15	DNA	
08/1963	Lyng, J. (H)	15	H SP KrF V	
09/1963	Gerhardsen, E. (DNA)	15	DNA	
10/1965	Borten, P. (SP)	15	H KrF SP V	
09/1969	Borten, P. (SP)	15	H KrF SP V	
03/1971	Brattelli, T. (DNA)	15	DNA	
10/1972	Korvald, L. (KrF)	15	SPV KrF	
10/1973	Brattelli, T. (DNA)	15	DNA	
01/1976	Nordli, O. (DNA)	16	DNA	
09/1977	Nordli, O. (DNA)	16	DNA	
02/1981	Brundtland, G.H. (DNA)	17	DNA	
10/1981	Willoch, K. (H)	18	H	
06/1983	Willoch, K. (H)	18	H KrF SP	
09/1985	Willoch, K. (H)	18	H KrF SP	
05/1986	Brundtland, G.H. (DNA)	18	DNA	
10/1989	Syse, J. (H)	18	H SP KrF	
11/1990	Brundtland, G.H. (DNA)	19	DNA	
10/1993	Brundtland, G.H. (DNA)	19	DNA	
10/1996	Jagland, T. (DNA)	19	DNA	
10/1997	Bondevik, K.M. (KrF)	19	KrF SP V	
03/2000	Stoltenberg, J. (DNA)	19	DNA	
10/2001	Bondevik, K.M. (KrF)	19	H KrF V	FrP

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
10/2005	Stoltenberg, J. (DNA)	19	DNA SV SP	
10/2009	Stoltenberg, J. (DNA)	20	DNA SP SV	
10/2013	Solberg, E. (H)	18	H FrP	KrFV
10/2017	Solberg, E. (H)	20	H FrP	V
01/2018	Solberg, E. (H)	20	H FrP V	

**Acronyms**

Ap	Labour Party
ALP	Anders Lange's Party
B	Farmers' Party
DLF	The Liberal People's Party
DNA	The Norwegian Labour Party
DNF	The New People's Party
FP	Progress Party
H	Conservative Party
KrF	Christian People's Party
MDG	Environment Party The Greens
NKP	Communist Party of Norway
R	Red
SF	Socialist Electoral League Socialist People's Party
SP	Centre Party
SV	Socialist Left Party
V	Liberal Party

# POLAND

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1991	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top seven parties (UD, SLD, WAK, PSL, KPN, PC, and KLD)</i>
1993	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (SLD and PSL)</i>
1997	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (AWS and SLD)</i>
2001	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SLD-UP)</i>
2005	moderately multi-party
2007	two-and-a-half-party
2011	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (PO and PiS)</i>
2015	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (PiS)</i>

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1993–2005 inclusive	moderately multi-party system
2007–2015 inclusive	two-and-a-half-party system

## History

Poland reappeared on the map after World War One. A short period of democratic government until 1926 gave way to military rule and autocracy until the German conquest of 1939. Falling into the Soviet sphere, the Poles proved especially stubborn and resistant, and were allowed private farms as well as autonomy for the Catholic Church. The Solidarity trade union formed in 1981 was quickly banned,

but would prove instrumental in achieving Poland's transition to democracy in 1989–1991. As a result of the brutal German occupation and the forced westward shift of Poland's borders by Stalin, a heterogeneous interwar society is now one of Europe's most homogeneous. Poland joined the European Union in 2004.

## Electoral system

Since 1991 Poland has always had a *Sejm* of 460 members elected by party list proportional representation. However, various aspects of the electoral system have changed, or indeed changed back and forth. The system involved two tiers until 2001; since then there is but one tier of 41 districts. The electoral formula has changed repeatedly; since 2002 it has been d'Hondt. Finally, as of 1993 a national threshold has been in place consisting of 5 percent for parties and 8 percent for electoral coalitions; these thresholds do not apply to parties representing ethnic minorities. A referendum in September 2015 included a question on whether to introduce single-member constituencies; however, the referendum had a turnout of only 7.8 percent and was thus invalid. Vacancies arising between general elections are filled by the individual who is next on the list of the party which formerly held the seat.

## Political parties and cleavages

The Polish party system has involved two broad phases. The first phase up through 2001 involved the ex-communists as always one of the top two parties and as the central pole of the system. The second phase since 2005 has seen the ex-communists reduced to a marginal position and ultimately eliminated from parliament, with the central competition between right-of-centre liberals and the populist radical right. That said, the first fully democratic election of 1991 produced literally the most fragmented election and parliament in postwar Europe (of the longstanding democracies), including representation for the humorous **Polish Beer Lovers' Party (PPPP)**.

The former Polish communists reformed into **Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP)** in 1990 and along with other left-wing and communist elements formed the **Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)** for the 1991 election. The SLD advocated a larger role for the state in the economy; that is, it stressed the importance of state ownership of industry, state-sponsored welfare, and state control of market forces. The party was also committed to reducing the Catholic Church's influence in politics and everyday life. The SLD was in government (and the largest party thereof) for slightly over half the period from 1991 to 2005, including when Poland acceded to the European Union in 2004. However, a major corruption scandal in 2002, combined with a bad economy (in particular high unemployment and spending cuts), saw the party drop to a then-record low in 2005. That election also saw a splinter party in the form of **Social Democracy**

of Poland (SDPL) but it was unsuccessful. In 2006 the SLD, the SDPL, the UP (see later), and the PD (see later) formed the **Left and Democrats (LiD)** electoral alliance which came third in the 2007 election and then dissolved in 2008. Then in 2015, after the marginal performance of the SLD-backed candidate in the presidential election, the SLD, TR (see later), and other parties formed the **United Left (ZL)** electoral alliance. However, the ZL fell just below the 8 percent threshold for an electoral alliance and so was excluded from the *Sejm*.

The **Polish Peasant Party (PSL)** is the largest party representing Poland's agrarian population. The PSL argues for state intervention to ensure protection of Polish agricultural goods from foreign products. In 1991 it ran as the Polish Peasants' Party-Programmatic Alliance (PSL-SP) but simply as the PSL since 1993. It is the most consistent of Poland's parties, in that it is the only one represented in every parliament since 1991.

The **Democratic Union (UD)** was formed in 1991 by the merger of two smaller and very new parties in advance of the upcoming *Sejm* election. The UD at its inception contained a number of elements, including a social democratic faction that advocated a humane form of capitalism, a laissez-faire faction, and a faction which argued for a limited role for the church in political life. Gradually, however, the party developed more of single liberal mindset which was for the continuation of reforms begun in 1989 and which was anti-populist and anti-demagogic. The party contained many intellectuals and dissidents from the communist era.

In 1994 the UD formed an electoral alliance with the **Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD)**. The KLD was also pro-market and pro-entrepreneur and favoured a quicker pace to reforms. Although winning seats in 1991, the KLD failed to make the 5 percent threshold in 1993. The alliance formed by the KLD and the UD was called the **Freedom Union (UW)**. In the 1997 election – which yielded Poland's most concentrated parliament in the first phase of its party system – the UW came third and became the junior coalition partner of the AWS (below). Ideally from its perspective the UW might have developed into a liberal ongoing party of government like the Free Democrats had traditionally been in Germany. However, in 2000 the UW exited the coalition and in 2001 it fell below the electoral threshold, as some of its members went over to the new PO (see later). In 2005 the UW reformed as the **Democratic Party (PD)**, which in 2007 ran as part of the LiD electoral alliance. In 2016 the PD merged with a parliamentary club to form the **Union of European Democrats (UED)**.

Competing for conservative and Catholic votes were initially many parties. The five-party **Christian Democracy (ChD)** alliance and the **Party of Christian Democrats (PChD)**, two small right-of-centre, pro-Catholic groupings won representation in 1991 and the latter found themselves a part of the 1992 government. However, the largest of the initial Catholic parties was the **Christian National Union (ZChN)**. Formed in 1989, the ZChN was both anti-Communist and nationalist. The party was the principle element behind first the **Catholic Election Action (WAK)** alliance which contested the 1991 election,

and then the **Catholic Election Committee “Fatherland”** alliance in 1993, which included the PChD. The ZChN supported protectionist measures against the import of foreign goods and believed in a strong place for the Catholic Church in everyday life. The party's base of support was Poland's rural population. Despite WAK having won the third highest number of seats in the 1991 election, the Fatherland alliance failed to make it over the new 8 percent threshold for coalitions and therefore failed to win representation in 1993. The **Peasant Alliance (PL)**, another right-of-centre party appealing to Poland's rural voters, was in the Fatherland alliance as well and like the ZChN was in the 1992 government. The **Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN)** was a nationalist right-wing party that appealed to the most disgruntled members of Polish society. While it won seats in both 1991 and 1993, it was seen as too extreme to enter government.

For the 1993 election then-President Lech Walesa formed the personalistic conservative **Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR)** as a group to appeal to voters fed up with the traditional parties. This was somewhat ironic in that previously he rejected the explicit support of the **Centre Civic Alliance (POC)**, based on the Christian democratic **Centre Agreement (PC)** which had been founded by Jarosław Kaczyński in 1990. On its own the PC would fall below the electoral threshold in 1993.

There have also been parties that are leftist but not ex-communist. The **Labour Union (UP)** was formed after the 1991 election and was successful in winning seats in 1993, but it fell below the 5 percent threshold in 1997. In 2001 the UP joined with the SLD in an electoral alliance, and it would join subsequent electoral alliances led by the SLD. This co-operation illustrated the ebbing of the initially sharp ex-communist versus others cleavage. The UP promotes economic interventionism and a slow pace of reforms, and it is anti-clerical while emphasizing its non-communist roots.

Poland's powerful trade unions were represented directly in the 1991 and 1993 elections by the **Solidarity** Trade Union. Although its vote share dropped only fractionally in 1993, this was enough to push Solidarity just below the 5 percent threshold for seats. It was thus one of the many centre-right forces which fell victim in 1993 to the new electoral law. To forestall a similar fate in the next election, in May 1996 Solidarity presided over the creation of an umbrella organization uniting Christian democrats, conservatives, nationalists, and some liberals called the **Solidarity Electoral Alliance (AWS)**, which would go on to win the plurality of seats in 1997. Besides Solidarity itself, the AWS contained the ZChN, the PL, the KPN, the BBWR, and the PC – indeed, over 30 parties in total!

## Party political changes after the AWS

The AWS would form a coalition with the UW in 1997. However the issues of governing, in terms of domestic policies, joining NATO, and especially negotiating

accession to the European Union, would pull apart the AWS (the ZChN in particular often voted against the government). Ultimately two new major parties, one liberal and one conservative nationalist and populist, would arise in 2001 out of the AWS. The remnants of the AWS itself would fail to meet the electoral threshold for coalitions in 2001. The liberal offshoot of the AWS is **Civic Platform (PO)**, which also includes elements of the UW. PO combines economic liberalism, moderate social conservatism, and a strong pro-European orientation. In contrast, the nationalist and strongly conservative elements in AWS evolved into the populist radical right – and economically interventionist – **Law and Justice (LiS)**, founded by the Kaczyński twins (Lech and Jarosław) with the PC as its initial core. These two parties provide a clear illustration of the globalization cleavage: PO is supported by (the overlapping categories) of voters of higher socio-economic status, voters in the more economically developed west and north of the country (essentially the areas that had been part of Imperial Prussia), and voters in large cities. Conversely, LiS is supported by unskilled workers, farmers, and pensioners; older and religious voters; voters in the east of the country and generally voters in rural areas and small towns. In other words, a key distinction is that PO voters are those who have clearly benefitted from the changes since 1989 (the shift to capitalism and the integration into the European Union) while LiS voters are those who have not benefitted.

The 2005 election saw Law and Justice win a plurality while Civic Platform came a close second. The two parties were unable to form a grand coalition, and LiS formed a minority government. For support it quickly turned to other even more populist radical right parties. The first of these, **Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (SRP)** was formed in 1992 but did not break through until the 2001 election. SRP is agrarian in orientation. The other populist radical right party, the **League of Polish Families (LPR)** was founded just before the 2001 election and is oriented towards strongly conservative social issues and clericalism. LiS would bring the SRP and the LPR into the government, although SRP would leave, come back, and leave again; the SRP was plagued with scandals and corruption changes especially regarding its leader Andrzej Lepper. Eventually an early election was called in 2007 which saw both the SRP and the LPR eliminated from parliament. The election was won with a plurality by Civic Platform which then governed with the PSL for two terms until LiS came back with a majority in 2015.

In 2010 MP Janusz Palikot would resign from the PO and form a social movement. The next year it became the **Palikot Movement (RP)** political party, which in 2013 became **Your Movement (TR)**. The party is socially liberal and strongly anti-clerical. In the 2015 election it was part of the unsuccessful ZL electoral alliance. 2015 would see the successful creation of a new classical liberal party, **.Modern (.N)**; it has vigorously defended liberal democracy in Poland against attacks from the LiS government. Lastly, 2015 also saw the entry into parliament of the anti-establishment **Kukiz'15** movement, led by punk rock musician Paweł Kukiz who had come third in the 2015 presidential election.




ELECTIONS IN POLAND SINCE 1991

<i>PF</i>		<i>1991</i>		<i>1993</i>		<i>1997</i>		<i>2001</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
SLD/SLD-UP	4	12.0	60	20.4	171	27.1	164	41.0	216
UP	4	—	—	7.3	41	4.7	0	(with SLD)	
PSL	7	8.7	48	15.4	132	7.3	27	9.0	42
PL	7	5.5	28	2.4	0	(into AWS)		—	—
Solidarity		5.1	27	4.9	0	(into AWS)		—	—
ChD	8	2.4	5	—	—	—	—	—	—
PChD	8	1.1	4		(into Father-land)	—	—	—	—
WAK/ Fatherland	8	8.7	49	6.4	0	(into AWS)		—	—
AWS	8	—	—	—	—	33.8	201	5.6	0
KLD	9	7.5	37	4.0	0	(into UW)		—	—
UD	9	12.3	62	10.6	74	(into UW)		—	—
UW	9	—	—	—	—	13.4	60	3.1	0
PO	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	12.7	65
POC/PC	10	8.7	44	4.4	0	(into AWS)		—	—
BBWR	10	—	—	5.4	16	(into AWS)		—	—
KPN	11	7.5	46	5.8	22	(into AWS)		—	—
LPR	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	7.9	38
PiS	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	9.5	44
SRP	12	—	—	2.8	0	0.1	0	10.2	53
ROP	12	—	—	—	—	5.6	6	—	—
German minority	21	1.2	7	0.7	4	0.4	2	0.4	2
PPPP	41	3.3	16	0.1	0	—	—	—	—
Others		16.0	27	9.4	0	7.6	0	0.6	0
TOTAL SEATS			460		460		460		460

<i>PF</i>		<i>2005</i>		<i>2007</i>		<i>2011</i>		<i>2015</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
SLD/ZL	4	11.3	55	(into LiD)		8.2	27	7.5	0
SDPL	4	3.9	0	(into LiD)		—	—	—	—
LiD	4	—	—	13.2	53	—	—	—	—
PD	5	2.5	0	(into LiD)		—	—	—	—
RP/TR	5	—	—	—	—	10.0	40	(into ZL)	
PSL	7	7.0	25	8.9	31	8.4	28	5.1	16
PO	9	24.1	133	41.5	209	39.2	207	24.1	138
.N	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	7.6	28

PF		2005		2007		2011		2015	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
LPR	11	8.0	34	1.3	0	–	–	–	–
PiS	11 then 12	27.0	155	32.1	166	29.9	157	37.6	235
SRP	12	11.4	56	1.5	0	0.1	0	0.0	0
Kukiz’15	12	–	–	–	–	–	–	8.8	42
German minority	21	0.3	2	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2	1
Others		4.5	0	1.3	0	4.0	0	9.0	0
TOTAL SEATS			460		460		460		460



**FIGURE 35.1** Poland: 2014 placement of parties on socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions.

Source: Polk, Jonathan, et al. (2017) “Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data”, *Research & Politics*, Volume 4: 1 (January-March), pp. 1–9. (with calculation of LEC-TAN).

Figure 35.1 illustrates the seat-winning Polish parties as of 2014 in terms of socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions, with the latter being much more important:

Governments

Until 2005, Polish governments alternated between those of the centre-right on the one hand and SLD-led coalitions or SLD minority governments on the other hand. From 2005 the alternative governments have been PiS (and allies) or PO and the PSL. That said, the PiS-led governments of 2005–2007 were quite unstable, whereas the PiS single-party majority government since 2015 has obviously been the opposite.

POLISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1991

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
12/1991	Olszewski, J. (PC)	23 (10)	ZChN PC PL PChD
07/1992	Suchocka, H. (UD)	27 (4)	KLD PL UD ZChN PChD PPG
04/1993	Suchocka, H. (UD)	22 (4)	UD ZChN KLD PChD
10/1993	Pawlak, W. (PSL)	19 (6)	PSL SLD
03/1995	Oleksy, J. (SLD)	19 (6)	SLD PSL
02/1996	Cimoszewicz, W. (SLD)	19 (5)	SLD PSL
10/1997	Buzek, J. (AWS)	33	AWS UW
06/2000	Buzek, J. (AWS)	27	AWS
10/2001	Miller, L. (SLD)	18 (4)	SLD-UP PSL
03/2003	Miller, L. (SLD)	17 (4)	SLD-UP
06/2004	Belka, M. (SLD)	16 (8)	SLD-UP
10/2005	Marcinkiewicz, K. (PiS)	18 (7)	PiS <i>LPR and SRP in support from 02/2006</i>
05/2006	Marcinkiewicz, K. (PiS)	22 (6)	PiS LPR SRP
07/2006	Kaczyński, J. (PiS)	22 (6)	PiS LPR SRP
09/2006	Kaczyński, J. (PiS)	20 (6)	PiS LPR
10/2006	Kaczyński, J. (PiS)	22 (6)	PiS LPR SRP
08/2007	Kaczyński, J. (PiS)	20 (6)	PiS LPR
11/2007	Tusk, D. (PO)	19 (6)	PO PSL
11/2011	Tusk, D. (PO)	20 (5)	PO PSL
10/2014	Kopacz, E. (PO)	19 (5)	PO PSL
11/2015	Szydło, B. (PiS)	24 (2)	PiS
12/2017	Morawiecki, M. (PiS)	22 (2)	PiS

Acronyms

- AWS     Solidarity Electoral Alliance
- BBWR   Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms
- ChD     Christian Democracy

KLD	Liberal Democratic Congress
KPN	Confederation for an Independent Poland
LiD	Left and Democrats
LPR	League of Polish Families
.N	.Modern
PC	Centre Agreement
PChD	Party of Christian Democrats
PD	Democratic Party
PdP	Covenant for Poland
PiS	Law and Justice
PL	Peasant Alliance
PO	Civic Platform
POC	Centre Civic Alliance
PPPP	Polish Beer Lovers' Party
PSL	Polish Peasant Party
PZ	Polish Union
RDS	Democratic Social Movement
ROAD	Citizens Movement for Democratic Action Party
ROP	Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland
RP	Palikot Movement
SDPL	Social Democracy of Poland
SdRP	Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland
SLCh	Peasant Christian Alliance
SLD	Democratic Left Alliance
SRP	Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland
TR	Your Movement
UD	Democratic Union
UED	Union of European Democrats
UP	Labour Union
UW	Freedom Union
WAK	Christian Electoral Action
ZChN	Christian National Union
ZL	United Left

# PORTUGAL

## The party pattern in each election, with additional components

1975	moderately multi-party, with two main parties (PSP and PPD)
1976	moderately multi-party, with two main parties (PSP and PSD)
1979	moderately multi-party
1980	moderately multi-party
1983	moderately multi-party, with two main parties (PSP and PSD)
1985	moderately multi-party
1987	moderately multi-party, with a dominant party (PSD)
1991	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (PSD)
1995	two-and-a-half-party
1999	two-and-a-half-party
2002	two-and-a-half-party
2005	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (PSP)
2009	moderately multi-party, with two main parties (PSP and PSD)
2011	moderately multi-party, with two main parties (PSD and PSP)
2015	two-and-a-half-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1975–1987 inclusive	moderately multi-party system
1991–2005 inclusive	two-and-a-half-party system

## History

Portugal has been a geographically cohesive polity since the eleventh century. The longstanding monarchy was overthrown in 1910, ushering in a highly unstable and

centrifugal parliamentary system which in turn was overthrown by the army in 1926. The finance minister of the new regime, Dr. Antonio Salazar, consolidated his personal position as dictator by 1932, and then proceeded to establish a state corporatist *Estado Novo* as of the 1932 constitution. Dr. Antonio Salazar remained as prime minister until 1968, then passed the position on to Dr. Marcello Caetano. Dr. Marcello Caetano tried to rule as a liberal authoritarian, but social tensions grew rapidly, in part over the cost of maintaining Portugal's empire in Africa. The armed forces overthrew Dr. Marcello Caetano in 1974, but then they quickly divided between moderates and left-wingers. Finally moderate armed forces personnel and politicians negotiated a transition in which a general would be the first president and a military-dominated "Council of the Revolution" would play an overseeing role. Constitutional changes in 1982 would eliminate both the role of the military and the central role of the president, and further changes in 1989 would eliminate the constitutional commitment to state ownership.

## Electoral system

Portugal uses a party list proportional representation electoral system with the d'Hondt method, with no electoral thresholds. There are 20 multi-member constituencies, one two-member constituency for Portuguese citizens elsewhere in Europe, and another two-member constituency for Portuguese citizens outside of Europe. Changes to the electoral system have been quite modest, mainly the 1989 reduction in total seats from 250 to 230.

## Political parties and cleavages

It should be noted at the start that when many of the democratic political parties were founded in Portugal, they described themselves as left-of-centre or socialist in order to distance themselves from the country's pre-1975 political history regardless of whether or not this was a true representation of the party's ideology. Not all parties have bothered to 'correct' their names.

The **Social Democratic Party (PSD)** was founded in 1974 as the **Popular Democratic Party (PPD)**. As per the previous point, the PPD proclaimed itself to be a socialist party, and was therefore highly critical of the capitalist system with calls for the nationalization of key industries. In 1976 the party changed its name to the PSD and through the late 1970s it became clearer that the party was less committed to socialism than it once professed. The PSD has a fairly fluid ideology and as a result has espoused a broad range of policies. Since the late 1970s, however, the party has been fairly consistent in supporting a more liberal economic policy, and has been very supportive of Portugal's membership in the European Union. In the 1979 and 1980 elections the party formed the **Democratic Alliance (AD)** with the more conservative CDS and PPM (see later). In terms of the support the party has a very broad base, but gets its strongest support from outside the more densely populated urban areas.

The **Democratic and Social Centre (CDS)** was founded in 1974. It was at the start a self-described centrist party which means that in fact it has been the most

conservative of the mainstream parties in Portugal. The party espouses Christian democratic values, has called for lower taxes, smaller government, and more privatization. Since the 1980s it has been rather nationalistic and opposed to further European integration. In 1993 it added the suffix **-People's Party (-PP)** to its name.

For the 2015 election the PSD and the CDS-PP formed the **Portugal Ahead (PàF)** electoral alliance for everywhere but the Azores and Madeira, building on a similar alliance for the European Parliament election of the previous year. In doing so they were able to maintain their position as the plurality force but lacking a majority the lost control over government at which point the PàF alliance expired.

The **Popular Monarchist Party (PPM)** was a party which was founded in support of the return of the monarchy in Portugal. The party attacked both communism and liberalism, as it felt that neither gives adequate protection to the environment. The PPM participated in the Democratic Alliance in 1979 and 1980 but then failed to win representation on its own.

On the actual left of the political spectrum, the **Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP)** was re-established in 1973 as the modern continuation of the country's historic socialist party. The PSP is, however, reformist rather than Marxist in ideology. The PSP supports Portugal's European Union and NATO membership. Like the PSD, the PSP enjoys a fairly broad voter base, and these two parties have always been the top two individual parties in Portuguese elections.

The **Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)** was originally founded in 1921. The party was seen as the "most Stalinist" communist party in Western Europe, and hardliners retained control at a party congress in 1990. The party opposed Portugal's entry into the European Community and did not support NATO. The party has generally formed electoral coalitions with smaller far left parties, including the 1976 **United People's Electoral Front (FEPU)** with the **Popular Democratic Movement (MDP)**, the **United People's Alliance (APU)** from 1979 to 1985 with the MDP, and the stable **United Democratic Coalition (CDU)** with the **Greens** since 1987. By the 2000s the PCP adopted a newer platform emphasizing social welfare, pacifism, and social liberalism. In 1999 three small leftist parties formed the **Left Bloc (BE)** which is in fact new left, focussing on social issues and, since 2007, environmentalism.

The **Democratic Renewal Party (PRD)** was founded in 1985 and was the popular political vehicle of the then-President António Ramalho Eanes. The PRD campaigned for the return of honesty and higher moral and ethical standards in government and rejected traditional ideologies. However, once the president left office the party ceased being a political force and lost most of its prominent members.

## Governments

In the unstable early years of Portuguese democracy, governments themselves were unstable, and at times the dominant president set up the government directly or at least tried to do so. With the rise of the PSD to majority status in the late 1980s, the system changed to one of generally stable governments and no presidential

ELECTIONS IN PORTUGAL SINCE 1975

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1975</i>		<i>1976</i>		<i>1979</i>		<i>1980</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
PCP/FEPU/APU	1			13.4	30	15.1	40	19.3	47	17.1	41
PSP and allies	4			40.7	116	36.6	107	28.1	74	28.4	74
AD	9 and 10			—	—	—	—	46.5	128	48.7	134
of which:											
PPD/PSD	9			28.4	81	25.6	73	29.1	80	29.8	82
CDS	10			8.2	16	16.8	42	15.6	43	16.7	46
PPM	10			0.6	0	0.5	0	1.8	5	2.2	6
Others				8.7	7	5.4	1	6.0	1	5.7	1
TOTAL SEATS					250		263		250		250

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1983</i>		<i>1985</i>		<i>1987</i>		<i>1991</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
APU/CDU	1			18.6	44	15.9	38	12.4	31	9.0	17
PSP	4			37.1	101	21.3	57	22.7	60	29.7	72
PRD	5			—	—	18.4	45	5.0	7	0.6	0
PSD	9			28.0	75	30.6	88	51.3	148	51.6	135
CDS/PP	10			12.9	30	10.2	22	4.5	4	4.5	5
others				3.5	0	3.5	0	4.0	0	4.6	1
TOTAL SEATS					250		250		250		230

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1995</i>		<i>1999</i>		<i>2002</i>		<i>2005</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
CDU	1			8.7	15	9.2	17	7.1	12	7.8	14
BE	2			—	—	2.5	2	2.9	3	6.5	8
PSP	4			44.6	112	45.0	115	38.6	96	46.4	121
PSD	9			34.8	88	33.0	81	41.0	105	29.6	75
CDS-PP	10			9.2	15	8.5	15	8.9	14	7.5	12
Others				2.7	0	1.8	0	1.6	0	2.2	0
TOTAL SEATS					230		230		230		230

		<i>PF</i>		<i>2009</i>		<i>2011</i>		<i>2015</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
CDU	1			8.1	15	8.2	16	8.6	17
BE	2			10.1	16	5.4	8	10.6	19
PSP	4			37.7	97	29.2	74	33.6	86
PSD	9			30.0	81	40.3	108	39.9	107
CDS-PP	10			10.8	21	12.2	24		
Others				3.3	0	4.7	0	7.4	1
TOTAL SEATS					230		230		230

*Note:* The 1975 election was for a constituent assembly.



interference. All partisan governments have been led by the PSD or the PSP, who have been mutually exclusive in government except for one “grand coalition” from 1983 to 1985. That was also the only time the PSP governed in formal coalition with another party, in contrast to the PSD. After the 2015 election the PSP did reach a confidence and supply agreement with the parties to its left – something it had never done before.

#### PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1976

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
07/1976	Soares, M. (PSP)	20 (6)	PSP	
01/1978	Soares, M. (PSP)	11 (2)	PSP CDS	
11/1978	Mota Pinto, C. (PSD)	16 (12)	PSD	
07/1979	Pintassilgo, M. (ind.)	21 (21)	(non-partisan caretaker government)	
01/1980	Sá Carneiro, F. (PSD)	16 (1)	PSD CDS	PPM
01/1981	Pinto Balsemão, F. (PSD)	18 (2)	PSD CDS PPM	
06/1983	Soares, M. (PSP)	17 (1)	PSP PSD	
11/1985	Cavaco Silva, A. (PSD)	16 (3)	PSD	
08/1987	Cavaco Silva, A. (PSD)	18 (3)	PSD	
10/1991	Cavaco Silva, A. (PSD)	19 (2)	PSD	
10/1995	Guterres, A. (PSP)	18 (4)	PSP	
10/1999	Guterres, A. (PSP)	19 (1)	PSP	
04/2002	Durão Barroso, J.M. (PSD)	18 (1)	PSD CDS-PP	
07/2004	Santana Lopez, P. (PSD)	20 (1)	PSD CDS-PP	
03/2005	Sócrates, J. (PSP)	17 (8)	PSP	
10/2009	Sócrates, J. (PSP)	17 (7)	PSP	
06/2011	Passos Coelho, P. (PSD)	12 (4)	PSD CDS-PP	
12/2015	Costa, A. (PSP)	18 (5)	PSP	BE CDU

#### Acronyms

AD	Democratic Alliance
APU	United People's Alliance
BE	Left Bloc
CDS	Democratic and Social Centre
CDS-PP	Democratic and Social Centre – People's Party
CDU	United Democratic Coalition
FEPU	United People's Electoral Front
MDP	Popular Democratic Movement
PCP	Portuguese Communist Party
PàF	Portugal Ahead
PP	Popular Party

PPD	Popular Democratic Party
PPM	Popular Monarchist Party
PRD	Democratic Renewal Party
PSD	Social Democratic Party
PSP	Portuguese Socialist Party

# ROMANIA

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1990	highly multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (FSN)</i>
1992	highly multi-party
1996	moderately multi-party
2000	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (PDSR)</i>
2004	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (PDSR and DA)</i>
2008	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (PD-L and PSD)</i>
2012	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (PSD)</i>
2016	moderately multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1996–2016 inclusive      moderately multi-party system

## History

Romania was recognized as independent at the Berlin Congress in 1878. It made large territorial gains following World War One but lost substantial areas to Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria in 1940. Transylvania was returned from Hungary after World War Two, and Romania continues to have a significant Hungarian minority. King Michael used the entry of Soviet troops in 1944 to dismiss a pro-German regime and switch to the allied side. The king was forced to accept a Communist government in 1945, and abdicated in 1947. In 1965 Nicolae Ceaușescu

took over, and begins a policy of independence from the Soviet Union. Romania's transition from communism was relatively violent and brutal, culminating in the 25 December 1989 execution of Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife. However, the National Salvation Front group (and soon political party) which replaced him had many elements of the old regime. Romania did not have its first truly fair election, or democratic change of government, until 1996. Romania joined the European Union in 2007.

## Electoral system

For most elections since 1990 Romania has used two-tiered party list proportional representation, with the Hare method used in each region and d'Hondt used nationally. Electoral thresholds were introduced in 1992. For individual parties there was a 3 percent electoral threshold; this was increased to 5 percent in 2000. For alliances the electoral threshold has depended on the number of parties in the alliance; this threshold reached up to 10 percent as of 2000. For the 2008 and 2012 elections a complicated form of mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) was used. One can note that an alternative change to a full single-member two-round system was favoured by the then-President Traian Băsescu, who called a referendum on this proposal in late 2007. Although over 80 percent of participants favoured the single-member proposal, voter turnout at 27 percent was insufficient to make the result valid. In addition to the seats elected 'nationally' in Romania, there have always been seats reserved for legally established national minorities – the number of such seats won have ranged from 11 to 18. These seats are usually won individually with very small shares of the vote. There is only one seat per each minority though, and such a Hungarian seat does not exist given the strength of the main Hungarian party, the UDMR (see later).

## Political parties and cleavages

The 1990 election saw the decisive victory of the **National Salvation Front (FSN)**, which had been the interim government after the fall of Nicolae Ceaușescu and which controlled much of the mass media. This was the party of Ion Iliescu, who won the presidential elections of 1990 and 1992. Two of Romania's main parties to this day descended directly from the former FSN. The first of these parties is the **Social Democracy Party of Romania (PDSR)** which, prior to a 1993 name change and absorption of a smaller socialist democratic party and a republican party, was known as the **Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN)**. Its 1994 government coalition and support agreements with nationalist and populist radical right parties further increased questions over the PDSR's commitment to democracy and created strife within the party. Losing support and popularity, the PDSR would be defeated in the 1996 election, but would return to power in 2000. It became the **Social Democratic Party (PSD)** in 2001 after merging with a

small social democratic party. Usually the largest party in Romania and always one of the top two, the PDSR/PSD has positioned itself on the centre-left of the Romanian political spectrum.

The second main party to descend from the FSN is the **Democratic Party (PD)**, founded in 1993. This was previously the **Democratic Party-National Salvation Front (PD-FSN)**, the FSN rump that remained after Ion Iliescu split with his group in 1992. For the 1996 election the party created the **Social Democratic Union (USD)** along with one of Romania's smaller social democratic parties. The split in the FSN which created the PD-FSN and the PDSR was not an ideological one; instead, it was caused by a personal conflict between Ion Iliescu and the PD-FSN leader and former prime minister, Petre Roman. However, over time the PD-FSN shifted to the centre-right of the Romanian political spectrum.

The main group that emerged in opposition to the FSN and its later splinter parties was the **Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR)**. Formed for the 1992 election, the centre-right CDR was a grouping of several parties, some of which had gained seats in 1990. Two component parties were particularly prominent within the CDR, not least given their histories. The first was the **National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party (PNT-CD)**, which was revived in 1990 as a continuation of one of Romania's historic political parties – the Peasant Party, which was dominant in the interwar period but which was subsequently banned by the communists with many members imprisoned. The second prominent party represented in the CDR was the **National Liberal Party (PNL)**, which existed in its historical form from 1869 to 1947 and was likewise revived in 1990. In addition to Christian democrats and liberals, the CDR also encompassed a green component in the **Romanian Ecologist Party (PER)**. Both the PNL and PER did served briefly in the 1991 FSN-led government.

The PER had begun in 1978 as an organization opposed to the enormous environmental damage and related human suffering of Nicolae Ceaușescu's policies – a very rare NGO which was allowed during his regime. In contrast, the **Ecological Movement of Romania (MER)** was formed essentially by former elements of the Nicolae Ceaușescu regime to tap into the demand for environmentalism. The MER only won seats in 1990. In 1996 it ran in the clearly unsuccessful **National Union of the Centre (UNC)** alliance with the **Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania (PDAR)** and the PUR (see later). The PDAR likewise was a copycat party, formed in 1990 to compete with the PNT-CD for the rural vote.

For its part, the CDR would lead the government after the 1996 election but in 2000 the PNL ran separately and the remainder of the CDR failed to clear the electoral threshold. In 2004 the PNL and PD ran together as the **Justice and Truth (D.A.)** alliance, which came second but formed the government in part due to the support of the centrist **Romanian Humanist Party (PUR)**. The PUR had won 19 seats in 2004 running with the PSD, but then switched to supporting the centre-right. The PUR had been founded in 1991, but had no success running on its own the only time it did so, in 1992. In 2000 and, as noted, 2004 it ran in electoral alliance with the PDSR/PSR. In 2005 the PUR became the **Conservative Party**


(PC), reflecting an ideological shift to conservatism; however, it continued to run in electoral alliance with the PSD in 2008 and 2012.

The D.A. alliance ended in 2007 when the PNL prime minister dismissed the PD ministers. Those PNL members who wanted closer co-operation with the DP had already formed the **Liberal Democratic Party (PLD)** at the end of 2006. At the start of 2008 the DP and PLD merged into the **Democratic Liberal Party (PDL)**. The PDL was successful in the 2008 election and led the government for a term, but lost half its support in 2012. In the 2009 presidential election the PDL backed Traian Băsescu in his successful re-election bid. However, in 2013 he broke with the leadership of the PDL. Traian Băsescu's supporters then formed the **People's Movement Party (PMP)**, which was both Christian Democratic and liberal. In 2016 the PMP absorbed the **National Union for the Progress of Romania (UNPR)**, which itself had been formed in 2010 by deputies from the PSD and PNL who supported Traian Băsescu. The UNPR had run with the PSD in 2012. In 2015 the UNPR absorbed the left populist People's Party–Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD), which had been founded in 2011 by the television presenter of that name. The PP-DD suffered from various defections and ultimately the conviction of Dan Diaconescu for extortion.

In November 2014 the rest of the PDL merged into the PNL. Meanwhile in July 2014 the PNL joined the Christian Democratic EPP in the European Parliament. Those PNL members who wished to have a liberal party quit and formed the **Liberal Reformist Party (PLR)**, which in 2015 merged with the PC to form the **Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE)**, named after the European liberal grouping (see the European Parliament section) which they joined. After the 2016 election the ALDE became the junior coalition partner of the PSD.

Romania also had its share of nationalist and populist radical right parties, most importantly in its initial post-Nicolae Ceaușescu elections. The first such party was the **Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR)**, founded in 1990 though running that year in the **Alliance for Romanian Unity (AUR)** with the Republican Party. The PUNR was at its most successful in the early 1990s, gaining 30 seats in the 1992 election to come fourth. Relying solely on its nationalist identity the party failed to develop clear positions on economic policy or Romania's relations with Western Europe, two areas of importance to Romanian voters. The only area in which the PUNR was consistent was in its position that Hungarian groups in Romania and Hungary itself present a threat to Romania's national and territorial sovereignty. The PUNR lost support in 1996 and then fell below the electoral threshold in 2000. In 2006 it was absorbed into the PC.

More successful was the ultimately populist radical right **Greater Romania Party (PRM)**, founded in 1991 as a national communist party. The PRM shared many of the PUNR's ideas on minorities within Romania and on neighbouring countries but was even more extreme in its nationalistic programme. Despite this fact, the PDSR relied on support from the PRM as well as the PUNR for its 1994 coalition government. In contrast to the PUNR, whose support dropped from its initial peak, the PRM grew in support and peaked in 2000, including having its



**FIGURE 37.1** Romania: 2006 placement of parties on socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions.

*Source:* Polk, Jonathan, et al. (2017) “Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data”, *Research & Politics*, Volume 4: 1 (January–March), pp. 1–9. (with calculation of LEC-TAN’).

leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor come second in the first round of the presidential election and thus carry through to the run-off.

At the opposite pole to the PRM and the PUNR there exists the **Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR in Romanian, RMDSZ in Hungarian)**. Formed in 1990, the UDMR represents the interests of the Hungarian population in Romania, and thus has a stable voting share. The UDMR has attempted to guarantee the rights of Hungarians to education, culture and protection of language and local government. Many of the UDMR’s policies therefore fuelled even greater nationalistic rhetoric on the part of the PRM and the PUNR. The UDMR has been a frequent participant in centre-right governments and one of the centre-left.

The former hard-line communists were briefly represented in Romanian politics by the neo-communist **Socialist Party of Labour (PSM)**, which was also nationalist. The PSM, which was considered the main successor to the ruling communist party, was able to win 13 seats in the 1992 election, just clearing the then-3 percent electoral threshold. The PSM fell below the threshold in 1996 and then in 2003 the party joined with the PSD.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, a LEC-TAN and in particular a cosmopolitan-nationalist division structured the Romanian party system as much as left-right economic issues. Figure 37.1 illustrates the key Romanian parties as of 2006 in terms of socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions (with multiculturalism used instead of nationalism as that was not measured):

However, the nationalist pole eventually vanished, and a new populist radical right party founded in 2015, the **United Romania Party (PRU)**, failed to clear the electoral threshold in 2016. In contrast, the anti-corruption **Save Romania Union (USR)**, building on a similar local party in Bucharest that had been founded in 2015, did enter parliament as the third largest party. Given the many corruption issues surrounding the PSR, attitudes to corruption – that is, the extent of opposition to it – have likely become a central division in Romanian party politics,

#### ELECTIONS IN ROMANIA SINCE 1990

	PF	1990		1992		1996		2000	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
FSN	1	66.3	263	10.2	43	–	–	–	–
PSM	1	–	–	3.0	13	2.2	0	0.7	0
FDSN/PDSR	1 then 6	–	–	27.7	117	21.5	91	36.6	155
MER	3	2.6	12	2.3	0	(in UNC)		–	–
PER	3	1.7	8	(in CDR)		(in CDR)		0.8	0
UNC	7	–	–	–	–	0.9	0	–	–
PUR	7	–	–	0.2	0	–	–	–	–
PDAR	7	1.8	9	3.0	0	* (in UNC)		–	–
PNT-CD	8	2.6	12	(in CDR)		(in CDR)		(in CDR)	
PNL	9	6.4	29	(in CDR)		(in CDR)		6.9	30
CDR	9	–	–	20.0	82	30.2	122	5.0	0
USD/PD	9	–	–	–	–	12.9	53	7.0	31
AUR/PUNR	11	2.1	9	7.7	30	4.4	18	1.4	0
PRM	12	–	–	3.9	16	4.5	19	19.5	84
UDMR	21	7.2	29	7.5	27	6.6	25	6.8	27
National minorities		1.2	11	2.0	13	2.5	15	3.2	18
Others		8.0	13	12.5	0	14.4	0	12.1	0
TOTAL SEATS			395		341		343		345

\* In 1992, the PDAR received just under 3.0 percent of the vote.

(Continued)



	<i>PF</i>	<i>2004</i>		<i>2008</i>		<i>2012</i>		<i>2016</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
USR	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	8.9	30
PSD (and allies)	6	36.8	132	33.1	114	58.6	273	45.5	154
PMP	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.3	18
PNL	9	(in D.A.)		18.6	65	(with PSD)		20.0	69
PDL (and allies)	9	(in D.A.)		32.4	115	16.5	56	(into PNL)	
D.A.	9	31.5	112	—	—	—	—	—	—
ALDE	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.6	20
PRM	12	13.0	48	3.2	0	1.2	0	1.0	0
PP-DD	12	—	—	—	—	14.0	47	(into PMP)	
PRU	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.8	0
UDMR	21	6.2	22	6.2	22	5.1	18	6.2	21
National minorities		2.7	18	3.4	18	3.4	18	1.4	17
Others		9.8	0	3.1	0	1.2	0	3.3	0
TOTAL SEATS			332		334		412		329

*Note:* The 1990 and 1992 elections did not meet democratic standards of fairness.

though one reinforcing the centre-left versus centre-right division and its underlying social cleavages. That is, centre-left (PSD) voters are older, more rural, and less educated, benefitting from clientelism and not being particularly concerned about reform. In contrast, centre-right (liberal, Christian Democratic, et cetera) voters are younger, more urban, more educated, and are supportive of reform and troubled by corruption.

## Governments

The governments of Romania have been bipolar, in that they have almost always been either led by the PSD or its antecedents, or formed by the centre-right parties usually including the UDMR. Given the fluidity over time of the Romanian centre-right, the latter outcome has involved differing parties leading these governments. From 1992 through 2004 Romanian governments – in the broad bipolar sense – changed with every election, but since then (to date) they have essentially lasted two parliamentary terms in a row. The one exception to these points was the brief “grand coalition” between the PDL and the PSD formed after the 2008 election.

## ROMANIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1990

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
06/1990	Roman, P. (FSN)	22 (3)	FSN	
10/1991	Stolojan, T. (FSN)	20 (3)	FSN PNL PDAR PER	
11/1992	Vacaroiu, N. (ind.)	20 (1)	FDSN	
08/1994	Vacaroiu, N. (ind.)	21 (1)	PDSR PUNR	PSM PRM
<i>as of 10/1995</i>				PSM
09/1996	Vacaroiu, N. (ind.)	20 (1)	PDSR	
12/1996	Ciorbea, V. (CDR)	20 (1)	CDR USD UDMR	
04/1998	Vasile, R. (CDR)	21 (2)	CDR PD UDMR	
12/1999	Isarescu, M. (ind.)	18 (1)	CDR PD UDMR	
12/2000	Nastase, A. (PDSR)	23	PDSR	
12/2004	Popescu-Tăriceanu, C. (PNL)	20 (1)	PNL PD PUR UDMR	
04/2007	Popescu-Tăriceanu, C. (PNL)	17	PNL UDMR	
12/2008	Boc, E. (PDL)	20 (1)	PDL PSD	
10/2009	Boc, E. (PDL)	11 (1)	PDL	
12/2009	Boc, E. (PDL)	17 (4)	PDL UDMR	
02/2012	Ungureanu, M.R. (ind.)	19 (4)	PDL UDMR UNPR	
05/2012	Ponta, V. (PSD)	17 (4)	PSD PNL PC	
12/2012	Ponta, V. (PSD)	19 (1)	PSD PNL PC UNPR	
03/2014	Ponta, V. (PSD)	18 (2)	PSD UDMR PC UNPR	
12/2014	Ponta, V. (PSD)	22 (1)	PSD PC PLR UNPR	
11/2015	Cioloș, D. (ind.)	19 (19)	(non-partisan technocratic government)	
01/2017	Grindeanu, S. (PSD)	22 (1)	PSD ALDE	
06/2017	Tudose, M. (PSD)	23 (1)	PSD ALDE	
01/2018	Dăncilă, V. (PSD)	25 (2)	PSD ALDE	

## Acronyms

ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats
AUR	Alliance for Romanian Unity
CDR	Democratic Convention of Romania
D.A.	Justice and Truth
FDSN	Democratic National Salvation Front
FSN	National Salvation Front
MER	Ecological Movement of Romania
PC	Conservative Party
PD	Democratic Party
PDAR	Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania

PER	Romanian Ecologist Party
PD-FSN	Democratic Party – National Salvation Front
PDL	Democratic Liberal Party
PDSR	Social Democracy Party of Romania
PER	Romanian Ecological Party
PLD	Liberal Democratic Party
PLR	Liberal Reformist Party
PP-DD	People's Party–Dan Diaconescu
PRM	Greater Romania Party
PRU	United Romania Party
PNL	National Liberal Party
PNȚ-CD	National Peasant and Christian Democratic Party
PSM	Socialist Party of Labour
PUNR	Party of Romanian National Unity
PUR	Romanian Humanist Party
UDMR	Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania
UNC	National Union of the Centre
UNPR	National Union for the Progress of Romania
USD	Social Democratic Union
USR	Save Romania Union

# SAN MARINO

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1945	two-party
1949	two-party
1951	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (APS, PCS, and PSS)</i>
1955	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (PDCS, PCS, and PSS)</i>
1959	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (PDCS)</i>
1964	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (PDCS)</i>
1969	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (PDCS)</i>
1974	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (PDCS)</i>
1978	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (PDCS)</i>
1983	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (PDCS)</i>
1988	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (PDCS)</i>
1993	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (PDCS)</i>
1998	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (PDCS)</i>
2001	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (PDCS)</i>
2006	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (PDCS and PSD)</i>
2008	highly multi-party, <i>with two main parties (PDCS and PSD)</i>
2012	highly multi-party
2016	highly multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1951–2006 inclusive      moderately multi-party system

## History

San Marino is a microstate entirely surrounded by Italy. It did not become a part of unified Italy, and Italy and San Marino recognized each other's sovereignty in 1862. San Marino's use of two Captain Regents as joint heads of state goes back to 1253. Its Grand and General Council (parliament) began in the fourteenth century, but for many decades the leading families of the territory exercised in effect oligarchical control. A directly elected council and responsible government with restricted suffrage came in 1906. There was a fascist takeover in 1923 which lasted until 1943. Female suffrage finally came in effect with the election of 1964. San Marino joined the United Nations in 1992.

## Electoral system

For many decades postwar San Marino used a party list proportional representation electoral system with the entire country serves as one constituency using the d'Hondt method. A legal threshold of 3.5 percent of the vote was introduced in 2008; previously the only threshold was an effective one arising from there being only 60 seats in parliament. However, paralleling somewhat developments in Italy, a broader change occurred in 2008 which structures the system around competition amongst coalitions: specifically, the introduction of a majority bonus for the winning coalition, so as to give it 35 out of the 60 seats. If no coalition wins a majority of the popular vote – as first happened in 2016 – then there is a run-off ballot between the top two coalitions to determine which one gets the majority bonus, with the seats of the remaining coalitions adjusted (down) accordingly.

## Cleavages, political parties, and dealignment

Postwar San Marino, even more so than Italy, initially involved polarized competition between socialists and communists on the left and Christian Democrats on the centre-right. On the left the **Sammarinese Socialist Party (PSS)** was founded in 1892 and the **Sammarinese Communist Party (PCS)** was founded in 1921 as a section of the Italian PCI. After the war they governed together and indeed ran together as the **Committee of Freedom (CdL)** front in 1945 and 1949. Opposing the CdL was the broadly centre-right **Sammarinese Democratic Union (UDS)** in 1945 which became the **Sammarinese Popular Alliance (APS)** in 1949. Out of the APS came the **Sammarinese Democratic Socialist Party (PSDS)** which ran in 1951 and 1955; it would be joined by anti-communist socialists who exited the PSS in 1957 (causing the government to lose its majority, and leading to a political crisis and Italian intervention in the autumn of that year). Together these two groups formed the **Sammarinese Democratic Socialist Party (PSDIS)** which would then govern with the Christian Democrats. In 1975 the PSDIS would split into the more leftist **Unitary Socialist Party (PSU)** which would eventually merge into the PSS and the more centrist **Party of Socialist Democracy (PDS)** which would later become the **Socialists for Reform (SR)**.

The PSS itself would remain in opposition until 1973, and the PCS until 1986 with a “historic compromise” between the PCDS and PCS. In 1990, after the Cold War, the PCS reformed itself as the **Sammarinese Democratic Progressive Party (PPDS)**, which in 2001 merged with the SR and another minor leftist party to create the **Party of Democrats (PdD)**. As in Italy, hardliners opposed these changes and in 1992 they created the **Sammarinese Communist Refoundation (RCS)**. In 2006 the RCS merged with a leftist split from the PdD to form the **United Left (SU)**; in 2016 the SU would run with two other groups as the **Democratic Socialist Left (SSD)**. During the Cold War the communists were always larger than the socialists (in part due to splits from the later) as in Italy; this would change as of the 1993 San Marino election. In 2005 the PSS and PdD would merge into the **Party of Socialists and Democrats (PSD)**. Those socialists who opposed this merger formed the social liberal **New Socialist Party (NPS)** which in 2008 ran as the core of the **Freedom List (LdL)** and which in 2012 merged with a regional leftist party to form the modern **Socialist Party (PS)**.

The **Sammarinese Christian Democratic Party (PDCS)** was formed in 1948 but was first part of the APS. The PDCS then ran on its own in 1951. From that election through the election of 2006 the PDCS was consistently the plurality party, and from 1959 to 2001 it won a very stable 25–29 seats in each election. For the first few postwar decades, other seat-winning parties on the centre-right were rare: these included the **Movement for Constitutional Freedoms (MLS)** from 1964 to 1974, which paralleled the Italian Radical Party. The first and through now most important permanent addition to parliament was the right populist **Popular Alliance of Sammarinese Democrats (APDS)** formed in 1993 and close to the Italian Northern League. This would be renamed the **Popular Alliance (AP)** in 2006.

More recent new parties in San Marino have been the following: the **Centre Democrats (DdC)**, a 2007 leftist split from the Christian Democrats which in 2011 merged with a similar group to form the **Union for the Republic (UPR)**; the conservative **Sammarinese Union of Moderates (USDM)** from 2008 to 2012; the left populist **Civic 10** movement, since 2012; and the environmentalist and left liberal **RETE Civic Movement**, also formed in 2012, and which allied in 2016 with the social liberal **Democratic Movement–San Marino Together (MD–SDI)**.

Although the first election under the new electoral system, that of 2008, led to the parties allying into two internally coherent coalitions of the centre-left and the centre-right, the 2012 and 2016 elections involved three coalitions which were less coherent, for example the PDCS and PSD being in the same coalition.

## Governments

Until the 2000s San Marino had three main types of governments: PDCS with socialists or social democrats; all-left governments of communists and socialists (though never led by the PCS); and least commonly grand coalitions of the PDCS and PCS. As noted, in the period since 2008 the coalitions have been pre-electoral but also shifting.

ELECTIONS IN SAN MARINO SINCE 1945

<i>PF</i>		<i>1945</i>		<i>1949</i>		<i>1951</i>		<i>1955</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
CdL		66.0	40	57.7	35	]	–	–	–
PCS	1						29.3	18	31.6
PSS	4						22.1	13	25.5
UDS/APS		34.0	20	42.3	25		–	–	–
PSDS	4	–	–	–	–		5.6	3	4.7
PDCS	8	–	–	(in APS)			43.0	26	38.2
TOTAL SEATS			60		60			60	60

<i>PF</i>		<i>1959</i>		<i>1964</i>		<i>1969</i>		<i>1974</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
PCS	1	26.0	16	24.1	14		22.8	14	23.6
PSS	4	13.8	8	10.7	6		18.0	7	13.9
MLS	5	–	–	2.2	1		2.1	1	1.6
PSDIS	7	15.9	9	16.2	10		11.9	11	15.4
PDCS	8	44.3	27	46.8	29		44.0	27	39.6
Others		–	–	–	–		1.2	0	5.9
TOTAL SEATS			60		60			60	60

<i>PF</i>		<i>1978</i>		<i>1983</i>		<i>1988</i>		<i>1993</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
PCS	1	25.1	16	24.4	15		28.7	18	]
RCS	1								
PPDS	2								
PSS	4	13.8	8	14.8	9		11.1	7	23.7
PSU	4	11.1	7	13.9	8		13.6	8	(into PSS)
PDS	7	4.2	2	–	–		–	–	–
PDCS	8	42.3	26	42.1	26		44.1	27	41.4
APDS	9	–	–	–	–		–	–	7.7
Others		3.5	1	4.9	2		2.5	0	5.3
TOTAL SEATS			60		60			60	60

<i>PF</i>		<i>1998</i>		<i>2001</i>		<i>2006</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
RCS/SU	1 then 2	3.3	2	3.4	2	8.7	5
PPDS/PdD	2	18.6	11	20.8	12	(into PSD)	
PSS	4	23.2	14	24.2	15	(into PSD)	
PSD	4	—	—	—	—	31.8	20
SR	4	4.2	2	—	—	—	—
NPS	4	—	—	—	—	5.4	3
PDCS	8	40.9	25	41.5	25	32.9	21
APDS/AP	9	9.8	6	8.2	5	12.1	7
Others		—	—	1.9	1	9.1	4
TOTAL SEATS			60		60		60

<i>PF</i>		<i>2008</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
SU (UL)	2	8.6	5
PSD	4	32.0	18
DdC	5	4.9	2
<i>Total Reform and Liberty coalition</i>		45.8	25
LdL (Freedom List)	4	6.3	4
PDCS	8	31.9	22
AP	9	11.5	7
USDM	8 and 11	4.3	2
<i>Total Pact for San Monaco coalition</i>		54.2	35
TOTAL SEATS			60

<i>PF</i>		<i>2012</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
SU	2	9.1	5
Civic 10	5	6.7	4
<i>Total Active Citizenry coalition</i>		16.1	9

(Continued)



PF		2012		
		% V	# S	
PS	4	12.1	7	
UPR	5	8.3	5	
USDM	8 and 11	1.7	0	
<i>Total Agreement for the Country coalition</i>		22.3	12	
PSD	4	14.3	10	
NS	7		3	]
PDCS	8	29.5	18	
AP	9	6.7	4	
<i>Total San Marino Common Good coalition</i>		50.7	35	
RETE	3	6.3	4	
Others		4.7	0	
TOTAL SEATS			60	

PF		2016		
		% V	# S	
SSD	2	12.1	14	
Civic 10	5	9.3	10	
RF (AP and UPR)	5 and 9	9.6	11	
<i>Total San Marino Now coalition</i>		31.4	35	
PS	4	7.7	3	
PSD	4	7.1	3	
NS	7	2.0	0	
PDCS	8	24.5	10	
<i>Total San Marino First coalition</i>		41.7	16	
RETE	3	18.3	8	
MD-SMI	5	4.5	1	
<i>Total Democracy in Motion coalition</i>		23.2	9	
Others		3.7	0	
TOTAL SEATS			60	

Note: Coalition vote totals since 2008 include small numbers of direct votes for each coalition.

Note: The vote percentages on the 2016 runoff were San Marino Now coalition 57.8 percent and San Marino First coalition 42.2 percent.

## SAN MARINESE GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1945

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Secretary of state for foreign and political affairs (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
03/1945	Casali, A. (CDL)	10	CDL
03/1949	Casali, A. (CDL)	10	CDL
06/1951	Celi, L. (PCS)	14 (1)	PDCS PCS PSS APIL
09/1951	Reffi, A. (PSS)	10	PCS PSS
09/1955	Giacomini, G. (PSS)	10	PCS PSS
04/1957*	Giacomini, G. (PSS)	10	PCS PSS
10/1957	Bigi, F. (PDCS)	10 (1)	PDCS PSDIS
09/1959	Bigi, F. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PSDIS
10/1964	Bigi, F. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PSDIS
11/1969	Bigi, F. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PSDIS
01/1971	Ghironzi, G. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PSDIS
03/1973	Berti, G.L. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PSS MLS
11/1974	Berti, G.L. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PSS
11/1975	Berti, G.L. (PDCS)	10	(caretaker government)
03/1976	Ghironzi, G. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PSS
11/1977	Ghironzi, G. (PDCS)	10	(caretaker government)
07/1978	Reffi, G.B. (PSS)	10	PCS PSS PSU
09/1981	Reffi, G.B. (PSS)	11	PCS PSS PSU DS
07/1983	Reffi, G.B. (PSS)	10	PCS PSS PSU
07/1986	Gatti, G. (PDCS)	9	PDCS PCS
07/1988	Gatti, G. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PCS
03/1992	Gatti, G. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PSS
07/1993	Gatti, G. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PSS
07/1998	Gatti, G. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PSS
03/2000	Gatti, G. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PPDS SR
07/2001	Gatti, G. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PSS
05/2002	Morri, R. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PSS
06/2002	Casali, A. (PSS)	10	PSS PdD APDS
12/2002	Stolfi, F. (PSS)	10	PDCS PSS
12/2003	Berardi, F. (PSS)	8	PDCS PdD/PSD PSS
07/2006	Stolfi, F. (PSD)	10	PSD AP SU
11/2007	Stolfi, F. (PSD)	10	PSD AP SU DC
12/2008	Mularoni, A. (AP)	10	PDCS AP LDL MS
12/2012	Valentini, P. (PDCS)	10	PDCS PSD NS AP
12/2016	Renzi, N. (RF)	7	SSD Civic 10 RF

\* loss of parliamentary majority

Note: San Marino has no prime minister. The secretary of state for foreign and political affairs has many prime ministerial roles.

## Acronyms

AP	Popular Alliance
APDS	Popular Alliance of Sammarinese Democrats
APS	Sammarinese Popular Alliance
CdL	Committee of Freedom
DdC	Centre Democrats
LdL	Freedom List
MD-SDI	Democratic Movement–San Marino Together
MLS	Movement for Constitutional Freedoms
NPS	New Socialist Party
PCS	Sammarinese Communist Party
PDCS	Sammarinese Christian Democratic Party
PdD	Party of Democrats
PDS	Party of Socialist Democracy
PPDS	Sammarinese Democratic Progressive Party
PS	Socialist Party
PSD	Party of Socialists and Democrats
PSDIS	Sammarinese Democratic Socialist Party
PSDS	Sammarinese Democratic Socialist Party
PSS	Sammarinese Socialist Party
PSU	Unitary Socialist Party
RCS	Sammarinese Communist Refoundation
RETE	Renewal, Equity, Transparency and Eco-sustainability
RF	Future Republic
SR	Socialists for Reform
SSD	Democratic Socialist Left
SU	United Left
UDS	Sammarinese Democratic Union
UPR	Union for the Republic

# SERBIA

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

2003	highly multi-party
2007	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (SRS, DS, and DSS)</i>
2008	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (DS and SRS)</i>
2012	highly multi-party
2014	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (SNS)</i>
2016	highly multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (SNS)</i>

## Party systems (with smoothing)

None.

## History

Serbia became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. It would be the core of what would become Yugoslavia after World War One. In the turbulent 1990s the autocrat Slobodan Milošević would dominate the country. The transition to democracy occurred in 2000. The confederation with Montenegro ended in 2006. In 2007 the province of Kosovo declared independence, something which has not been legally recognized by Serbia. The northern region of Vojvodina, with a Hungarian minority population, has a certain level of autonomy.

## Electoral system

Serbia uses a party list proportional representation electoral system with the d'Hondt method, with the entire country serving as one constituency. There is a 5 percent electoral threshold for seats; since 2004 this threshold does not apply to parties representing ethnic minorities.

## Cleavages, political parties, and dealignment

Throughout the autocratic 1990s Serbian politics was dominated by the **Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)**, founded in 1990 and led for almost all of the decade by Slobodan Milošević, the president of Serbia from 1989 to 1997, when he became the president of the (rump) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After the fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000 the SPS would continue for a decade as a smaller national populist social democratic party, but in 2010 it adopted a new party programme to become a more standard social democratic party. To that end, in 2008 the SPS entered into a reformist and pro-European Union government. Consequently, left populist elements then broke off to form the **Movement of Socialists (PS)**.

In the 2000 transitional election the **Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS)** alliance won an overwhelming majority. With the DOS candidate coming second in the November 2003 presidential election, the alliance disbanded right afterwards. In the parliamentary election at the end of that year, there were three different main component parts of the DOS alliance running, the first two of which predated the DOS. The **Democratic Party (DS)** is a social democratic party established in 1990. The **Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)** is a conservative nationalist party created in 1992. In 2014, a faction of the DSS created the pro-Russian, anti-Western **Serbian National Party (SNP)**; despite such orientation in 2016 the SNP would run with the SNS (see later). The conservative, free market-oriented **G17 Plus (G17+)** was created as an NGO in 1997 by 17 economists and other experts; it became a political party in 2002. In 2010, G17+ founded the **United Regions of Serbia (URS)** grouping to emphasize regional development; the URS became a unified party in 2013. In the 2014 election the URS fell below the electoral threshold and in 2015 it was dissolved.

Serbia has a couple conservative and monarchist parties that in the 1990s and 2000s had some success. These are the **Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO)**, which was founded in 1990, and the **New Serbia (NS)** party, which broke off from the SPO in 1997 and which has always run as part of a broader electoral coalition including one with the SPO in 2003. However, the main alternative to the DOS and its components/successors have been populist radical right and nationalist Serbian parties. In the 2000s the key party here was the ultra-nationalist **Serbian Radical Party (SRS)**, founded in 1991 by Vojislav Šešelj who had left the

SPO. The SRS was irredentist, demanding a greater Serbia. However, with Vojislav Šešelj voluntarily surrendering to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in early 2003, SRS deputy president Tomislav Nikolić assumed de facto leadership, and stressed economics more than nationalism. In the 2003 and 2007 elections the SRS was the largest party, but was kept out of government. In 2007 the nationalist **Party of Serbian Unity (SSJ)** merged into the SRS; the SSJ had been founded in 1993 and won seats in 2000. Then in 2008 the SRS rebelled over Tomislav Nikolić's support for the Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) between Serbia and the European Union, which went against the party's euro-scepticism and effectively its hostility to the independence of Kosovo. Tomislav Nikolić and others were expelled from the SRS, and in turn founded the **Serbian Progressive Party (SNS)** which with its allies won a plurality in 2012 and then majorities in 2014 and 2016.

On the non-nationalist side, the social liberal **Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)** was formed in 2005 as a split from the DS. Also left liberal and reformist is the **Enough is Enough (DJB)** association, formed in 2014. The **Social Democratic Party (SDS)** is now the party of ex-president Boris Tadić; lacking enough time to register before the 2014 election the SDS legally ran as part of the Greens. Serbia also has various ethnic minority parties; of those that run alone the largest is the **Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSZ in Hungarian)**, founded in 1994. However, the VMSZ has never been in government. In contrast, two parties representing the Bosniaks of the Sandžak region have been in multiple governments. The first such party is the **Party of Democratic Action of Sandžak (SDA S)**, founded in 1990. The second was the **Sandžak Democratic Party (SDP)**, founded in 1996. In 2009 its leader and the then-Minister of Labour Rasim Ljajić decided to aim for multi-ethnic support; the SDP was consequently folded into the new **Social Democratic Party of Serbia (SDPS)**. Indeed, the SDP/SDPS has always run as part of broad national lists; the SDA not so since 2003. Since 2013 there is also the **Bosniak Democratic Union of Sandžak (BDZ S)**, though this party has not been in government.

In 2000, the various ethnic minority parties ran as part of the DOS; in 2003, some of these ran as part of the **Together for Tolerance (ZT)** electoral coalition which included non-ethnic minority parties. Lastly, Serbia has a pensioners' party broadly in the centre-left, the **Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (PUPS)**, founded in 2005. The PUPS has run in coalition with various larger parties.

## Governments

The main parties in Serbia usually run in electoral alliances of several parties, most of which wind up in cabinet. Consequently, governments since 2003 have been quite multi-party. Since 2014 the coalitions have also been oversized.

ELECTIONS IN SERBIA SINCE 2000

<i>PF</i>		<i>2000</i>		<i>2003</i>		<i>2007</i>		<i>2008</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
DOS		65.7	176	—	—	—	—	—	—
DS (and allies)	4	(in DOS)		12.8	37	23.1	64	39.3	102
SPS (and allies)	6 then 4	14.1	37	7.7	22	5.7	16	7.8	20
LDP (and allies)	5	—	—	—	—	5.4	15	5.4	13
SPO	10	3.9	0	7.8	22	3.4	0	(with DS)	
G17+/URS	10	—	—	11.6	34	6.9	19	(with DS)	
NS	10	(in DOS)		(with SPO)		(with DSS)		(with DSS)	
SSJ (and allies)	11	5.5	14	1.8	0	—	—	—	—
DSS	11	(in DOS)		18.0	53	16.8	47	11.9	30
SRS	12	8.8	23	28.0	82	29.1	81	30.1	78
PUPS	31	—	—	—	—	3.2	0	(with SPS)	
ZT	21	(in DOS)		4.3	0	—	—	—	—
VMSZ	21	(in DOS)		(in ZT)		1.3	3	1.8	4
SDA S (and allies)	21	(in DOS)		(with DS)		0.9	2	0.9	2
Other ethnic minority parties	21	(in DOS)		(in ZT)		1.5	3	1.2	1
Other parties		2.1	0	8.0	0	2.7	0	1.6	0
TOTAL SEATS		250		250		250		250	

<i>PF</i>		<i>2012</i>		<i>2014</i>		<i>2016</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
DS (and allies)	4	23.1	67	6.2	19	6.2	16
SDS (and allies)	4	—	—	5.9	18	5.2	13
DJB	4	—	—	2.2	0	6.2	16
SPS (and allies)	4	15.2	44	13.9	44	11.3	29
LDP (and allies)	5	6.8	19	3.5	0	(with SDS)	
URS	10	5.8	16	3.1	0	—	—
DSS (and allies)	11	7.3	21	4.4	0	5.2	13
SNS (and allies)	11	25.2	73	50.0	158	49.7	131
SRS	12	4.8	0	2.1	0	8.3	22
VMSZ	21	1.8	5	2.2	6	1.5	4
SDA S	21	0.7	2	1.0	3	0.8	2
BDZ S	21	—	—	(with LDP)		0.9	2
Other ethnic minority parties	21	1.7	3	0.9	2	1.1	2
Other parties		7.6	0	4.6	0	3.6	0
TOTAL SEATS		250		250		250	

**SERBIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 2001**

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
01/2001	Đinđić, Z. (DS)	24	DOS	
03/2003	Živković, Z. (DS)	25	DOS	
03/2004	Koštunica, V. (DSS)	21 (1)	DSS G17+ SPO NS	SNS
05/2007	Koštunica, V. (DSS)	25 (1)	DS DSS G17+ NS SDP	
07/2008	Cvetković, M. (ind.)	27 (1)	DS G17+ SPS PUPS SDA S	
07/2012	Dačić, I. (SPS)	19 (2)	SDP SPO SNS SPS URS NS PUPS SDA S SDPS	
09/2013	Dačić, I. (SPS)	22 (6)	SNS SPS NS PS PUPS SDA S SDPS	
04/2014	Vučić, A. (SNS)	19 (5)	SNS SPS NS PS SDPS	
08/2016	Vučić, A. (SNS)	20 (4)	SNS SPS PS PUPS SDPS	
06/2017	Brnabić, A. (ind.)	22 (4)	SNS SPS PS PUPS SDPS SNP	

*Note:* Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was assassinated in March 2003.

**Acronyms**

BDZ S	Bosniak Democratic Union of Sandžak
DJB	Enough is Enough
DOS	Democratic Opposition of Serbia
DS	Democratic Party
DSS	Democratic Party of Serbia
G17+	G17 Plus
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
NS	New Serbia
PS	Movement of Socialists
PUPS	Party of United Pensioners of Serbia
SDA S	Party of Democratic Action of Sandžak
SDP	Sandžak Democratic Party
SDPS	Social Democratic Party of Serbia
SDS	Social Democratic Party
SNP	Serbian National Party
SNS	Serbian Progressive Party
SPO	Serbian Renewal Movement
SPS	Socialist Party of Serbia
SRS	Serbian Radical Party
SSJ	Party of Serbian Unity
URS	United Regions of Serbia
VMSZ	Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians
ZT	Together for Tolerance



# SLOVAKIA

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1990	highly multi-party
1992	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (HZDS)</i>
1994	highly multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (HZDS)</i>
1998	moderately multi-party
2002	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (HZDS, SDKÚ-DS, Smer-SD, and SMK-MKP)</i>
2006	highly multi-party
2010	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (Smer-SD)</i>
2012	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (Smer-SD)</i>
2016	highly multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1998–2006 inclusive      highly multi-party system

## History

Slovakia was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and thus after 1867 most of its territory was under Hungarian rule. In 1918 the Czechoslovak Republic was formed with the Czechs as well as sizable German and Hungarian minorities. Slovaks saw and see the interwar government as an instrument of Czech hegemony. A Slovak state was created in 1939 as a puppet regime of Nazi Germany. Reunited Czechoslovakia was under communist rule from 1948. There were mass protests

and demonstrations in 1989, with the Public Against Violence movement plays a role similar to that of the Civic Forum in the Czech lands. Czechoslovakia itself was peacefully dissolved by the leaders of the Czech Republic and Slovakia at the end of 1992 – what was called the “velvet divorce”. What follows pertains to Slovakia within Czechoslovakia from 1990 and then independent Slovakia from 1993.

## Electoral system

Slovakia elects its 150 deputies using a party list proportional representation system with the Hagenbach-Bischoff method. Since 1998 there is one country-wide electoral district; previously there had been four multi-member districts. The electoral threshold for a single party began in 1990 at 3 percent of the valid votes cast nationally; since 1992 this has been 5 percent. For coalitions, since 1992 the standard thresholds have been 7 percent in the case of a coalition of two or three parties, and 10 percent for a coalition of four or more parties. However, for the 1998 election the government of Vladimír Mečiar, in an attempt to hold on to power by hurting the opposition coalition and the allied Hungarian parties, changed the threshold to 5 percent per two to four *component* parties of a coalition – thus for coalitions of, respectively, two, three, and four or more parties the threshold was 10, 15, and 20 percent. This threshold feature (as well as others) was struck down the following year by the Constitutional Court, and a law re-established the previous thresholds.

## Political parties and party cleavages

In the 1990s, Abraham (1995: 96) noted that the “[m]ain political actors in Slovakia are divided more according to their former political status or their different interpretation of Slovakia’s history than according to the ideological banners they presently carry”. Indeed, in the initial democratic years, a main point of party political contention was between those who defended the fascist Slovak state of World War Two and those who praised the anti-fascist Slovak National Uprising of 1944.

Like its Czech counterpart Civic Forum, **Public Against Violence (VPN)**, formed in 1989, was the main Slovak opposition movement against the ruling communist government. And like its Czech counterpart, the VPN largely disintegrated into several factions following the parallel Czechoslovakian and Slovak elections in 1990. The VPN was dissolved in 1991, but its direct successor, the **Civic Democratic Union (ODÚ)**, only lasted one year, having been unsuccessful in 1992. The major political party to form from the VPN was the **Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)**, the clear winner of the 1992 election. Headed and dominated by Vladimír Mečiar, the HZDS quickly became a nationalistic party which combined leftist economic and social policies with an appeal to nationalistic sentiments and symbols more typical of populist radical right-wing parties. The HZDS thus was an ideal type national populist social democratic party of post-communist Europe.

The HZDS was occasionally weakened by defections and divisions. In 1994 the HZDS government was brought down when more liberal members of the party left to form the **Alternative of Political Realism (APR)** which subsequently became the **Democratic Union of Slovakia (DEÚS)**. In 2002 HZDS members excluded by Vladimír Mečiar, including future president Ivan Gašparovič, formed the **Movement for Democracy (HZD)**. The HZD failed to enter parliament, but still cost the HZDS support. Overall, though, in the four Slovak elections from 1992 through 2002 the HZDS was always the largest party – though declining and losing almost half its support over this period. In 2003, the HZDS adopted the term **People's Party (L'S)** as a prefix in an unsuccessful attempt to become part of the European People's Party. After failing to enter parliament in both 2010 and 2012, the **L'S-HZDS** dissolved in 2014.

Parties closely allied with the HZDS during its dominance included the populist radical right **Slovak National Party (SNS)**, a party which dates back to the first republic. The SNS is both intensely nationalist and anti-Hungarian. It is a Catholic, conservative party which advocates cautious economic policies. In 1994 the party passed a resolution stating that only ethnic Slovaks could be party members. In 2001, one of the SNS's co-founders left and formed the **Real Slovak National Party (PSNS)**. Although the PSNS did slightly better than the SNS in 2002, neither cleared the electoral threshold. The two parties merged back together in 2005.

Another ally of the HZDS was the **Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS)**, which split away from the **Party of the Democratic Left (SDL')** in 1994 because the latter was moving towards the to the centre of the political spectrum. As a junior coalition partner of the HZDS from 1994 to 1998 the ZRS successfully kept various key industries under state control. The ZRS urged the protection of worker's rights and argued against Slovak membership in NATO. It fell out of parliament in 1998, never to return.

For its part, the SDL' was formed in 1990 by former communists and reform communists as the **Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS)**. The party changed its name to the SDL' for the 1992 election in order to reflect its ideological shift from communism to social democracy. A new KSS would form right after that election and continues to this day, but it has only entered parliament once, in 2002.

The SDL', and for that matter ultimately the L'S-HZDS, would lose the left of the political spectrum to another left centre populist party, **Direction (Smer)**. Smer was founded in 1999 by Robert Fico, who had been the most popular member of the SDL'. In 2005 Smer would in fact absorb the SDL', the **Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS)**, and another SDL' splinter and become **Direction–Social Democracy (Smer-SD)**. Since the 2006 election Smer-SD has consistently been the single largest party in Slovakia. In 2010 Smer-SD would receive the endorsement of the now-defunct HZD. Its first coalition government in 2006, with the SNS and the L'S-HZDS, led to Smer-SD being suspended for over a year from the Party of European Socialists (PES). Fico originally stressed corruption issues and the fact that his candidates were new to politics; over time and in government his focus has been more on traditional left-of-centre economics.

The remaining parliamentary parties in Slovakia have generally been on the centre-right; certainly this was the case in the 1990s. The first of these parties is the **Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)**. Founded in 1990, the KDH has strong links to the Catholic Church and seeks to be a mainstream European Christian Democratic party which supports privatization and smallholders. The party was originally in opposition to independence for Slovakia. The KDH leader Jan Čarnogurský served as prime minister in the April 1991 government. The party returned to the government coalition which ousted Vladimír Mečiar, if only temporarily, in 1994. Support for the KDH was quite stable from 1992 through 2012. Then in 2016 it fell just below the electoral threshold as some of its support went to the social conservative **Network (SIEŤ)**, formed by the former KDH MP Radoslav Procházka who had come third in the 2014 presidential election. However, despite promising to not enter into government with Smer-SD, Radoslav Procházka did thus that, causing the party to implode and its MPs to go in various directions – its last MP leaving in 2017.

The conservative, agrarian-oriented **Democratic Party (DS)** was founded in 1989, and saw itself as the continuation of the 1940s Democratic Party which won a majority in Slovakia in the 1946 Czechoslovak election, only to be liquidated after the communist takeover in 1948. The post-communist DS was much less successful, winning seats as a stand-alone party only in the election of 1990. The same limited initial success befell the **Green Party in Slovakia (SZS)**.


In 1994, and even more in 1998, Slovakia's anti-Vladimír Mečiar parties formed electoral coalitions to maximize their combined seats, given that some of these had fallen below the electoral threshold in 1992. In 1994, **Common Choice (SV)** grouped the SDL', the SDSS, the SZS, and two minor forces. The 1997 decision of the SDL' to support Vladimír Mečiar led to the breakup of SV. In 1998, the **Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK)** grouped the DS, the DUS, the KDH, the SDSS, and the SZS. Although the SDK was meant to last just for the one election, Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda (originally of the KDH) wanted there to be a broader centre-right party; consequently he formed the **Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ)** in 2000. In 2006 the SDKÚ united with the smaller DS.

Outside of SDK was the new social liberal **Party of Civic Understanding (SOP)**, formed in 1998, which aimed initially to reduce polarization in Slovak politics. The SOP would not last: in 2002 it ran with the SDL' and in 2003 it dissolved. However, its founder Rudolf Schuster did become president in 1999. A media owner, Pavol Rusko, who had considered joining the SOP instead founded in 2001 the right liberal **Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO)** – 'áno' meaning 'yes' in Slovak – which entered parliament and government in 2002. The party suffered internal divisions, and fell out of parliament in 2006. Eventually the party was bought by a businesswoman as a personal vehicle who then changed its name.

Another right liberal but also Eurosceptic party, **Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)** was founded in 2009 and has proven durable. The conservative party **Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OL'aNO)** began as four candidates on the SaS list in 2010, and then became a political party the following year.

It included a couple small conservative splinters from other parties. On the extreme right, the **People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS)** was founded in 2010 by Marian Kotleba, who added his surname as a prefix in 2015. The party seeks to build on the legacy of Jozef Tiso, the leader of Nazi Germany’s client Slovak state during World War Two. Lastly, the populist radical right party **We Are Family (SR)** was founded in 2015.

Finally, Slovakia has always had parties representing its ethnic Hungarian minority. The first two such parties, both formed in 1990, were the **Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKM in Hungarian)** and **Coexistence (E in Hungarian)**. Coexistence in fact was also supported by other ethnic minorities. MKM and E ran in 1990 and 1992 as allied parties and then allied in 1994 with a



**FIGURE 40.1** Slovakia: 2014 placement of parties on socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions.

Source: Polk, Jonathan, et al. (2017) “Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data”, *Research & Politics*, Volume 4: 1 (January-March), pp. 1–9(with calculation of LEC-TAN).

# ELECTIONS IN SLOVAKIA SINCE 1990

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1990</i>		<i>1992</i>		<i>1994</i>		<i>1998</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
KSS/SDL'	1 then 4	13.4	22	14.7	29	(in SV)		14.7	23
KSS (new)	1	—	—	0.8	0	2.7	0	2.8	0
ZRS	1	—	—	—	—	7.3	13	1.3	0
SZS	3	3.5	6	1.1	0	(in SV)		(in SDK)	
SDSS	4	—	—	4.0	0	(in SV)		(in SDK)	
SV	3 and 4	—	—	—	—	10.4	18	—	—
SOP	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	8.0	13
HZDS	6	—	—	37.3	74	35.0	61	27.0	43
VPN/ODÚ	9	29.3	48	4.0	0	—	—	—	—
DEÚS	9	—	—	—	—	8.6	15	(in SDK)	
SDK	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	26.3	42
KDH	10	19.2	31	8.9	18	10.1	17	(in SDK)	
DS	10	4.4	7	3.3	0	3.4	0	(in SDK)	
SNS	12	13.9	22	7.9	15	5.4	9	9.1	14
MKM and E/ MK	21	8.7	14	7.4	14	10.2	17	—	—
SMK-MKP	21	—	—	—	—	—	—	9.1	15
Others		7.6	0	10.6	0	6.9	0	1.7	0
TOTAL SEATS			150		150		150		150

	<i>PF</i>	<i>2002</i>		<i>2006</i>		<i>2010</i>		<i>2012</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
KSS	1	6.3	11	3.9	0	0.8	0	0.7	0
ZRS	1	0.5	0	0.3	0	0.2	0	(with KSS)	
SDL'	4	1.4	0	(into Smer-SD)		—	—	—	—
HZDS/ L'S-HZDS	6	19.5	36	8.8	15	4.3	0	0.9	0
HZD	6	3.3	0	0.6	0	—	—	—	—
Smer/Smer-SD	6	13.5	25	29.1	50	34.8	62	44.4	83
SKDÚ/ SDKÚ-DS	8	15.1	28	18.4	31	15.4	28	6.1	11
ANO	9	8.0	15	1.4	0	—	—	—	—
SaS	9	—	—	—	—	12.1	22	5.9	11
KDH	10	8.3	15	8.3	14	8.5	15	8.8	16
OL'aNO	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	8.6	16
SNS	12	3.3	0	11.7	20	5.1	9	4.6	0
PSNS	12	3.7	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
L'SNS	13	—	—	—	—	1.3	0	1.6	0
SMK-MKP	21	11.2	20	11.7	20	4.3	0	4.3	0
Most-Híd	21	—	—	—	—	8.1	14	6.9	13
Others		5.9	0	5.8	0	5.1	0	7.2	0
TOTAL SEATS			150		150		150		150

(Continued)

	<i>PF</i>	<i>2016</i>	
		<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
KSS	1	0.6	0
Smer-SD	6	28.3	49
SDKÚ-DS	8	0.3	0
SIEĽ	8	5.6	10
SaS	9	12.1	21
KDH	10	4.9	0
OL'aNO	10	11.0	19
SNS	12	8.6	15
SR	12	6.6	11
Kotleba – L'SNS	13	8.0	14
SMK-MKP	21	4.0	0
Most-Híd	21	6.5	11
Others		3.5	0
TOTAL SEATS		150	

third Hungarian party as the **Hungarian Coalition (MK in Hungarian)**. The 1998 electoral system change led these parties to merge into one as the **Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP)**, which combined the Slovak and Hungarian acronyms. For a time the SMK-MKP was the only party representing the ethnic Hungarian minority. Then in 2009, Béla Bugár, who had been the leader of the SMK-MKP until 2007 (and the MKM before that) formed the new party of **Bridge (Most-Híd)**, which joins the Slovak and Hungarian words for 'bridge'. As its name implies, Most-Híd seeks to bridge the two communities and it has been successful in that regard, with over a third of its membership being ethnic Slovak. However, by taking so many votes from the SMK-MKP it has caused the latter to fall to a steady 4 percent plus support since 2010, not enough to be in parliament.

Figure 40.1 illustrates the various Slovak parties as of 2014 in terms of socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions:

### Governments

Slovakia has always had a clear polarization between on the one hand left populist governments led by first the HZDS and later Smer/Smer-SD with allied nationalist parties, and on the other hand broadly centre-right governments opposed to the former. The one party that has crossed this divide is Most-Híd, which served in a centre-right government from 2010 to 2012 and with Fico's Smer-SD since 2016.

## SLOVAKIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1990

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
06/1990	Mečiar, V. (PAV)*	23	PAV KDH DS	
04/1991	Čarnogurský, J. (KDH)*	23	parts of VPN (ODÚ) KDH DS	
06/1992	Mečiar, V. (HZDS)*	17	HZDS SNS	
03/1993	Mečiar, V. (HZDS)	16	HZDS	
11/1993	Mečiar, V. (HZDS)	18	HZDS SNS	
03/1994	Moravčík, J. (DEÚS)	18	SDL' DEÚS KDH	MKdH
12/1994	Mečiar, V. (HZDS)	19	HZDS ZRS SNS	
10/1998	Dzurinda, M. (SDK)	20	SDK SDL' SMK SOP	
10/2002	Dzurinda, M. (SDKÚ)	18	SDKÚ ANO SMK KDH	
07/2006	Fico, R. (Smer-SD)	15	Smer-SD SNS LS-HZDS	
07/2010	Radičová, I. (SDKÚ-DS)	15	SDKÚ-DS SaS KDH Most-Híd	
04/2012	Fico, R. (Smer-SD)	14 (4)	Smer-SD	
04/2016	Fico, R. (Smer-SD)	15	Smer-SD SNS Most-Híd SIEĽ	
08/2016	Fico, R. (Smer-SD)	15	Smer-SD Most-Híd SNS	
03/2018	Pellegrini, P. (Smer-SD)	15	Smer-SD Most-Híd SNS	

\* pre-independence

## Acronyms

ANO	Alliance of the New Citizen
APR	Alternative of Political Realism
DS	Democratic Party
DEÚS	Democratic Union of Slovakia
E	Coexistence
HZD	Movement for Democracy
HZDS	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
KDH	Christian Democratic Movement
Kotleba-L'SNS	Kotleba – People's Party Our Slovakia
KSS	Communist Party of Slovakia
L'S-HZDS	People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
L'SNS	People's Party Our Slovakia
MK	Hungarian Coalition
MKM	Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement
Most-Híd	Bridge
ODÚ	Civic Democratic Union
OL'aNO	Ordinary People and Independent Personalities
PSNS	Real Slovak National Party
SaS	Freedom and Solidarity



SDK	Slovak Democratic Coalition
SDKÚ	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union
SDL'	Party of the Democratic Left
SDSS	Social Democratic Party of Slovakia
SIET'	Network
Smer	Direction
Smer-SD	Direction–Social Democracy
SMK-MKP	Party of the Hungarian Coalition
SNS	Slovak National Party
SOP	Party of Civic Understanding
SR	We Are Family
SV	Common Choice
SZS	Green Party in Slovakia
VPN	Public Against Violence
ZRS	Association of Workers of Slovakia

## Reference

Abraham, Samuel (1995), “Early Elections in Slovakia: A State of Deadlock”, *Government and Opposition*, Volume 30: 1, pp. 86–100.

# SLOVENIA

**The party pattern in each election, *with additional components***

1990	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top six parties (SDP, LDS, SKD, SKZ, SDZ, and ZS)</i>
1992	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (LDS, SKD, ZL, and SNS)</i>
1996	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (LDS, SLS, and SDS)</i>
2000	highly multi-party
2004	highly multi-party
2008	highly multi-party
2011	highly multi-party
2014	highly multi-party
2018	highly multi-party

**Party systems (with smoothing)**

1992–2018 inclusive	highly multi-party system
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**History**

Historically Slovenia was territory consisting of a number of Austrian crown lands, then it was part of Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes which was later renamed Yugoslavia in October 1929. During World War Two Slovenia was divided between Germany, Hungary, and Italy. In 1945 Slovenia became a constituent

republic of the Yugoslavian Federation; this was followed by 45 years of Communist one-party rule. In April 1990 the **DEMOS (Democratic Opposition of Slovenia)** alliance of centre-right parties obtained a majority of legislative seats in the tricameral Slovene Assembly in the first multi-party election to take place in the Yugoslav Federation since World War Two. DEMOS would only last a couple of years, dissolving in April 1992. On 2 July 1990 the Slovene parliament accepted a Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Republic of Slovenia. In February 1991 the Slovene assembly resolved to disassociate from Yugoslavia. This was followed by a brief war with Federal Yugoslav forces after which the Federal government accepted Slovene independence. Slovenia joined the European Union in 2004.

### Electoral system

Since 1992 Slovenia has had 90 deputies, almost all of whom are elected in eight multi-member constituencies, each with 11 seats. The last two seats are single-member constituencies, with one for each of the (small) Hungarian and Italian minorities in the country. For the 88 regular seats, party list proportional representation with (since 2000) the Droop quota is used. Since 2000 there is a 4 percent threshold for seats; previously this was 3 percent. A preferential vote majority system is used for the two deputies representing the Italian and Hungarian communities. In a 1996 referendum, voters favoured a change to a single-member two-round majority electoral system for the parliament, however the turnout was insufficient to make this valid.

### Political parties and cleavages

Post-communist party politics in Slovenia began with a bipolar structure of anti-communists versus reformed communists, then moved to a multi-polar structure based on left-right ideology and religiosity. To this has now been added a division of old political parties versus new personalistic ones. This being said, most of the parties tend to present themselves as centre parties, broadly speaking.

The DEMOS electoral coalition would break up in 1991, leaving five constituent parties, variously agrarian, Christian Democrat, green, liberal, and social democrat. The vaguely liberal **Slovenian Democratic Union (SDZ)** would split in 1991 when the majority decided to become a conservative party, namely the **National Democratic Party (NDS)**; the clearly liberal elements left and formed the **Democratic Party of Slovenia (DSS)**. Unlike the unsuccessful NDS, the DSS would win seats in 1992 but not in 1996. Likewise the **Greens of Slovenia (ZS)**, formed in 1989, did not win seats after 1992.

That said, a party that had not arisen from DEMOS was Slovenia's most successful party in the three elections following independence in 1991. This was the **Liberal Democratic Party (LDS)**, founded in 1990, which in 1994 merged with the majority of the DSS and the small left-centre **Socialist Party of Slovenia (SSS)** which was founded in 1990 to become **Liberal Democracy of Slovenia**

**(LDS).** The LDS held the post of prime minister for almost the entire period until 2004. It was descended from the former League of Socialist Youth of Slovenia – the youth wing of the ruling communist party. Having discarded its former communist leanings, the party described itself as more or less a traditional liberal party locating itself in the broad centre of the political spectrum. It was held together quite effectively by its pragmatic leader Janez Drnovšek, who dominated Slovenian politics for a decade. However, in 2002 Janez Drnovšek chose to run for the largely ceremonial presidency, and hand-picked his finance minister to succeed him as prime minister. After losing the election of 2004 the LDS began to have internal fights and splinters. In particular, more left liberal elements split off in 2007 to form **Zares (“Indeed”)**, which won seats in 2008 but then likewise succumbed to internal divisions and collapsed in support, ultimately dissolving in 2015.

The **Slovene Christian Democrats (SKD)** was the largest component part of the DEMOS alliance. The SKD then won the second largest number of seats in the 1992 election. Formed in 1990 by a group of “non-clerical Catholic intellectuals”, the SKD was a Western-style Christian democratic party which supported the social market and traditional conservative and religious values. It was strongly in favour of both EU and NATO membership for Slovenia. For the 1996 election the SKD formed the **Slovene Spring Alliance (SP)** with two other parties.

The second member of the SP was the agrarian and ethno-nationalist **Slovenian People’s Party (SLS)**, a conservative values party, which claims to descend from the prewar party of the same name. In fact the SKD was more the heir of said party, leading to conflict between the modern SLS and SKD. The modern SLS was formed in 1988 as the non-political **Slovenian Peasant Union (SKZ)**, the first openly non-communist political organization of the Slovenia Spring. The SKZ registered itself formally as a party in 1990, becoming a member of the DEMOS grouping. It adopted the SLS rubric in 1991. The SLS has had reservations about EU membership. The party calls for greater protection of farmers and believes in more decentralization to local government.

In April 2000 the SKD merged into the SLS, and for the 2000 election they ran as the SLS-SKD, but then became just the SLS as of 2001. In July 2000 the SLS-SKD reversed its previous position and voted to maintain proportional representation. This reversal caused Prime Minister Andrej Bajuk and others who supported changed the constitution and the electoral system (to a majoritarian one) left the SLS-SKD and formed **New Slovenia–Christian Democrats (NSI)**.

The third member of the SP alliance was the **Social Democratic Party of Slovenia (SDSS)**. This initially self-described social democratic party in the European tradition was founded in 1989 and narrowly won representation in the 1992 election but nevertheless found its way into the coalition government of 1993. Despite its social democratic name, under the leadership of Janez Janša from 1993 the SDSS became a populist radical right party which was strongly anti-communist. Then after 2000 it joined the European People’s Party (EPP) and shifted its policies, ultimately becoming essentially a conservative party and indeed similar to the extent Christian democratic NSI (which though was more right-wing economically and

more TAN than standard Christian democratic parties). In 2003, the SDSS renamed itself the **Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS)**. For the 2018 election the party adopted a more nationalist, populist, and strongly anti-immigrant position. Since 2004, the SDS has always been one of the two largest parties, and the main party on the centre-right.

Continuously on the populist radical right has been the **Slovenian National Party (SNS)**, founded in 1991 and still with the same leader since then. The SNS is also anti-clerical. It won seats in each election through 2008, but dropped below the electoral threshold after that. Splinter elements left the party in 1993 and again in 2008.

One of the few parties to position itself not in the crowded centre of Slovene politics but rather on the left is the **Social Democrats (SD)**. Its roots go back to reform communists in Slovenia who left the Yugoslav communists in 1990 and ran as the **Party of Democratic Renewal (SDP)** and then ran with other left forces in 1992 as the **United Left (ZL)**, most of which became in 1993 the **United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD)**. In 2005 the party shortened its name to the present form, and the following year it broke fully with its communist past. In 2007 the SD gained several high-profile defections from the imploding LDS, and became the main opposition to the SDS. In the 2008 election the Social Democrats narrowly became the largest party, but then dropped off in the face of new parties.

Slovenia has an ongoing single-interest party in the form of the **Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS)**, which formed in 1991 and ran as part of the United Left in 1992. DeSUS has won seats in every election since 1996 and has often been in government. In contrast, the **Party of the Youth of Slovenia (SMS)**, formed in 2000, only won seats in the election of that year. In 2009, it became more of a green party, but with little success.

The 2011 election would see two new parties based on individuals win seats, and indeed one become the largest party. That was the social liberal **Positive Slovenia (PS)**, formed by the then-mayor of Ljubljana Zoran Janković – with the PS initially being named as his list. The second such new party was the classical liberal **Gregor Virant's Civic List (LGV)**, Virant being a former cabinet minister; in 2012 this would become the **Civic List (DL)**. PS would form a coalition government in 2013, with Alenka Bratušek as prime minister – Zoran Janković having temporarily stepped aside due to corruption allegations. In 2014, after unsuccessfully challenging Zoran Janković for the PS leadership, Alenka Bratušek quit the PS and then resigned as prime minister, which triggered an early election in July. For this election she formed her own party, the **Alliance of Alenka Bratušek (ZaAB)**, which ran in 2018 as the **Party of Alenka Bratušek (SAB)**. The 2014 election would see both the PS and the DL fail to remain in parliament, and neither party ran in 2018.

Several other new parties ran in the 2014 election. This included the **Pirate Party of Slovenia (PSS)**, founded in 2012, which was unsuccessful. Two new forces did win seats though. One was the **United Left (ZL)**, an electoral alliance of small leftist parties and groups not to be confused with the 1992 grouping of this name. In 2017 two constituent components of ZL merged to form **The Left**

(**Levica**). More importantly, the eponymous **Party of Miro Cerar (SMC)** was formed by said individual, a law professor and son of a famous gymnast and Olympic Gold Medalist. The party won a plurality of seats in 2014 and Cerar became prime minister. In 2015 it renamed itself the **Modern Centre Party (SMC)**.

Likewise in 2018 there was another eponymous new party, the **List of Marjan Šarec (LMŠ)**, which is a social liberal party like PS and the SMC before it. Šarec himself is a former actor, journalist, and small-town mayor who narrowly lost the 2017 presidential election. Overall, the centre-left ideological space in Slovenia has been open since the collapse of the LDS, with no stable party emerging there.

#### ELECTIONS IN SLOVENIA SINCE 1990

	PF	1990		1992		1996		2000	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
ZS	3	8.8	8	3.7	5	1.8	0	0.9	0
SDP/ZL/ZLSD	4	17.3	14	13.6	14	9.0	9	12.1	11
SSS	4	5.4	5	2.7	0	—	—	—	—
LDS	5	14.5	12	23.5	22	27.0	25	36.2	34
SDZ	5 and 9	9.5	8	—	—	—	—	—	—
DSS	5	—	—	5.0	6	2.7	0	0.8	0
NSI	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	8.8	8
NDS	10	—	—	2.2	0	(with SKD)		—	—
SKD	10	13.0	11	14.5	15	9.6	10		
SKZ/SLS	11	12.6	11	8.7	10	19.4	19	9.5	9
SDSS	4 then 12	7.4	6	3.3	4	16.1	16	15.8	14
SNS	12	—	—	10.0	12	3.2	4	4.4	4
DeSUS	31	—	—	(in ZL)		4.3	5	5.2	4
SMS	31	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.3	4
Others		11.4	3	12.8	0	6.9	0	2.0	0
Total elected from party lists			78		88		88		88
Ethnic minorities	21		2		2		2		2
TOTAL SEATS			80		90		90		90

	PF	2004		2008		2011		2014	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
ZL	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.0	6
ZLSD/SD	4	10.2	10	30.4	29	10.5	10	6.0	6
LDS	5	22.8	23	5.2	5	1.5	0	—	—
Zares	5	—	—	9.3	9	0.6	0	—	—
PS	5	—	—	—	—	28.5	28	3.0	0
ZaAB	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.4	4

(Continued)

	PF	2004		2008		2011		2014	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
PSS	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.3	0
SMC	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	34.5	36
NSI	8	9.1	9	3.4	0	4.9	4	5.6	5
LGV/DL	9	—	—	—	—	8.4	8	0.6	0
SDS	10	29.1	29	29.2	28	26.2	26	20.7	21
SLS	11	6.8	7	5.2	5	6.8	6	3.9	0
SNS	12	6.3	6	5.4	5	1.8	0	2.2	0
DeSUS	31	4.0	4	7.4	7	7.0	6	10.2	10
SMS	31	2.1	0	(with SLS)		0.9	0	—	—
Others		9.6	0	4.5	0	2.9	0	1.6	0
<i>Total elected from party lists</i>			88		88		88		88
Ethnic minorities	21		2		2		2		2
TOTAL SEATS			90		90		90		90

		2018	
		% V	# S
The Left	1	9.3	9
SD	4	9.9	10
SAB	5	5.1	5
PSS	5	2.2	0
SMC	5	9.8	10
LMŠ	5	12.6	13
NSI	8	7.2	7
SLS	11	2.6	0
SDS	11	24.9	25
SNS	12	4.2	4
DeSUS	31	4.9	5
Others		7.3	0
<i>Total elected from party lists</i>			88
Ethnic minorities	21		2
TOTAL SEATS			90

## Governments

As noted, almost all Slovenian governments up through 2004 were headed by the LDS, and the only changes were with regard to which parties (always plural) the LDS decided to choose as allies. With the implosion of the LDS there has been no dominant government party since then, but rather a polarization between governments led by the controversial SDS, and governments in opposition to the party.

## SLOVENIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1990

<i>In Power Date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime Minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
05/1990*	Peterle, L. (SKD)	17	SKD SDZ SDSS ZS SKZ
05/1992	Drnovšek, J. (LDS)	22	LDS SDSS ZLSD ZS DSS SSS
01/1993	Drnovšek, J. (LDS)	16 (1)	LDS SKD ZLSD SDSS
04/1994	Drnovšek, J. (LDS)	16 (1)	LDS SKD ZLSD
01/1996	Drnovšek, J. (LDS)	18 (3)	LDS SKD
02/1997	Drnovšek, J. (LDS)	19 (2)	SLS LDS DeSUS
06/2000	Bajuk, A. (SLS+SKD)	17 (4)	SLS SDSS SKD
08/2000	Bajuk, A. (NSI)	17 (4)	SLS SDSS SKD NSI
11/2000	Drnovšek, J. (LDS)	15	LDS ZLSD SLS DeSUS
12/2002	Rop, A. (LDS)	17 (2)	LDS SLS ZLSD DeSUS
12/2004	Janša, J. (SDS)	16	SDS NSI SLS DeSUS
11/2008	Pahor, B. (SD)	19 (7)	SD Z LDS DeSUS
02/2012	Janša, J. (SDS)	13	SDS DeSUS LGV NSI SLS
03/2013	Bratušek, A. (PS)	13	PS DL SD DeSUS
05/2014	Bratušek, A. (ZaAB)	13	ZaAB DL SD DeSUS PS
09/2014	Cerar, M. (SMC)	17	SMC DeSUS SD
09/2018	Šarec (LMŠ)	17	LMŠ SMC SAB SD DeSUS <i>supported by The Left</i>

\* pre-independence.

## Acronyms

DEMOS	Democratic Opposition of Slovenia
DeSUS	Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia
DL	Civic List
DSS	Democratic Party of Slovenia
LDS	Liberal Democratic Party Liberal Democracy of Slovenia
LMŠ	List of Marjan Šarec
NDS	National Democratic Party
SI	New Slovenia—Christian Democrats
PS	Positive Slovenia
PSS	Pirate Party of Slovenia
SAB	Party of Alenka Bratušek
SD	Social Democrats
SDP	Party of Democratic Renewal
SDSS	Social Democratic Party of Slovenia
SDS	Slovenian Democratic Party
SDZ	Slovenian Democratic Union
SKD	Slovene Christian Democrats
SKZ	Slovenian Peasant Union
SLGV	Gregor Virant's Civic List (LGV)



SLS	Slovenian People's Party
SMC	Party of Miro Cerar Modern Centre Party
SMS	Party of the Youth of Slovenia
SNS	Slovene National Party
SP	Slovene Spring Alliance
SSS	Socialist Party of Slovenia
ZaAB	Alliance of Alenka Bratušek
ZL	United Left
ZLSD	United List of Social Democrats
ZS	Greens of Slovenia

# SPAIN

**The party pattern in each election, *with additional components***

1977	two-and-a-half-party
1979	two-and-a-half-party
1982	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (PSOE)</i>
1986	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (PSOE)</i>
1989	two-and-a-half-party
1993	two-and-a-half-party
1996	two-and-a-half-party
2000	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (PP)</i>
2004	two-and-a-half-party
2008	two-and-a-half-party
2011	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (PP)</i>
2015	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (PP, PSOE, and Podemos)</i>
2016	moderately multi-party

**Party systems (with smoothing)**

1977–2011 inclusive	two-and-a-half-party system
---------------------	-----------------------------

**History**

Once a great European power, Spain went into comparative decline in the seventeenth century. By the nineteenth century patterns of political instability had set in.

Ideologically Spain was highly polarized amongst monarchical nationalists, liberal republicans, regionalists, and later on socialists and anarchists. The Second Republic of 1931–1936 was Spain's first true democracy. This republic was both highly fragmented and very polarized, and divisions and mistrust between secular republicans and Catholic conservatives eventually set the stage for a military rebellion and consequent civil war. Victorious in the civil war, General Francisco Franco established an authoritarian regime which was strongly centralist. Francisco Franco remained in power for decades; towards the end of his rule he decided that after his death the monarchy would be restored. However, unforeseen by Francisco Franco, the new King Juan Carlos initiated democratization. All parties, including the Communists, were allowed to compete and an election was held in 1977. A new constitution, including varying elements of regional government, was approved by 87 percent of the voters in a 1978 referendum. Elements of the military made a last ditch, somewhat farcical attempt to overthrow the regime in 1981, but most of the army stayed loyal to the king, who actively opposed the uprising. Spain joined the European Union in 1986.

### Electoral system

Spain uses a proportional representation system with multi-member districts. However, its 350 deputies are elected through no less than 52 districts. Two of these are single member districts for the African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, and the rest of the electoral districts are Spain's 50 provinces (not to be confused with the Autonomous Communities, where regional power lies). Every province, no matter how small, is entitled to a minimum of three deputies. Conversely, only in Barcelona and Madrid are the districts large enough to be truly proportional. There are no national compensatory seats. Consequently, the system is somewhat disproportional, but this has aided in lessening fragmentation, especially until 2015.

### Political parties and cleavages

Post-Francisco Franco Spain has had relatively few national parties, but many regional ones. Of the national parties, the most consistent force until recently has been the **Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)**, which dates back to 1879. During the Francisco Franco years, party leaders were either underground or in exile in France. Felipe González became the PSOE secretary-general in 1974, just in time to lead it in democratic elections. After coming a respectable second in the 1977 election, the PSOE shed its Marxism and became a moderate social democratic party. Indeed, after coming to power in 1982 the party often governed in a right-of-centre way, especially concerning economic restructuring and foreign policy (where it reversed its traditional opposition to NATO). Yet it made clear contributions to democratic deepening and political decentralization. The PSOE is traditionally supported by workers, but particularly by state employees and pensioners.

Its historic rival on the left was the **Spanish Communist Party (PCE)**, which was founded in 1921 and, as noted previously, legalized in 1977. Traditionally Leninist, the party moderated its ideology somewhat in 1978, and also accepted the new democratic order including the monarchy. Despite these changes, in the 1977 and 1979 elections the PCE got only around 10 percent of the vote, much less than in other Latin European countries, as the Socialists were able to dominate the left. Furthermore, the autocratic leadership style of PCE General Secretary Santiago Carrillo led to internal conflict and a drop in support in the early 1980s. Risking marginalization, the party responded after the 1986 election by forming a broader front with other small leftist parties. This new front has been known since 1989 as the **United Left (IU)**, and is allied with the **Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV)**, founded in 1987. From 1989 through 1996 the IU-ICV would have reasonable success in terms of votes – though still penalized in terms of seats by the electoral system – but would then be more marginal. A true competitor to the PSOE on the left did not occur until the creation of **Podemos** (“We Can”) in 2014. Podemos arose in reaction to the economic crisis of 2008 onwards, building on the Spanish anti-austerity movement. Strongly decentralist, Podemos in fact functions via regional affiliates in the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Valencia. For the 2016 election Podemos and the IU-ICV ran together as **Unidos Podemos** (“United We Can”).

In Spanish politics, however, the key initial force after Francisco Franco’s death was not the left but that of the **Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD)**. Adolfo Suárez had been picked by King Juan Carlos in 1976 to establish democracy, and Adolfo Suárez needed an organization to contest the 1977 election. He thus created the UCD from above, bringing together some 13 parties from the centre-left to the moderate right. As its name implies, the party stressed its democratic credentials and its centrism. Victorious in both the 1977 and 1979 elections, the UCD was nevertheless largely held together by the cohesion of government and Adolfo Suárez’s personality. With Adolfo Suárez’s sudden resignation as prime minister in 1981, and subsequent leaving of the party, the UCD fragmented and collapsed. It was dissolved in 1983.

Adolfo Suárez himself founded another centre party, the **Democratic and Social Centre (CDS)**, in 1982. The CDS peaked in 1986, when it became the third largest party in Spain. However, like the UCD, the CDS could not survive Adolfo Suárez’s departure from politics in the early 1990s. After failing to win any seats in the 1993 election, the CDS was dissolved. The third basically centrist party in Spain would be the social liberal **Union, Progress and Democracy (UPyD)**, founded in 2007 but winning seats only in its first two elections of 2008 and 2011.

With the collapse of the UCD, and the failure of the CDS to recapture the broad centre, the main opposition to the PSOE became, almost by default, the **Popular Alliance (AP)**. The AP was founded in 1977 as a home for conservatives and ultra-conservatives, including many former Francisco Franco officials. Indeed, it was the former minister of information and tourism under Francisco Franco, Manuel Fraga, who founded and initially led the AP. Although popular in his home region of Galicia, Manuel Fraga’s democratic credentials were questioned by most Spaniards.

Consequently, although the party got a quarter of the vote in the 1982 election after the collapse of the UCD (and the transfer of many UCD voters), it remained stuck at that level into the 1990s, well behind the Socialists who were clearly the dominant party. With a name change to the **Popular Party (PP)** in 1989 and more importantly changes in leadership, the party was finally able to position itself on the moderate right and thus become “acceptable”. Its next leader, José María Aznar, was able to take the PP above a third of the votes in 1993, to the plurality of votes and seats and then government in 1996, and finally to a single-party majority in 2000. The PP has established a standard conservative voting base of free market-oriented business people and social conservatives, including religious Spaniards. The PP remains weak, however, in the more nationalistic regions of Spain, where there are local centre-right parties and where the historic centrism of the Spanish right is looked on quite unfavourably.

Competing with the PP for economically right-of-centre votes has been the liberal **Citizens (C's)** party, founded in 2006 in Catalonia. Indeed, Citizens arose in opposition to Catalan nationalism and remains strongly centralist. Its opposition to the PP has centred on issues of corruption under Mariano Rajoy, PP prime minister starting in 2011. Overall, Citizens has tried to position itself between the PSOE and the PP (see Figure 42.1), and indeed supported the former after the 2015 election and the latter after the 2016 election.

All of these parties are national, or what the Spanish call “state-wide parties”, in that they run candidates throughout the country. Spain also has, however, various regional or “non-state-wide” parties through most of its autonomous communities, as its regions are called. There have been literally dozens of regional parties in Spain, and these have been collectively strongest in the Basque Country and Catalonia, certainly in terms of state-wide Spanish elections. Autonomous community party politics within these two regions are analysed subsequently. That being said, three of Spain’s non-state-wide centre-right parties are worth noting for their impact on national politics in terms of determining governments. The parties are the **Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ in Basque, PNV in Spanish)**, founded in 1985; the Catalan **Convergence and Union (CiU)**, founded in 1979 but dissolved into its components in 2015 (most of which still ran together in the Spanish election that year as **Democracy and Freedom [DiL]**); and the **Canarian Coalition (CC)** in the Canary Islands, founded as a merger of local parties in 1993, of which the most important group has been the **Association of Canary Islands Independents (AIC)**. The EAJ-PNV, CiU, and CC have all been centre-right parties in a socio-economic sense, therefore one might assume that they are close to the PP. This would be a false assumption, however. Because the Socialists have been more open to decentralization than the conservatives, and because the PSOE governments have been if anything right-of-centre on economics, the EAJ-PNV and especially the CiU were willing to support the PSOE after it was cut down to a minority in 1993. Certainly these main regional parties have been quite adept at using the balance of power to extract concessions from the main national parties. Of course, there have also been regional parties that are left of centre, in the Basque Country and in Catalonia but also in Galicia with the **Galician National Bloc (BNG)**.

# ELECTIONS IN SPAIN SINCE 1977

	PF	1977		1979		1982		1986	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
PCE	1	9.3	20	10.8	23	4.1	4	3.8	7
PSOE	4	30.3	118	30.5	121	48.4	202	44.6	184
UCD	8	34.8	165	35.0	168	6.8	12	—	—
CDS	8	—	—	—	—	2.9	2	9.2	19
AP	10	8.4	16	6.5	9	26.5	106	26.3	105
EAJ-PNV	21	1.7	8	1.7	7	1.9	8	1.6	6
HB	21	—	—	1.1	3	1.0	2	1.1	5
CiU	21	2.8	11	2.7	8	3.7	12	5.1	18
ERC	21	0.8	1	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.4	0
Others		11.9	11	11.0	10	4.0	1	7.9	6
TOTAL SEATS			350		350		350		350

	PF	1989		1993		1996		2000	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
IU + ICV	1	9.1	17	9.6	18	10.6	21	6.0	9
PSOE	4	39.9	175	39.1	159	38.0	141	34.7	125
CDS	8	7.9	14	1.8	0	—	—	—	—
PP	10	25.9	107	35.0	141	39.2	156	45.2	183
EAJ-PNV	21	1.2	5	1.2	5	1.3	5	1.6	7
HB	21	1.1	4	0.9	2	0.7	2	—	—
EA	21	0.7	2	0.6	1	0.5	1	0.4	1
CiU	21	5.1	18	5.0	17	4.6	16	4.3	15
ERC	21	0.4	0	0.8	1	0.7	1	0.9	1
AIC/CC	21	0.3	1	0.9	4	0.9	4	1.1	4
BNG	21	0.2	0	0.5	0	0.9	2	1.3	3
Others		8.2	7	4.6	2	2.6	1	4.5	2
TOTAL SEATS			350		350		350		350

	PF	2004		2008		2011		2015	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
IU + ICV	1	5.3	5	3.8	2	7.0	11	3.7	2
Podemos	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	20.8	69
PSOE	4	43.3	164	44.4	169	29.2	110	22.2	90
UPyD	5	—	—	1.2	1	4.8	5	0.6	0
Citizens	9	—	—	—	—	—	—	14.0	40
PP	10	38.3	148	40.4	154	45.2	186	28.9	123
EAJ-PNV	21	1.7	7	1.5	6	1.4	5	1.2	6
EA/Amaiur/EH Bildu	21	0.3	1	0.2	0	1.4	7	0.9	2
CiU/DiL	21	3.3	10	3.1	10	4.2	16	2.3	8
ERC	21	2.6	8	1.2	3	1.1	3	2.4	9
CC – PNC	21	0.9	3	0.7	2	0.6	2	0.3	1

(Continued)

	PF	2004		2008		2011		2015	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
BNG	21	0.8	2	0.8	2	0.8	2	0.3	0
Others		3.5	2	2.7	1	4.3	3	2.4	0
TOTAL SEATS	21		350		350		350		350


  

	PF	2016	
		% V	# S
Unidos Podemos	2	21.3	71
PSOE	4	22.8	85
UPyD	5	0.2	0
Citizens	9	13.1	32
PP	10	33.3	137
EAJ-PNV	21	1.2	5
EH Bildu	21	0.8	2
CDC	21	2.0	8
ERC	21	2.6	9
CC – PNC	21	0.3	1
BNG	21	0.2	0
Others		2.1	0
TOTAL SEATS			350

Figure 42.1 illustrates the key state-wide Spanish parties as of 2014 in terms of socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions:

Governments

Spanish governments have always been single-party affairs, despite the use of positive parliamentarianism. In the 1980s, of course, the Socialists won three straight majority governments, making any coalition unnecessary. However, the bias in the electoral system ensured that, until 2015, even if the lead party did not win a majority, it was not that far short of this (by around only 10–20 seats). Thus the UCD in the 1970s, the PSOE in 1993, and the PP in 1996 were all able to form stable minority governments, although in the 1990s this was at the price of concessions to the regional parties. In 1996, the negotiations between the PP and the main regional parties were difficult, and it took some two months for PP leader Aznar to get their agreement. However, the change in Spain from a two-and-a-half-party system through 2011 to a moderately multi-party pattern as of 2015, and the somewhat anti-system role of Podemos in this new reality, has



**FIGURE 42.1** Spain: 2014 placement of parties on socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions.

*Source:* Polk, Jonathan, et al. (2017) “Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data”, *Research & Politics*, Volume 4: 1 (January-March), pp. 1–9(with calculation of LEC-TAN).

made government formation much more challenging. Indeed, no government was invested successfully after the 2015 election (a proposed PSOE government in an agreement with Citizens failed given opposition from both the PP and Podemos), leading to a new election (which did strengthen somewhat the incumbent PP). The post-2016 election minority PP government was based on only 35 percent of the seats, the then-smallest percentage ever in contemporary Spain. It was ultimately removed in a constructive vote of non-confidence in June 2018, to be replaced though by a PSOE government with a much lower parliamentary base.



**SPANISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1977**

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
07/1977	Suárez, A. (UCD)	20 (1)	UCD	
03/1979	Suárez, A. (UCD)	24 (2)	UCD	
02/1981	Calvo Sotelo, L. (UCD)	19	UCD	
12/1982	González, F. (PSOE)	17	PSOE	PCE CDS
07/1986	González, F. (PSOE)	17	PSOE	
12/1989	González, F. (PSOE)	19 (3)	PSOE	AIC
<i>[as of 10/1990]</i>				CiU CDS EAJ-PNV
				AIC
06/1993	González, F. (PSOE)	18 (6)	PSOE	CiU EAJ-PNV
<i>[from 1994]</i>				CiU EAJ-PNV CC
05/1996	Aznar, J.M. (PP)	15 (3)	PP	CiU EAJ-PNV CC
04/2000	Aznar, J.M. (PP)	16	PP	CiU CC (until 2003)
04/2004	Rodríguez Zapatero, J.L. (PSOE)	17	PSOE	ERC IU CC BNG
04/2008	Rodríguez Zapatero, J.L. (PSOE)	17	PSOE	
12/2011	Rajoy, M. (PP)	14 (3)	PP	
12/2015	Rajoy, M. (PP)	14 (2)	PP caretaker	
10/2016	Rajoy, M. (PP)	14 (2)	PP	Citizens CC
06/2018	Sánchez, P. (PSOE)	18 (7)	PSOE	

**Acronyms**

Note: See also the Basque Country and Catalonia sections for additional regional parties and their evolution.

AIC	Association of Canary Islands Independents
AP	Popular Alliance
BNG	Galician National Bloc
CC	Canarian Coalition
CDS	Democratic and Social Centre
CiU	Convergence and Union (Catalonia)
C's	Citizens
DiL	Democracy and Liberty (Catalonia)
EAJ-PNV	Basque Nationalist Party
ICV	Initiative for Catalonia Greens
IU	United Left
PCE	Spanish Communist Party
PP	Popular Party
PSOE	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
UCD	Union of the Democratic Centre
UpyD	Union, Progress and Democracy

# THE BASQUE COUNTRY

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1980	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (EAJ)</i>
1984	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (EAJ)</i>
1986	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (PSE, EAJ, HB, and EA)</i>
1990	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (EAJ, PSE, and HB)</i>
1994	highly multi-party
1998	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (EAJ, PP, HB, and PSE)</i>
2001	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (EAJ-EA)</i>
2005	moderately multi-party
2009	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (EAJ and PSE)</i>
2012	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top three parties (EAJ, EHB, and PSE)</i>
2016	moderately multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1986–1998 inclusive	highly multi-party system
2001–2016 inclusive	moderately multi-party system

## History

As a people, the Basques go back to the eighth century. The Basque language is quite unique and distinct from that of its neighbours. The three historic Basque

provinces were incorporated into Castile (Spain) in 1200. Due to conflicts arising from the succession to the Spanish throne in 1700, the Basque provinces were largely unique in Spain in being allowed to maintain their charters and institutions, including taxation powers. The non-tax powers were, however, eliminated in the 1870s, and the tax powers were limited to two of the three provinces. Nevertheless, this institutional legacy has combined with linguistic distinctiveness to produce a strong sense of Basque identity.

The three Basque provinces became in 1979 an Autonomous Community of post-Francisco Franco democratic Spain, the Statute of Autonomy of which was approved by Basque voters in October of that year. However, the Basque deputies never signed the 1977 Spanish constitution. Of the 17 Autonomous Communities in Spain, the Basque Country is the only one which has been plagued with periods of nationalist violence, that of ETA (the “Basque Liberty and Homeland Movement”). In the 2000s *lehendakari* (premier) Juan José Ibarretxe proposed a much looser association of the Basque Country with Spain, including it having a right to self-determination. Though this plan was approved by the Basque parliament, not surprisingly the Spanish parliament rejected even debating it. A planned 2008 consultative referendum on negotiations about a similar proposal of self-determination was likewise rejected by the Constitutional Court of Spain, after an appeal by the Spanish government.

## Electoral system

Elections in the Basque Country use party list proportional representation. Since the 1984 election there have been 75 seats, which are divided equally into 25 seats for each of the three Basque provinces (Alava, Guipúzcoa, and Vizcaya). A party must win 5 percent of the vote in one province to qualify for representation. However, as just over half the population lives in Vizcaya, compared to about one-third in Guipúzcoa and only about 13 percent in Alava, this equal treatment of provinces introduces an obvious bias. It is perhaps not coincidental that the only province with its own party is Alava.

## Political parties and cleavages

The Basque Country has a fragmented party system, which is first and foremost divided into Basque and state-wide (Spanish) parties, as national identity is the central cleavage. Collectively, the Basque parties have always had a majority of seats. In every autonomous community election in the Basque Country the largest party in terms of votes (and, 1986 excepted, seats) has been the **Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ in Basque, PNV in Spanish)** which dates back to 1895. It does best in the province of Vizcaya, including the Basque capital, Bilbao. The EAJ combines Basque nationalism with a basic semi-loyalty to Spain. In socio-economic matters

it is moderately conservative. Overall, the EAJ should be seen as a “catch-all” party for the Basques.

A poor showing for the EAJ in the Spanish national election of June 1986 led to a split within the EAJ, with the former *lehendakari* (premier), Carlos Garaikoetxea, presiding over the creation later that year of **Basque Solidarity (EA)**. EA shared the same moderate nationalism of the EAJ, but was slightly left of centre. This combination thus put it in the same political space as the **Basque Left (EE)** which was founded in 1977. The Basque Left would merge with the socialists (PSE, see later) in 1993, making the latter even more Basque in identity. For its part, Basque Solidarity would later run with the EAJ, then run separately again in 2009, then in 2012 join into EHB (see later).

A much harder sense of Basque nationalism, as well as of leftism, was offered by **Herri Batasuna (HB – United People)**, formed in 1978. This party was closely linked to the terrorist organization ETA, and obviously was supported only by the most nationalistic Basques. It also had a younger demographic than the EAJ. For the 1998 and 2001 elections, HB reformulated itself as **Euskal Herritarrok (EH – Basque Citizens)**, with a somewhat softer image. Then in 2002 it became the **Communist Party of the Basque Homelands (EHAK)**. However in 2008, the party was outlawed by the Spanish Supreme Court for its ties to ETA, as HB had been in 2003. More moderate currents in the 1990s within HB and EH eventually led to the creation of **Aralar** (named after the Basque mountain range), which opposed the violent struggle of ETA. In 2011 EA, Aralar, and other leftist-nationalist forces joined in the **Amaiur** alliance which contested the Spanish election of that year. In 2012 these components reformed as **Basque Country Gather (EH Bildu)**, which remains the expression of Basque far left pro-independence nationalism.

Running in the Basque Country elections have been the traditional state-wide Spanish parties – the communists; the centrists of the UCD, CDS, and recently UPyD; and the conservatives (AP/PP); or in the case of the Socialists their autonomous regional affiliate, the **Socialist Party of the Basque Country (PSE)**. Of these parties, only the PSE have been relatively successful in most Basque elections – in part related to their distinctive Basque nature. The communists, as they did state-wide, allied with the Greens to become the **United Left-Greens (EB-B)**. In 2016, they would ally with Podemos in **United We Can (EP)**. The conservative AP/PP, for its part, was initially seen very negatively as a Madrid-oriented centralist force. However, with time it was seen as more acceptable, and grew to become the second largest party in the 1998 and 2001 elections before falling back. Finally, there was a sub-regional party in the form of the **Unidad Alavesa (UA – Alevesan Unity)**, a 1986 split-off from the AP in rural Aleva, the province in which the AP had traditionally done best. The AP never received more than 18 percent of the Alevesan vote, but its share was magnified by the disproportional number of seats in Aleva. After the 2005 election in which it only got 2.2 percent of the Alevesan vote the party dissolved.

ELECTIONS IN THE BASQUE COUNTRY SINCE 1980

	1980		1984		1986		1990	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
AP/PP	4.8	2	9.4	7	4.8	2	8.2	6
UA	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.4	3
UCD/CDS	8.5	6	—	—	3.5	2	0.7	0
EAJ	38.1	25	42.0	32	23.7	17	28.5	22
EA	—	—	—	—	15.8	13	11.4	9
PSE	14.2	9	23.1	19	22.1	19	19.9	16
EE	9.8	6	8.0	6	10.8	9	7.7	6
PCE-EPK/IU	4.0	1	1.4	0	0.6	0	1.4	0
HB	16.6	11	14.6	11	17.4	13	18.3	13
Others	4.0	0	1.5	0	1.3	0	2.5	0
TOTAL SEATS		60		75		75		75

	1994		1998		2001		2005	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
PP	14.4	11	20.1	16	23.1	19	17.4	15
UA	2.7	5	1.3	2		(into PP)	0.3	0
EAJ/EAJ-EA	29.8	22	28.0	21	42.7	33	38.7	29
EA	10.3	8	8.7	6		(with PNV)		(with PNV)
PSE	17.1	12	17.6	14	17.9	13	22.7	18
IU (EB-B)	9.1	6	5.7	2	5.6	3	5.3	3
Aralar	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.3	1
HB/EH/EHAK	16.3	11	17.9	14	10.1	7	12.4	9
Others	0.3	0	0.7	0	0.6	0	0.9	0
TOTAL SEATS		75		75		75		75

	2009		2012		2016	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
PP	14.1	13	11.7	10	10.2	9
EAJ	38.6	30	34.6	27	37.6	28
EA	3.7	1		(into EH Bildu)	—	—
UPyD	2.1	1	1.9	1	—	—
PSE	30.7	25	19.1	16	11.9	9
IU (EB-B)/EP	3.5	1	1.6	0	14.9	11
Aralar/EH Bildu	6.0	4	25.0	21	21.3	18
Others	1.3	0	6.1	0	4.2	0
TOTAL SEATS		75		75		75

### Governments

All Basque governments have been based on the EAJ, which expect for the post-2009 government has monopolized the position of *lehendakari* (premier). Nevertheless, coalition negotiations have usually been difficult and time-consuming. The EAJ-led governments have often involved coalitions with the PSE, as traditionally the second strongest party.

#### BASQUE COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1980

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Lehendakari (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
04/1980	Garaicoetxea, C. (EAJ)	14	EAJ	
04/1984	Garaicoetxea, C. (EAJ)	12	EAJ	
01/1985	Ardanza, J. A. (EAJ)	11	EAJ	
02/1987	Ardanza, J. A. (EAJ)	14	EAJ PSE	CDS
02/1991	Ardanza, J. A. (EAJ)	14	EAJ EA EE	
09/1991	Ardanza, J. A. (EAJ)	15	EAJ PSE	
12/1994	Ardanza, J. A. (EAJ)	11	EAJ PSE-EE EA	
07/1998	Ardanza, J. A. (EAJ)	11	EAJ EA	
12/1998	Ibarretxe, J. J. (EAJ)	11	EAJ EA	EH
07/2001	Ibarretxe, J. J. (EAJ-EA)	11	EAJ EA	IU-EBB
09/2001	Ibarretxe, J. J. (EAJ-EA)	12	EAJ EA IU-EBB	
06/2005	Ibarretxe, J. J. (EAJ-EA)	12	EAJ EA IU-EBB	
05/2009	López, P. (PSE-EE)	11	PSE-EE	PP UPyD
12/2012	Urkullu, I. (EAJ)	9	EAJ	
11/2016	Urkullu, I. (EAJ)	12	EAJ PSE-EE	

### Basque acronyms

EA	Basque Solidarity
EAJ	Basque Nationalist Party
EB-B	United Left-Greens
EE	Basque Left
EH	Basque Citizens
EHAK	Communist Party of the Basque Homelands
EH Bildu	Basque Country Gather
EP	United We Can
EPK	Basque Communist Party
HB	United People
PSE	Socialist Party of the Basque Country

# CATALONIA

**The party pattern in each election, with additional components**

1980	moderately multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties (CiU, PSC, and PSUC)
1984	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (CiU)
1988	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (CiU)
1992	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (CiU)
1995	moderately multi-party, with a dominant party (CiU)
1999	two-and-a-half-party
2003	moderately multi-party, with two main parties (CiU and PSC)
2006	moderately multi-party
2010	highly multi-party, with a dominant party (CiU)
2012	highly multi-party
2015	moderately multi-party, with a dominant party (JxSí)
2017	highly multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties (C's, JxCat, and ERC)

**Party systems (with smoothing)**

1984–1992 inclusive	two-and-a-half-party system, with a single-party majority (CiU)
1995–2006 inclusive	moderately multi-party system

**History**

Despite being under the Spanish crown in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Catalonia retained its own official language, currency, and taxes, and its independent

institutions. However, Philip V would abolish all of these in 1716 and institute direct, repressive control from Madrid. Since then Catalans have struggled for (the return of) their autonomy within Spain. The stillborn First Republic of Spain of 1873–1874 would have granted Catalonia autonomy, and the Second Republic did in fact do so in 1932. Catalonia was a strong supporter of Republican Spain in the civil war, so the entry of Francisco Franco's troops into the region in 1938 ended all autonomy. With the return to democracy, autonomous status was returned to Catalonia; this status being confirmed by the Catalan people in the referendum of October 1979. In 2005–2006 a new Statute of Autonomy was reached with the PSOE government – including reference in the preamble to Catalonia as a “nation” – and approved in a June 2006 referendum in Catalonia. However, the PP was opposed to this Statute and eventually in 2010 the Constitutional Court of Spain ruled that various parts were unconstitutional, weakening the Statute and leading a growth in support for an independence referendum.

The 2015 Catalan election would produce a pro-independence majority in the Catalan parliament. On 01 October 2017 an independence referendum was held in Catalonia which saw 92 percent voting yes but a turnout of only 43 percent as opponents boycotted the vote. Moreover, there were clear irregularities in the voting process, as well as on the other side force used by the national police to try to prevent the vote. That said, on 27 October 2017 the Catalan parliament declared independence, a declaration which was suspended by the Spanish Constitutional Court. The central government also invoked Article 155 of the Spanish constitution (which required Senate approval), allowing it to suspend the Catalan government and assume direct rule. The parliament was then dissolved and a new election was called for December 2017, which confirmed a narrow pro-independence seat majority in the parliament. However, several separatist leaders were arrested for their role in the referendum or went into exile to avoid arrest, complicating the process of finding a premier. A new government was finally formed – and Article 155 lifted – in June 2018.

## Electoral system

Elections in Catalonia use party list proportional representation with the d'Hondt method. The territory is divided into four districts which range quite a lot in size, that is, from 15 to 85 seats. The electoral threshold for representation is 3 percent of valid votes (including blank votes) in each district.

## Political parties and cleavages

Catalan nationalism structures its party system, along with left-right ideology. The first cleavage overlaps with the distinction between Catalan parties which only exist in Catalonia and the state-wide Spanish parties which also run in the community. The main Catalan party was for quite some time the moderately nationalist **Convergence and Union (CiU)**. CiU was created in 1978 as an electoral coalition of the liberal centrist **Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC)** and



the Christian democratic **Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC)**, along with some moderates from the **Democratic Left of Catalonia (EDC)**. In 2001 the CiU was reconstituted as a federation of the CDC and UDC. The name “Convergence and Union” reflected the sense in which the CiU was a merger, with the Christian Democratic wing in particular retaining a clear identity. Initially social democratic in its economic orientation, the CiU quickly shifted to the moderate right. It had a clear “catch-all” vocation. As Premier Artur Mas of the CDC pushed the CiU towards supporting outright independence, the CiU split into its two component parties. The CDC would link up with the ERC (see later) to form the electoral coalition **Together for Yes (JxSí)** for the 2015 election, whereas the UDC would run on its own – and unsuccessfully. Given various corruption scandals associated with it, in 2016 the CDC would rename itself the **Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT)** or simply the Democratic Party. In 2017 the PDeCAT was part of the **Together for Catalonia (JxCAT)** alliance which also included some independents chosen by deposed Premier Carles Puigdemont.

With the CiU becoming right-of-centre, left-wing Catalan nationalists consequently would support either the **Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)** or the **Initiative for Catalonia (IC)**. The ERC was the governing party of Catalonia during the pre-Francisco Franco republican period. Reformed in 1975, and allied with small Maoist groups, it did not do very well in the first Catalan election of 1980, placing fifth. Its subsequent choices to support and then join the CiU minority government led to a further loss of supporters directly to the CiU. However, the ERC would begin to do better starting in 2003, at times being the third most popular party. A separate leftist Catalan nationalist party is the **Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP)** which was founded in 1986 but did not run in a Catalan election until 2012, focussing prior to then solely on municipal politics.

The Initiative for Catalonia (IC) was formed in 1987, as the successor to the **Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC)**. The PSUC had been formed in 1936 as an autonomous communist party, and after the return to democracy the party re-established its autonomy from the national PCE (now IU). The PSUC came a strong third in the 1980 election, but thereafter slumped as a result of internal ideological divisions. The IC formation and non-leftist name thus sought to establish a broader base of support for the party; nevertheless its appeal was largely limited to the industrial belt around Barcelona. In 1995 it formed an electoral alliance with the Greens, called as of 2002 **Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV)**. Leftist splinters from the IU formed in 1998 the **United and Alternative Left (EUiA)**; from 2003 the ICV and the EUiA would run as an electoral coalition. Finally, for the 2015 election the ICV-EUiA joined with Podemos and others to form the **Catalonia Yes We Can (CSQP)** electoral alliance, which in 2017 ran as **Catalonia in Common–We Can (CeCP)**.

The two main state-wide Spanish parties – the Socialists and the Popular Party – have always competed in Catalan elections, as did initially the UCD and later the CDS. In the case of the Socialists there is importantly an autonomous Catalan party, the **Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC)**, founded in 1978, which is nevertheless

an integrated part of the state-wide PSOE. Consequently the official party label of the Catalan socialists is PSC-PSOE. As for the Popular Party, it has a Catalan wing but with less autonomy than that of the PSC. The PP has been limited in Catalonia both by its (until recently) highly centralist image and by the reality that most of its theoretically natural supporters (moderate conservatives, shopkeepers, et cetera) were in fact loyal to the CiU.

Lastly, there is the interesting situation of **Citizens (C's)** which was formed in 2006 in Catalonia to oppose Catalan nationalism and unilingualism. It first ran in the Catalan election of that year before expanding to become a state-wide party. Within Catalonia its support is heavily based in Barcelona. In 2017 it became the single largest party.

Indeed, overall geography overlaps with the identity cleavage. Specifically, most state-wide parties – including the PSC-PSOE but not the PP – have done best in Barcelona, and worst in medium and smaller centres such as Gerona. For the CiU and the ERC, and recently JxSí and JxCAT (most of which have somewhat straddled the left-right divide), the situation is essentially the reverse, as Catalan nationalism is stronger in the ‘provinces’ than in the capital. This is in large part because

#### ELECTIONS IN CATALONIA SINCE 1980

	1980		1984		1988		1992	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
AP/PP	2.4	0	7.7	11	5.3	6	6.0	7
CiU	28.0	43	47.0	72	46.0	69	46.7	70
CC-UCD/CDS	10.7	18	–	–	3.9	3	0.9	0
ERC	9.0	14	4.4	5	4.2	6	8.1	11
PSC	22.6	33	30.3	41	30.0	42	27.9	40
PSUC/IC	18.9	25	5.6	6	7.8	9	6.6	7
Others	8.4	2	5.0	0	2.8	0	3.8	0
TOTAL SEATS		135		135		135		135

	1995		1999		2003		2006	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
PP	13.2	17	9.6	12	12.0	15	10.9	14
CiU	41.4	60	38.0	56	31.2	46	32.2	48
ERC	9.6	13	8.8	12	16.7	23	14.3	21
C's	–	–	–	–	–	–	3.1	3
PSC	25.1	34	38.2	52	31.4	42	27.4	37
IC/ICV-EUiA	9.8	11	2.5	3	7.4	9	9.7	12
Others	0.9	0	2.9	0	1.3	0	2.4	0
TOTAL SEATS		135		135		135		135

(Continued)

	2010		2012		2015		2017	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
PP	12.7	18	13.2	19	8.5	11	4.3	3
UDC	–	–	–	–	2.5	0	–	–
CiU/PDeCAT	39.6	62	31.2	50	(split)		(in JxCat)	
SI	3.4	4	1.3	0	–	–	–	–
ERC (and allies)	7.2	10	13.9	21	(in JxSí)		21.5	32
JxSí/JxCat	–	–	–	–	39.7	62	21.7	34
C's	3.5	3	7.7	9	18.0	25	25.5	37
PSC	18.9	28	14.6	20	12.8	16	13.9	17
ICV-EUiA	7.6	10	10.0	13	(in CSQP)		(in CeCP)	
CSQP/CeCP	–	–	–	–	9.0	11	7.5	8
CUP	–	–	3.5	3	8.2	10	4.5	4
Others	7.1	0	4.6	0	1.3	0	1.1	0
TOTAL SEATS	135		135		135		135	

Barcelona has received the overwhelming share of in-migration to Catalonia from the rest of Spain over the past decades.

Governments

In contrast to the Basque Country with its shifting coalitions, Catalonia was mostly governed by the CiU up through 2015 (with the main exception of PSC-led governments after the 2003 and 2006 elections), and indeed with the same premier, Jordi Pujol, from 1980 to 2003 setting a record for years in power (see Chapter 5). Since 2015 and the push for independence, governments have been both harder to form and less stable.

CATALAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1980

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
04/1980	Pujol, J. (CiU)	12	CiU	CC-UCD ERC
05/1984	Pujol, J. (CiU)	12	CiU ERC	AP
02/1987	Pujol, J. (CiU)	12	CiU	AP
06/1988	Pujol, J. (CiU)	13	CiU	
04/1992	Pujol, J. (CiU)	14	CiU	
12/1995	Pujol, J. (CiU)	15	CiU	
11/1999	Pujol, J. (CiU)	15	CiU	
12/2003	Maragall, P. (PSC)	17	PSC ERC ICV-EUiA	
05/2006	Maragall, P. (PSC)	15	PSC ICV-EUiA	
11/2006	Montilla, J. (PSC)	15	PSC ERC ICV-EUiA	

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
12/2010	Mas, A. (CiU)	12 (4)	CiU	
12/2012	Mas, A. (CiU)	13 (2)	CiU	ERC
06/2015	Mas, A. (CDC)	13 (2)	CDC	ERC
01/2016	Puigdemont, C. (CDC/PDeCAT)	14 (2)	CDC/PDeCAT	ERC CUP until June 2016
<i>[executive suspended from 10/2017 to 06/2018]</i>				
06/2018	Torra, Q. (Ind./ JxCAT)	14 (3)	ERC PDeCAT	

*Note:* From 1980 to June 2015, the CiU is treated as a single entity for these purposes. That said, when in government the majority of its ministers were always from the larger CDC component.

## Catalan acronyms

C's	Citizens
CDC	Democratic Convergence of Catalonia
CeCP	Catalonia in Common–We Can
CiU	Convergence and Union
CSQP	Catalonia Yes We Can
EDC	Democratic Left of Catalonia
ERC	Republican Left of Catalonia
EUiA	United and Alternative Left
IC	Initiative for Catalonia
ICV	Initiative for Catalonia Greens
JxCAT	Together for Catalonia
JxSí	Together for Yes
PDeCAT	Catalan European Democratic Party
PSC	Socialist Party of Catalonia
PSUC	Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia
UDC	Democratic Union of Catalonia

# SWEDEN

## **The party pattern in each election, with additional components**

1948	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1952	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1956	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1958	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1960	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1964	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1968	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (SAP)</i>
1970	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1973	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1976	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1979	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1982	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1985	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1988	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1991	highly multi-party
1994	highly multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
1998	highly multi-party
2002	highly multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SAP)</i>
2006	highly multi-party, <i>with two main parties (SAP and M)</i>
2010	highly multi-party
2014	highly multi-party
2018	highly multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1948–1988 inclusive	moderately multi-party system
1991–2018 inclusive	highly multi-party system

## History

Sweden established a national monarchy and political independence from Denmark in 1523, and would become a European power in the seventeenth century. Since 1814, however, the country has pursued a policy of neutrality. The first modern constitution, that of 1809, gave the monarch full executive power and provided for a parliament *Riksdag*, elected from four estates. A bicameral parliament was established in 1866, but full responsible government did not come until 1917. The struggle for responsible government had pitted Liberals and later Social Democrats against conservatives, and thus shaped the pre-World War One party system. Full democratization, and thus universal suffrage, saw the Social Democrats quickly become the largest party.

The upper house of parliament was abolished in 1970. Previous to this, it had been elected by the regional and city councils using an eight-year rotation system. Further constitutional changes in 1975 made the monarch a pure figurehead, to the extent that it is the speaker of the *Riksdag* who appoints the prime minister. Sweden joined the European Union in 1995.

## Electoral system

Sweden introduced proportional representation with the Sainte-Laguë formula in 1917. Until 1969 there was no national threshold, but the smallness of various constituencies discriminated somewhat against smaller parties and gave a slight bonus to the Social Democrats. In 1969 a unicameral *Riksdag* of 350 seats was established (effective with the 1970 election), but after the 1973 election produced a dead-even tie (175–175) between the socialist and non-socialist blocs this was changed to 349 seats. The electoral system for the unicameral *Riksdag* has two main changes. First, in addition to the 310 deputies elected in multi-member districts, a further 39 levelling seats are distributed at the national level to ensure overall proportionality. Second, a legal threshold for seats was established, this being 4 percent of the national vote. Otherwise, if a party wins at least 12 percent of the vote in a given district, it is eligible for seats in that district. Given the lack of regional parties in Sweden, this second point is rarely relevant.

Under bicameralism the lower house of parliament had a four-year term, but the term for the unicameral *Riksdag* from 1970 was only three years. This changed back to four years as of the 1994 election.

## Political parties and traditional cleavages

Sweden has historically been a largely homogeneous country. Thus for much of the nineteenth century the main divide was the class cleavage, although there was also a rural-urban cleavage. From the 1920s to the 1980s, the same five parties monopolized the parliament. Of these, the dominant one was the **Social Democratic Workers' Party (SAP or in recent years just S)**, which was founded in 1889. The party has been Sweden's largest for a full century (since 1917), but has won outright majorities only in 1940 and 1968. Its 44 straight years of power from 1932 to 1976 set a record in democratic Europe. The party did not stress nationalization until the end of this period, but in power it built up a major welfare state. The SAP dominated the blue-collar vote, aided by Europe's highest level of unionization and the SAP's close ties to the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO). However, the SAP also did well with lower and middle white-collar workers, especially in the public sector.

Social Democratic internal cohesion was aided by the fact that more left-wing elements broke off in 1917 to form the **Left Social Democratic Party (VSdP)**, most of which in 1921 became the **Swedish Communist Party (SKP)**. Essentially autonomous of the Soviet Union, the party changed its name in 1967 to the **Left Party Communists (VPK)** and again in 1990, after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, to simply the **Left Party (VP)**. The name changes to VPK and then VP symbolized a change in its voting base, from one largely of older blue-collar workers to a post-materialist base of students and public sector workers.

On the non-socialist or "bourgeois" side of the spectrum, the party most in opposition to the Social Democrats are Sweden's conservatives, formed in 1904 as the **Right Party (HP)**. With right-wing politics proving to have limited appeal in a social democratic country, the party changed its name in 1969 to the **Moderate Coalition Party (M)**. The party clearly favours smaller government and a more market-oriented society. In 2006 the party adopted the unofficial term "New Moderates" and shifted more to the centre, facilitating a pre-election alliance of the four centre-right parties. Since 1979 M has been the largest of the non-socialist parties, and in 2010 it even gained almost the exact level of support as the SAP.

Less clear in its postwar ideology has been the **Liberals (L)**, their name as of 2015 – before which they were the **People's Party (FP)** from 1934 to 1990 then the **Liberal People's Party** (same acronym) until 2015. The first liberal party was founded in 1902 and split for a time between the wars into prohibitionist and non-prohibitionist parties. The Liberals are right-of-centre, but not as clearly laissez-faire as the conservative Moderates. The Liberal voting core, too, has been somewhat unfocused, but it has largely been based on urban white-collar workers.

As noted previously, in addition to social class Sweden has had an historic rural-urban cleavage. This found expression in the **Agrarian Party (BF)**, dating back to 1910. Although the Agrarians were a non-socialist party, they were open to reform and suspicious of urban elites. Consequently, from the 1930s onwards they

cooperated with the Social Democrats, ultimately becoming a junior coalition partner in the 1950s. As the rural population declined, the party decided to target centrist voters in the cities as well, and thus changed its name in 1957 to the **Centre Party (C)**. Somewhat overlapping with the rural-urban cleavage has been a very modest religiosity cleavage, which led in 1964 to the creation of **Christian Democratic Unity (KDS)**, which in 1987 became the **Christian Democratic Society Party (also KDS)**, and then in 1996 simply the **Christian Democrats (KD)**. For many years the party barely registered a presence at the national level. In 1985 and 1988 it ran in alliance with the Centre Party, winning one seat in the first case. In 1991, it suddenly jumped in support to just clear the 4 percent threshold and has remained in the Riksdag since then.

### Realignment and new divisions

The left-right ideological division has remained key in Swedish politics. As noted, through the 1950s at least, there was also an important urban-rural cleavage. Starting perhaps in the late 1960s, however, the second dimension of conflict in Swedish party politics was a materialist versus post-materialist one. The first major focus for this division was the issue of nuclear power in the 1970s, this being opposed by the VPK and the CP, and supported to varying degrees by the SAP, the M, and the FP. The nuclear power issue also led to the establishment in 1981 of a specific Green party, the **Environmental Party—the Greens (MpG or commonly just MP)**. In addition to being against nuclear power, the party has stressed gender equality, decentralization, and direct democracy. Initially the Swedish Greens rejected the left-right continuum, and were indeed more centrist than, say, the German Greens. However, in the 1990s the party openly placed itself on the left of centre.

Although the nuclear power issue continued in Sweden, in the 1990s it was displayed or more precisely reinforced by the issue of Swedish membership in the European Union. After decades of saying that neutral Sweden had no need to be part of European integration, the ruling Social Democrats changed their tune, and, after a national referendum, Sweden joined the European Union as of the start of 1995. Sweden's joining, and then continued membership, was however strongly opposed by the Left Party, the Greens, and most of the Centre Party, all of whom saw dangers to Swedish democracy, values, and the environment in being ruled from Brussels. In contrast, the Social Democrats, Liberals, and Moderates stressed the economic benefits of membership.

This second division of partisan conflict in Sweden has modified into a broader LEC-TAN one with the rise of populist radical right parties. The first such protest party was **New Democracy (NyD)**, formed in 1991 and entering parliament that year, which contributed to pushing the Social Democrats below 40 percent of the popular vote for the first time since 1928. After that election, the four centre-right parties – M, FP, C, and KDS – formed a minority non-socialist coalition.



Dissatisfaction with welfare cuts by this government led to a swing back to the Social Democrats in 1994, when New Democracy also disappeared from parliament. NyD would be declared bankrupt and dissolved in 2000.

Much more durable have been the populist radical right **Sweden Democrats (SD)**, which was formed in 1988 but which was a quite minor party until the 2000s, when they expelled their openly neo-fascist members. The SD first entered the Riksdag in 2010 and then became the third largest party in 2014 and again in 2018. The party remains strongest in the south of Sweden (coming first in 2018 in Skåne County) and in parts of West Sweden. In the run-up to the 2018 election they sought to soften their image and excluded various extreme members, who in turned formed the rival **Alternative for Sweden (AfS)**, the name being inspired by the Alternative for Germany.

Lastly, a relatively new left-LEC party is the **Feminist Initiative (Fi or F!)**, formed in 2005. In 2014 it jumped in support but still fell short of the four percent threshold, thus lessening the seats won by the overall left.

Figure 45.1 illustrates the key Swedish parties as of 2014 in terms of socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions:

ELECTIONS IN SWEDEN SINCE 1948

	PF	1948		1952		1956		1958	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
SKP	1	6.3	8	4.3	5	5.0	6	3.4	5
SAP	4	46.1	112	46.0	110	44.6	106	46.2	111
BF / C	7	12.4	30	10.7	26	9.5	19	12.7	32
FP	9	22.7	57	24.4	58	23.8	58	18.2	38
HP	10	12.3	23	14.4	31	17.1	42	19.5	45
others		0.1	0	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.0	0
TOTAL SEATS			230		230		231		231

	PF	1960		1964		1968		1970	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
SKP / VPK	1	4.5	5	5.2	8	3.0	3	4.8	17
SAP	4	47.8	114	47.3	113	50.1	125	45.3	163
C	7	13.6	34	13.3	35	16.1	39	19.9	71
FP	9	17.5	40	17.2	43	14.7	34	16.2	58
KDS	10	—	—	1.8	0	1.5	0	1.8	0
HP / M	10	16.6	39	13.7	33	12.9	32	11.5	41
others		0.1	0	1.5	1	1.7	0	0.4	0
TOTAL SEATS			232		233		233		350

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1973</i>		<i>1976</i>		<i>1979</i>		<i>1982</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
VPK	1			5.3	19	4.8	17	5.6	20	5.6	20
MpG	3			—	—	—	—	—	—	1.7	0
SAP	4			43.6	156	42.7	152	43.2	154	45.6	166
C	7			25.1	90	24.1	86	18.1	64	15.5	56
FP	9			9.4	34	11.1	39	10.6	38	5.9	21
KDS	10			1.8	0	1.4	0	1.4	0	1.9	0
M	10			14.3	51	15.6	55	20.3	73	23.6	86
others				0.6	0	0.4	0	0.8	0	0.3	0
TOTAL SEATS					350		349		349		349


		<i>PF</i>		<i>1985</i>		<i>1988</i>		<i>1991</i>		<i>1994</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
VPK /VP	1 then 2			5.4	19	5.8	21	4.5	16	6.2	22
MpG	3			1.5	0	5.5	20	3.4	0	5.0	18
SAP	4			44.7	159	43.2	156	37.7	138	45.3	161
C	7			12.5	44	11.3	42	8.5	31	7.7	27
FP	9			14.2	51	12.2	44	9.1	33	7.2	26
KDS	10		(with CP)			2.9	0	7.1	26	4.1	15
M	10			21.3	76	18.3	66	21.9	80	22.4	80
NyD	12			—	—	—	—	6.8	25	1.2	0
others				0.4	0	0.7	0	1.0	0	1.0	0
TOTAL SEATS					349		349		349		349

		<i>PF</i>		<i>1998</i>		<i>2002</i>		<i>2006</i>		<i>2010</i>	
				% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
VP	2			12.0	43	8.4	30	5.9	22	5.6	19
Fi	2			—	—	—	—	0.7	0	0.4	0
MpG	3			4.5	16	4.6	17	5.2	19	7.3	25
SAP	4			36.4	131	39.9	144	35.0	130	30.7	112
C	7			5.1	18	6.2	22	7.9	29	6.6	23
FP	9			4.7	17	13.4	48	7.5	28	7.1	24
KD	10			11.8	42	9.1	33	6.6	24	5.6	19
M	10			22.9	82	15.3	55	26.2	97	30.1	107
SD	12			0.4	0	1.4	0	2.9	0	5.7	20
others				2.2	0	1.7	0	2.1	0	0.9	0
TOTAL SEATS					349		349		349		349

(Continued)

	PF	2014		2018	
		% V	# S	% V	# S
VP	2	5.7	21	8.0	28
Fi	2	3.1	0	0.5	0
MpG	3	6.9	25	4.4	16
SAP	4	31.0	113	28.3	100
C	7	6.1	22	8.6	31
FP / L	9	5.4	19	5.5	20
KD	10	4.6	16	6.3	22
M	10	23.3	84	19.8	70
SD	12	12.9	49	17.5	62
AfS	12	—	—	0.3	0
others		1.0	0	0.8	0
TOTAL SEATS			349		349

*Note:* for 1964 and 1968, the votes for joint C and FP lists are re-distributed between them.



**FIGURE 45.1** Sweden: 2014 placement of parties on socio-economic left-right and LEC-TAN dimensions.

*Source:* Polk, Jonathan, et al. (2017) “Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data”, *Research & Politics*, Volume 4: 1 (January-March), pp. 1–9(with calculation of LEC-TAN).

## Governments

With the exception of 1976–1982 and 1991–1994, all postwar Swedish governments until 2006 were formed, or led, by the SAP. The first non-socialist governments of 1976–1982 were unstable due to strong divisions amongst the parties, especially over nuclear energy, and none served a full term with the same composition. In contrast, the four-party non-socialist coalition formed in 1991 survived its full term (then three years), as did the centre-right coalitions of 2006–2010 and 2010–2014. As for the Social Democrats, they have generally formed minority governments supported by the Centre Party and occasionally the Liberals, but after 1998 have turned to the Left Party and the Greens for support – thus reinforcing Sweden’s traditional left–right divide.

Indeed, bipolarity in Swedish elections and government formation peaked in 2006, when as noted earlier the four centre-right parties established a pre-election alliance as a clear alternative to the Social Democrats, then collectively won a majority. However, the entry into the Riksdag of the Sweden Democrats in 2010 created a third pole in the Swedish party system. This fragmentation proved particularly challenging after the 2014 election, when the Social Democrats only won 31 percent of the vote and then formed a minority government with the Greens. The defeat of the government budget after the Sweden Democrats voted for the centre-right proposal looked set to trigger a fresh election (an extra election in terms of Swedish parliamentarianism). However, in December 2014 the government and the four centre-right parties reached an agreement to marginalize the Sweden Democrats by agreeing that whichever of the left (red-greens) or the centre-right (but not the populist radical right SD) won the most seats would be able to govern, inasmuch as the other side would abstain on budget votes. Meant to last eight years (two parliamentary terms), this agreement only lasted until October 2015 when the KD withdrew.

### SWEDISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1946

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
10/1946	Erlander, T. (SAP)	16 (2)	SAP	
10/1948	Erlander, T. (SAP)	19 (3)	SAP	
09/1951	Erlander, T. (SAP)	16 (3)	SAP BF	
09/1952	Erlander, T. (SAP)	16 (3)	SAP BF	
09/1956	Erlander, T. (SAP)	17 (4)	SAP BF	
10/1957	Erlander, T. (SAP)	15 (2)	SAP	
06/1958	Erlander, T. (SAP)	15 (1)	SAP	
10/1960	Erlander, T. (SAP)	15 (1)	SAP	
10/1964	Erlander, T. (SAP)	16	SAP	
09/1968	Erlander, T. (SAP)	17	SAP	
10/1969	Palme, O. (SAP)	19	SAP	

(Continued)

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
09/1970	Palme, O. (SAP)	19	SAP	VPK
10/1973	Palme, O. (SAP)	18	SAP	VPK
10/1976	Fälldin, T. (C)	20 (1)	C FP M	
10/1978	Ullsten, O. (FP)	18 (1)	FP	
10/1979	Fälldin, T. (C)	21 (1)	C M FP	
05/1981	Fälldin, T. (C)	18 (1)	C FP	
10/1982	Palme, O. (SAP)	20	SAP	VPK
10/1985	Palme, O. (SAP)	21	SAP	VPK
03/1986	Carlsson, I. (SAP)	20	SAP	VPK
09/1988	Carlsson, I. (SAP)	21	SAP	VPK
02/1990	Carlsson, I. (SAP)	22	SAP	
10/1991	Bildt, C. (M)	21 (3)	M C FP KDS	
10/1994	Carlsson, I. (SAP)	22	SAP	VP
<i>[as of 05/1995]</i>				C
03/1996	Persson, G. (SAP)	21	SAP	C
10/1998	Persson, G. (SAP)	20	SAP	VP MpG
10/2002	Persson, G. (SAP)	22	SAP	VP MpG
10/2006	Reinfeldt, F. (M)	22	M C FP KD	
10/2010	Reinfeldt, F. (M)	24	M C FP KD	
10/2014	Löfven, S. (SAP)	24	SAP MpG	
<i>[from 12/2014 to 10/2015]</i>				M C FP KD (on budgetary matters)

## Acronyms

AfS	Alternative for Sweden
BF	Agrarian Party
C	Centre Party
Fi or F!	Feminist Initiative
FP	(Liberal) People's Party
HP	Right Party
KD	Christian Democrats
KDS	Christian Democratic Unity/Christian Democratic Society Party
KP	Communist Party
L	Liberals
MpG or MP	Environmentalist Party–the Greens
M	Moderate Coalition Party
NyD	New Democracy
SAP	Social Democratic Workers' Party
SD	Sweden Democrats
VP	Left Party
VPK	Left Party Communists
VSdP	Left Social Democratic Party

# SWITZERLAND

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

- 1947 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (FDP, SPS, and KVP)*
- 1951 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (FDP, SPS, and KVP)*
- 1955 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (SPS, FDP, and KVP)*
- 1959 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (FDP, SPS, and KCVP)*
- 1963 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (SPS, FDP, and KCVP)*
- 1967 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (SPS, FDP, and KCVP)*
- 1971 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (FDP, SPS, and CVP)*
- 1975 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (SPS, FDP, and CVP)*
- 1979 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (FDP, SPS, and CVP)*
- 1983 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (FDP, SPS, and CVP)*
- 1987 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top three parties (FDP, CVP, and SPS)*
- 1991 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top four parties (FDP, SPS, CVP, and SVP)*
- 1995 highly multi-party, *with a relative balance of the top four parties (SPS, FDP, CVP, and SVP)*

1999	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (SPS, SVP, FDP, and CVP)</i>
2003	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (SVP, SPS, FDP, and CVP)</i>
2007	highly multi-party
2011	highly multi-party
2015	highly multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1947–2015 inclusive                      highly multi-party system

## History

Switzerland dates back to 1291, when a treaty of alliance was signed between three independent cantons. The number of cantons grew over time, reaching 22 by 1815. However, Switzerland as a polity remained confederal. Divisions over increasing central control (opposed by Catholic mountain cantons) led to a brief civil war in 1847. The following year a federal constitution was drawn up and passed by almost seven to one in a referendum. Federal power was further strengthened in 1874. Switzerland is strongly bicameral, and the now 26 Swiss cantons have considerable autonomy. Some of these are divided into half cantons. The Swiss population, through either initiatives or referenda, has a considerable influence over public policy. As such, elections are but one part of the political process rather than key events per se. Women did not receive the right to vote until 1971.

## Electoral system

Switzerland elects its 200-member (since 1963) National Council through a system of party list proportional representation with the cantons (or half cantons) serving as the electoral districts. However, six of these – Uri, Obwalden, Nidwalden, Glarus (since 1971), Appenzell Ausserrhoden (since 2003), and Appenzell Innerrhoden – are so small as to only have one deputy each. Elections in these six districts are thus by single-member plurality. In the remaining districts proportional representation with the d'Hondt highest average formula is used. As there are a relatively high number of districts and no national compensation/levelling seats, the Swiss electoral system is neither perfectly proportional nor linear – in that it has happened that the second-place party in terms of votes comes first in seats.

## Political parties and cleavages

Despite having four official languages, in Switzerland religiosity, religion, social class, and region have all mattered as much or more than language in terms of

electoral cleavages. In the case of Switzerland it is also useful to distinguish between the traditional parties of government and the remaining, smaller parties. The first of these parties of government was the **Radical Party (FDP in German, PRD in French)**, which monopolized power in Switzerland from the civil war of 1848 until the introduction of proportional representation in 1917. The Radicals were radical in the nineteenth century continental sense of being strongly secular. It was largely an urban party, supported by the Swiss bourgeoisie, but also by the farmers in French protestant areas. An ideologically similar party was the **Liberal Party of Switzerland (PLS in French, LPS in German)**, which was a long-standing French Protestant bourgeois party, particularly strong in Geneva. The PLS/LPS peaked in 1991 but was clearly weaker by the 2000s. It thus ran and caucused jointly with the FDP/PRD, and the two parties merged in 2009 to form **FDP.The Liberals (PLR in French)**.

The **Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SPS in German, PSS in French)** was founded in 1870, and it is the only major left-wing party in Switzerland. It is strongest amongst workers in the protestant industrial areas of the country. Never very doctrinaire (as it could not be in such a bourgeois country), the SPS/PSS has since the 1980s added environmental issues to its platform.

What since 1970 has been called the **Christian Democratic People's Party (CVP in German, PDC in French)** was formed in 1912 as the **Conservative People's Party (KVP in German, PCP in French)** and then became in 1957 the **Conservative-Christian Social People's Party (KCVP in German, PCCS in French)**. Although intended as a party for all Christians, its support is disproportionately Catholic and thus regionally concentrated. Like most European Christian democratic parties, the CVP/PDC supports moderate state intervention and sees itself as a bridge between social classes and, in the Swiss case, between the mountainous and the more urbanized areas. The party suffers from an aging electorate, and has been in decline in recent elections. Since 2011 the CVP/PDC has formed a common parliamentary *Fraktion* with the small protestant **Evangelical People's Party (EVP in German, PEV in French)** which dates back to 1919.

The fourth traditional party of government was until 1971 the **Party of Farmers, Traders, and Citizens (BGB)**, founded in 1917 and essentially restricted to German-speaking Protestant areas. In 1971 the BGB merged with much of the small **Democratic Party (DP in German, DEM in French)**, formed in 1942, to create the **Swiss People's Party (SVP in German, UDC in French)**. (The Zurich Democrats would join the FDP.) The SVP emphasized agricultural policy, and thus was particularly strong amongst farmers, but, again, only in the German-speaking Protestant areas. Until the early 1990s, the BGB/SVP was clearly the smallest of the four governing parties. As Switzerland considered closer relations with the European Union in the 1990s, the SVP/UDC adopted a more militant protectionist and isolationist stance under the controversial leadership of Christoph Blocher. Such a stance allowed it to expand into German-speaking *Catholic* mountainous areas, largely at the expense of the CVP. The SVP/UDC thus transformed into a populist radical right party focussing on opposition to immigrants and asylum-seekers, and related grew to be the clearly largest party certainly by 2007.



There had in fact already been a nationalistic and isolationist party in the German part of Switzerland, the **National Action for People and Homeland (NA)**, which was formed in 1961 and which became the **Swiss Democrats (SD in German, DS in French)** in 1991. The creation of the NA was in particular a reaction against the growing number of Italians living and working in Switzerland. From 1999 the SD/DS would lose almost all of its support to the SVP/UDC, but it still exists. In 1971, the **Republican Movement (RB in German, MR in French)** broke away from the NA, and lasted until 1989. Finally, in the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino the SVP/UDC is weak, with its position essentially filled by the populist radical right **Ticino League (LdT in Italian)**, one of the four main parties in the canton. The LdT was created in 1991, and sits with the SVP/UDC in the federal parliament.

The radical right populism of the SVP/UDC would polarize Swiss politics, and after the 2007 election other parties elected a more moderate SVP/UDC member to the cabinet in place of Blocher. This led the party to quit supporting the government, and in 2008 the SVP/UDC dissidents formed a new party, the **Citizens' Democratic Party (BDP in German, PBD in French)**. This party drew on the traditional centrist/agrarian wing of the SVP/UDC which had been eclipsed by Blocher and other populists.

Beyond these traditional parties and related parties, there has been quite a range of smaller parties in Switzerland. The communist **Swiss Party of Labour (PdA in German, PST in French)** was founded in 1944 (the Communist Party itself having been banned in 1940). It was won at least a seat in every election except for 2011, but was most successful in 1947. The **Alliance of Independents (LdU in German, AdI in French)** was created in 1936 by Gottlieb Duttweiler, the founder of the Migros supermarket chain and co-operative movement. It was middle of the road and sought to reconcile capital and labour, while also looking after Migros' commercial interests. The LdU was supported in German-speaking Switzerland and was strongest in Zurich. After Gottlieb Duttweiler's death in 1962, the party became a social liberal one, and then in the 1980s environmentalists became the dominant force – but that led to Migros sharply curtailing its financial support. Weakening throughout the 1990s, the party disbanded at the end of 1999.

The **Green Party of Switzerland (GPS in German, PES in French)** was formed in 1983. Like other European Green parties, its support comes disproportionately from young, urban voters, but it also does best in the German-speaking cities. In 2007 more centrist and free market-oriented elements of the GPS/PES broke off to form the **Green Liberal Party (glp in German, pvl in French)**. Switzerland is obviously not unique in having Green parties, but it may well be in once having an explicitly “anti-Green” party. The **Automobile Party (AP)** was formed in 1984, and peaked in support in 1991. As its original name indicated, it was oriented towards private automobile users and supported lower gasoline taxes, and more generally populist radical right policies. In 1994 it renamed itself the **Freedom Party of Switzerland (FPS in German, PSL in French)**. By 1999 it had become irrelevant, as most of its supporters had gone over to the SVP/UDC.

ELECTIONS IN SWITZERLAND SINCE 1947

	PF	1947		1951		1955		1959	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
PdA/PST	1	5.1	7	2.7	5	2.6	4	2.7	3
SPS/PSS	4	26.2	48	26.0	49	27.0	53	26.4	51
BGB	7	12.1	21	12.6	23	12.1	22	11.6	23
DP/DEM	7	2.9	5	2.2	4	2.2	4	2.2	4
KVP/PCP/KCVP/PCCS	8	21.2	44	22.5	48	23.2	47	23.3	47
EVP/PEV	8	0.9	1	1.0	1	1.1	1	1.4	2
FDP/PRD	9	23.0	52	24.0	51	23.3	50	23.7	51
PLS/LPS	9	3.2	7	2.6	5	2.2	5	2.3	5
LdU/AdI	31	4.4	8	5.1	10	5.5	10	5.5	10
Others		1.0	1	1.3	0	0.9	0	1.0	0
TOTAL SEATS			194		196		196		196

	PF	1963		1967		1971		1975	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
PdA/PST	1	2.2	4	2.9	5	2.6	5	2.4	4
SPS/PSS	4	26.6	53	23.5	50	22.9	46	24.9	55
LdU/AdI	5	5.0	10	9.1	16	7.6	13	6.1	11
BGB/SVP/UDC	7	11.4	22	11.0	21	11.1	23	9.9	21
DP/DEM	7	1.8	4	1.4	3	—	—	—	—
KCVP/PCCS/CVP/PDC	8	23.4	48	22.1	45	20.4	44	21.1	46
EVP/PEV	8	1.6	2	1.6	3	2.1	3	2.0	3
FDP/PRD	9	23.9	51	23.2	49	21.7	49	22.2	47
PLS/LPS	9	2.2	6	2.3	6	2.2	6	2.4	6
NA/AN	12	—	—	0.6	1	3.2	4	2.5	2
RB/MR	12	—	—	—	—	4.3	7	3.0	4
Others		1.8	0	2.3	1	1.9	0	3.6	1
TOTAL SEATS			200		200		200		200

	PF	1979		1983		1987		1991	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
PdA/PST	1	2.1	3	0.9	1	0.8	1	0.8	2
GPS/PES	3	0.6	1	1.9	3	4.9	9	6.1	14
SPS/PSS	4	24.4	51	22.8	47	18.4	41	18.5	41
LdU/AdI	5	4.1	8	4.0	8	4.2	8	2.8	5
SVP/UDC	7	11.6	23	11.1	23	11.0	25	11.9	25
CVP/PDC	8	21.3	44	20.2	42	19.6	42	18.0	35
EVP/PEV	8	2.2	3	2.1	3	1.9	3	1.9	3
FDP/PRD	9	24.0	51	23.3	54	22.9	51	21.0	44
PLS/LPS	9	2.8	8	2.8	8	2.7	9	3.0	10

(Continued)

	<i>PF</i>	<u>1979</u>		<u>1983</u>		<u>1987</u>		<u>1991</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
NA/AN/SD/DS	12	1.3	2	2.9	4	2.5	3	3.4	5
RB/MR	12	0.6	1	0.5	1	0.3	0	–	–
AP	12	–	–	–	–	2.6	2	5.1	8
LdT	12	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.4	2
Others		5.0	5	7.4	6	8.1	6	6.1	6
TOTAL SEATS			200		200		200		200

	<i>PF</i>	<u>1995</u>		<u>1999</u>		<u>2003</u>		<u>2007</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
PdA/PST	1	1.2	3	1.0	2	0.7	2	0.7	1
GPS/PES	3	5.0	8	5.0	8	7.4	13	9.5	20
SPS/PSS	4	21.8	54	22.5	51	23.3	52	19.3	43
LdU/AdI	5	1.8	3	0.7	1	–	–	–	–
glp/pvl	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	2.1	3
CVP/PDC	8	16.8	34	15.8	35	14.4	28	14.3	31
EVP/PEV	8	1.8	2	1.8	3	2.3	3	2.4	2
FDP/PRD	9	20.2	45	19.9	43	17.3	36	15.5	31
PLS/LPS	9	2.7	7	2.2	6	2.2	4	1.8	4
SVP/UDC	12	14.9	29	22.6	44	26.7	55	28.6	62
SD/DS	12	3.1	3	1.8	1	1.0	1	0.5	0
FPS/PSL	12	4.0	7	0.9	0	0.2	0	0.1	0
LdT	12	0.9	1	0.9	2	0.3	1	0.6	1
Others		5.8	4	4.8	4	4.3	5	4.6	2
TOTAL SEATS			200		200		200		200

	<i>PF</i>	<u>2011</u>		<u>2015</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
PdA/PST	1	0.5	0	0.4	1
GPS/PES	3	8.4	15	7.1	11
SPS/PSS	4	18.7	46	18.8	43
glp/pvl	5	5.4	12	4.6	7
BDP/PBD	7	5.4	9	4.1	7
CVP/PDC	8	12.3	28	11.6	27
EVP/PEV	8	2.0	2	1.9	2
FDP/PLR	9	15.1	30	16.4	33
SVP/UDC	12	26.6	54	29.4	65
LdT	12	0.8	2	1.0	2
Others		4.8	2	4.7	2
TOTAL SEATS			200		200

## Governments

The Swiss Federal Council (cabinet) is comprised of a fixed seven members, and once it is voted in by parliament it is not subject to non-confidence votes. Hence governments last the four-year term, unless a coalition party chooses to leave. In 1959, the so-called magic formula was achieved, wherein the Radicals, Socialists, and Catholic People's Party each got two of the seven seats on the Federal Council, and the then-smaller BGB and now SVP the last one. In 2003 there was a rare change in that the SVP/UDC gained a second seat at the expense of the CVP/PDC, which went from two seats to one. In 2008–2009 the BDP/PBD briefly replaced the SVP/UDC, and then for a few years there were five parties in the Federal Council.

### SWISS GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1947

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>#M</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
12/1947	7	FDP KVP BGB SPS
12/1951	7	FDP KVP BGB SPS
12/1953	7	KVP FDP BGB
12/1955	7	KVP FDP BGB
12/1959	7	KCVP FDP SPS BGB
12/1963	7	KCVP FDP SPS BGB
12/1967	7	KCVP FDP SPS BGB
12/1971	7	CVP FDP SPS SVP
12/1975	7	CVP FDP SPS SVP
12/1979	7	CVP FDP SPS SVP
12/1983	7	CVP FDP SPS SVP
12/1987	7	CVP FDP SPS SVP
12/1991	7	CVP FDP SPS SVP
12/1995	7	CVP FDP SPS SVP
12/1999	7	CVP FDP SPS SVP
12/2003	7	FDP SPS SVP CVP
12/2007	7	FDP SPS SVP dissidents CVP
11/2008	7	BDP FDP SPS CVP
01/2009	7	FDP SPS BDP CVP SVP
12/2011	7	FDP SPS BDP CVP SVP
12/2015	7	FDP SPS SVP CVP

*Note:* Only the German-language acronyms are given.

*Note:* Switzerland has no prime minister.

The position of president of the Swiss Confederation rotates annually by seniority amongst the members of the Federal Council.

The four main parties (BGB/SVP, CVP, FDP, and SPS) have all had councillors occupy this position.

## Acronyms (original language)

AdI	(French)	Alliance of Independents
AP	(German)	Automobile Party
BDP	(German)	Citizens' Democratic Party
BGB	(German)	Party of Farmers Traders and Citizens
CVP	(German)	Christian Democratic People's Party
DEM	(French)	Democratic Party
DP	(German)	Democratic Party
DS	(French)	Swiss Democrats
EVP	(German)	Evangelical People's Party
FDP	(German)	Radical Party
FPS	(German)	Freedom Party of Switzerland
glp	(German)	Green Liberal Party
GPS	(German)	Green Party of Switzerland
KCVp	(German)	Conservative-Christian Social People's Party
KVP	(German)	Conservative People's Party
LdT	(Italian)	Ticino League
LdU	(German)	Alliance of Independents
LPS	(German)	Liberal Party of Switzerland
MR	(French)	Republican Movement
NA	(German)	National Action for People and Homeland
PBD	(French)	Citizens' Democratic Party
PCCS	(French)	Conservative-Christian Social People's Party
PCP	(French)	Conservative People's Party
PDC	(French)	Christian Democratic People's Party
PES	(French)	Green Party of Switzerland
PEV	(French)	Evangelical People's Party
PLR	(French)	Liberal-Radical Party
PLS	(French)	Liberal Party of Switzerland
PRD	(French)	Radical Party
PSS	(French)	Socialist Party of Switzerland
pvl	(French)	Green Liberal Party
RB	(German)	Republican Movement
SD	(German)	Swiss Democrats
SDP	(German)	Swiss Democratic Party
SPS	(German)	Socialist Party of Switzerland
SVP	(German)	Swiss People's Party
UDC	(French)	Swiss People's Party

# TURKEY

Note: the elections of 1954 and 1957 were not free and fair, and likewise both elections in 2015 (certainly the latter one) and the election of 2018 did not meet democratic standards of fairness. (On the two 2015 elections, see Esen and Gumuscu 2016.)

## **The party pattern in each election, with additional components**

1950	two-party, with a single-party super-majority (DP)
1954	two-party, with a single-party super-majority (DP)
1957	two-party
1961	moderately multi-party, with two main parties (CHP and AP)
1965	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (AP)
1969	two-and-a-half-party, with a single-party majority (AP)
1973	moderately multi-party, with two main parties (CHP and AP)
1977	two-and-a-half-party
1983	moderately multi-party, with a predominant party (ANAP)
1987	moderately multi-party, with a predominant party (ANAP)
1991	moderately multi-party
1995	moderately multi-party, with a relative balance of the top three parties (RP, DYP, and ANAP)
1999	moderately multi-party, with a relative balance of the top five parties (DSP, MHP, FP, ANAP, and DYP)
2002	two-party
2007	moderately multi-party, with a predominant party (AKP)
2011	moderately multi-party, with a predominant party (AKP)

2015 Jun	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (AKP)</i>
2015 Nov	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (AKP)</i>
2018	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (AKP)</i>

**Party systems (with smoothing)**

1950–1957 inclusive	two-party system (DP and CHP)
1965–1977 inclusive	two-and-a-half-party system (AP and CHP)
1983–2018 inclusive	moderately multi-party system

**History**

The Ottoman Empire once ruled the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa. By the nineteenth century, however, the Ottoman Empire was seen as “the sick man of Europe”. After its defeat in World War One, Mustapha Kemal Atatürk proclaimed Turkey a republic in 1923, and established a secular, nationalistic legacy. Multi-party elections began in 1946, and the first truly competitive election was in 1950. However, the 1954 and 1957 elections were not free and fair, as the governing Democratic Party banned parties and generally tilted heavily the electoral field. They would be removed by the Turkish military. Indeed, the doctrine of “Kemalism” has been used no less than four times in the post-1945 period to justify military intervention. The first three interventions (1960, 1971, 1980) were actual military coups followed by short authoritarian regimes and constitutional changes. The 1980–1983 period of military rule was the longest lasting and the most fundamental, in that all previous parties and most political leaders were banned for a further five years. The last instance of successful military intervention, that of 1997, was called a “soft coup” which involved the military forcing the Islamist prime minister out of office.

Turkey has recently undergone a shift to electoral authoritarianism as of its November 2015 election (if not indeed earlier), an authoritarianism which intensified greatly after a failed coup in July 2016. That said, almost all elections in Turkey since 1950 have met the standards of electoral democracy. In 2017 the constitution was modified in a referendum of questionable fairness to, amongst other changes, create a full presidential system (including a vice president) and abolish the position of prime minister. The changes took effect as of the next presidential and parliamentary election, which were held early in a snap 2018 poll.

**Electoral system**

In the 1950s Turkey used a highly majoritarian electoral system in which the party with the plurality of votes in a given province won all of that province’s seats. This led, not surprisingly, to some very lopsided victories. Moreover, as these victories meant defeats for the elite’s preferred party, the CHP, in the 1961 constitution that

followed the 1960 military coup the electoral system was changed to proportional representation using the d'Hondt formula, with the seats still calculated within each of the 67 provinces, but now proportionally. In an attempt to limit the fragmentation caused by such a system and the unstable governments of the Second Republic, the post-1980 coup administration introduced a very high threshold for electoral representation: 10 percent of the national vote. As noted in Chapter 4, this is the highest current electoral threshold in Europe. In 2018 a change was made to allow party alliances, which exempt component parties from the 10 percent threshold. This was done by the government to facilitate an AKP-MHP alliance for the 2018 election. In turn, four opposition parties formed their own electoral alliance.

### Cleavages, ideologies, and political parties

There have been three main overlapping divisions in Turkish society: traditional versus secular/universal values, rural versus urban, and left versus right. All of these have arisen out of opposition to or support for the Kemalist view of Turkey, and the location of people with one set of beliefs or the other. "Kemalism" held to the principles of republicanism, secularism, statism, national solidarity, and Westernization, but also Turkish nationalism. In short, "Kemalism" was situated on the secular left. Mustapha Kemal Atatürk himself felt that traditional, Islamic Turkey needed to be modernized, and in many ways this meant adopting Western values.

The original Kemalist party was the **Republican People's Party (CHP)**, founded by Mustapha Kemal Atatürk in 1923 and the sole political party in Turkey until 1946. Unfortunately for the party, the ideals of "Kemalism" were strongly supported only by urban elites, so the party was rarely successful in electoral competition. In the 1960s it stressed its leftism somewhat more and targeted urban industrial workers. After being banned in 1980, the CHP ran as the **Populist Party (HP)** in 1983 and then split into two: the **Democratic Left Party (DSP)**, formed in 1984, and the **Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP)**, formed in 1985 and as of the 1995 election once again the CHP. Until that 1995 election, the SHP was the stronger of the two. The CHP even fell below the 10 percent threshold in 1999. However, it rebounded in the following election of 2002 whereas the DSP was eliminated as a relevant force.

If the CHP and its successors were the party of the dominant elites (although not the dominant number of voters) in Turkish society, then the **Democratic Party (DP)** and its successors were through the 1990s the party or parties of the rural periphery in opposition to the secular bureaucratic elite. The DP, formed in 1946, won all three of the elections in the 1950s, in the first two cases with a majority of the vote as well. In its policies it did not actually deviate much from the official "Kemalist" secularism and statism. Nevertheless, the DP was liquidated by the military after the 1960 coup. The party then reconstituted itself as the **Justice Party (AP)** in 1961, which positioned itself as moderately right-of-centre. The AP was at its strongest in the mid-to-late 1960s, winning outright majorities in 1965 and 1969. It was supported by urban business people, farmers, and moderate



Islamists. Tension between its liberal and conservative wings led the latter to break off and form a new Democratic Party in 1970, however most of its leaders would return to the AP in 1975.

In the subsequent period, two parties claimed the legacy of the DP/AP. The first of these was the **Motherland Party (ANAP)**, formed in 1983 for the election of that year. Deemed as the 'acceptable' right-of-centre party by the military, and benefitting from the bias in the electoral system, the ANAP was able to win majorities in 1983 and 1987. From the mid-1980s onwards, the party became both explicitly secular and more laissez-faire in its economics. In doing so, it became the preferred party of urban, Westernized, private sector voters. The other party claiming the DP/AP legacy was the **True Path Party (DYP)**, formed after the 1983 election. The DYP had a less clear ideology, in that it wanted to appeal as well to urban entrepreneurs but also hold on to the traditional DP/AP rural vote. Nevertheless, there was not a significant difference between the views of the DYP and ANAP, and the main reason for the persistence of two major right-of-centre parties (as opposed to just one) was the personal animosity between the party leaders. The ANAP and the DYP were both eliminated from parliament (the DYP not by much) in the realigning election of 2002, when the centre-right vote shifted to the new AKP (see later). In 2007 it was announced that the DYP and ANAP would merge to form a new **Democratic Party (DP)**; however, the ANAP backed out just before the election. The DYP still went ahead with the name change.

Beyond these main parties, there were other, smaller parties, some of which got into government as junior coalition partners in the 1960s and 1970s. Many of these smaller parties arose as splits from either the CHP or the DP/AP. Thus the **Reliance Party (GP)** was a right-of-centre split from the centre-left CHP; in 1971 it became the **Republican Reliance Party (GCP)**. Conversely the **New Turkey Party (YTP)**, existing from 1961 to 1970, was a less free market version of the AP. However, there was also on the far left the Marxist **Turkish Workers Party (TİP)**, formed in 1961, and on the nationalist right the **Nation Party (MP)** and later the **Republican Peasants' National Party (CKMP)**, which in 1962 saw a split leading to another Nation Party (MP). In 1969 the CKMP merged along with other far-right forces into the more clearly fascistic **National Action Party (MHP)**. These more extreme parties tended to act as centrifugal forces in the 1960s (TİP) and 1970s (MHP), contributing to the polarization which led to military intervention in 1971 and 1980. In 1997, Devlet Bahçeli took over as leader of the MHP and removed its extremist and violent fringes, allowing the party to enter the political mainstream relatively speaking. This occurred after the 1999 election when for the first (and so far only time) the MHP was a junior party in government.

Initially and for a generation there were no Islamist parties in Turkey. The first of these was the **National Salvation Party (MSP)** of the 1970s, which was able to get itself into government under both the CHP and the AP. The MSP was essentially reformed in 1983 (after the last period of military rule) as the **Welfare Party (Refah or RP)**, which gained steadily in both the 1991 and 1995 elections – winning the plurality of seats and votes in the latter election. The growth in

Refah support was not primarily a reflection of the growth in religious conservative Muslims, for these in fact accounted for less than half its support in recent years in the 1990s. Rather, Refah quickly established itself as a successful protest party, particularly for the large and growing number of urban migrants, that is, those poorer rural Turks who have moved to the main urban areas, as opposed to traditional urban residents who have tended to support Kemalism. In 1996 Refah formed a coalition with True Path. In June 1997, however, worried about Refah's Islamist orientation and its attempts to "desecularize" Turkey, the military forced Refah leader Necmettin Erbakan out of the prime minister's office. The party itself was soon dissolved, and Necmettin Erbakan himself banned from politics. Nevertheless, the party reconstituted itself in 1998 as the **Virtue Party (FP)**, which came third in 1999. However, in 2001 the FP in turn was banned. Its deputies then organized two different parties: a hardline element formed the **Felicity Party (SP)** which had only marginal appeal and the broader moderate elements formed the **Justice and Development Party (AKP)** which won the 2002 election and has been in power ever since.

The 2002 election was the most volatile one in postwar Turkey excluding periods of military intervention, numerically in terms of total vote volatility (see Chapter 2) and essentially 100 percent in terms of seat volatility as all five parties (including the three coalition parties) that had been in parliament lost support and were eliminated by the 10 percent threshold. The CHP returned to parliament, and some of the large protest vote (but no seats) went to the right populist **Young Party (GP)** created that year. However, the big winner in 2002 was the AKP, created just the previous year and led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who had been the Welfare Party mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998 until he was banned for being too Islamist. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan set up the AKP to be moderately conservative, and its success in 2002 was a combination of winning the centre-right vote and the moderate Islamist vote as well as protest voters. The initial AKP governments were successful in growing the economy, and in lessening corruption and military influence. In 2004 the AKP abolished the death penalty as had been required by Turkey's application to join the European Union. The AKP even showed a certain tolerance towards the Kurds in terms of the use of Kurdish. Consequently the party saw a large further increase in voter support in 2007 and a touch more in 2011. However, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became more polarizing and autocratic, abusing state resources, and there were various corruption scandals. He also switched to a strongly anti-Kurdish policy. Consequently, the AKP party fell to a minority in the June 2015 election, and might well have lost even more support with a truly level playing field. Yet, no government was formed after that election – in large part due to AKP intransigence – leading to a fresh election in November in the context of even greater media censorship which returned the AKP to a majority.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan increased presidential powers and then won the first direct presidential election in 2014. As noted, a fully presidential system has existed from 2018. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's nationalism and ultimately anti-Kurdish views were appealing to the MHP, which drew closer to him and ran jointly with the

AKP in 2018. Most of the MHP supported his changing Turkey to a presidential system. However, a minority in the MHP opposed this change and broke away in 2017 to form the centre-right **Good Party (İYİ Party)** which promised a return to a parliamentary system and has an ideology of civic nationalism rather than the ethnic nationalism of the MHP. The İYİ Party also attracted some members and supporters of the CHP, as the new party stressed Kemalist policies especially in terms of education, secularism, and a general pro-Western orientation.

As for Turkey's Kurdish minority, its first and most controversial political actor has been the **Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)**, founded in 1978, which despite its name is not a political party (in the sense of running for office) but a paramilitary organization and for many a terrorist one. The first actual Kurdish political party was the **People's Democracy Party (HADEP)**, formed in 1994. It would ultimately be banned by the Constitutional Court in 2003 for allegedly supporting the PKK. The place of HADEP was essentially taken by the **Democratic People's Party (DEHAP)**, founded in 1997 and which ran in 2002. In 2005 DEHAP merged with another party to form the **Democratic Society Party (DTP)**, which itself would be banned in 2009. Realizing that it could not reach the 10 percent threshold (which had excluded both HADEP and DEHAP from parliament), for the 2007 election DTP along with various smaller leftist parties formed the "Thousand Hope Candidates" electoral alliance which presented its candidates as independents. This strategy was successful in winning seats. On the banning of the DTP, most of its deputies and members joined the **Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)**, which was formed in 2008. For the 2011 election it continued the successful strategy of running as part of an electoral alliance with smaller left parties, and having the alliance candidates run as independents. In 2002 the BDP and the various leftist parties merged into the **Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP)**, which combined left populism, minority rights, and social liberalism. Running as a party list (rather than as independents), the HDP exceeded expectations and easily cleared the 10 percent hurdle in June 2015, and narrowly so in November 2015.

## Governments

Governments in Turkey have tended to be led by one of whichever are the two main parties in a given period. There have been many single-party majorities, but with the exception of the 1950s under the DP and the period since 2002 under the AKP this pattern of single-party majority has not been sustainable over the long haul. Thus there is often space for smaller parties to manoeuvre themselves into a few cabinet seats. In the 1990s, moreover, a pattern was established in which, rather than a larger party forming the government with a smaller party or parties, two larger parties (ANAP, DYP, SHP, Refah, and/or DSP) got together in government. Such governments required protracted negotiations, and tended to be unstable. The May 1999 Bülent Ecevit government went further in this vein, being in fact composed of three reasonably sized parties.

ELECTIONS IN TURKEY SINCE 1950

	PF	1950			1954			1957			1961		
		%V	#	S	%V	#	S	%V	#	S	%V	#	S
CHP	4	39.6	69		35.4	31		41.1	178		36.7	173	
HP	5	—	—		—	—		3.8	4		—	—	
YTP	9	—	—		—	—		—	—		13.7	65	
DP/AP	10/9	55.2	416		57.6	503		47.9	424		34.8	158	
MP/CMP/ CKMP	11	4.6	1		4.9	5		7.1	4		14.0	54	
Others/ independents		0.6	1		2.2	2		0.1	0		0.8	0	
TOTAL SEATS			487			541			610			450	

	PF	1965			1969			1973			1977		
		%V	#	S	%V	#	S	%V	#	S	%V	#	S
TİP	1	3.0	14		2.7	2		—	—		0.1	0	
CHP	4	28.7	134		27.4	143		33.3	185		41.4	213	
GP/CGP	7	—	—		6.6	15		5.3	13		1.9	3	
MSP	8	—	—		—	—		11.8	48		8.6	24	
YTP	9	3.7	19		2.2	6		—	—		—	—	
AP	9	52.9	240		46.5	256		29.8	149		36.9	189	
DP	10	—	—		—	—		11.9	45		1.9	1	
CKMP	11	2.2	11		(modified into MHP)			—	—		—	—	
MP	11	6.3	31		3.2	6		0.6	0		(merged into MHP)		
MHP	13	—	—		3.0	1		3.4	3		6.4	16	
Others/ independents		3.2	1		8.4	21		3.9	7		2.8	4	
TOTAL SEATS			450			450			450			450	

	PF	1983			1987			1991			1995		
		%V	#	S	%V	#	S	%V	#	S	%V	#	S
HP/SHP/CHP	4	30.5	117		24.7	99		20.8	88		10.7	49	
DSP	4	—	—		8.5	0		10.7	7		14.6	76	
DYP	9	—	—		19.1	59		27.0	178		19.2	135	
ANAP	10	45.1	211		36.3	292		24.0	115		19.7	132	
MDP	10	23.3	71		—	—		—	—		—	—	
Refah (RP)	10	—	—		7.2	0		16.9	62		21.4	158	
MHP	13	—	—		—	—		—	—		8.2	0	
HADEP	21	—	—		—	—		—	—		4.2	0	

(Continued)

	<i>PF</i>	<u>1983</u>		<u>1987</u>		<u>1991</u>		<u>1995</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Others/ independents		1.1	0	4.2	0	0.6	0	2.1	0
<i>Unfilled</i>		1							
TOTAL SEATS		400		450		450		550	

	<i>PF</i>	<u>1999</u>		<u>2002</u>		<u>2007</u>		<u>2011</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
CHP	4	8.7	0	19.4	178	20.9	112	26.0	135
DSP	4	22.2	136	1.2	0			0.3	0
DYP/DP	9	12.0	85	9.6	0	5.4	0	0.7	0
ANAP	10	13.2	86	5.1	0	—	—	—	—
FP/SP	10	15.4	111	2.5	0	2.3	0	1.3	0
AKP	10	—	—	34.3	363	46.6	341	49.8	327
MHP	12	18.0	129	8.3	0	14.3	71	13.0	53
GP (Young Party)	12	—	—	7.2	0	3.0	0	—	—
HADEP/ DEHAP	21	4.8	0	6.2	0	—	—	—	—
DTP/BDP and allies	21	—	—	—	—	5.2	26	6.6	35
Others/ independents		5.7	3	6.2	9	2.3	0	2.3	0
TOTAL SEATS		550		550		550		550	

\* running as  
independents

	<i>PF</i>	<u>June 2015</u>		<u>November 2015</u>		<u>2018</u>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
HDP	2	13.1	80	10.8	59	11.7	67
CHP	4	25.0	132	25.3	134	22.6	146
DP	9	0.2	0	0.1	0	(with İYİ Party)	
İYİ Party	9	—	—	—	—	10.0	43
SP	10	2.1	0	0.7	0	1.3	0
AKP	11	40.9	258	49.5	317	42.6	295
MHP	12	16.3	80	11.9	40	11.1	49
Others/ independents		2.4	0	1.7	0	0.7	0
TOTAL SEATS		550		550		600	

Notes: The 1954 and 1957 elections were not free and fair. The November 2015 and 2018 elections were not fair.

**TURKISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1950**

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
<b>First Republic</b>				
05/1950	Menderes, A. (DP)	17	DP	
05/1954	Menderes, A. (DP)	18	DP	
11/1957	Menderes, A. (DP)	20 (1)	DP	
[military coup in 1960]				
<b>Second Republic</b>				
11/1961	Inönü, I. (CHP)	22 (1)	CHP AP	
06/1962	Inönü, I. (CHP)	23 (4)	CHP NTP CKMP	
12/1963	Inönü, I. (CHP)	23 (3)	CHP	
02/1965	Ürgüplü, S.H. (ind.)	23 (3)	AP CKMP YTP MP	
10/1965	Demirel, S. (AP)	24 (1)	AP	
11/1969	Demirel, S. (AP)	25	AP	
[military coup in 1971]				
01/1974	Ecevit, M.B. (CHP)	25	CHP MSP	
11/1974	Irmak, Y. (ind.)	26 (26)	(non-partisan caretaker government)	
03/1975	Demirel, S. (AP)	30	AP MSP CGP MHP	
06/1977	Ecevit, M.B. (CHP)	16 (1)	CHP	
08/1977	Demirel, S. (AP)	29	AP MSP MHP	
01/1978	Ecevit, M.B. (CHP)	25	CHP CGP DP	
11/1979	Demirel, S. (AP)	29	AP	MSP MHP
[military coup in 1980]				
<b>Third Republic</b>				
12/1983	Özal, T. (ANAP)	22 (2)	ANAP	
12/1987	Özal, T. (ANAP)	25	ANAP	
11/1989	Akbulut, Y. (ANAP)	31	ANAP	
06/1991	Yilmaz, M. (ANAP)	30	ANAP	
10/1991	Demirel, S. (DYP)	32	DYP SHP	
06/1993	Çiller, T. (DYP)	32	DYP SHP	
03/1996	Yilmaz, M. (ANAP)	33	DYP ANAP	
06/1996	Erbakan, N. (RP)	18	RP DYP	
06/1997	Yilmaz, M. (ANAP)	19 (1)	ANAP DSP DTP	CHP
01/1999	Ecevit, M.B. (DSP)	25 (3)	DSP	ANAP DYP
06/1999	Ecevit, M.B. (DSP)	36	DSP MHP ANAP	
11/2002	Gül, A. (AKP)	25	AKP	
03/2003	Erdoğan, R. T. (AKP)	23	AKP	
09/2007	Erdoğan, R. T. (AKP)	24	AKP	
07/2011	Erdoğan, R. T. (AKP)	26	AKP	
08/2014	Davutoğlu, A. (AKP)	26	AKP	

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
08/2015	Davutoğlu, A. (AKP)		(interim pre- election government)	
11/2015	Davutoğlu, A. (AKP)	27	AKP	
05/2016	Yildirim, B. (AKP)	27	AKP	

### Turkish acronyms

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
AP	Justice Party
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party
CGP	Republican Reliance Party
CHP	Republican Peoples' Party
CKMP	Republican Peasants' National Party
DEHAP	Democratic People's Party
DP	Democratic Party
DSP	Democratic Left Party
DTP	Democratic Society Party
DYP	True Path Party
FP	Virtue Party
GP (1969)	Reliance Party
(2000s)	Young Party
HADEP	People's Democracy Party
HDP	Peoples' Democratic Party
HP	Populist Party
İYİ Party	Good Party
MHP	National Action Party
MP	National Party
MSP	National Salvation Party
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
Refah	Welfare Party
SHP	Social Democratic Populist Party
SP	Felicity Party
TİP	Turkish Workers Party
YTP	New Turkey Party

### Reference

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# UNITED KINGDOM

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1945	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (Labour)</i>
1950	two-party
1951	two-party
1955	two-party
1959	two-party
1964	two-party
1966	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (Labour)</i>
1970	two-party
1974 Feb	two-and-a-half-party
1974 Oct	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (Labour)</i>
1979	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (Conservative)</i>
1983	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (Conservative)</i>
1987	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (Conservative)</i>
1992	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (Conservative)</i>
1997	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (Labour)</i>
2001	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (Labour)</i>
2005	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (Labour)</i>
2010	two-and-a-half-party
2015	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (Conservative)</i>
2017	two-and-a-half-party



## Party systems (with smoothing)

1950–1970 inclusive	two-party system (Conservatives and Labour)
1974–1992 inclusive	two-and-a-half-party system (Conservatives and Labour)
2005–2017 inclusive	two-and-a-half-party system (Conservatives and Labour)

## History

The United Kingdom has at its core England, to which Wales was formally joined in 1536 and likewise Scotland in 1707; these three nations forming Great Britain. The island of Ireland was under British rule for centuries, but in 1921 the Catholic South broke away, leaving only Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.

Internally, British political developments occurred slowly and evolutionary, sparing the country the turmoil that occurred in most of Europe. Parliamentary government was achieved by the 1830s, but the suffrage was extended over a century. Britain has also not been invaded for centuries, leading to an insular outlook, especially in England. The United Kingdom joined the European Community (as it was called then) in 1973, and the voters confirmed the country's (modestly) renegotiated membership after-the-fact in a referendum in 1975. In a 2016 referendum the vote went the opposite way – in favour of leaving the European Union (“Brexit”), something which was triggered in 2017.

## Electoral system

The United Kingdom uses a straightforward single-member plurality electoral system. It was not until 1948, however, that extra votes for business people and certain university graduates were eliminated, as were the special university seats and the remaining two-member districts. A referendum in 2011 rejected a change to the alternative vote (single-member majority) electoral system by 68 percent to 32 percent.

## Political parties and cleavages

The **Labour Party** was formed in the early 1900s as a grouping of socialist intellectuals and members of the trade unionist movement. The party has battled throughout its history with the conflict of adhering to the socialist doctrine on which the party was founded on the one hand, and electoral viability on the other. The party platform has therefore swung between espousing more far-left and more centre-left policies. In the early 1980s the party was on the far left arguing for nuclear disarmament, more socialist economic policies, and the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Community. This swing left was counteracted by a shift to the right in the late 1980s and early 1990s culminating in the “New Labour” movement championed by Tony Blair, which has included calls for budget constraint and welfare reform. The party has been consistent in its support

of devolution of powers with regard to Scotland and Wales. After Tony Blair and his successor Gordon Brown, the Labour Party shifted back to the left especially under Jeremy Corbyn, its leader from 2015.

The **Conservative Party** (or Tory Party) is the United Kingdom's oldest modern party, whose lineage some have dated back as far as the seventeenth century. The party has never had a very firm ideology and has therefore espoused a variety of conservative to centrist policies throughout its history. In recent decades though the party has been most closely associated with economic liberalism. The Conservative Party has also consistently been suspicious of (or outright opposed to) the devolution of powers to the Celtic areas. After the 2016 referendum, its leaders and members favoured a "harder" (that is, clearer) Brexit than did those of Labour. The Conservatives' main bases of support have been business, the middle class, and farmers.

The **Liberal Democratic Party** was formed by the merger of the historic Liberal Party and the newer Social Democratic Party. The **Liberal Party** was formed in 1859 and was the major rival to the Conservatives prior to Labour's rise to prominence in the 1920s. The **Social Democratic Party** was created by moderate Labour members who split from the party in 1981 over opposition to the party's anti-European Community stance and far-left policy swing. The two parties first got together in 1982 to form an electoral alliance which competed in the 1983 and 1987 elections. The Liberal Democrats then competed in subsequent elections as a unified party. The party has concentrated on issues such as the protection of the environment and strong support for the European Union (and opposition to "Brexit"). Always disadvantaged by the electoral system, it won its highest number of seats in 2005, in part due to its opposition to the Gulf War. After the 2010 election it became the junior coalition partner to the Conservatives but had little success achieving its policies, and consequently lost badly in the 2015 election.

There have been several other Great Britain-wide parties running for the House of Commons since 1945, and indeed that was the most successful postwar election in terms of other parties – and independents – winning seats. This included two seats for the **Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB)**, which existed from 1920 to 1991. In every election since 1950, other Great Britain-wide parties have each either won no seats or at most one seat. This has been true for parties as different as the neo-fascist **National Front (NF)**, formed in 1967 and strongest in the 1970s; its very similar rival the **British National Party (BNP)**, formed in 1982 and strongest in the 2000s; the Eurosceptic **Referendum Party** which existed from 1994 to 1997 and which was heavily financed by its creator, the multi-millionaire James Goldsmith; and the **Green Party of England and Wales (GPEW)**, formed in 1990. This lack of seats has also been true for ultimately the most successful "other" party in terms of votes, the anti-EU and populist radical right **UK Independence Party (UKIP)**, formed in 1993. In both 2005 and 2010 UKIP was fourth in terms of votes across the United Kingdom, but won no seats. Then in 2015 it jumped to over 12 percent of the vote and third place in terms of votes, but still only won a single seat. Having achieved its goal of "Brexit" in the

2016 referendum, UKIP was wiped out in the 2017 election and fell back to under 2 percent of the vote.

Various regional parties have run for the UK House of Commons, starting with the two nationalist parties representing the Scottish and Welsh minorities. The **Scottish National Party (SNP)** was formed in 1934 and advocates an independent Scotland. **Plaid Cymru**, the Welsh Nationalist Party, was founded in 1925 and has long advocated democratic socialist self-government for Wales. Plaid Cymru was initially solely concerned with the Welsh speakers of Wales but in recent decades has attempted to broaden its appeal to the entire population of Wales. These nationalist parties first had a mini-breakthrough in the two 1974 elections, especially in the October 1974 election when the SNP won 11 seats in the House of Commons and Plaid Cymru three. They were then able to pressure the Labour government to hold referenda on devolving powers to their regions. Support for the SNP subsequently fell back, with its seat totals ranging from two to three from 1979 to 1992 and then from five to six from 1997 to 2010. However, building on its absolute majority won in the 2011 Scottish election (see later) and even more on the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, in 2015 the SNP surged to sweep Scotland with 56 of its 59 seats in the House of Commons. In 2017 the SNP fell back to 35 seats (still a majority in Scotland), as the unionist opposition to it and its plans for a second independence referendum led such voters to coalesce around the most viable unionist candidate in many constituencies. In contrast, support for Plaid Cymru has changed little since 1974, ranging from two to four seats since the February 1974 election. (The creation of regional parliaments in Scotland and Wales, as discussed later, has provided both the SNP and Plaid Cymru with more successful forums.)

In contrast to Scotland and Wales, where only one regional party either exists (Wales) or has won seats in the House of Commons (Scotland), Northern Ireland has multiple parties running both for the Northern Ireland Assembly (see later) and, since 1974, for the House of Commons. The most successful of these in United Kingdom elections have been on the Protestant side the **Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)** and from 2005 the **Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)**, and on the Catholic side the **Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)** and from 2001 **Sinn Féin (SF)**. Indeed, the main British parties have not run candidates in Northern Ireland for the House of Commons for decades. In the polarized 2017 UK election, the DUP and SF won all but one Northern Irish seat between them.

## Governments

From 1945 until 2010, governments in the United Kingdom were always single-party, either of the Conservatives or the Labour Party. Although the February 1974 election returned a hung parliament which led to a Labour minority government, an election in October that year gave Labour a bare majority. By 1976, however, said Labour majority had become a minority, dependent on the Liberals with whom a formal pact was agreed in 1977. Likewise at the end of the 1992–1997

ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM SINCE 1945

<i>PF</i>		<i>1945</i>		<i>1950</i>		<i>1951</i>		<i>1955</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Communist Party	1	0.4	2	0.3	0	0.1	1	0.1	0
Labour	4	47.7	393	46.1	315	48.8	295	46.4	277
Liberals	9	9.0	12	9.1	9	2.6	6	2.7	6
Conservatives★	10	39.8	210	★ 43.4	298	48.0	321	49.7	345
SNP	21	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	0
Plaid Cymru	21	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.2	0
Others		2.9	23	0.9	3	0.6	2	0.9	2
TOTAL SEATS		640		625		625		630	

<i>PF</i>		<i>1959</i>		<i>1964</i>		<i>1966</i>		<i>1970</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Communist Party	1	0.1	0	0.2	0	0.2	0	0.1	0
Labour	4	43.8	258	44.1	317	48.0	364	43.1	288
Liberals	5	5.9	6	11.2	9	8.5	12	7.5	6
Conservatives	10	49.4	365	43.4	304	41.9	253	46.4	330
SNP	21	0.1	0	0.2	0	0.5	0	1.1	1
Plaid Cymru	21	0.3	0	0.3	0	0.2	0	0.6	0
Others		0.4	1	0.6	0	0.7	1	1.3	5
TOTAL SEATS		630		630		630		630	

<i>PF</i>		<i>February 1974</i>		<i>October 1974</i>		<i>1979</i>		<i>1983</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
Labour	4	37.2	301	39.3	319	36.9	269	27.6	209
Liberals + SDP★★	5 and 7	19.3	14	18.3	13	13.8	11	25.4	23
Conservatives	10	37.9	297	35.8	277	43.9	339	42.4	397
NF	13	0.2	0	0.4	0	0.6	0	0.1	0
SNP	21	2.0	7	2.9	11	1.6	2	1.1	2
Plaid Cymru	21	0.5	2	0.6	3	0.4	2	0.4	2
UUP	21	1.2	11	1.2	9	0.8	7	0.8	11
DUP	21			0.3	1	0.2	3	0.5	3
SDLP	21	0.5	1	0.5	1	0.4	1	0.4	1
SF	21	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	1
Others		1.2	2	0.7	1	1.3	1	1.1	1
TOTAL SEATS		635		635		635		650	

(Continued)

	<i>PF</i>	<i>1987</i>		<i>1992</i>		<i>1997</i>		<i>2001</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
GPEW	3	0.3	0	0.5	0	0.2	0	0.6	0
Labour	4	30.8	229	34.4	271	43.2	419	40.7	412
Liberal Democrats	5	22.6	22	17.8	20	16.8	46	18.3	52
★★									
Conservatives	10	42.3	376	41.9	336	30.7	165	31.7	166
UKIP	12	—	—	—	—	0.3	0	1.5	0
BNP	13	0.0	0	0.1	0	0.1	0	0.2	0
SNP	21	1.3	3	1.9	3	2.0	6	1.8	5
Plaid Cymru	21	0.4	3	0.5	4	0.5	4	0.7	4
UUP	21	0.8	9	0.9	10	0.8	10	0.8	6
DUP	21	0.3	3	0.3	3	0.3	2	0.7	5
SDLP	21	0.5	3	0.5	4	0.6	3	0.6	3
SF	21	0.3	1	0.2	0	0.4	2	0.7	4
Referendum Party	31	—	—	—	—	2.6	0	—	—
Others		0.4	1	1.0	0	1.5	2	1.7	2
TOTAL SEATS			650		651		659		659

	<i>PF</i>	<i>2005</i>		<i>2010</i>		<i>2015</i>		<i>2017</i>	
		% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>	% <i>V</i>	# <i>S</i>
GPEW	3	1.0	0	0.9	1	3.8	1	1.6	1
Labour	4	35.2	355	29.0	258	30.4	232	40.0	262
Liberal Democrats	★★★	22.0	62	23.0	57	7.9	8	7.4	12
Conservatives	10	32.4	198	36.1	307	36.9	331	42.4	318
UKIP	12	2.2	0	3.1	0	12.6	1	1.8	0
BNP	13	0.7	0	1.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	0
SNP	21	1.5	6	1.7	6	4.7	56	3.0	35
Plaid Cymru	21	0.6	3	0.6	3	0.6	3	0.5	4
UUP	21	0.5	1	0.3	0	0.4	2	0.3	0
DUP	21	0.9	9	0.6	8	0.6	8	0.9	10
SDLP	21	0.5	3	0.4	3	0.3	3	0.3	0
SF	21	0.6	5	0.6	5	0.6	4	0.7	7
Others	21	1.9	4	1.8	2	1.2	1	1.1	1
TOTAL SEATS			646		650		650		650

\* including National Liberals in 1945.

★★ In 1983 and 1987 the Liberals and the newly formed Social Democrats maintained separate identities but competed in an electoral alliance. Since 1992 they have competed as one party, the Liberal Democrats.

★★★ 5 then 9 then 5.

Major government, divisions within the Conservative Party over European integration cut the government to minority status, forcing it to rely on the votes of the Ulster Unionists – a situation that was repeated after the 2017 election. A major change came in 2010 with the United Kingdom's first postwar coalition government, comprised of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. Desire to have a government lasting a full parliamentary term was a contributing factor to a formal coalition. As noted earlier, though, the Liberal Democrats suffered major losses in the 2015 election, and did not recover much in 2017.

#### UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1945

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
07/1945	Attlee, C. (Labour)	21	Labour Party
02/1950	Attlee, C. (Labour)	18	Labour Party
11/1951	Churchill, W. (Conservative)	16	Conservative Party
04/1955	Eden, A. (Conservative)	18	Conservative Party
05/1955	Eden, A. (Conservative)	18	Conservative Party
01/1957	Macmillan, H. (Conservative)	19	Conservative Party
10/1959	Macmillan, H. (Conservative)	20	Conservative Party
10/1963	Douglas-Home, A. (Conservative)	22	Conservative Party
10/1964	Wilson, H. (Labour)	22	Labour Party
04/1966	Wilson, H. (Labour)	22	Labour Party
06/1970	Heath, E. (Conservative)	18	Conservative Party
03/1974	Wilson, H. (Labour)	21	Labour Party
10/1974	Wilson, H. (Labour)	23	Labour Party
04/1976*	Callaghan, J. (Labour)	23	Labour Party
<i>[from 03/1977 to 07/1978 supported by the Liberal Party in effectively a co-operation agreement]</i>			
05/1979	Thatcher, M. (Conservative)	22	Conservative Party
06/1983	Thatcher, M. (Conservative)	22	Conservative Party
06/1987	Thatcher, M. (Conservative)	23	Conservative Party
11/1990	Major, J. (Conservative)	22	Conservative Party
04/1992	Major, J. (Conservative)	22	Conservative Party
12/1996*	Major, J. (Conservative)	22	Conservative Party
05/1997	Blair, T. (Labour)	22	Labour Party
06/2001	Blair, T. (Labour)	22	Labour Party
05/2005	Blair, T. (Labour)	21	Labour Party
06/2007	Brown, G. (Labour)	22	Labour Party
05/2010	Cameron, D. (Conservative)	23	Conservative Party Liberal Democrats
05/2015	Cameron, D. (Conservative)	22	Conservative Party
07/2016	May, T. (Conservative)	22	Conservative Party
06/2017	May, T. (Conservative)	23	Conservative Party <i>supported by DUP on confidence and supply</i>

\* loss of parliamentary majority.

## **Acronyms**

BNP	British National Party
CPGB	Communist Party of Great Britain
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party (Northern Ireland)
GPEW	Green Party of England and Wales
NF	National Front
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party (Northern Ireland)
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SF	Sinn Féin (Northern Ireland)
SNP	Scottish Nationalist Party
UKIP	UK Independence Party
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party (Northern Ireland)

# NORTHERN IRELAND

## The party pattern in each election, with additional components

1945	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (UUP)</i>
1949	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (UUP)</i>
1953	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (UUP)</i>
1958	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (UUP)</i>
1962	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (UUP)</i>
1965	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (UUP)</i>
1969	moderately multi-party, <i>with a predominant party (UUP)</i>
1973	moderately multi-party
1996	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (UUP, DUP, SDLP, and Sinn Féin)</i>
1998	highly multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (UUP, SDLP, DUP, and Sinn Féin)</i>
2003	moderately multi-party, <i>with a relative balance of the top four parties (DUP, UUP, Sinn Féin, and SDLP)</i>
2007	moderately multi-party
2011	moderately multi-party
2016	moderately multi-party
2017	moderately multi-party

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1945–1973 inclusive	moderately multi-party system, <i>with a predominant party through 1969 (UUP)</i>
2003–2017 inclusive	moderately multi-party system



History

From 1921 to 1972 a regional parliament existed in Northern Ireland, the elections for which were always won by the Ulster Unionist Party (see later). Catholic frustration at this outcome led to violence and finally suspension of the parliament (as being part of the “problem”) by the British government, which had retained full sovereignty. A tentative peace settlement in the 1990s led to elections for a constitutional forum and then the creation of a new Northern Irish Assembly. The governments formed since then are based on consociational power-sharing, which as explained in the “Governments” subsection is somewhat obligatory in nature.

Electoral system

From 1929 through 1969 Northern Ireland used the single-member plurality electoral system. Up through 1965 this included four seats for Queen’s University, elected by a tiny number of voters. During this period many seats were uncontested, averaging 40 percent of the seats from 1945 to 1969 (see the following table).

To facilitate power-sharing, in 1973 the electoral system was changed to the single transferable vote (STV) system – which had in fact been used in 1921 and 1925. As of 2017, Northern Ireland has 18 STV electoral districts (these being its 18 seats in the UK House of Commons) each electing five members (before 2017 each elected six members). STV has always been used for local and European elections in the region.

NORTHERN IRELAND PARLIAMENT UNCONTESTED POSTWAR SEATS UNDER SMP

<i>Election</i>	<i>Total Uncontested</i>	<i>Percentage Uncontested</i>
1945	20	38.5
1949	20	38.5
1953	25	48.1
1958	27	51.9
1962	24	46.2
1965	23	44.2
1969	7	13.5

Political parties and cleavages

In Northern Ireland the overwhelmingly main cleavage is that of religion and consequent constitutional views, between protestant unionist and Catholic nationalist/republican parties. There is, however, a third group of parties which are non-sectarian.

Effectively the only unionist party for many decades was the **Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)**, founded in 1905. It won absolute seat majorities in every Northern

Irish election from the first in 1921 up through 1969. In the period since then the official UUP has, however, been far less rigid in its unionist position than other unionist parties, or some of its own breakaways, by showing its willingness to engage in power-sharing and even to tolerate North-South Irish bodies as long as they have no executive powers. In the late 1960s the party split internally over the reforms pushed through by Prime Minister Terence O'Neill, a division that continued under Terence O'Neill's successor Brian Faulkner and which was reinforced by the UK government's 1973 white paper on constitutional change in Northern Ireland. That white paper led to an assembly elected by proportional representation as of the election that year; the subsequent Sunningdale Agreement then called for a power-sharing executive. When the anti-Sunningdale faction gained control of the UUP in 1974, Faulkner created the **Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (UPNI)** which existed until 1981. An opposite, more militant anti-power-sharing breakaway from the UUP was the **Vanguard Ulster Unionist Party (VUUP)**, which existed from 1972 to 1978. When power-sharing returned to Northern Ireland in 1999 after the 1998 Belfast Agreement, the UUP provided the first minister, but not without internal dissent.

The main alternative to the UUP has been the **Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)**, created in 1971 by the more radical members of the unionist movement. The party's support initially came primarily from members of the Free Presbyterian Church which was organized by the Reverend Ian Paisley, the leader of the DUP. The party however began to enjoy support from segments of the protestant working class as well. Openly anti-Catholic (Reverend Ian Paisley denounced the Pope regularly), and anti-Dublin, the party also was a harsh critic of the European Union as it was seen as a threat to national sovereignty. The party attracted the Protestant protest vote and was opposed to the Good Friday Agreement. However, by the 2007 election most of the party accepted power-sharing and Reverend Ian Paisley became first minister; indeed the party has provided all first ministers since 2007. An anti-power sharing group broke away at the end of 2007 to form the **Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV)**. A scandal about a failed renewable energy scheme that wound up costing taxpayers dearly led to a major drop in support for the DUP in 2017.

Other unionist parties have included: the **Ulster Liberal Party**, with ties to the British Liberal Party, which existed in its postwar variant from 1956 to 1987; the **UK Unionist Party (UKUP)** which existed from 1995 to 2008, and which was opposed to the peace agreement and called for closer links with Britain; the **Ulster Democratic Party (UDP)** which existed from 1981 to 2001; and the leftist **Progressive Unionist Party (PUP)** which was formed in 1979 out of the **Independent Unionist** group. Both the UDP and the PUP signed the Good Friday Agreement but were critical of what they saw as too many concessions to republican/nationalist parties. These two parties have also been significant because they had strong links with different loyalist paramilitary groups: the UDP was associated with the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), and the PUP was linked with the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Both the UDA and the UVF ended their

armed campaigns in 2007. Finally, the three independent Unionists elected in 1998 formed the **United Unionist Assembly Party** that September.

On the nationalist side of the political spectrum the Catholic vote initially went to the **Nationalist Party**, which existed from 1918 to 1977. Formed from the Northern Irish members of the Irish Parliamentary Party, the National Party had little central control and its deputies relied on their own local machines. The party also tended to abstain at the Stormont parliament until the 1960s, in protest at the division of Ireland. Other smaller nationalist parties were the **Socialist Labour Party** and the **Republican Labour Party (RLP)**, the leaders of which in 1970 formed the **Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)**. Left-of-centre, the SDLP is largely Catholic and has argued that popular consent should determine reunification with the Republic of Ireland. It was been instrumental in getting the peace process underway. The party has rejected violence as a means by which to attain political goals. The party is a strong supporter of the European Union.

The other main nationalist party is **Sinn Féin**. In its current form it was also founded in 1970, but it did not present candidates for elected office until 1982. Sinn Féin, whose name means “We Ourselves”, is an Irish-wide party which has argued for end of partition and the reunification of the country. The party was led by Gerry Adams from 1983 until 2018, and is both a Catholic and a working-class party. The party was famous (or infamous) for its connection to the Irish Republican Army (IRA). From 2003, Sinn Féin has been the strongest of the nationalist parties, and in 2017 it came within one seat of being tied for the largest party in the Assembly.

The **Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI)** is the largest of the truly cross-community political parties in Northern Ireland. The party, which was founded in 1970, is a non-sectarian, centrist party supported by both Protestants and Catholics. It gained a lot of the support and membership of the Ulster Liberal Party. The APNI supports not just the concept of a strong Northern Ireland Assembly but one with a high degree of devolved powers similar to Scotland. The party also espouses a liberal economic policy and is strongly pro-European Union. Though non-sectarian and thus with presumably less of a core base, its support has been fairly consistent – and in every election since 1996 it has been the fifth largest party.

The **Northern Ireland’s Women’s Coalition (NIWC)** was another cross-community party. The NIWC was formed in the spring of 1996 on a non-sectarian platform which sought to raise the profile of women in politics in Northern Ireland, and lasted until 2006. Also non-sectarian, but emphasizing environmentalist, pacifist, and leftist values is the **Green Party in Northern Ireland**, formed in 1983. In 2006 it became a regional partner of the Green Party in the Republic of Ireland. Likewise existing in both parts of Ireland is the Trotskyist **People Before Profit Alliance (PBPA)**, founded in 2005, and which has always run on its own in Northern Ireland (in contrast to the Republic).

ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1945–1982

	1945		1949		1953		1958	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
UUP	50.4	33	62.7	37	48.6	38	44.0	37
Independent Unionist	5.0	2	0.6	2	12.8	1	6.8	0
NI Labour	18.5	2	7.1	0	12.1	0	15.8	4
Nationalist Party	9.1	10	26.8	9	10.8	7	14.9	7
Independent Nationalist	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.1	1
Commonwealth Labour	7.8	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Communist	3.5	0	0.2	0	0.5	0	—	—
Independent Labour	2.8	1	2.1	1	1.5	1	3.1	0
Socialist Republican	1.5	1	★	1	—	—	—	—
Irish Labour	—	—	—	—	5.1	1	3.0	0
Anti-Partition	—	—	—	—	3.0	2	—	—
Republican Labour	—	—	—	—	2.3	1	3.1	1
Independent Labour Group	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.0	1
Other parties	1.1	0	—	—	2.6	0	3.4	0
Independents	0.3	2	0.5	2	0.7	1	1.8	1
TOTAL SEATS		52		52		52		52

★ Note: The only candidate was elected unopposed.

	1962		1965		1969	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
UUP	48.8	34	59.1	36	48.2	36
pro-Terence O'Neill					31.1	24
anti-Terence O'Neill					17.1	12
Independent Unionist	—	—	—	—	15.5	3
pro-Terence O'Neill					12.9	3
anti-Terence O'Neill					2.5	0
NI Labour	25.4	4	20.4	2	8.1	2
Nationalist Party	15.1	9	8.2	9	7.6	6
Liberal	3.6	1	3.9	1	1.3	0
Republican Labour	2.5	1	1.0	2	2.4	2
Independent Labour	2.3	0	1.4	0	—	—
Irish Labour	1.1	1	—	—	—	—
Independent Labour Group	0.8	1	—	—	—	—
National Democratic Party	—	—	4.7	1	4.6	0
Other parties	0.0	0	1.3	0	8.4	0
Independents	0.4	1	★	1	3.9	3
TOTAL SEATS		52		52		52

★ Note: The only independent candidate was elected unopposed.

(Continued)

	<i>1973</i>		<i>1975</i>		<i>1982</i>	
	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
UUP	35.8	31	25.8	19	29.7	26
pro-assembly/UPNI	25.3	24	7.7	5	–	–
<i>anti-assembly</i>	10.5	7				
Independent Unionist	1.9	1	0.6	1	1.5	1
Independent Loyalist	–	–	0.9	1	–	–
DUP	10.8	8	14.8	12	23.0	21
VUPP	10.5	7	12.7	14	–	–
NI Labour	2.6	1	1.4	1	–	–
Nationalist Party	0.9	0	–	–	–	–
SDLP	22.1	19	23.7	17	18.8	14
Sinn Féin	–	–	–	–	10.1	5
APNI	9.2	8	9.8	8	9.3	10
Other parties	5.6	3	2.3	0	7.3	1
Independents	0.6	0	0.3	0	0.3	0
TOTAL SEATS		78		78		78

#### ELECTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND SINCE 1996

	<i>1996</i>		<i>1998</i>		<i>2003</i>		<i>2007</i>	
	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
UUP	24.2	30	21.3	28	22.7	27	14.9	18
SDLP	21.4	21	22.0	24	17.0	18	15.2	16
DUP	18.8	24	18.0	20	25.7	30	30.1	36
Sinn Féin	15.5	17	17.7	18	23.5	24	26.2	28
APNI	6.5	7	6.5	6	3.7	6	5.2	7
UKUP	3.7	3	4.5	5	0.8	1	1.5	0
PUP	3.5	2	2.6	2	1.2	1	0.6	1
NIWC	1.0	2	1.6	2	0.8	0	–	–
UDP	2.2	2	1.1	0	–	–	–	–
Labour Party	0.9	2	0.3	0	–	–	0.0	0
Green Party	0.5	0	0.1	0	0.4	0	1.7	1
Independents	0.2	0	3.7	3	2.9	1	2.8	1
Other parties	1.6	0	0.6	0	1.3	0	1.8	0
TOTAL SEATS		110		108		108		108

	<i>2011</i>		<i>2016</i>		<i>2017</i>	
	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
UUP	13.2	16	12.6	16	12.9	10
SDLP	14.2	14	12.0	12	11.9	12
DUP	30.0	38	29.2	38	28.1	28

Sinn Féin	26.9	29	24.0	28	27.9	27
APNI	7.7	8	7.0	8	9.1	8
TUV	2.5	1	3.4	1	2.6	1
Green Party	0.9	1	2.7	2	2.3	2
PBPA	0.8	0	2.0	2	1.8	1
UKIP	0.6	0	1.5	0	0.2	0
Independents	2.4	1	3.3	1	1.8	1
Other parties	0.8	0	2.3	0	1.6	0
TOTAL SEATS		108		108		90

Note: %V is first preferences.

Note: The 1975 election was to the constitutional convention.

Note: The 1996 election was to the peace forum.

## Governments

Up through 1969 elections always yielded a majority for the UUP, and there were only four prime ministers from 1920 to 1969. Governments were then largely suspended from 1972 to 1999. Ultimately, disagreements over the timing of the decommissioning of Irish Republican Army weapons prevented a Northern Irish government from being formed until November 1999. At two times afterwards the government has been suspended by London, but suspension is no longer allowed. Under the peace accord and what has followed, governments in Northern Ireland are to reflect the results of elections, but in a consociational way. Thus a member (presumably the leader) of the largest party becomes first minister. Likewise, a member of the second largest party becomes deputy first minister (which is actually a co-equal position despite the name). Indeed, if either of these parties refuses to participate a government cannot be formed and new elections are called – as happened in 2017 when Sinn Féin left the government. All other main parties are entitled to be in the government, but they can opt for opposition as most did in 2016. For each party in cabinet, the number of ministers is determined based on the d'Hondt version of proportional representation. For example, using this formula in the first executive of 1999 the UUP got three cabinet seats (beyond that of the first minister), as did the SDLP (beyond that of the deputy first minister), while the hardline Protestant DUP and Sinn Féin each got two cabinet seats. The Northern Irish government could thus be described as an “involuntary coalition”. After the 2017 election, no government was ever formed (as of June 2018), and the Northern Irish budget was passed by the Westminster Parliament.

### NORTHERN IRISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1945

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
07/1945	Brooke, B. (UUP)		UUP
03/1949	Brooke, B. (UUP)		UUP

(Continued)

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
10/1953	Brooke, B. (UUP)		UUP
03/1958	Brooke, B. (UUP)		UUP
06/1962	Brooke, B. (UUP)		UUP
03/1963	O'Neill, T. (UUP)		UUP
12/1965	O'Neill, T. (UUP)		UUP
03/1969	O'Neill, T. (UUP)		UUP
05/1969	Chichester-Clark, J. (UUP)	9	UUP
03/1971	Faulkner, B. (UUP)	9 (1)	UUP
<i>[executive suspended from 03/1972 to 01/1974]</i>			
<b>Chief Executive (party)</b>			
01/1974	Faulkner, B. (UUP pro-assembly)	11	UUP SDLP APNI
<i>[executive suspended from 05/1974 to 11/1999]</i>			
<b>First minister (party)</b>			
11/1999	Trimble, D. (UUP)	12	SDLP UUP DUP Sinn Féin
<i>[executive suspended from 02/2000 to 05/2000]</i>			
05/2000	Trimble, D. (UUP)	12	SDLP UUP DUP Sinn Féin
07/2001	Empey, R. (UUP) [acting]	12	SDLP UUP DUP Sinn Féin
11/2001	Trimble, D. (UUP)	12	SDLP UUP DUP Sinn Féin
<i>[executive suspended from 10/2002 to 05/2007]</i>			
05/2007	Paisley, I. (DUP)	12	DUP Sinn Féin UUP SDLP
06/2008	Robinson, P. (DUP)	12	DUP Sinn Féin UUP SDLP
01/2010	Foster, A. (DUP) [acting]	11	DUP Sinn Féin UUP SDLP
02/2010	Robinson, P. (DUP)	12	DUP Sinn Féin UUP SDLP
04/2010	Robinson, P. (DUP)	13	DUP Sinn Féin UUP APNI
05/2011	Robinson, P. (DUP)	13	SDLP DUP Sinn Féin APNI UUP
09/2015	Foster, A. (DUP) [acting]	11	SDLP DUP Sinn Féin APNI UUP
10/2015	Robinson, P. (DUP)	13	SDLP DUP Sinn Féin APNI
01/2016	Foster, A. (DUP)	13	SDLP DUP Sinn Féin APNI
05/2016	Foster, A. (DUP)	10 (1)	SDLP DUP Sinn Féin

Acronyms

APNI	Alliance Party of Northern Ireland
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
NIWC	Northern Ireland's Women's Coalition
PBPA	People Before Profit Alliance
PUP	Progressive Unionist Party

RLP	Republican Labour Party
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party
TUV	Traditional Unionist Voice
UDP	Ulster Democratic Party
UKUP	UK Unionist Party
UPNI	Unionist Party of Northern Ireland
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party
VUUP	Vanguard Ulster Unionist Party



# SCOTLAND

## The party pattern in each election, *with additional components*

1999	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (Labour)</i>
2003	moderately multi-party
2007	moderately multi-party, <i>with two main parties (SNP and Labour)</i>
2011	two-and-a-half-party, <i>with a single-party majority (SNP)</i>
2016	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (SNP)</i>

## Party systems (with smoothing)

1999–2016 inclusive   moderately multi-party system

## History

The monarchies of England and Scotland were united in 1603, but it was not until 1707 that Queen Anne finally “forced” Scotland into the United Kingdom, despite objections in Scotland. Prior to this unification, Scotland had been independent for centuries, and had had a parliament since 1326. The 1707 Treaty of Union thus ended the separate Scottish parliament, but Scotland retained its separate church and educational and legal systems. In the decades before World War One, the Liberal Party made various unsuccessful attempts to introduce home rule for Scotland. A separate administrative office, the Scottish Office, was however created, and the secretary of state for Scotland would become a cabinet position in 1926.

In the first post-World War Two decades, the British parties showed little interest in further changes for Scotland. However, a 1967 by-election victory by the

Scottish National Party led to various reports and ultimately to modifications of opinion in the British parties. What was now called “devolution” concerned the transfer of powers to a new Scottish parliament. In a minority situation, and under pressure from the SNP and Plaid Cymru, the Labour government in 1977 introduced legislation to allow for referenda on devolution in Scotland and Wales. However, an amendment opposed by the government but passed by the House of Commons required that the vote not only be positive but that the “yes” vote be at least 40 percent of the electorate. Thus although in the referendum of March 1979 the Scots did vote 51.6 percent to 48.4 percent in favour of devolution, the yes votes were only 32.9 percent of the electorate. Consequently the vote failed, and the Labour government was soon replaced by the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was opposed to devolution, but the unpopularity of her party and its policies in Scotland led eventually to an upturn in popular support for Scottish devolution. This was formalized in the Scottish Constitutional Convention of 1989–1997, largely an alliance of Labour and Liberal Democrats. The victorious Labour government of 1997 was thus much more enthusiastic about devolution than it had been in the late 1970s, and quickly introduced legislation for another referendum. This vote, held in September 1997, asked first about devolving powers to a Scottish parliament and then in a second question asked whether this parliament should have modest powers to raise income taxes. Both questions received a decisive yes vote (74.3 percent and 63.5 percent, respectively). No specific share(s) of the electorate were required. The Scottish Parliament thus came into existence in 1999. It has full powers over such areas as agriculture, economic development, education, the environment, health, and policing.

In 2014 a referendum on independence held by the SNP government (to which UK Prime Minister David Cameron agreed) was defeated by 55.3–44.7 percent. Further devolution was granted by the Scottish Acts of 2014 and 2016, with the latter constitutionally entrenching the Scottish Parliament and a Scottish government – thus making the United Kingdom quasi-federal with respect to Scotland.

## Electoral system

Scotland uses a form of mixed-member proportional electoral system. Most of the seats in the Scottish Parliament (73 of 129) are elected by single-member plurality. The remaining 56 seats are assigned to “top up” the results in each district so as to make the district results as proportional as possible. There are eight districts, each of which has seven additional member “top-up” seats. Once these seven seats are awarded, that is the end of the process even if not every party has been fully equalized. (In other words, there is no possibility of expanding the Parliament as in Germany or New Zealand.) It is also important to stress that the calculation is done within each district, rather than for Scotland overall (which would be more proportional). Although there is no legal threshold to receive top-up seats, the effective threshold in a region is 5–6 percent.

Political parties and cleavages

The three main British parties – Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, and Labour – contest the elections to the Scottish Parliament. Labour is strongest in the Glasgow area and in central Scotland, and correspondingly both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats are weakest in those areas. The Green Party also competes in Scotland. However, there are also various Scotland-specific parties. The most important of these is the **Scottish National Party (SNP)**. Founded in 1934, it won its first seat in the UK House of Commons in a by-election in April 1945, but quickly lost it in the general election of June of that year. It was not until 1970 that it won a seat in a British general election. The SNP has long campaigned for Scottish independence, and is also clearly a left-of-centre party. Support for the party relates inversely to age. Its regional support is strongest in the northeast of Scotland and in the Highlands and Islands. Two other leftist parties have formed, in part as a reaction to the moderate policies of the Labour Party under Tony Blair. These are the **Scottish Socialist Party (SSP)**, formed in 1998, and the **Socialist Labour Party**. The SSP is concentrated in Glasgow.

There are thus two main cleavages in Scotland. The first is the traditional left-right cleavage, which overlaps with the distinction between the industrial and non-industrial areas. The second main cleavage is the national one, that is, whether Scotland should become independent or remain part of the United Kingdom. This cleavage essentially separates the SNP from the other parties.

Governments

After the first Scottish parliament election of 1999 Labour and the Liberal Democrats formed a coalition government, which continued after the 2003 election. This marked the first postwar coalition in Britain. Since 2007, however, the SNP has

ELECTIONS IN SCOTLAND SINCE 1999

	1999		2003		2007		2011	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
Labour	33.6	56	29.3	50	29.2	46	26.3	37
SNP	27.3	35	20.9	27	31.0	47	44.0	69
Conservatives	15.4	18	15.5	18	13.9	17	12.4	15
Liberal Democrats	12.4	17	11.8	17	11.3	16	5.2	5
SGP	3.6	1	6.7	7	4.0	2	4.4	2
Socialist Labour	2.4	0	1.1	0	0.7	0	0.8	0
SSP	2.0	1	6.9	6	0.6	0	0.4	0
UKIP	–	–	0.6	0	0.4	0	0.9	0
Independents	1.2	1	1.4	3	1.0	1	1.1	1
Other parties	2.1	0	5.8	1	7.9	0	4.5	0
TOTAL SEATS		129		129		129		129

	<i>2016</i>	
	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>
Labour	19.1	24
SNP	41.7	63
Conservatives	22.9	31
Liberal Democrats	5.2	5
SGP	6.6	6
RISE	0.5	0
UKIP	2.0	0
Independents	0.2	0
Other parties	1.8	0
TOTAL SEATS		129

*Note:* %V is for party list component.

been the sole party of government, first as a minority supported by the SGP, then as a majority, then as a minority again.

#### SCOTTISH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1999

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>First minister (party)</i>	<i>#M</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>	<i>Supporting parties</i>
05/1999	Dewar, D. (Labour)	11	Labour Party Liberal Democrats	
10/2000	McLeish, H. (Labour)	12	Labour Party Liberal Democrats	
11/2001	McConnell, J. (Labour)	11	Labour Party Liberal Democrats	
05/2003	McConnell, J. (Labour)	12	Labour Party Liberal Democrats	
05/2007	Salmond, A. (SNP)	6	SNP	SGP
05/2011	Salmond, A. (SNP)	11	SNP	
11/2014	Sturgeon, N. (SNP)	10	SNP	
05/2016	Sturgeon, N. (SNP)	10	SNP	

#### Acronyms

SNP	Scottish National Party
SSP	Scottish Socialist Party

# WALES

**The party pattern in each election, *with additional components***

1999	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (Labour)</i>
2003	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (Labour)</i>
2007	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (Labour)</i>
2011	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (Labour)</i>
2016	moderately multi-party, <i>with a dominant party (Labour)</i>

**Party systems (with smoothing)**

1999–2016 inclusive	moderately multi-party system
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**History**

Wales was finally conquered by England in 1283. Acts of Union were passed in 1536 and 1543 which phased out all Welsh laws and administrative systems, replacing these with English ones. The only surviving element of Welsh identity was the Welsh language, but this too would face inroads by English over the next centuries. (Today less than 20 percent of the Welsh population speaks Welsh, mainly in the northwest.) Overall, Welsh demands for autonomy have always been less than those of Scotland. It was not until the 1960s that a Welsh Office and the secretary of state for Wales were established.

A referendum on devolution was held in 1979, on the same day as and similar to the one in Scotland (see previously). However, only 20.3 percent of the Welsh voters voted yes to devolution. Facing uncertain support, the pro-devolution Labour

government of 1997 held a referendum vote in Wales a week after the vote in Scotland, in hopes of a domino effect. Even with this added boost, the vote for devolution in Wales only passed by 50.3 percent to 49.7 percent.

Devolution gave Wales an Assembly, as in Northern Ireland, as opposed to the Parliament in Scotland. The nomenclature was important, as the assembly has had less power in two senses. First of all, the National Assembly for Wales had no power over taxation. Secondly, although it dealt with largely the same areas as the Scottish Parliament (agriculture, economic development, education, the environment, health, and also the Welsh language), the National Assembly for Wales had only powers of secondary legislation in these areas. That is, primary or framework legislation (which applies everywhere but Scotland) needed to first be passed by the House of Commons in London. Then the Welsh assembly had the power to “fill in the details”. However, after subsequent parliamentary acts (2006, 2014, 2017) and a 2011 referendum in Wales which passed by 63.5 percent to 36.5 percent, the Welsh assembly now has direct legislative powers in devolved areas, with certain taxation powers planned for 2019.

## Electoral system

Wales uses a form of mixed-member proportional electoral system. Two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly for Wales (40 out of 60) are elected by single-member plurality. The remaining 20 seats are additional member seats assigned to “top up” the results in each district so as to make the district results as proportional as possible. There are 5 districts, each of which has thus only 4 “top-up” seats. Once these 4 seats are awarded, that is the end of the process even if not every party has been fully equalized. (In other words, there is no possibility of expanding the Assembly as in Germany or New Zealand.) It is also important to stress that the calculation is done within each district, rather than for Wales overall (which would be more proportional). Although there is no legal threshold to receive top-up seats, the effective threshold in a region is 7–8 percent.

## Political parties and cleavages

The three main traditional British parties – Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, and Labour – contest the elections to the Welsh assembly, as now does UKIP. Labour has traditionally been the strongest party in Wales, often winning mining constituencies with huge majorities. The Green Party also competes in Wales. However, the main indigenous party is the Welsh National Party, **Plaid Cymru**. Founded in 1925, it did not its first seat in the UK House of Commons until a by-election in July 1966. It won its first seat in a British general election in February 1974. Plaid Cymru has always stressed self-government for Wales rather than outright independence. Its support has traditionally been limited to rural Wales, especially the Welsh-speaking northwest. Even if nationalistic, non-Welsh speakers have been somewhat suspicious of it. There is thus a clear ethnic/linguistic cleavage in Wales in addition to the overall left-right divide.

ELECTIONS IN WALES SINCE 1999

	1999		2003		2007		2011	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
Labour	35.4	28	36.6	30	29.6	26	36.9	30
Plaid Cymru	30.5	17	19.7	12	21.0	15	17.9	11
Conservatives	16.5	9	19.2	11	21.5	12	22.5	14
Liberal Democrats	12.5	6	12.7	6	11.7	6	8.0	5
Greens	2.5	0	3.5	0	3.5	0	3.4	0
Socialist Labour	1.0	0	1.2	0	1.3	0	2.4	0
UKIP	—	—	3.5	0	3.9	0	4.6	0
BNP	—	—	0.4	0	4.3	0	2.4	0
Independents	0.3	0	—	—	1.0	1	0.1	0
Other parties	1.3	0	3.2	1	2.2	0	1.7	0
TOTAL SEATS		60		60		60		60

	2016	
	% V	# S
Labour	31.5	29
Plaid Cymru	20.8	12
Conservatives	18.8	11
Liberal Democrats	6.5	1
Greens	3.0	0
UKIP	13.0	7
Independents	0.2	0
Other parties	6.2	0
TOTAL SEATS		60

Note: %V is for party list component.

Governments

Although Prime Minister Tony Blair favoured a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition in Wales in 1999 to parallel the one that developed in Scotland, Labour First Secretary (or Premier) Alun Michael chose to form a minority administration after the first election. This lasted only a few months though, and then such a coalition was formed with a different first minister. Labour has in fact always held the position of first minister of Wales without exception. However, the governments have varied between Labour single-party minorities, Labour-Liberal Democrat coalitions, and for one term a Labour-Plaid Cymru “grand coalition”.

WELSH GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1999

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>First minister (party)</i>	<i>#M</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
05/1999	Michael, A. (Labour)	8	Labour Party
02/2000	Morgan, R. (Labour)	9	Labour Party Liberal Democrats
05/2003	Morgan, R. (Labour)	9	Labour Party
05/2007	Morgan, R. (Labour)	7	Labour Party
06/2007	Morgan, R. (Labour)	9	Labour Party Plaid Cymru
12/2009	Jones, C. (Labour)	9	Labour Party Plaid Cymru
05/2011	Jones, C. (Labour)	8	Labour Party
05/2016	Jones, C. (Labour)	8	Labour Party Liberal Democrats <i>investiture achieved via agreement with Plaid Cymru</i>



# THE EUROPEAN UNION

Elections to the European Parliament are held every five years in the member states. These involve their respective national political parties in the context of transnational political groups and certain broad parameters of timing and rules.

**The party pattern in each election, *with additional components***

1979–1981	highly multi-party
1984–1987	highly multi-party
1989	highly multi-party
1994–1996	highly multi-party
1999	highly multi-party
2004–2007	highly multi-party
2009–2013	highly multi-party, <i>with two main party groups (EPP and S&amp;D)</i>
2014	highly multi-party

**Party (group) systems (with smoothing)**

1979–2014 inclusive	highly multi-party (group) system
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**History**

Back in the Common Assembly of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) three party groups were formed: Liberals, Christian Democrats, and Socialists. The first direct election to the European Parliament was held in 1979, and these have been held every five years since then. The following table indicates the

evolution of seats in each member state (which are loosely based on population but which are far from fully proportional) as well as the total number of members of the European Parliament (MEPs).

The powers of the European Parliament have grown over time, but it still has incomplete control over the executive of the European Union (that is, the European Commission). The national leaders of the member states in the European Council pick the president of the European Commission, although as of the Treaty of Lisbon (effective December 2009) they must “take into account” the outcome of the European Parliament election. For 2014 the main party groups chose *Spitzenkandidaten* (lead candidates), and with the Christian Democratic group winning the most seats they claimed a mandate for their *Spitzenkandidat* Jean-Claude Juncker to become commission president, as indeed he did.

#### SEATS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BY MEMBER STATE SINCE 1979

	1979	1981	1986	1994	1995	2004	2007	2009	2013	2014
Belgium	24	24	24	25	25	24	24	22	22	21
Denmark	16	16	16	16	16	14	14	13	13	13
Germany	81	81	81	99	99	99	99	99	99	96
Ireland	15	15	15	15	15	13	13	12	12	11
France	81	81	81	87	87	78	78	72	72	74
Italy	81	81	81	87	87	78	78	72	72	73
Luxembourg	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Netherlands	25	25	25	31	31	27	27	25	25	26
United Kingdom	81	81	81	87	87	78	78	72	72	73
Greece		24	24	25	25	24	24	22	22	21
Spain			60	64	64	54	54	50	50	54
Portugal			24	25	25	24	24	22	22	21
Sweden					22	19	19	18	18	20
Austria					21	18	18	17	17	18
Finland					16	14	14	13	13	13
Czech Republic						24	24	22	22	21
Estonia						6	6	6	6	6
Cyprus						6	6	6	6	6
Lithuania						13	13	12	12	11
Latvia						9	9	8	8	8
Hungary						24	24	22	22	21
Malta						5	5	5	5	6
Poland						54	54	50	50	51
Slovenia						7	7	7	7	8
Slovakia						14	14	13	13	13
Bulgaria							18	17	17	17
Romania							35	33	33	32
Croatia									12	11
TOTAL EU	410	434	518	567	626	732	785	736	748	751

N.B. plus 18 observer MEPs from 2011 to 2014.

## Electoral system

There has never been an EU-wide electoral system; instead individual member states have always chosen their own system. France has always used proportion representation however, never its national two-round system. The United Kingdom (the only other EU member state with a majoritarian national electoral system) used single-member plurality from 1979 through 1994, but then switched to proportional representation starting with its 1999 European Parliament election.

Electoral thresholds vary across the member states, although these cannot be higher than 5 percent. In 2012, the European Parliament passed a resolution in favour of appropriate and proportionate minimum electoral thresholds. In 2014, 14 – so exactly half – of the then-member states (Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom) had no formal electoral threshold, Cyprus had a 1.8 percent threshold, Greece had a 3 percent threshold, three member states (Austria, Italy, Sweden) had a 4 percent threshold, and nine member states (Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) had a 5 percent threshold. One can note that recent rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany led to the elimination of its previous 5 percent electoral threshold. Of course, outside of the main member states the number of seats produces an effective threshold to win a seat. Variations also exist in terms of the electoral formula, and in terms of whether the calculation is done nationally or in regional constituencies.

Once elected, the MEPs form into transnational party groups; those failing to do so become unaffiliated (officially Non-Inscrits or NI). There has always been a minimum number of members needed for a party group, but starting in 2009 the European Parliament has also had a *breadth* requirement so that the MEPs in a party group needed to be from a certain number of countries. As of the 2008 rules, party groups must comprise at least 25 members from at least one-quarter (so now seven) member states.

## Party groups and cleavages

The Christian democratic and socialist party groups have always been the two largest, with the socialists being the largest after the first four European Parliament elections and then the Christian democrats being the largest since 1999. The Christian democrats are organized as the **European People's Party (EPP)**, founded in 1953. At times early on they were also called the **European People's Party – Christian Democrats (EPP-CD)**. The EPP had broad support in the original six member states, but less after expansion starting in 1973. In Britain the main party on the (centre-)right was and is conservative not Christian democratic. The British and Danish Conservatives thus formed the **European Conservatives (C)** group in 1973, renamed the **European Democrats (ED)** in 1979. In 1992, with the hopes of becoming the largest grouping, the EPP allied with the ED,

despite the confederalism of the latter. This EPP-ED alliance lasted until after the 2009 European Parliament election, when the British Conservatives withdrew to form a new conservative group (having campaigned in part on such). Nevertheless, though mostly Christian democratic, the EPP continues to include parties that are in fact (traditional) conservative ones such as the Spanish Popular Party (since 1989) and the French UMP/LR (since 2004), or parties that are liberal such as the Polish PO. As of 2014, the EPP had representatives from every member state except the United Kingdom, with the German contingent being the largest.

The **Socialist Group (SOC)** was founded in 1953, and in 1992 became the **Party of European Socialists (PES)** and in 2004 became again the Socialist Group. Their breadth of support gave the PES clear pluralities overall in the second, third, and fourth European Parliament elections – aided by manufactured majority wins for the British Labour Party (under single-member plurality voting) in 1989 and 1994 (the latter quite lopsided). In recent years, in order to broaden their membership and in particular to take in members of the Italian Democratic Party, in 2009 they renamed themselves the **Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)**. The S&D are the only party group to normally have representation in every state. The largest delegations have traditionally come from Germany and the United Kingdom.

Further left, the **Communists and Allies (COM)** group was formed in 1973, dominated by the Italian and French communists. As the Soviet Union imploded, in 1989 Eurocommunist parties from Italy, Spain, and Greece formed the **European United Left (GUE)** group, whereas hardline French, Portuguese, and Greek Communists formed the **Left Unity (LU)** group. In 1994 all of these parties (or splinters) would form the Confederal Group of the European United Left (still GUE), with fairly balanced support across Latin member states. After Finland and Sweden joined the European Union in 1995 Nordic new left parties and former communist parties formed the Nordic Green Left which then allied with the GUE in the **European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL)**. Nowadays this group includes radical leftist parties such as SYRIZA of Greece and Podemos of Spain.

The third traditional party group is that of the Liberals, formed in 1953, then in 1976 becoming the **Liberal and Democratic Group (LD)**. In 1985 they became the **Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group (LDR)** group to integrate the Portuguese Social Democrats (PSD) who were right-of-centre but not in the PSD's own view liberal. In 1994 the name changed to the **European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR)** and then in 2004 to the **Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)**. Back when the Christian Democrats were more exclusively such, the Liberals were seen as being on their right, but now one could place the more disparate EPP equally right as the ALDE. The ALDE has representatives from most but certainly not all member states. Across the eight European Parliament elections, the Liberals have ranged from being the third-largest to the fifth-largest party group.

In 1984, a **Rainbow (R)** group was formed comprising green parties, smaller left parties, and regionalists. The Greens would form a unique group in 1989, and the regionalists then became part of the heterogeneous **European Radical Alliance (ERA)** dominated by the French Radicals. After the 1999 election the Greens and regionalists allied again into the **Greens – European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA)**. This now has members in some 60 percent of the member states, with the largest delegation traditionally and currently being that of the German Greens. (As noted previously, Nordic Green Left parties are in a separate party group.)

Perhaps the greatest fluidity has been on the right of the political spectrum amongst parties that are neither Christian Democrat nor liberal but instead Eurosceptic conservative (broadly defined); that is, anti-integrationist, nationalist, and sometimes populist radical right. The main such grouping began in 1979 as the **European Progressive Democrats (EPD)**, then in 1984 became the **European Democratic Alliance (EDA)**, both formed around the French Gaullists and the Irish Fianna Fáil. This group strongly defended the Common Agricultural Policy. In 1995 a new **Union for Europe (UFE)** group was formed, including Forza Italia. In 1999 both the Gaullist RPR and Forza Italia would join the EPP. What was left became the **Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN)** with the Italian National Alliance and the Irish Fianna Fáil as its main components. In 2009 the group dissolved with members going in various directions. A new nationalist conservative group was formed then, the **European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)** group, based on the UK Conservatives (who as noted left the EPP) and the populist radical right Polish Law and Justice Party.

The second such eurosceptic grouping began in 1994 as the **Europe of Nations (EN)** group, which in 1996 became the **Independents for a Europe of Nations (I-EN)** group, and then in 1999 **Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD)**. These groups were dominated by French and Danish eurosceptics, the latter being centre-left. The 2004 European Parliament election saw an increased support for populist eurosceptics, in particular the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), leading to an **Independence/Democracy (ID)** group, which in 2009 became **Europe of Freedom and Diversity (EFD)**, and as of 2014 **Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)**. EFDD was the smallest group in terms of member states, with MEPs from only seven countries, and is dominated by UKIP and the Italian Five Star Movement.

Finally, occasionally there has been a far-right grouping in the European Parliament. From 1984 until it dissolved in 1994 there was the **European Right (ER)**, based on the French National Front (FN) and the Italian MSI. During 2007 an Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty (ITS) group was led by the FN and the Romanian PRM, but then the latter withdrew and the group dissolved. A far-right grouping reappeared in 2015 – that is, a year after the 2014 European Parliament election – as the **Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF)** group, dominated by the FN with other populist radical right parties from Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS SINCE 1979 (TRANSNATIONAL PARTY GROUPS OF SEAT-WINNING NATIONAL LISTS)

PF		1979/81		1984/87		1989		1994-96	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
LU	1	—	—	—	—	1.9	14	(with GUE)	
COM/GUE	1 then 2	13.4	48	12.0	49	7.9	28	4.9	33
R	3 and 2	—	—	3.4	20	—	—	—	—
Greens	3	—	—	—	—	6.3	30	4.6	29
SOC/PES	4	27.3	123	28.0	165	29.6	180	27.5	215
ERA	21 and 5	—	—	—	—	2.0	13	2.6	19
LD/LDR/ ELDR	9 and 5	8.2	40	8.4	44	7.9	49	7.2	44
EPP(-CD)/EP	8	30.0	115	26.6	122	25.3	121	26.5	181
ED	10	6.0	64	4.3	68	4.0	34	(with EPP)	
EN/I-EN	10 and 11*	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.1	20
EPD/EDA/ UFE	10 and 11	3.5	22	3.7	28	2.3	20	9.1	54
ER	12	—	—	3.3	16	3.2	17	—	—
TGI		2.3	11	—	—	—	—	—	—
Non-Inscrits		2.9	11	1.5	6	2.9	12	5.4	31
Others without seats		6.3	0	8.7	0	6.7	0	10.1	0
TOTAL SEATS			434		518		518		626

(member states) (10) (12) (12) (15)  
\* plus Danish anti-EU movements

PF		1999		2004/07		2009/13		2014	
		% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
GUE-NGL	2	6.9	42	6.0	41	4.1	36	7.6	52
Greens-EFA	3 and 21	6.6	48	6.5	43	7.9	55	6.9	50
PES/S&D	4	27.1	180	25.9	217	24.4	189	24.6	191
ELDR/ALDE	9 and 5	6.4	50	8.9	99	11.0	84	8.1	67
EPP-(ED)	8 and 10	36.2	233	35.8	291	34.8	270	24.4	221
UEN/ECR	9 through 12 **	4.7	30	3.7	37	5.0	56	7.3	70
EDD/ID/ EFD/EFDD	12	2.0	16	2.1	25	4.9	32	6.6	48

(Continued)

PF	1999		2004/07		2009/13		2014	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
Non-Inscrits	5.3	27	8.2	32	3.6	26	6.2	52
Others without seats	4.7	0	2.9	0	4.3	0	8.3	0
TOTAL SEATS		626		785		748		751
(member states)		(15)		(27)		(28)		(28)

\*\* 9 through 12, but mainly 10 and 11.  
 Note: These are “after-the-fact” calculations based on which parties join certain party groups, as that is the only way to be fully consistent. Consequently, vote percentages underestimate many of the political groups at times as all non-seat winning parties go under ‘others’. In earlier elections this effect applies the most to the Liberals.




FIGURE 52.1 European Parliament party groups on two dimensions.

Although party groups can be classified on the left-right dimension, their respective views on the desired level of European integration is more important. On this alternate dimension, the Christian Democrats were originally the most integrationist party group, but are now joined on this side of the division by the Liberals, Social Democrats, and Greens. As a consequence, there has been a strong degree of co-operation here, especially between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats who as the two largest groups have always had a majority of the European Parliament between them. Figure 52.1 places the party groups of 2015 in a rough two-dimensional sense:

## Governments

The party political groups in the European Commission reflect which parties are in power in the individual member states, as they are the ones who nominate said individuals. However, since 1995 the commission must pass an investiture vote after its formation (after the European Parliament election), and it is not necessarily the case that a party group will vote for the investiture even if there is a commissioner from such a party. For example, the Greens-EFA did not vote for the 1999 Prodi Commission even there was a (single) Green commissioner, who was from Germany (which was then entitled to two commissioners and had an SPD-Green government at the time). That said, the three traditional groups of Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals have ultimately voted for every commission that has been invested.

### EUROPEAN COMMISSIONS SINCE 1958

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>President (domestic party)</i>	<i>#C (I)</i>	<i>Party political groups in the European Commission</i>	<i>Voting for investiture</i>
01/1958	Hallstein, W. (Christian Democrat)	9	CD SOC LIB	
01/1962	Hallstein, W. (Christian Democrat)	9	CD SOC LIB	
06/1967	Rey, J. (Liberal)	14	CD SOC LIB	
07/1970	Malfatti, F.M. (Christian Democrat)	9	CD SOC LIB	
03/1972	Manholt, S. (Labour)	9	CD SOC LIB	
01/1973	Ortoli, F.-X. (Gaullist)	14	CD SOC ED EPD LIB	
01/1977	Jenkins, R. (Labour)	13	CD SOC LIB ED EPD	
01/1981	Thorn, G. (Liberal)	17	EPP SOC LIB EPD ED	
01/1985	Delors, J. (Socialist)	17	EPP SOC LIB EPD ED	
01/1989	Delors, J. (Socialist)	17	EPP SOC LIB EDA ED	
01/1993	Delors, J. (Socialist)	17	EPP PES LIB EDA ED	

(Continued)



<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>President (domestic party)</i>	<i>#C (I)</i>	<i>Party political groups in the European Commission</i>	<i>Voting for investiture</i>
01/1995	Santer, J. (EPP)	20 (2)	PES EPP ELDR ED UFE	EPP PES ELDR UFE ED
03/1999	Marin, M. (PES) [interim]	20 (3)	PES EPP ELDR ED UFE	(no investiture vote)
09/1999	Prodi, R. (ELDR)	20 (1)	PES EPP ED ELDR Greens	EPP PES ELDR
11/2004	Barroso, J.M. (EPP)	27 (2)	ELDR EPP PES UEN	EPP PES ELDR ED
02/2010	Barroso, J.M. (EPP)	27 (5)	ELDR EPP S&D	EPP S&D ELDR
10/2014	Juncker, J.-C. (EPP)	28 (1)	EPP S&D ALDE ECR	EPP S&D ALDE

## Acronyms

ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
COM	Communists and Allies
ECR	European Conservatives and Reformists
ED	European Democrats
EDA	European Democratic Alliance
EDD	Europe of Democracies and Diversities
EFD	Europe of Freedom and Diversity
EFDD	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
ELDR	European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party
EN	Europe of Nations
ENF	Europe of Nations and Freedom
EPD	European Progressive Democrats
EPP	European People's Party
EPP-CD	European People's Party–Christian Democrats
ER	European Right
ERA	European Radical Alliance Greens–EFA Greens–European Free Alliance
GUE	European United Left
GUE-NGL	European United Left–Nordic Green Left
ID	Independence/Democracy
I-EN	Independents for a Europe of Nations
LD	Liberal and Democratic Group
LDR	Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group
LU	Left Unity
PES	Party of European Socialists

R	Rainbow
S&D	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
SOC	Socialist Group
UEN	Union for Europe of the Nations
UFE	Union for Europe



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## PART III

# Individual case analyses of oscillating regimes

In this part of the book descriptions are given of the party systems of 10 European polities that have multi-party parliamentary elections, but have not had these at the level of electoral democracy for four elections in a row through June 2018. The sections follow a set format, in that first one notes which elections were not democratic (that is, insufficiently free and fair). Then a brief historical overview of the polity is given. Then the electoral system(s) is/are explained. This is followed by a discussion of the main parties and political divisions, and finally some comments on the nature of governments. For each case at least one and usually two tables are provided: the first (or first ones) gives the results of all elections in terms of both percentage of the total vote [%V] and the number of seats won [#S]. For cases where the government is accountable to parliament, the second table lists all governments, giving for each: the month the government passed its investiture vote and/or took office; the prime minister (or equivalent); the number of ministers in the government [#M]; of these the number of independents [(I)], if any; and the parties in the government. Finally, all of the party acronyms of the parties discussed are listed alphabetically.



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# ALBANIA

## The extent of democratic elections

Most Albanian elections since 1992 have been generally democratic, but those of 1996 and 2009 clearly did not meet democratic standards of fairness.

## History

Albania became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1912 in the context of the Balkan Wars. Italy would occupy the country during both World Wars. The autocratic interwar period was dominated by Achmed Zogu, first as prime minister, then president, and then as a monarch. Postwar Albania was a fully autarkic communist system led for four decades by Albanian Party of Labour (PPSH) Party Secretary Enver Hoxha. The PPSH held a semi-competitive election in 1991 and was then defeated by the Democratic Party in 1992. A 1997 referendum rejected the restoration of the monarchy; however this involved vote manipulation.

## Electoral system

Albania has generally used a mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system since 1992, although for two elections a parallel system was used. The majority of seats have always been allocated in single-member districts rather than from party lists. That said, multiple changes have occurred in the details. Moreover, on a couple of occasions the two main parties have both 'gamed' the system to advantage themselves or allied parties. The size of the parliament has always been 140 seats except for 1997 when it was 155 seats.

Initially in 1992 a mixed-member proportional system was used, with 100 seats allocated by single-member majority (that is, if no majority winner then there was

a run-off between the top two candidates) and 40 compensatory party list seats. The party list seats required a 4 percent threshold for individual parties and were allocated by the largest remainder system with a Hare quota.

In 1996 this was changed to a parallel system with 115 seats allocated by single-member majority as before and 25 party list seats requiring a 4 percent threshold for single parties and an 8 percent threshold for electoral coalitions (still using the Hare quota), but the party list seats were non-compensatory. In 1997 the parallel system remained but with 115 single member seats and 40 party list seats, for which the electoral threshold for a single party was lowered to 2 percent.

In 2001 Albania changed its electoral system back to mixed-member proportional with as before under MMP 100 single-member majority seats and 40 party list seats. The latter had thresholds of 2.5 percent for single parties and 4 percent for coalitions, and still used the Hare quota. That said, each of the main two parties ‘gamed’ the MMP system by having some constituency candidates run legally as independents which meant that they could win more party list seats at the expense of third parties. In 2005 the only change was that the single-member seats were now allocated by plurality instead of majority vote. However, there was a differing ‘gaming’ of the system wherein each of the two main parties encouraged their supporters to vote for smaller allied parties in the party list vote. This meant that each of the main parties won far more constituency seats than their proportionate overall total based on the party list vote (see elections table later).

Finally in 2009 Albania switched to pure list party list proportional representation. Seats are allocated in each of 12 regions with regional electoral thresholds of 3 percent for single parties and 5 percent for electoral coalitions, and now using Sainte-Laguë instead of the Hare quota.

## Political parties and cleavages

Albanian party politics contains a sharp divide between its two main parties, the centre-right **Democratic Party (PDSH)** founded in 1990 and the ex-communist **Socialist Party (PSSH)** founded in 1991. The PD’s base is in the north of the country and the PSSH’s base is in the south, with the geographic centre being politically balanced. This regional pattern reflects the ethnic division between the Gëgs in the north and the Tosks in the south. All other parties are much smaller, and until the 2017 election almost all of these joined in the coalitions led by the two main parties. (In 2017 the two main parties eschewed pre-electoral coalitions.) Specifically, allied with the PDSH has been such parties as the **Republican Party of Albania (PRSH)**, the **National Front Party (PBK)**, the **Demochristian Party of Albania (PDKSH)**, the **New Democracy Party (PDR)** which split from the PDSH in 2000 and rejoined it later, and the **Party for Justice, Integration, and Unity (PDIU)** – previously the **Party for Justice and Integration (PDI)**. Meanwhile, allied with the PSSH has been the **Social Democratic Party of Albania (PSDSH)**, the Greek minority **Union for Human Rights Party (PBDNJ)**, the **Agrarian Party of Albania (PASH)** which in 2003 became the

**Environmental Agrarian Party (PAA)**, the **Democratic Alliance Party (PAD)**, and the **Christian Democratic Party of Albania (PKDSH)**. The one main exception to these bipolar alliance patterns has been the **Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI)**, founded in 2004 by former PSSH Prime Minister Ilir Meta who broke from his party. The LSI ran separately in 2005, 2009, and 2017, although it did join the PSSH-led alliance in 2013.

#### ELECTIONS IN ALBANIA SINCE 1992

	1992		1996		1997		2001	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
<i>PDSH and allies</i>	65.2	93	67.5	127	31.5	34	43.9	52
of which:								
PDSH	62.1	92	55.5	122	25.8	29	37.6	46
PRSH	3.1	1	5.7	3	2.4	1	—	—
PBK	—	—	5.0	2	2.3	3	—	—
PDKSH	—	—	1.3	0	1.0	1	1.1	0
PDR	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.2	6
<i>PSSH and allies</i>	33.0	47	27.5	13	61.5	117	53.9	86
of which:								
PSSH	25.7	38	20.4	10	52.7	101	42.3	73
PSDSH	4.4	7	1.5	0	2.5	9	3.7	4
PBDNJ	2.9	2	4.0	3	2.8	4	2.7	3
PASH	—	—	—	—	0.8	1	2.6	3
PAD	—	—	1.6	0	2.7	2	2.6	3
Other parties	1.8	0	5.0	0	7.0	4	2.2	2
TOTAL SEATS		140		140		155		140

	2005		2009		2013		2017	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
<i>PDSH-led alliance</i>	42.9	74	46.9	70	39.5	57	★	★
of which:								
PDSH	7.8	56	40.2	68	30.5	50	28.8	43
PRSH	20.3	11	2.1	1	3.0	3	0.2	0
PDR	7.5	4	(into PDSH)		—	—	—	—
PDI/PDIU	1.2	0	1.0	1	2.6	4	4.8	3
Others	6.1	3	3.6	0	3.4	0	—	—

(Continued)



**518** Individual case analyses of oscillating regimes

	2005		2009		2013		2017	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
<i>PSSH-led alliance</i>	41.9	60	45.3	66	57.6	83	★	★
of which:								
PSSH	9.0	42	40.9	65	41.4	65	48.3	74
PSDSH	12.9	7	1.8	0	0.6	0	0.9	1
PBDNJ	4.2	2	1.2	1	0.9	1		(into PSSH)
PKDSH	—	—	—	—	0.5	1	0.2	0
PAA	6.7	4	0.9	0	0.2	0	—	—
LSI	—	—	—	—	10.4	16	—	—
Others	9.1	5	0.5	0	3.6	0	—	—
<i>LSI-led alliance</i>	8.5	5	5.6	4			★	★
of which:								
LSI	8.5	5	4.9	4		(with PSSH)	14.3	19
<i>Others and independents</i>	6.7	1	2.2	0	2.9	0	2.4	0
TOTAL SEATS		140		140		140		140

★ *Note:* No pre-electoral alliances formed in 2017.

*Note:* % V always from party list component, but system ‘gamed’ in 2005 – see the ‘Electoral system’ section.

**Governments**

Albanian governments have until recently always been coalitions led by either of the two main parties. However, after 2017 the PSSH formed a single-party government as it had a majority and there were no pre-electoral coalitions.

**ALBANIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1992**

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
04/1992	Meksi, A. (PDSH)	23	PDSH PRSH
07/1996	Meksi, A. (PDSH)	26	PDSH PRSH
03/1997	Fino, B. ((PSSH)	20	PSDH PSSH PRSH PSDSH PBDNJ PBK
07/1997	Nano, F. (PSSH)	22	PSSH PSDSH PAD PASH PBDNJ
10/1998	Majko, P. (PSSH)	19	PSSH PAD PSDSH PASH PBDNJ

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
11/1998	Meta, I. (PSSH)	17	PSSH PSDSH PAD PASH PBDNJ
09/2001	Meta, I. (PSSH)	21	PSSH PSDSH PDSH
02/2002	Majko, P. (PSSH)	19	PSSH PASH PBDNJ PSDSH
07/2002	Nano, F. (PSSH)	23	PSSH PASH PBDNJ
09/2005	Berisha, S. (PDSH)	16	PDSH PAA PBDNJ PDR PRSH
09/2009	Berisha, S. (PDSH)	16	PDSH LSI PBDNJ PRSH
09/2013	Rama, E. (PSSH)	19	PSSH LSI PBDNJ PKDSH
09/2017	Rama, E. (PSSH)	15	PSSH

## Acronyms

LSI	Socialist Movement for Integration
PAA	Environmentalist Agrarian Party
PAD	Democratic Alliance Party
PASH	Agrarian Party of Albania
PBDNJ	Union for Human Rights Party
PBK	National Front Party
PDI/PDIU	Party for Justice and Integration/Party for Justice, Integration, and Unity
PKDSH	Demochristian Party of Albania
PDR	New Democracy Party
PDSH	Democratic Party of Albania (check end)
PKDSH	Christian Democratic Party of Albania
PRSH	Republican Party of Albania
PSDSH	Social Democratic Party of Albania
PSSH	Socialist Party of Albania

# ARMENIA

## The extent of democratic elections

No parliamentary election through 2017 met democratic standards of fairness. However, the popular government which came to power in May 2018 is planning to hold an early election as soon as they amend the election laws.

## History

Armenians as a people were divided between those in the Russian and the Ottoman empires, with the latter subjecting its Armenian population to a genocide starting in 1915. A brief period of Armenian independence as the First Republic of Armenia existed from 1918 to 1920, until the country was overrun by the Red Army and then declared a Soviet Republic. Armenia's contemporary independence occurred in 1991 as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1988 to 1994 Armenia and Azerbaijan were at war over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, with Armenia clearly winning the conflict but Nagorno-Karabakh (from 2017, the Republic of Artsakh) itself remaining a de facto state as the territory is considered internationally to be part of Azerbaijan.

The 1995 Armenian constitution established a dominant, directly elected president co-existing with a parliamentary system as in many other post-Soviet states. However, the president was limited to two consecutive five-year terms. In 2008, at the end of his second term, President Robert Kocharyan stepped down and backed his then-Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan. Serzh Sargsyan was elected president and then re-elected in 2013, though neither presidential election should be seen as fair. Then in 2015 a referendum (also not fair) approved constitutional changes which made the prime minister the dominant political actor, with the weaker president henceforth elected by parliament for a single seven-year term. Importantly, these changes were not to come into effect until after the 2017–2018 election cycle. The assumption (and opposition view) was that these changes were designed to allow President Serzh Sargsyan to remain in power as a prime minister after his second

presidential term. Serzh Sargsyan denied this, but intentionally kept a very low profile during the referendum – and indeed in April 2018 his Republican Party MPs duly voted him in as prime minister. However, this event provoked sufficient public opposition and demonstrations that Serzh Sargsyan resigned as prime minister after only six days. Nikol Pashinyan (of the small Civil Contract party), the former newspaper editor turned politician who mobilized opposition to Serzh Sargsyan, became prime minister on the second attempt in May 2018 with the support of all opposition MPs and a sufficient number from the regime party.

## Electoral system

From 1995 through 2012 Armenia used a parallel electoral system. Initially in 1995 the overwhelming majority of seats (150 of 190) were in the single-member district component, but the party list share would increase over time and by 2003 become most of the seats and for 2007 and 2012 was 90 of the 131 seats. The 2015 constitutional amendments included a change to pure party list proportional representation in a smaller legislature of 105 members (including a single-member seat for each of four ethnic minorities). The current system involves two-tiered proportional representation using the d'Hondt method and with preferences at the regional level. The threshold is 5 percent for parties and 7 percent for electoral alliances. A party with a majority of votes is guaranteed 54 percent of the seats if it does not already have this; conversely the seat share of the largest party is capped at two-thirds.

## Political parties and cleavages

Through 2018 the central political force was the **Republican Party of Armenia (HHK)**, founded in 1990. Elite based, this was a definite post-Soviet “party of power” with limited ideology. In contrast, the nationalist and socialist **Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF)** dates back to 1890, and dominated the government of the First Republic of Armenia. Banned in 1994 as a threat to then-President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, it has never been a major party but remains a durable one having been in parliament consistently since 1999. The **Armenian Communist Party (HKK)** has carried on after the Soviet Union, but has not been represented in parliament since 1999. The second largest party from 2007 was the conservative, rural-based **Prosperous Armenia Party (BHK)**, founded in 2004 by the oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan.

Other parties in parliament at times through 2012 have been the conservative **National Unity (AM)**; the centrist **Rule of Law (OEK)**, which in 2015 became **Armenian Renaissance (HV)**; the liberal **Heritage**; and the social democratic **United Labour Party (MAK)**. BHK can also be seen as primarily the political vehicle of its leader; this was also true of the **National Democratic Union (AZM)**, the party of Vazgen Manukyan, the opposition candidate in the unfair 1996 presidential election; and the **Armenian National Congress (HAK)**, founded in 2008 by former president Levon Ter-Petrosyan.

For the 2017 election the key new force was the liberal **YELQ (“Way Out”) Alliance**, a grouping of three small parties including **Civil Contract (Kp)** the party of Nikol Pashinyan, the reformist prime minister from 2018.

# **ELECTIONS IN ARMENIA SINCE 1995**

	1995		1999		2003		2007	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
HHK and allies	43.9	88	41.3	62	23.6	33	33.9	64
HKK	12.4	10	12.0	10	2.1	0	0.7	0
Shamiram Women's Party	17.4	8	—	—	—	—	—	—
AZM	7.7	5	5.1	6	(in Justice)		—	—
ARF	(banned)		7.8	8	11.4	11	13.2	16
OEK	—	—	5.3	6	13.0	19	7.1	9
Right and Unity Bloc	—	—	7.9	7	—	—	—	—
Justice alliance	—	—	—	—	13.7	14	—	—
AM	—	—	—	—	8.9	9	3.7	0
MAK	—	—	—	—	5.6	6	4.4	0
BHK	—	—	—	—	—	—	15.1	18
Heritage	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.0	7
Other parties	18.6	5	20.6	0	21.8	2	15.9	0
Independents	72		32		37		17	
Unfilled seats	2							
TOTAL SEATS	190		131		131		131	

	2012		2017	
	% V	# S	% V	# S
HHK and allies	44.1	69	49.2	58
ARF	5.7	5	6.6	7
OEK/HV	5.5	6	3.7	0
BHK and allies	30.2	37	27.3	31
Heritage	5.8	5	2.1	0
HAK	7.1	7	1.7	0
HKK	1.1	0	0.7	0
YELQ Alliance	—	—	7.8	9
Other parties	0.6	0	0.9	0
Independents	2			
TOTAL SEATS	131		105	

*Note:* All elections through 2017 did not meet democratic standards of freedom and fairness.

\* including four seats for national minorities.

*Note:* vote shares always just for party lists.

## Governments

Even during the autocratic period under the HHK, coalition governments were the norm, with the ARF the most common coalition partner of the HHK.

### ARMENIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1999

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
06/1999	Sargsyan, V. (HHK)		HHK ARF
11/1999	Sargsyan, A. (HHK)		HHK ARF
05/2000	Margaryan, A. (HHK)		HHK ARF
06/2003	Margaryan, A. (HHK)	15 (1)	HHK ARF OEK
06/2006	Margaryan, A. (HHK)	15 (4)	HHK ARF
03/2007	Sargsyan, S. (HHK)	15 (4)	HHK ARF
06/2007	Sargsyan, S. (HHK)	16 (2)	HHK ARF BHK OEK
04/2008	Sargsyan, T. (HHK)	16 (2)	HHK ARF BHK OEK
10/2009	Sargsyan, T. (HHK)	16 (4)	HHK BHK OEK
06/2012	Sargsyan, T. (HHK)	19 (5)	HHK OEK
04/2014	Abrahamyan, H. (HHK)	18 (7)	HHK
02/2016	Abrahamyan, H. (HHK)	18 (4)	HHK ARF
09/2016	Karapetyan, K. (HHK)	18 (3)	HHK ARF
05/2017	Karapetyan, K. (HHK)	19 (4)	HHK ARF
04/2018	Sargsyan, S. (HHK)	21 (4)	HHK ARF
04/2018	Karapetyan, K. (HHK) acting PM	17 (4)	HHK
05/2018	Pashinyan, N. (Kp)	22	YELQ BHK ARF

## Acronyms

AM	National Unity
ARF	Armenian Revolutionary Federation
AZM	National Democratic Union
BHK	Prosperous Armenia Party
HAK	Armenian National Congress
HHK	Republican Party of Armenia
HKK	Armenian Communist Party
HV	Armenian Renaissance
Kp	Civil Contract
MAK	United Labour Party
OEK	Rule of Law
YELQ	Way Out

# BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

## The extent of democracy

As a consequence of the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, the High Representative in charge of overseeing the Agreement was established. This person had ultimate decision-making or at least veto power through 2006 and still somewhat today. The elections themselves were free and fair until 2018, but the parliament so elected is part of a very weak central government.

## History

Bosnia-Herzegovina became independent from Yugoslavia in 1992. It had been the most ethnically diverse part of Yugoslavia, and its ethnic Serbs never wanted to be part of the new country. Violent ethnic conflicts and all-out wars occurred in the first half of the 1990s, ultimately drawing in US forces. The peace agreement signed in Dayton, Ohio (USA) in 1995 recognized the country as composed of two parts: a Bosnian-Croat Federation and a Serbian Republic. The central government would be and remains weak, and is led by a collective three-person presidency.

## Electoral system

The electoral system for the Bosnia-Herzegovina parliament is party list proportional representation using the Sainte-Laguë method. Of the 42 seats, 28 (two-thirds) are allocated to the Bosnian-Croat Federation and 14 (one-third) to the Serbian Republic.

## Political parties and cleavages

The overwhelming majority of votes in Bosnia-Herzegovina go to parties with an ethnic identity, and each of the three groups has had more than one such party. For

the Bosniaks, the plurality party has always been the **Party of Democratic Action (SDA)**, founded in 1990. From the SDA the **Party of Democratic Activity (A-SDA)** split off in 2008. The other main Bosniak party is the **Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH)**, founded in 1996. For the Croats, the plurality party has always been the **Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)**, founded in 1990 and linked to the Croatian party of the same name. From the HDZ the **New Croatian Initiative (NHI)** split off in 1998 and the **Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990)** split off in 2006. For the Serbs, initially the plurality party was the **Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)**, founded in 1990; since 2006 it has been the **Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)**, founded in 1996.

There are also multi-ethnic political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina; the **Social Democratic Party (SDP)**, founded in 1991, has been a consistent such party. Other relevant multi-ethnic parties have been the **Union for a Better Future (SBB)** as of the 2010 election and the **Democratic Front (DF)** as of the 2014 election.

#### ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA SINCE 1996

	1996		1998		2000		2002	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
<i>Multi-ethnic</i>								
ZL	4.4	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
SDP		(in ZL)	9.3	4	18.0	9	10.4	4
UBSD	—	—	1.7	2		(into SDP)	—	—
<i>Bosniak</i>								
SDA	37.9	19	33.8	17	18.7	8	21.9	10
SBiH	3.9	2		(with SDA)	11.3	5	11.0	6
BPS	0.1	0	0.7	0	1.1	1	0.8	1
<i>Croat</i>								
HDZ	14.1	8	11.6	6	11.4	5	9.3	5
DNZ	1.1	0	1.2	1	1.3	1	1.3	1
NHI	—	—	2.4	1	1.6	1	1.1	1
<i>Serb</i>								
SDS	24.1	9	9.4	4	16.7	6	14.0	5
SRS	2.6	0	6.9	2		(with SDS)	2.0	1
NSSM	5.7	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
SLOGA	—	—	12.4	4	1.9	1	0.3	0
<i>alliance</i>								
RS	—	—	1.6	1	—	—	—	—
PDP	—	—	—	—	6.4	2	4.3	2
SNSD	—	—	—	—	4.5	1	9.3	3
DNS	—	—	—	—	1.4	0	1.4	0
SP	—	—	—	—	2.5	1	2.0	1
Other parties	6.1	0	9.0	0	3.2	1	10.9	3

(Continued)



## 526 Individual case analyses of oscillating regimes

	1996		1998		2000		2002	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
<i>DP Pensioners</i>	–	–	–	–	1.1	1	–	–
<i>BOSS</i>	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.5	1
<i>Pensioners</i>	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.4	1
<i>Economic Bloc</i>	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.3	1
<b>TOTAL SEATS</b>		42		42		42		42

	2006		2010		2014		2018	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
<i>Multi-ethnic</i>								
SDP	10.1	5	17.3	8	6.7	3	9.1	5
SBB	–	–	8.0	4	8.7	4	4.2	2
NSRzB	2.3	1	2.6	1	0.8	0	–	–
NS	–	–	1.2	0	0.7	0	2.9	2
DF	–	–	–	–	9.2	5	5.8	3
<i>Bosniak</i>								
SDA	16.9	9	13.1	7	18.7	10	17.0	9
SBiH	15.5	8	5.3	2	1.6	0	1.1	0
BPS	2.7	1	1.7	0	2.4	1	1.0	0
A-SDA	–	–	1.1	0	1.4	1	1.8	1
<i>Croat</i>								
HDZ	4.9	3	7.0	3	7.5	4	9.0	5
HDZ 1990	3.7	2	3.1	2	2.5	1	1.7	0
<i>Serb</i>								
SNSD	19.1	7	16.9	8	15.6	6	16.0	6
SDS	7.7	3	8.4	4	13.0	5	9.8	3
PDP	2.0	1	2.4	1	3.1	1	5.1	2
DNS	1.4	1	1.8	1	2.3	1	4.2	1
DNZ	1.2	1	0.9	1	1.0	0	–	–
SP	1.0	0	0.9	0	1.2	0	1.9	1
Other parties	11.5	0	8.3	0	3.6	0	9.4	2
<b>TOTAL SEATS</b>		42		42		42		42

## Governments

Governments in Bosnia-Herzegovina are required to be broad (would-be) consociational coalitions.

**BOSNIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1997**

<i>In Office Date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Chair of the Council of Ministers (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
01/1997	Silajdžić, H. (SBiH) and Bosić, B. (SDS)*	6	HDZ SBiH SDP SDS
02/1999	Silajdžić, H. (SBiH) and Mihajlović, S. (SPRS)*	6	HDZ SBiH SDA SNSD SPRS
06/2000	Tuševljak, S. (ind.)	6 (1)	HDZ SDA SPRS
10/2000	Raguž, M. (HDZ)	6 (1)	HDZ SDA SPRS
02/2001	Matić, B. (SDP)	6	SDP NHI PDP SBiH SPRS
07/2001	Lagumdžija, Z. (SDP)	6	SDP NHI PDP SBiH SPRS
03/2002	Mikerević, D. (PDP)	6	SDP NHI PDP SBiH SPRS
01/2003	Teržić, A. (SDA)	8 (1)	HDZ SDA PDP SBiH SDS
01/2007	Špirić, N. (SNSD)	10	SNSD HDZ SBiH SDA HDZ-1990
12/2007	Špirić, N. (SNSD)	10	SNSD HDZ SBiH SDA HDZ-1990
01/2012	Bevanda, V. (HDZ)	10	SDP HDZ SNSD HDZ-1990 SBB SDS
04/2015	Zvizdić, D. (SDA)	10	HDZ SDA SDS DF PDP

\* co-chairs.

**Acronyms**

A-SDA	Party of Democratic Activity
BPS	Bosnian Patriotic Party
DF	Democratic Front
DNS	Democratic People's Alliance of the Serbian Republic
DNZ	Democratic People's Union
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
HDZ 1990	Croatian Democratic Union 1990
NHI	New Croatian Initiative
NS	Our Party
NSRzB	People's Party for Work and Betterment
NSSM	People's Alliance for Free Peace
PDP	Party of Social Progress of the Serbian Republic
RS	Republican Party
SBB	Union for a Better Future
SBiH	Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina
SDA	Party of Democratic Action
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SDS	Serbian Democratic Party
SLOGA	Accordance
SNSD	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats
SP	Socialist Party
SPRS	Socialist Party of the Serbian Republic
SRS	Serbian Radical Party
UBSD	Union of Social Democrats of Bosnia and Herzegovina
ZL	Joint List

# GEORGIA

## The extent of democratic elections

The 1999 and 2003 parliamentary elections (under Eduard Shevardnadze) and the 2008 elections (under Mikheil Saakashvili) did not meet democratic standards of fairness.

## History

Georgia was absorbed by Russia in the early nineteenth century. It proclaimed its independence in May 1918, and this was recognized by the Soviets in 1920. However, in 1921 the country was overrun by the Red Army and then declared a Soviet Republic. In the 1990 election for the Georgian Supreme Soviet the pro-independence movement won a majority of seats. The Georgian Communist Party split from the CPSU in December 1990 and agitated for independence, which was declared in early 1991 but not achieved until the following year after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Georgia has experienced conflict and ultimately loss of control over two autonomous regions – Abkhazia as of a 1992–1993 war and South Ossetia as of a 2008 war with Russia heavily involved. Both separatist regions have been recognized as independent by Russia. The former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze returned to Georgia in March 1992 and led the country until being overthrown in the Rose Revolution of late 2003. Mikheil Saakashvili subsequently became president, and was re-elected in 2008. However, the unfairness of the 2008 parliamentary election, Mikheil Saakashvili's authoritarian tendencies, and the country's defeat in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War led to mass protests demanding his resignation in 2009. Mikheil Saakashvili accepted his party's defeat in the 2012 election.

The 1995 constitution formally concentrated power in the president, including control over the cabinet, and a state minister replaced the position of prime minister. After the Rose Revolution the position of prime minister was re-established. Constitutional changes passed in 2010 but not effective until after the 2013 presidential election made the political system parliamentary with the cabinet responsible to the parliament and the president having a corrective role. Many assumed these changes and especially their timing was to facilitate a switch by Mikheil Saakashvili to becoming prime minister after his second term as president was over (the limit being two such terms), but as noted this manoeuvre did not work out for him.

## Electoral system

In 1992 the electoral system involved the chairman of parliament being directly elected by a nation-wide ballot. The deputies were elected by proportional representation in 10 multi-member regions. Voters could vote for up to three parties, and a system of point allocation was then used to determine how many seats a party was given. A parallel electoral system was adopted in 1995. There was a total of 235 seats, of which 85 were in single-member districts and the remaining 150 seats were elected by party list proportional representation. In 1995, there was a 5 percent (of total votes) threshold to gain party list seats. For the 1999 and 2003 elections, this threshold was increased to 7 percent of the total votes. The criterion of total votes is important as in 1999 a party, the SLP, got 7.02 percent of the *valid* votes (by this author's calculations), but this was only 6.59 percent of the total votes – and so it got no party list seats.

As of 2008 the electoral system was changed by the United National Movement. First of all, the parliament was cut back to 150 deputies. Of these 150, 75 MPs were elected in single member districts (and with only 30 percent of the vote needed to win, otherwise there was a runoff) and 75 MPs were elected from party lists in a single national district with a 5 percent threshold of valid votes. Specific district seats for Abkhazia, which had not been filled for several elections, were removed. The current electoral system has been in force from January 2012. It involves 73 MPs elected in single member districts – but with 50 percent of the vote now required to avoid a runoff – and 77 MPs elected from party lists, still in a single national district with a 5 percent threshold of valid votes. The Hare-Niemeyer formula is used. The constitutional revision of 2017 mandates a change to full proportional representation but not until 2024. For the 2020 election the mixed system will still be used, but with the threshold for party list seats lowered to 3 percent just for that election.

## Political parties and cleavages

The 1992 election were dominated by three blocs of political parties. The **“Peace” (Mshvidoba)** Bloc featured parties representing agrarians, conservatives, and

monarchists. The **11 October** bloc (named after the date of the election) comprised republican parties. The **“Unity” (Ertoba)** bloc was a grouping of liberal parties. Of these three blocs that competed in 1992, “Unity” was the only one to contest the 1995 election, albeit unsuccessfully.

Post-1992, the party system has been generally concentrated around three successive parties or electoral blocs. First of all, the **Citizens’ Union of Georgia (SMK)** was launched by Eduard Shevardnadze in 1993 to obtain a parliamentary majority on which he could rely so he would not have to rule by consensus. The party was closely associated with the **Green Party of Georgia (SMP)** which contested the 1992 election on its own. The SMK was a top-down centrist party which includes many ex-communists. Also allied with the SMK was the **Socialist Party of Georgia (SSP)**, which was founded in 1995 for the election of that year.

Initially, the main opposition to the SMK was the **National Democratic Party (EDP)**, which claimed to be the heir to the pre-Soviet party of the same name. A Christian democratic party, it favoured restoration of the monarchy as a means of national unification. The EDP was allied with the smaller **Democratic Party (DP)**. The two parties contested the 1992 election separately but campaigned together in 1996 under the EDP rubric. The nationalistic EDP was opposed to CIS membership, and opposed ratification of a friendship treaty with Russia.

For the 1999 election, an official anti-Eduard Shevardnadze bloc was created entitled the **Union of Democratic Revival (DAK)**. This very heterogeneous bloc grouped nationalists, monarchists, minorities, and leftists, all in a populist opposition led by the autocratic leader in the Adjara region, Aslan Abashidze. The regime wanted this unpalatable grouping as its main opponent. In this polarized election between Eduard Shevardnadze’s SMK and the anti-Eduard Shevardnadze DAK, the only other force to clear the new, higher electoral threshold was the **Industry Will Save Georgia (MGS)** bloc – as the **Georgian Labour Party (SLP)** fell just below the threshold in terms of total votes. That said, the SMK padded the vote totals so as to win a majority. In part this majority occurred because the inflated turnout value (some 30 percent higher according to Areshidze) pushed the SLP and quite likely the EDP, under the electoral threshold (Areshidze 2007: 48–49).

In 2003 the SMK broke apart due to growing opposition to Eduard Shevardnadze’s rule, and the main pro-Eduard Shevardnadze force in that election was **For a New Georgia (AS)**. Opposition to Eduard Shevardnadze was divided amongst various forces, including the DAK and the **United National Movement (ENM)** of Mikheil Saakashvili, the latter founded in 2001. The electoral fraud in this election led to the Rose Revolution and the Georgian Supreme Court annulling the results. A new parliamentary election was held in March 2004 after the presidential victory of Mikheil Saakashvili in January. His ENM won two-thirds of the vote in this parliamentary election, and likewise a majority in the unfair 2008 election. The only other group to win seats in 2004 was the **Rightist Opposition (MO)**

alliance between the **New Rightists (AM)**— or New Conservatives — who had also won seats in 2003 and the MGS. In 2008 this alliance ran as the **Joint Opposition (GO)** electoral bloc. Also elected in 2008 were the SLP (again) and the new **Christian-Democratic Movement (KDM)**. In 2014 most of the members of the KDM would join the Democratic Movement–United Georgia.

The ENM would be defeated in 2012 by the **Georgia Dream** electoral alliance created by billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili, which grouped together quite disparate parties in opposition to Mikheil Saakashvili. Georgia Dream would win again in 2016, this time without its right liberal **Free Democrats (TD)** component which ran on its own. The only other party to win seats in 2016 was the populist pro-Russian **Alliance of Patriots of Georgia (SPA)**. As for the ENM, most (21) of its deputies would break with Mikheil Saakashvili in 2017 and form the liberal **Movement for Liberty–European Georgia**.

#### ELECTIONS IN GEORGIA SINCE 1992

	1992		1995		1999		2003	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
Peace Bloc	20.9	35	—	—	—	—	—	—
11 October Bloc	11.0	19	—	—	—	—	—	—
Unity Bloc	7.6	15	—	—	—	—	—	—
EDP	8.4	14	8.4	34	4.7	0	—	—
SMP	4.5	11	—	—	0.6	0	—	—
DP	6.4	10	(with EDP)		—	—	—	—
QTK	5.1	8	4.5	3	—	—	—	—
SMK	—	—	25.2	108	44.5	131	—	—
AS	—	—	—	—	—	—	21.3	57
ENM	—	—	—	—	—	—	18.1	42
Burjanadze – Democrats	—	—	—	—	—	—	8.8	19
AM	—	—	—	—	—	—	7.3	16
SSP	—	—	4.0	4	—	—	—	—
DAK	—	—	7.3	31	26.8	58	18.8	39
MGS Bloc	—	—	—	—	7.5	15	6.2	4
SLP	—	—	—	—	7.0	2	12.0	23
Other parties	36.1	53	50.6	12	8.9	0	7.5	0
Independents		60		29		17		21
Abkhazian representatives (unfilled)				12		12		10
Vacant seats				2				4
TOTAL SEATS		225		235		235		235

(Continued)

	2004		2008		2012		2016	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
ENM	67.0	135	59.2	119	40.3	65	27.1	27
MO (AM + MGS)/GO	7.6	15	17.7	17	—	—	—	—
Georgia Dream Bloc	—	—	—	—	55.0	85	48.7	115
TD	—	—	—	—			4.6	
DAK	6.0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
SLP	5.8	0	7.4	6	1.2	0	3.1	0
KDM and allies/DM-UG	—	—	8.7	6	2.1	0	3.5	0
SPA	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.0	6
Other parties	13.6	0	7.0	2	1.4	0	8.0	1
Pro-ENM independents		23						
Anti-ENM independents		15						
Other independents		37						1
Abkhazian representatives (unfilled)		10						
TOTAL SEATS		235		150		150		150

Note: The 1999, 2003, and 2008 elections did not meet democratic standards of freedom and fairness.

Note: Vote shares always just for the party lists.

Governments

Although from 1992 to 1995 Georgia had a prime minister, Eduard Shevardnadze as the chairman of parliament was the key figure. After the constitutional change to a formal president-dominant system, the governments were picked in turn by Presidents Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikheil Saakashvili and were composed largely of members of their respective parties. Since 2013 and the change to a parliamentary system all governments have been led by Georgia Dream.

GEORGIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 2004

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
02/2004	Zhvania, Z. (ERM)	21	ERM
02/2005	Noghaideli, Z. (ERM)	21	ERM
11/2007	Gurgenidze, V. (ind.)	21 (1)	ERM
11/2008	Mgaloblishvili, G. (ind.)	18 (1)	ERM
02/2009	Gilauri, N. (ind.)	18 (1)	ERM
07/2012	Merabishvili, V. (ERM)	18	ERM
10/2012	Ivanishvili, B. (Georgia Dream)	19 (6)	Georgia Dream and allies
11/2013	Garibashvili, I. (Georgia Dream)	20	Georgia Dream and allies
12/2015	Kvirikashvili, G. (Georgia Dream)	20	Georgia Dream and allies
11/2016	Kvirikashvili, G. (Georgia Dream)	19	Georgia Dream
06/2018	Bakhtadze, M. (Georgia Dream)	14	Georgia Dream

## Acronyms

AM	New Rightists
AS	For a New Georgia
DAK	Union of Democratic Revival
DM-UG	Democratic Movement–United Georgia
DP	Democratic Party
EDP	National Democratic Party
ENM	United National Movement
GO	Joint Opposition
KDM	Christian-Democratic Movement
MGS	Industry Will Save Georgia
MO	Rightist Opposition
SLP	Georgian Labour Party
SMK	Citizens' Union of Georgia
SMP	Green Party of Georgia
SPA	Alliance of Patriots of Georgia
SSP	Socialist Party of Georgia
TD	Free Democrats

## Reference

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# KOSOVO

## The extent of democracy

The 2014 election was arguably the first free and fair election in Kosovo, and the 2017 election was democratic as well. Election results are given from 2001.

## History

Kosovo was a province of Serbia, but one with a Muslim majority. It remained in Serbia when Yugoslavia broke apart in the early 1990s, but was repressed by the regime of Slobodan Milošević leading to NATO intervention in 2000 and then UN administration. Independence was declared in 2008 and this has been recognized by a majority of countries world-wide but still not by Serbia and several other European countries. However, the European Union mediated the 2013 Brussels Agreement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo which normalized their relations.

## Electoral system

The electoral system is one of party list proportional representation using the d'Hondt method. The 120 seats include 10 for the Serb minority and 10 for other ethnic minorities.

## Political parties and cleavages

Of the traditional two main parties, the **Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)**, founded in 1989, has been more conservative, whereas the **Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)**, founded in 1999, was originally social democratic. However, in 2013 the PDK repositioned itself on the centre-right, thus blurring the left-right

distinction. In 2004 the **Democratic Alternative of Kosovo (ADK)** split from the LDK, but would later run in alliance with it. Likewise, LDK infighting led to a separate **Democratic League of Dardania (LDD)** being founded in 2007 which allied with the **Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (PSHDK)**, but in 2015 this grouping would merge back into the LDK. In 2014 **NISMA (Initiative)** split from the PDK. The third force in Kosovar politics has been **Self-Determination! (VV!)**, founded in 2005. VV! is leftist and strongly nationalist. Other ethnically Kosovar parties have been the centre-left **Reformist Party ORA (PR ORA)**, which existed from 2004 to 2010; the centre-right **Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK)**, founded in 2001; the conservative **Justice Party (PD)**, founded in 2004; the liberal **New Kosovo Alliance (AKR)**, founded in 2006; and the nationalist **Movement for Integration (LB)**, founded in 2007.

Kosovo's Serb minority initially founded the **Return Coalition (KP)** for the 2001 election and then the **Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija (SLKM)** for 2004 which became the **Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija (SDSKM)** for 2007. Other Serb parties have included the **Independent Liberal Party (SLS)**, founded in 2006, and the **United Serbian List (JSL)**. Since the Brussels Agreement and greater Serbian voter participation, there has been one main **Serb List (SL)**. The main ethnic Bosniak party is the **Vakat Coalition (KV)**. Lastly, there have been various ethnic Turkish parties: the main one is the **Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo (KDTP)**, founded in 1990 as the **Turkish Democratic Union (TDB)**, which changed its name in 2001.

#### ELECTIONS IN KOSOVO SINCE 2007

	2001		2004		2007		2010	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
PDK and allies	25.7	26	28.9	30	34.3	37	32.1	34
LDK	45.7	47	45.4	47	22.6	25	24.7	27
AKR	—	—	—	—	12.3	13	7.3	8
PSHDK/LDD-PSHDK	—	—	1.8	2	10.0	11	2.1	0
AAK	7.8	8	8.4	9	9.6	10	11.0	12
PR ORA	—	—	6.2	7	4.1	0	—	—
VV!	—	—	—	—	—	—	12.7	14
KP/SLKM/SDSKM	11.3	22	0.2	8	0.1	3	0.1	1
SLS	—	—	—	—	0.1	3	2.1	8
JSL	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.9	4
NISMA	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
KDTP	1.0	3	1.2	3	0.9	3	1.2	3
PD	0.6	1	1.0	1	1.7	0	(with AKR)	
KV	—	—	0.7	3	0.9	3	0.8	2
Others	7.9	13	6.2	10	3.4	12	5.0	7
TOTAL SEATS	120		120		120		120	

(Continued)

	2014		2017	
	% V	# S	% V	# S
PDK and allies	30.4	37	33.7	39
LDK	25.2	30	25.5	29
AKR	4.7	0		(with LDK)
PSHDK/LDD-PSHDK		(with LDK)		(into LDK)
AAK	9.5	11		(with PDK)
PR ORA	—	—	—	—
VV!	13.6	16	27.5	32
KP/SLKM/SDSKM	—	—	—	—
SLS	0.1	0	0.5	1
JSL	—	—	—	—
SL	5.2	9	6.1	9
NISMA	5.2	6		(with PDK)
KDTP	1.0	2	1.1	2
ADK		(with LDK)	—	—
LB		(with PDK)	—	—
PD		(with PDK)	—	—
KV	0.9	2	0.9	2
Others	4.2	7	4.7	6
TOTAL SEATS		120		120

Note: Elections before 2014 did not meet democratic standards.

Note: %V does not include the reserved ethnic minority seats.

Note: Seats for others include the remaining ethnic minority seats.

## Governments

The initial broad coalition of Kosovar parties gave way to those of the LDK and AAK. Since 2008 the PDK has been in every government, as have the main Serbian parties. The latter have insisted on keeping VV! out of government.

### KOSOVAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 2002

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
03/2002	Rexhepi, B. (PDK)		LDK PDK AAK PSHDK
12/2004	Haradinaj, R. (AAK)		LDK AAK
03/2005	Kosumi, B. (AAK)		LDK AAK
03/2006	Çeku, A. (ind.)		LDK AAK
02/2008	Thaçi, H. (PDK)	19	PDK LDK SLS KDTP
02/2011	Thaçi, H. (PDK)	23	PDK AKR SLS AAK
12/2014	Mustafa, I. (LDK)	23	LDK PDK Serb List ADK KDTP KV LB PD
09/2017	Haradinaj, R. (AAK)	24	PDK AKR NISMA AAK Serb List KDTP LIR KV

**Acronyms**

AAK	Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
ADK	Democratic Alternative of Kosovo
AKR	New Kosovo Alliance
JSL	United Serb List
KDTP	Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo
KP	Return Coalition
KV	Vakat Coalition
LB	Movement for Integration
LDD-PSDK	Democratic League of Dardania – Christian Democrats
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo
LIR	List Dr. Ibrahim Rugova
NISMA	Initiative
PD	Justice Party
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo
PR ORA	Reformist Party ORA ('Hour')
PSHDK	Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo
SDSKM	Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija
SLKM	Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija
SLS	Independent Liberal Party
TDB	Turkish Democratic Union
VV!	Self-Determination!

# MACEDONIA

## The extent of democratic elections

The 1994, 2008, and 2014 elections in Macedonia each did not meet democratic standards of fairness.

## History

Macedonia was ruled by Ottoman Turks for five centuries. In 1913 it was divided between Greece and Serbia – known as Aegean Macedonia and Vardar Macedonia, respectively. A small portion of its territory was given to Bulgaria following World War One. After World War Two Macedonia became a constituent republic of the Communist-ruled federal Yugoslavia. The 1990 election was inconclusive, and renamed Communists held onto the presidency. On 25 January 1991 the Macedonian Assembly unanimously adopted a declaration of independence; a new constitution was adopted on 17 November 1991. Officially the country has been known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) because of a dispute with Greece over its name; in June 2018 an agreement was reached with Greece on a compromise name of the Republic of North Macedonia.

## Electoral system

Initially, in 1994, Macedonia used a single-member majority-plurality electoral system. To win a single-member constituency in the first round, an absolute majority was needed, plus one-third of the registered electors of the constituency concerned. Otherwise, candidates who had received at least 7 percent of the votes cast in the first round were entitled to be candidates in the second round.

For the 1998 election the electoral system was modified so that only 85 of the seats would come from single-member districts and the remaining 35 would come from national party lists using a proportional representation calculation with a threshold of 5 percent. Also, for the single-member districts the second round, when needed, was changed to a straight run-off between the top two candidates from the first round.

As of 2002 the electoral system has been pure party list proportional representation using the d'Hondt method with a threshold of 5 percent. In 2011 and 2014 there were three additional single-member plurality seats for Macedonians living abroad in three global regions. These became a single global constituency in 2016 but with increasing vote totals required to win one or more seats – consequently, no such candidate was elected in 2016.

### Political parties and cleavages

The main party on the political left is the **Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM)** which is the descendent of the **League of Communists (SKM)**. In 1991 the Communists adopted their current name. In 1994, the SDSM created the **Alliance of Macedonia (SM)** with the smaller and far left-wing **Socialist Party of Macedonia (SPM)** and the **Liberal Party of Macedonia (LPM)**, both of which were founded in 1990. The LPM was, however, ousted from the government and the SM alliance in a cabinet reshuffle in 1996 and was forced into opposition. In 2002 the **Together for Macedonia (ZMZ)** alliance united these three parties plus the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which was founded in 1997.

The main party on the political right is the **Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE)**. The VMRO was named after a historic group founded in 1893 which fought for independence from the Turks. The DPMNE was launched by Macedonian migrant workers in Sweden. The two halves merged in 1990 as an organization of the 'democratic centre'. The party strongly endorses the revival of Macedonian cultural identity. The VMRO-DPMNE boycotted the 1994 election due to ballot fraud. For the 1998 election the party moderated its nationalistic appeals, specifically stating that it no longer aspired to unite parts of Bulgaria and Greece into a "Greater Macedonia". The VMRO-DPMNE also stressed support for greater market reforms, and linked up with the new **Democratic Alternative (DA)**, a pro-market party founded in 1998. Other parties allied with the VMRO-DPMNE or joining it in government have been the **Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)**, founded in 1997, and the **New Social Democratic Party (NSDP)**, founded in 2005.

The Albania population of Macedonia was initially represented by the **Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP; PPD in Albanian)**, founded in 1990. The party only operated in areas with substantial Albania populations. The PDP

was in the first two of Macedonia's governments despite its participation in a boycott of the legislature from February to July of 1995 by Albanian parties. Founded in 2001 after the conflict between the Albanian National Liberation Army and the Macedonian security forces, the **Democratic Union for Integration (DUI; BDI in Albanian)** replaced the PDP as the main party of ethnic Albanians. Another ethnic Albanian party which has since 2002 consistently won seats on its own is the **Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA; PDSH in Albanian)**, founded in 1997 as a merger of the **People's Democratic Party (NDP; PDK in Albanian)**, founded in 1990, and the **Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians (PDPA)**, a PDP/PPD split-off. In 2008 the PDSH would absorb the remnants of the PDP/PPD. More recent Albanian parties are the **National Democratic Revival (RDK in Albanian)** founded in 2011, which in 2016 was the core of the **Alliance for Albanians (AzA; ApS in Albanian)** coalition, and the **Oath Movement (Besa Movement)**, founded in 2014. There is also an ethnic Turkish party, the **Turkish Democratic Party (TDP)**, which is part of the VMRO-DPMNE coalition. Likewise part of the VMRO-DPMNE coalition was the **Union of Roma in Macedonia (SRM)**.

## ELECTIONS IN MACEDONIA SINCE 1994

	1994		1998		2002		2006	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
SM	29.9	88	—	—	—	—	—	—
VMRO-DPMNE	14.3	*	28.1	49	25.0	33	[ 32.5	38
SRM	—	—	—	—	0.6	1	[	1
LPM	1.6	5	—	—	(in ZMZ)		[	2
SPM	0.7	1	4.7	1	(in ZMZ)		[	3
PDP	8.8	10	19.3	25	2.4	2		(with BDI)
NDP	3.0	4	—	—	2.2	1	0.5	0
SDSM		(in SM)	25.1	27		(in ZMZ)		(in ZMZ)
DA	—	—	10.7	13	1.5	0	—	—
ZMZ	—	—	—	—	41.4	60	23.3	32
BDI	—	—	—	—	12.1	16	12.2	16
DPA	—	—	(with PDP)		5.3	7	7.5	11
NSDP	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.1	7
LDP	—	—	7.0	4		(in ZMZ)		(in ZMZ)
Other parties	27.9	5	4.9	1	8.9	0	17.2	9
Independents	13.8	7	0.2	0	0.6	0	0.7	1
TOTAL SEATS		120		120		120		120

\* boycotted second round.

	<i>2008</i>		<i>2011</i>		<i>2014</i>		<i>2016</i>	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
VMRO-DPMNE coalition	48.8	63	39.0	56	44.5	61	39.4	51
SDSM	[ 23.6	23	32.8	42	26.2	34	37.9	49
LDP	[	4	1.5	0	—	—	—	—
BDI	12.8	18	10.2	15	14.2	19	7.5	10
DPA	8.3	11	5.9	8	6.1	7	2.7	2
Besa Movement	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.0	5
RDK/AzA	—	—	2.7	2	1.6	1	3.0	3
Others	6.5	1	7.9	0	7.4	1	4.5	0
TOTAL SEATS	120		123		123		120	

*Note:* The 1994, 2008, and 2014 elections did not meet democratic standards of fairness.

*Note:* %V is for the proportional representation component.

## Governments

Governments in Macedonia have always been coalitions, either led by the VMRO-DPMNE or by the SDSM. The only time these two main parties have served together have been in brief pre-election governments. A consistent feature has been the presence of an ethnic Albanian party in each government.

### MACEDONIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1994

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
12/1994	Crvenovski, B. (SDSM)	20	SDSM LPM PDP SPM
02/1996	Crvenovski, B. (SDSM)	20	SDSM PDP SPM
11/1998	Georgievski, L. (VMRO-DPMNE)	29	VMRO-DPMNE DA DPA
11/2000	Georgievski, L. (VMRO-DPMNE)	27	VMRO-DPMNE DPA LDP SRM
05/2001	Georgievski, L. (VMRO-DPMNE)	21	VMRO-DPMNE SDSM DPA LDP PDP
11/2001	Georgievski, L. (VMRO-DPMNE)	22	VMRO-DPMNE DPA LDP PDP
11/2002	Crvenovski, B. (SDSM)	18	SDSM BDI LDP
06/2004	Kostov, H. (SDSM)	18	SDSM BDI LDP
12/2004	Bučkovski, V. (SDSM)	19	SDSM BDI LDP
08/2006	Gruevski, N. (VMRO-DPMNE)	22 (1)	VMRO-DPMNE DPA NSDP LPM MTDP SPM

(Continued)



<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
07/2008	Gruevski, N. (VMRO-DPMNE)	22 (2)	VMRO-DPMNE BDI SPM TDP
07/2011	Gruevski, N. (VMRO-DPMNE)	23 (2)	VMRO-DPMNE BDI SPM TDP UPE
06/2014	Gruevski, N. (VMRO-DPMNE)	24 (2)	VMRO-DPMNE BDI UPE
11/2015	Gruevski, N. (VMRO-DPMNE)	24 (2)	VMRO-DPMNE BDI SDSM UPE
01/2016	Dimitriev, E. (VMRO-DPMNE)	26 (4)	VMRO-DPMNE BDI SDSM UPE
05/2016	Dimitriev, E. (VMRO-DPMNE)	26 (4)	VMRO-DPMNE BDI UPE
09/2016	Dimitriev, E. (VMRO-DPMNE)	26 (4)	VMRO-DPMNE BDI SDSM UPE
05/2017	Zaev, Z. (SDSM)	26 (2)	SDSM and allies BDI AzA <i>external support from Besa</i>

## Acronyms

AzA	Alliance for the Albanians
BDI	Democratic Union for Integration (DUI is the Macedonian acronym)
DA	Democratic Alternative
DPA	Democratic Party of Albanians
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LPM	Liberal Party of Macedonia
NDP	People's Democratic Party
NSDP	New Social Democratic Party
PDP	Party for Democratic Prosperity
RDK	National Democratic Revival
RSM-LP	Reform Forces of Macedonia – Liberal Party
SDSM	Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia
SKM	League of Communists of Macedonia
SM	Alliance of Macedonia
SPM	Socialist Party of Macedonia
SRM	Union of Roma in Macedonia
SRSM	Alliance of Reform Forces of Macedonia
TDP	Turkish Democratic Party
VMRO-DPMNE	Internal Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity
ZMZ	Together for Macedonia (coalition)

# MOLDOVA

## The extent of democratic elections

The elections held in 2005 and April 2009 under the Communists did not meet democratic standards of fairness.

## History

Moldovans are not an historic people of Europe but rather a post-Soviet nation of Romanian-speakers. Moldova encompasses the territory of the pre-1940 Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (located within Ukraine) which was joined to all but the northern and southern portions of the territory of Bessarabia upon the latter's detachment from Romania in 1940 as part of the Nazi-Soviet pact. In 1989, the communist president endorsed the nationalist demands of the Popular Front of Moldova. The name of "Moldova" was adopted in June 1990; it was previously "Moldavia". In the 1990 election Popular Front members running as independents gained election to the previously communist dominated legislature. The Moldovan government declared the annexation of Bessarabia illegal and vowed to return it to Romania. This statement of purpose prompted the creation in August 1990 of the Republic of Gaguzia by the Turkic Gaguz minority in that region. The following month the Dnestr Republic on the east of said river declared itself independent as well. In 1991 Moldova declared independence (thus becoming a separate country from Romania), but the period of 1991–1994 was marked by regional strife and economic turmoil. The first post-independence election was held in 1994.

## Electoral system

Moldova has one multi-member nation-wide constituency for 104 deputies. It uses a proportional representation system, for which the electoral threshold has evolved.

Initially in 1994 this was set at 4 percent of the national vote for both parties and electoral blocs. In 2000 this was raised to 6 percent for both. In 2002 the threshold for electoral blocs of two parties was raised to 9 percent, and for blocs of three or more parties it was raised to 12 percent. In June 2009 the threshold for a single party was lowered to 5 percent. Then before the 2010 election all the thresholds were lowered so these became 4 percent for a single party, 7 percent for electoral blocs of two parties, and 9 percent for blocs of three or more parties. For 2018, the electoral system will be a mixed system with 50 deputies elected from party lists and 51 in single-member constituencies.

## Political parties and cleavages

In Moldova there has existed an overlaying reform/anti-reform cleavage, a weak communist/anti-communist cleavage, but also early on a strong set of divisions based on nationality. The ethnic Moldovan majority was divided between “Romanian” nationalists and “Moldovan” nationalists. The early party formation in the transition period was the result of positioning by competing party elites.

The winner of the 1994 election, the first after independence, was the **Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova (PDAM)**, founded in 1991, which associated not with farmers but with the republican agro-industrial complex, made up of village mayors and collective farm managers. The PDAM leadership had a common ideological outlook as reformed communists. It was initially the strongest political force due to clear policy orientation, an institutional power base, and good organization. In 1994 the party advocated Moldovan independence from both Russia and Romania and the cultivation of a “Moldovan” identity while accommodating all ethnic groups in the territory. The party moved to a more moderate position on the national issue following the 1994 election, and called for permanent neutrality and the banning of foreign troops from the country.

That said, the dominant political group following the eclipse of the Communist regime in mid-1991 was the **Popular Front of Moldova (FPM)**. The grouping, which was founded in 1989, disintegrated in 1992 and one of its largest factions was transformed into the **Christian Democratic Popular Front (FPCD)**. The FPCD was launched as one of Moldova’s pro-Romanian parties which argued for integration with Romania. Following its poor showing in 1994 the FPCD joined forces with the **Party of Rebirth and Conciliation of Moldova (PRCM)** to form the nationalistic right-wing **Democratic Convention of Moldova (CDM)**, led by former president Mircea Snegur, for the 1998 election. After that election, the Christian Democrats reformed as the **Christian Democratic People’s Party (PPCD)**. After the 2005 election, the PPCD gave support to the PRCM (see later) government and thus betrayed its pro-unification (with Romania) voters, causing its support to collapse. The party would carry on, and ultimately change to a stress on Christian values, but without success.

As for the PRCM, it was launched by Snegur in 1995 and was declared to be a ‘mass party of the centre’ but in reality was more to the right of centre. The party advocated the transformation of Moldova into a presidential form of government as opposed to

a parliamentary system. It also tried to attract the support of Romanian nationalists by advocating a move to make Romanian and not Moldovan the official language. However, the PRCM fell below the electoral threshold in 2001 and thereafter joined a liberal grouping which became part of the **Our Moldova Alliance (AMN)** (see later).

The **Party of Communists of the Moldovan Republic (PCRM)** was banned in 1991 but regained legal status after the election of 1994 by which time many former communists had opted for the socialists or the PDAM. The PCRM thus first ran in the 1996 presidential election, when it came third. It then polled 30 percent and won 40 seats in the 1998 parliamentary election, benefiting largely from a shift in support away from the socialists and agrarians. From the 1998 election through that of 2010 inclusive the PCRM was the single largest party. It governed autocratically when in office, and was nationalistic.

For its part, the **Socialist Party of Moldova (PSM)** was formed in 1993 as the pro-Russian successor to the former ruling communist party. In the 1994 and 1998 elections it formed an alliance with the **Unity Movement for Equality in Rights (MUE)** – an alliance supported by the banned communists in 1994, pushing this into second place. In 1997 members of the PSM formed the **Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM)**, which initially had little support on its own, which ran with the PSM in 2005 as the **Motherland (R)** electoral bloc, and which then in 2009–2010 supported the PCRM. However, in 2011 a few leaders and deputies of the PCRM switched to the PSRM. In the 2014 election the PSRM was openly supported by Russia, and narrowly became the single largest party.

Also winning seats in the 1994 election was the **Peasants' and Intellectuals' Bloc (BȚI)**, a moderate pro-Romanian alliance of smaller parties some of which had split from the PFM. The parties that made up the bloc went on to form the United Democratic Forces (CDU) alliance following the election of 1994 which one year later became the centre-right **Party of Democratic Forces (PFD)**. In 1998 the PFD virtually replicated the percentage of votes and number of seats that the BȚI had received, but then won little support in 2001.

The 1998 election also saw the emergence of a new pro-government centrist alliance, the **Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova (PMDP)**. The PMDP was re-established in 2000 as the **Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM)**, which then ran on its own in 2001 and from 2009. The 2001 and 2005 elections saw the PCRM win back to back majorities, though unfairly in the latter case. In both elections the second place went to different loose centre-left alliances. In 2001 this was the **Braghiș Alliance (AB)** electoral bloc, formed by then-Prime Minister Dumitru Braghiș. In 2003 the AB would join with other parties to form the social liberal **Our Moldova Alliance (AMN)**. In 2005 the second-place group was the **Democratic Moldova (MD)** electoral bloc, which included both the AMN and the PDM.

Two right-of-centre parties have arisen in recent years, one liberal and one conservative, and these along with the PDM have worked together in opposition to the ex-communists. The **Liberal Party (PL)** in fact began as the small and unsuccessful Christian democratic **Party of Reform (PR)**, which in 2005 adopted its current name and liberal policies. The conservative **Liberal Democratic Party of**

**Moldova (PLDM)** was formed in 2007. In 2011 the PLDM absorbed the by then extra-parliamentary AMN. In March 2015 former Prime Minister Iurie Leancă left the PLDM to form the **European People's Party of Moldova (PPEM)**, in protest at the informal co-operation of the PLDM with the PCRM.

#### ELECTIONS IN MOLDOVA SINCE 1994

	1994		1998		2001		2005	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
PDAM	43.2	56	3.6	0	1.2	0	—	—
PSM + MUE	22.0	28	1.8	0	—	—	(in electoral bloc R)	
BȚI/PFD	9.2	11	8.8	11	1.2	0	—	—
FPCD/PPCD	7.5	9	(in CDM)		8.2	11	9.1	11
CDM/PRCM	—	—	19.4	26	5.8	0	(in electoral bloc MD)	
PCRM	—	—	30.0	40	50.1	71	46.0	56
PMDP/PDM	—	—	18.2	24	5.0	0	(in electoral bloc MD)	
electoral bloc AB	—	—	—	—	13.4	19	(in electoral bloc MD)	
electoral bloc MD	—	—	—	—	—	—	28.5	34
PSRM/electoral bloc R	—	—	0.6	0	—	—	4.9	0
Other parties	15.6	0	12.0	0	12.8	0	10.6	0
Independents	2.5	0	5.6	0	2.3	0	0.9	0
TOTAL SEATS	104		101		101		101	

	April 2009		July 2009		2010		2014	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
PCRM	49.5	60	44.7	48	39.3	42	17.5	21
PSRM	(with PCRM)		(with PCRM)		(with PCRM)		20.5	25
PCR	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.9	0
PPCD	3.0	0	1.9	0	0.5	0	0.7	0
PLDM	12.4	15	16.6	18	29.4	32	20.2	23
PDM	3.0	0	12.5	13	12.7	15	15.8	19
PL	13.1	15	14.7	15	10.0	12	9.7	13
AMN	9.8	11	7.3	7	2.1	0	(merged into PLDM)	
Other parties	8.1	0	2.3	0	4.9	0	9.5	0
Independents	1.1	0	0.0	0	1.1	0	1.2	0
TOTAL SEATS	101		101		101		101	

*Note:* The 2005 and April 2009 elections did not meet democratic standards of fairness.

## Governments

As noted, the PDAM formed the government after the 1994 election. Since 1998 Moldova has had governments both of communists and their centre-right rivals – with the choice between these. The PCRM only governed when it had an absolute majority (2001–2009) as until 2014 it had no allies in parliament. Sometimes the non-communist parties emphasize their European orientation when forming government. Thus after the July 2009 election the then-four non-communist parties formed a governing coalition called the **Alliance for European Integration (AIE)**, a grouping used on two later occasions. Later governing coalitions included the **Pro-European Governing Coalition (CGPE)** in 2013.

### MOLDOVAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1994

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
03/1994	Sangheli, A. (PDAM)	20 (3)	PDAM
01/1997	Ciubuc, I. (ind.)	20	non-partisan
05/1998	Ciubuc, I. (ind.)	21	CDM PMDP PFD
03/1999	Sturza, I. (PMDP)	20	PMDP PRCM PFD
12/1999	Braghiş, D. (ind.)	17	non-partisan
04/2001	Tărlăv, V. (PCRM)	17	PCRM
04/2005	Tărlăv, V. (PCRM)	17	PCRM
03/2008	Greceanii, Z. (PCRM)	19	PCRM
06/2009	Greceanii, Z. (PCRM)	19	PCRM
09/2009	Filat, V. (PLDM)	25	PLDM PL AMN PD
01/2011	Filat, V. (PLDM)	19	PLDM PDM PL
05/2013	Leancă, I. (PLDM)	18	PLDM PDM PL
02/2015	Gaburici, C. (PLDM)	18	PLDM PDM <i>external support from PCRM</i>
06/2015	Streleţ, V. (PLDM)	19	PDM PLDM PL
01/2016	Filip, P. (PDM)	19 (7)	PDM PL <i>external support from ex-PCRM parliamentary group</i>
05/2017	Filip, P. (PDM)	11 (7)	PDM
10/2017	Filip, P. (PDM)	11 (6)	PDM PPEM

## Acronyms

AB	Braghiş Alliance
AIE	Alliance for European Integration
AMN	Our Moldova Alliance
BȚI	Peasants' and Intellectuals' Bloc
CDM	Democratic Convention of Moldova
CGPE	Pro-European Governing Coalition
FPCD	Christian Democratic Popular Front

FPM	Popular Front of Moldova
MD	Democratic Moldova
MUE	Unity Movement for Equality in Rights
PCRM	Party of Communists of the Moldovan Republic
PDAM	Democratic Agrarian Party of Moldova
PDM	Democratic Party of Moldova
PFD	Party of Democratic Forces
PL	Liberal Party
PLDM	Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova
PMDP	Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova
PPCD	Christian Democratic People's Party
PPEM	European People's Party of Moldova
PR	Party of Reform
PRCM	Party of Rebirth and Conciliation of Moldova
PSM	Socialist Party of Moldova
PSRM	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova
R	Motherland

# MONACO

## The extent of democracy

Monaco lacks responsible government. The prince picks the minister of state, who until 2005 had to be a French citizen (normally a civil servant or diplomat). Since 2005 the minister of state can be a Monegasque, but that has yet to happen. In any case, the Monegasque government remains unaccountable to the National Council (parliament), only to the monarch. And it was only with the 1962 constitution that the Monegasque National Council acquired actual legislative powers. Female suffrage was also granted with this constitution.

## History

The Principality of Monaco has been ruled by the House of Grimaldi since 1297. Monaco has been an associated state of France since 1918, with France providing military defence. A new treaty with France in 2002 allowed for a Monegasque to become minister of state (see previously).

## Electoral system

Monaco uses a parallel electoral system, with two-thirds of the seats elected in one multi-member constituency by plurality vote (the leading 16 candidates) and one-third of the seats assigned by proportional representation with a 5 percent threshold and using the Hare quota. Voters can either choose a party list or select candidates from various lists ("panachage").

## Political parties and cleavages

Parties have traditionally been weak actors in Monaco, given the lack of responsible government and panachage by the voters. The main historical party was



the **National and Democratic Union (UND)**, founded in 1962. This party won every election until 2003, when it was defeated by the centrist **Union for Monaco (UPM)** coalition, now the **Monaco Union (UM)**. After its defeat, the UND then renamed itself **Rally and Issues (ReE)**, and then returned to control the National Council in 2013 via the centre-right **Horizon Monaco (HM)** coalition with smaller parties created prior to said election. One seat was won in 2013 by **Renaissance**, which represents the interests of the employees of SBM (which owns the casino and related businesses). In 2017 the new centre-left **Primo! Priority Monaco (PM)** was formed, which swept to victory in 2018.

ELECTIONS IN MONACO SINCE 1963

	1963		1968		1973		1978	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
UND		17	89.2	18		16		18
MUD		1	9.2	0		1		0
Other parties		–	1.6	0		1		–
TOTAL SEATS		18		18		18		18

	1983		1988		1993		1998	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
UND		18		18		15	67.4	18
Other parties		0		0		2	32.6	0
Independents		–		–		1	–	–
TOTAL SEATS		18		18		18		18

	2003		2008		2013		2018	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
UPM/UM	58.5	21	52.2	21	39.0	3	16.2	1
UND/ReE/HM	41.5	3	40.5	3	50.3	20	26.1	2
Renaissance	–	–	–	–	10.7	1	–	–
PM	–	–	–	–	–	–	57.7	21
Other parties			7.3	0				
TOTAL SEATS		24		24		24		24

Note: Election results are given since the 1962 constitution which granted the National Council actual legislative powers; vote shares are only available continuously since 1998.

**Governments**

As noted, the ministers of state have been non-partisan appointees of the prince, and unaccountable to parliament.

**Acronyms**

HM	Horizon Monaco
PM	Primo! Priority Monaco
ReE	Rally and Issues
UM	Monaco Union
UND	National and Democratic Union
UPM	Union for Monaco

# RUSSIA

## The extent of democratic elections

Russia's elections were reasonably democratic in the 1990s, certainly the parliamentary elections were so, but democracy ended with the shift from President Boris Yeltsin to President Vladimir Putin (possibly even as of the 1999 parliamentary election). Consequently, a detailed analysis of 1990s party politics is given, with briefer material on the autocratic period since 2000.

## History

Russia's first Duma was created in 1905 by Tsar Nicholas II as a concession after the 1905 revolution, but he saw this as illegitimate and at time shut it down. Following the 1917 revolution Russia came under Bolshevik rule. In the late 1980s liberalizing reforms were brought about by Mikhail Gorbachev. In the early 1990s Boris Yeltsin became Russian president and Russia began to more fully embrace democratic competition. The Soviet Union itself was dissolved at the end of 1991. Boris Yeltsin resigned early in 1999 and was succeeded by Vladimir Putin, who quickly consolidated an autocracy with heavy use of "administrative resources" including state control of the media in elections, as well as the jailing, exiling, or even elimination of political opponents.

## Electoral system

There are a total of 450 members elected to the Russian State Duma. From 1993 to 2007 there was a parallel system in which 225 seats were elected by single-member plurality and the remaining 225 seats elected separately by party list proportional representation with a 5 percent national threshold. From 1995, to emphasize, this was 5 percent of total votes not just valid votes. Results from the single member districts had no effect on the allocation of the party list seats. Voters also had the

option of voting “against all”. In 2007 the electoral system was changed to party list proportional representation for all seats, with a 7 percent electoral threshold. Voting “against all” was removed as an option. In 2014 the electoral system changed back to the previous parallel system with a 5 percent threshold for the party lists seats (though no return to allowing a vote “against all”).

## Political parties and cleavages through 1999

In 1990s Russian politics, the main division was between pro-government and opposition parties. The latter category could be divided up into three different groupings: left-wing opposition parties, pro-reform opposition parties, and nationalist opposition parties, with a residual group of centrist deputies.

In analysing Russia, an initial distinction needs to be made between parties and parliamentary groups. In the Russian Duma, the minimum number of deputies required for a parliamentary faction is 35; members outside of a faction have very little influence. Consequently, after an election most independents group themselves into a parliamentary group to qualify as a faction, while a minority join actual parties. After the 1993 election, three such parliamentary groups were formed; after the 1995 election, there was but one main parliamentary group of independents.

In the 1993 election, the main pro-government party was **Russia's Democratic Choice (DVR)**. It was the most successful political party in this election in terms of seats, though second in party list votes. Many, but not all, of its members would go on to form a new pro-government party for the 1995 election, causing the DVR to fall to only nine seats in 1995. In 2001, the remains of DVR would merge into the Union of Right Forces (see later). In the 1995 election, the said new and then most important pro-government party was **Our Home is Russia (NDR)**. This was the party led by Victor Chernomyrdin, Boris Yeltsin's prime minister for many years. Still, NDR would only come second in 1995 (to the communists), and a distant second at that. A second-place finish (though close second in terms of votes) was also the result in the 1999 election of the pro-government **Unity**, which mainly and successfully sought to come ahead of the **Fatherland–All Russia (OVR)** alliance of competing elites led by former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov and Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov.

Smaller pro-government parties also existed. Amongst these was the **Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES)**. PRES did reasonably well in 1993 but only managed to win one seat in 1995. The key parliamentary groups formed from pro-government deputies were the **Liberal-Democratic Union of 12 December (12 Dec)**, formed after the 1993 election; the **Regions of Russia (RR)**, formed after the 1995 and 1999 elections; and the **People's Deputies (ND)** and the **Agro-Industrial Bloc (APB)**, both formed after the 1999 election.

Amongst the opposition parties, the left-wing parties held the most seats in parliament. The strongest of these parties was the **Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)**. The KPRF was founded in 1990, banned in 1991 by Boris Yeltsin following the coup attempt in August of that year, but legalized again for the 1993 election. The party is the largest of the six or so parties which claim to be the

sole legitimate heir to the **Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)**. The party is in favour of a high degree of state control and stresses the priority of restoring state order. The party is critical of aspects of the communist past such as authoritarianism and the anti-religiousness of the former ruling party. The KPRF nevertheless likes to stress the importance of heroes of the Soviet period like Yuri Gagarin and Marshal Zhukov amongst others. It has become increasingly nationalistic.

The second largest of the left-wing parties was the **Agrarian Party of Russia (APR)**; this was the political arm of the state and collective farms. The party included many former members of the KPRF when it was banned in 1991. The party concentrated on two goals, first, to prevent the legalization of a market in the agricultural sector and second to secure generous subsidies to the agro-industrial sector. The party was initially highly successful in accomplishing these goals by allying itself with the KPRF to bloc government reform policies. For the 1999 election the APR was part of the FAR alliance. On its own again, it failed to make the electoral threshold in 2003 and 2007 and then in 2008 merged with United Russia (see later).

Also on the left after the 1993 election was the parliamentary group **Russia's Way**. For the 1995 election, Russia's Way along with other forces became an actual new party called **Power to the People! (VN!)**. The party, which labelled itself as left-patriotic, advocated a platform of increasing state involvement in industry, re-instituting Soviet-era social policies, and indeed re-unifying the Soviet Union. The VN! wanted to create a coalition of forces on the left encompassing both the KPRF and the APR. This idea was turned down by the leadership of the KPRF.


Pro-reform opposition parties and parliamentary groups in the 1990s Duma challenged the government from the liberal side. The key party here initially was the **Yavlinsky-Boldyrec-Lukin Bloc**, more commonly known as **Yabloko** ("apple"). Yabloko stressed the importance of free markets and civil liberties. In 1999 the left liberal Yabloko was joined in the Duma by the more right liberal **Union of Right Forces (SPS)**, formed by some of the "young reformers" of the 1990s. Neither party cleared the electoral threshold for party list seats in 2003. Attempts to merge Yabloko and SPS in 2005 and 2006 ultimately foundered. In 2008, SPS dissolved itself.

The third opposition bloc represented in the Russian parliament in the 1990s, the nationalist bloc, was headed by the **Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)** led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The LDPR, which was founded in 1990, claimed to be dedicated to the idea of a state based on law and a market economy. In reality, however, the party called for the re-establishment of the Russian state within the boundaries of the Soviet Union or better yet the boundaries of 1865 which would incorporate Alaska and large portions of Poland, including its capital of Warsaw. The party is neither liberal nor democratic, but rather xenophobic, anti-Western, and supportive of harsh measures against crime.

For the 1995 election two other nationalist parties appeared. The first was the **Congress of Russian Communities (KRO)**, which backed the popular general (and 1996 presidential candidate) Alexander Lebed'. Perhaps not surprisingly, it did disproportionately well amongst military voters. The second new nationalist party, a LDPR splinter, was the **Derzhava** (Great Power) **Party** formed by former vice-president Alexander Rutskoi. Neither party was able to win any party list seats, however.

Centrist parties and groups which were not part of any of the previously mentioned blocs (though at times supporting the government) but which were in the Duma included the feminist **Women of Russia (ZR)**, which won seats in both 1993 and 1995. The **Democratic Party of Russia (DPR)** won 15 seats in 1995 but did not contest the 1995 election. After the 1993 election, a parliamentary group was formed in the centre called **New Regional Policy (NRP)**, consisting of deputies with close ties to state industry. Overall, though, these centrist elements soon effectively ceased to exist.

Although left and right were certainly applicable terms in Russia, it may make more sense to focus specifically on how quickly parties wished to move to a (fully) capitalist economy. This can be combined with their sense of nationalism or cosmopolitanism. Consequently, the Russian party system after the 1995 election is illustrated in the following two-dimensional manner (Figure 61.1), with the main electoral parties represented:



**FIGURE 61.1** Russian party system after the 1995 election on two dimensions

## 556 Individual case analyses of oscillating regimes

To stress again, the economically anti-capitalist parties were also nationalist and anti-Western to varying degrees; in contrast, the NDR and even more Yabloko were economically liberal *and* democratic.

### ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA 1993–2003

	<i>Election December 1993</i>		<i>Post-election situation April 1994</i>	<i>Election December 1995</i>		<i>Post-election situation January 1996</i>
	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i># S</i>
<i>Pro-government parties</i>						
DVR	15.5	70	73	3.9	9	
PRES	6.7	19	30	0.4	1	
12 Dec			26			
NDR				10.3	55	66
RR						40
<i>Nationalist parties</i>						
LDPR	22.9	64	64	11.4	51	51
KRO	—	—		4.4	5	
Derzhava	—	—		2.6	0	
<i>Leftist opposition parties</i>						
KPRF	12.4	48	45	22.7	157	149
APR	8.0	33	55	3.8	20	35
RP/VN!	—	—	14	1.6	9	38
<i>Liberal opposition parties</i>						
Yabloko	7.9	23	28	7.0	45	46
<i>Centrist parties</i>						
ZR	8.1	23	23	4.6	3	
DPR	5.5	15	15	—	—	
NRP			66			
Other parties	8.8	8		24.5	18	
Independents		141	5	2.8	77	25
Against all parties	4.2					
Unfilled seats		6	6			
TOTAL SEATS		450	450		450	450

	<i>Election December 1999</i>		<i>Post-election situation January 2000</i>	<i>Election December 2003</i>		<i>Post-election situation October 2007</i>
	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i># S</i>
<i>Pro-government parties</i>						
NDR	1.2	7				
ER	23.8	73	81	38.2	222	303
OVR	13.6	68	43			
ZR	2.1	0				
RR			40			
ND			58			
APB			36			
NPRF	—	—		1.2	17	
<i>Nationalist parties</i>						
LDPR	6.1	17	17	11.7	36	30
Rodina	—	—		9.2	37	40
<i>Leftist opposition parties</i>						
KPRF	24.8	113	95	12.8	52	47
APR		(in OVR)		3.7	2	
<i>Liberal opposition parties</i>						
Yabloko	6.0	20	21	4.4	4	
SPS	8.7	29	33	4.1	3	
Other parties	10.3	9		10.0	6	
Independents		105	17		68	24
Against all parties	3.4			4.8		
Unfilled seats		9	9		3	6
TOTAL SEATS		450	450		450	450

%V always refers to the party list component.

## Party politics under United Russia hegemony

After Vladimir Putin became president the OVR began to crumble and patronage was used to lure OVR deputies to Unity. Then in 2001 Unity and OVR would merge into **United Russia (ER)**, and the Russian party system in the 2003



election was one of ER dominance, becoming ER hegemony by the end of that parliament. United Russia benefits from electoral authoritarian unfairness and electoral system changes, but also controls over opposition parties. Specifically, Russia's 2001 law "On Political Parties" sets high requirements for political parties, including total membership and breadth of membership. The law also gave authorities various reasons for liquidating current parties. Consequently for example, the Progress Party (PP) – formerly the People's Alliance (NA) – of opposition activist Alexei Navalny has repeatedly been denied registration and thus has never run in a national election.

In this electoral authoritarian regime the KPRF and the LDP both remain, but the latter generally supports Vladimir Putin and the former sometimes does. True (liberal) opposition parties have remained outside of the Duma, even if registered. This is true of Yabloko, which continues to run, as well as newer liberal parties. Of these, **Civilian Power (GS)** ran in 2007, then in 2009 merged with former elements of SPS and others to form **Right Cause (PD)** which in 2016 became the **Party of Growth (PR)**. The **People's Freedom Party (PARNAS)** ran in 2016; its predecessor had been forcibly dissolved in 2007 however this was overturned in 2012 after a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights.

The main two new parties who have entered the Duma since 2003 have broadly supported Vladimir Putin, and have been seen as parties intended to divide the potential opposition vote. The first, the ultra-nationalistic **Rodina** (Motherland) was founded in 2003. It and two other parties merged in 2006 to form the more left-leaning pro-Vladimir Putin party **A Just Russia (SR)**. The following year SR absorbed the **People's Party of the Russian Federation (NPRF)**, another pro-government party that had been formed in 2001 seemingly to take support away from the KPRF.

#### ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA SINCE 2007

	2007		2011		2016	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
<i>Pro-government parties</i>						
ER	65.0	315	50.1	238	55.2	343
SR	7.8	38	13.5	64	6.3	23
<i>Nationalist parties</i>						
LDPR	8.2	40	11.9	56	13.4	39
Rodina		(with SR)		(with SR)	1.5	1
<i>Leftist opposition parties</i>						
KPRF	11.7	57	19.5	92	13.6	42
APR	2.3	0	–	–	–	–

	2007		2011		2016	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
<i>Liberal opposition parties</i>						
Yabloko	1.6	0	3.5	0	2.0	0
SPS	1.0	0	—	—	—	—
GS/PD/PR	1.1	0	0.6	0	1.3	0
PARNAS	—	—	—	—	0.7	0
Other parties	1.2	0	1.0	0	6.0	1
Independents						1
TOTAL SEATS		450		450		450

Note: Vote % is for the party lists (party lists).

## Governments

The governments in Russia are chosen by the president and do not necessarily contain party representatives. This is especially true in the make up of the cabinet as opposed to the prime minister. Moreover, new governments are appointed after every presidential election, but not every parliamentary one. Consequently, the following table has a different format.

### RUSSIAN PRESIDENTS AND PRIME MINISTERS SINCE 1992

<i>President</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Notes:</i>
Yeltsin, B.	<i>Gaidar, Y. (acting PM)</i>	06/1992	<i>never confirmed by the Congress of People's Deputies</i>
	Chernomyrdin, V. (NDR from 1995)	12/1992	vote in Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation
	Chernomyrdin, V. (NDR)	08/1996	post-presidential election
	Kirienko, S. (ind.)	04/1998	(approved on third attempt)
	Primakov, Y. (OVR)	09/1998	
	Stepashin, S. (ind.)	05/1999	
	Putin, V. (Unity)	08/1999	
Putin, V.	Kasyanov, M. (ind.)	05/2000	post-presidential election
	Fradkov, M. (ind.)	03/2004	
	Fradkov, M. (ind.)	05/2004	post-presidential election
	Zubkov, V. (ER)	09/2007	
Medvedev, D.	Putin, V. (ER)	05/2008	post-presidential election
Putin, V.	Medvedev, D. (ER)	05/2012	post-presidential election
	Medvedev, D. (ER)	05/2018	post-presidential election

## Acronyms

12 Dec	Liberal-Democratic Union of 12 December
APB	Agro-Industrial Bloc
APR	Agrarian Party of Russia
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Derzhava	Great Power
DPR	Democratic Party of Russia
DVR	Russia's Democratic Choice
ER	United Russia
GS	Civilian Power
KRO	Congress of Russian Communities
KPRF	Communist Party of the Russian Federation
LDPR	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
ND	People's Deputies
NDR	Our Home is Russia
NPRF	People's Party of the Russian Federation
NRP	New Regional Policy
OVR	Fatherland-All Russia
PARNAS	People's Freedom Party
PD	Right Cause
PR	Party of Growth
PRES	Party of Russian Unity and Accord
Rodina	Motherland
RP	Russia's Way
RR	Regions of Russia
SPS	Union of Right Forces
SR	A Just Russia
VN!	Power to the People!
Yabloko	Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc
ZR	Women of Russia

# UKRAINE

## The extent of democracy

Democracy versus electoral autocracy in Ukraine has revolved more around presidential elections and presidents than parliamentary ones. The flawed presidential election of 1999 that re-elected Leonid Kuchma ushered in the first period of autocracy, which included the 2002 parliamentary election. The reaction against vote rigging in the 2004 presidential election in favour of Viktor Yanukovich led to the Orange Revolution and a re-run of the presidential run-off in 2005. However, Viktor Yanukovich would win the free and fair presidential election of 2010, and then would preside over the undemocratic parliamentary election of 2012. In 2014 Viktor Yanukovich would be forced from office by the Euromaiden protests against his pro-Russia policies.

## History

Ukraine was under Polish rule in the sixteenth century and then was briefly independent in the seventeenth century. It came under Russian control in the eighteenth century. In 1917 Ukraine became briefly independent once again, but then it was forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1922. In July 1990 the Ukraine Supreme Soviet issued a sovereignty declaration, followed in August 1991 by a formal declaration of independence. In February 2014 Russia occupied and in March 2014 annexed the Crimean peninsula, and from 2014 Russia forces also have occupied parts of the eastern rebel areas of Donetsk and Luhansk.

## Electoral system

The electoral system used in the 1994 Ukrainian election involved the 450 deputies all being elected in single-member constituencies on a majority basis with an

“against all” option and a second, run-off ballot of the top two candidates. If there was no absolute majority winner (of the total votes) after the second ballot then a new election was held between these two candidates. In addition, turnout had to be 50 percent in a constituency for the election to be valid. Failing this, a further election was held with the hopes of higher turnout, sometimes months later. No less than 112 seats were unfilled after the second ballot, including a majority of those in Kiev. By-elections over the next two years would fill most but not all of these seats.

Consequently, as of 1998 there has been no turnout requirement. However, as of 1998 there have been two different electoral systems used. The first has been a parallel system with half the deputies (225) still elected in single-member constituencies by majority vote, with the other 225 deputies elected in one nation-wide constituency by a party list proportional representation system the calculation of which does not take into account the results from the single-member seats. This system was used in 1998, 2002, 2012, and 2014 – though in 2014 the ratio was 47 percent single-member seats to 53 percent party list seats. The vote threshold here for the party list seats was 4 percent in 1998 and 2002 and 5 percent as of 2012. In contrast to this parallel system, in both 2006 and 2007 nation-wide party list proportional representation was used, with a 3 percent vote threshold.

## Political parties and cleavages

Ukraine initially did not have a very well-established party system, especially on the centre-right/pro-democratic side. In 1994 the party affiliations of candidates were not even listed on the ballot. Following the March/April 1994 election, independents were the largest single group represented in parliament, holding just over half of the seats! While in 1998 this figure dropped to 28 percent, independents still remained the second largest grouping in parliament. After elections many independents have drifted clearly into one grouping or another; however, they are not officially a member of any party.

Most actual parties in Ukraine can be divided into three groupings, though with shifting compositions. The left grouping in parliament has included communists, socialists, and a peasant party, as well as smaller socialist and agrarian parties. These parties are pro-Russian and anti-Western/anti-liberal. The **Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU)** was founded in 1993 with no legal claims to the Communist party which ruled Soviet Ukraine and which was banned in 1991 for allegedly supporting the anti-Mikhail Gorbachev coup in August 1991. The KPU's main base of support has been retirees, embittered workers, and others nostalgic for the Soviet past. It was represented in parliament until 2014. The **Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU)** was founded in 1991 by rank and file members of the ruling Communist Party, and the party did avoid recruiting any former high-ranking communists. The SPU advocated legal status for the Russian language and dual citizenship. It was one of the four main parties until 2007. The third party in the left grouping was the **Peasants' Party of Ukraine (SePU)**. Because both the SePU and the SPU relied on support from the rural population the two parties presented a joint list for

the 1998 election. The SPU suffered a split in 1996 when far left members left and formed the **Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU)**. The PSPU won 16 seats in 1998 but then its electoral bloc failed to clear the electoral threshold in 2002.

A centre grouping of parties existed in the Ukrainian parliament in the late 1990s. The larger parties in this grouping included the pro-reform **People's Democratic Party of Ukraine (NDPU)** which was formed in 1996 by a merger of two smaller centrist parties. More crucially, the NDPU was the main government party and was supported by pro-government business interests. The other big party in the centre was the **United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (OSDPU)**. The OSDPU drew on support from Ukrainians who agreed with the government's policies but did not like the parties or personalities associated with these policies. The OSDPU would stay in parliament until the 2006 election when it fell below the electoral threshold. The centre grouping also included three new parties after the 1998 election. The first, **Hromada ('Community')**, gained most of its support from businessmen eager for state subsidies. The second, the **Agrarian Party of Ukraine (APU)**, was supported by collective farm directors. Also new in the centre was the **Party of Greens of Ukraine (PZU)**, who chose the centre as the most reformist grouping.

The (centre-)right grouping of pro-Western and loosely liberal parties was initially the second weakest in parliament and contained the party which received the second largest number of votes in the 1998 election, the **People's Movement of Ukraine (NRU)**, or more commonly **Rukh ('Movement')**. Rukh, founded in 1989 as a civic movement (as the Communist Party was still the only legal party) and then in 1990 as a political party, was originally a broad-based democratic coalition similar to the popular fronts of the Baltic states. In the early 1990s, however, Rukh began to suffer from an identity crisis and began to support a moderately nationalist programme. It then clearly became the vehicle of the nationalist West Ukraine.

This centre-right grouping would be successful as of the 2002 parliamentary election, starting with the plurality win of the **Our Ukraine (NU)** grouping around Viktor Yushchenko, which included Rukh. Also winning support in this election was the **Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYT)**. Later on when blocs were banned the BYT reorganized itself as the **Fatherland** party. In 2012 a new anti-corruption party, the **Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR)**, would come third. In the 2014 election, UDAR would provide the core, at least organizationally, for the winning **Petro Poroshenko Bloc (Bloc PP)**. Also successful in 2014 was the **People's Front (NF)**, which split from Fatherland. Another seat-winning right-wing party in 2014 was the **Self Reliance (OS) Union**, based on Christian Democracy and localism.

Perhaps the most consequential part of the 2002 election was the formation of **For a United Ukraine (ZYU)**, created to support President Kuchma. Its key element, the **Party of Regions (PR)**, had existed as a marginal force since 1997 but would become the largest party in the 2006, 2007, and 2012 elections, drawing

support from older Russian-speaking and/or pro-Russia voters and often with a dubious commitment to democracy. The PR would essentially cease to exist after the 2014 Euromaiden protests, not running in the presidential or parliamentary election of that year. Elements of it did get back into parliament as the **Opposition Bloc (OB)**. Another party that briefly came out of ZYU was the **Lytvyn Bloc**.

The far right in Ukraine had at most marginal success until recently. In the 1990s, the only far-right group of any modest success was the **Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN)**. KUN won some representation in each of 1994 and 1998, then joined NU. The **Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU)** had neo-Nazi elements and would establish a paramilitary organization. In 2004, under a new leader, the party become **Svoboda (“Freedom”)**, still on the far right but without its neo-Nazi elements. Svoboda remained marginal for a couple of elections, but then in 2012 it jumped up to 10 percent of the vote. It remained in parliament after 2014, where it was joined on the far right by **Right Sector (PS)**, which has paramilitary roots and some neo-fascist elements. Finally, in 2012 the left populist and nationalist **Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko (PROL)** won a seat, and then cleared the party list electoral threshold in 2014. It is very much the personal vehicle of its leader.

ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE 1994–2002

	Election March/ April 1994		Post-election situation December 1995		Election March 1998		Post-election situation January 1999
	% V	# S	# S		% V	# S	# S
<i>Leftist parties</i>							
KPU	12.7	86	100		25.4	122	122
SePU	2.7	19	34	[	8.8	34	24
SPU	3.1	14	15	[			
PSPU	–	–			4.1	16	14
<i>Centrist parties</i>							
	1.8	11	23				
NDPU	–	–			5.2	29	72
OSDPU	–	–			4.1	17	24
Hromada	–	–			4.8	23	45
PZU	–	–			5.6	19	27
APU	–	–			3.8	8	15
<i>Rightist parties</i>							
Rukh	5.1	20	24		9.7	46	46
Other rightist	4.0	11	12		6.4	7	0

	<i>Election March/ April 1994</i>		<i>Post-election situation December 1995</i>	<i>Election March 1998</i>		<i>Post-election situation January 1999</i>
	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i># S</i>	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i># S</i>
<i>Far-right parties</i>						
KUN	1.3	5	3	2.8	5	
SNPU	0.2	0	0	0.2	1	0
Other far rightist	0.8	4	4	1.1	1	
Other parties	1.8	0	0	12.6	6	14
Independents	66.5	168	203		111	45
Against all lists				5.4		
Unfilled seats		112	32		5	2
TOTAL SEATS		450	450		450	450

	<i>Election March 2002</i>		<i>Post-election situation May 2002</i>	<i>Post-election situation October 2002</i>
	<i>% V</i>	<i># S</i>	<i># S</i>	<i># S</i>
KPU	20.8	66	64	61
Our Ukraine (NU)	24.5	111	119	110
ZYU	12.2	101	175	disbanded into eight different factions totalling 183 deputies
BYT	7.5	22	23	20
SPU	7.1	22	22	21
OSDPU	6.5	24	31	38
PSPU	3.3	0	0	0
Other parties	15.6	9	0	0
Independents		92	13	15
Against all lists	2.5			
Unfilled seats		3	3	2
TOTAL SEATS		450	450	450

*Note:* The 2002 election was held under electoral autocracy.



## ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE SINCE 2006

	2006		2007		2012		2014	
	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S	% V	# S
PR/OB	32.8	186	34.9	175	30.0	185	9.4	29
BYT/Fatherland	22.7	129	31.2	156	25.5	101	5.7	19
NU	14.2	81	14.4	72	1.1	0	–	–
SPU	5.8	33	2.9	0	0.5	0	–	–
KPU	3.7	21	5.5	27	13.2	32	3.9	0
Bloc Lytvyn	2.5	0	4.0	20	–	–	–	–
UDAR/Bloc PP	–	–	–	–	14.0	40	21.8	132
Svoboda	0.4	0	0.8	0	10.4	36	4.7	6
PS	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.8	1
PROL	–	–	–	–	1.1	1	7.4	22
NF	–	–	–	–	–	–	22.1	82
OS	–	–	–	–	–	–	11.0	33
Against all lists	1.8		2.8					
Others	16.1	0	3.5	0	4.2	7	12.2	3
Independents						43		96
Unfilled seats						5		27*
TOTAL SEATS		450		450		450		450

\* from non-voting areas in Crimea, Donetsk Oblast, and Luhansk Oblast.

Note: The 2012 election was held under electoral autocracy.

## Governments

Ukrainian prime ministers were non-partisan presidential appointees until the 2004 constitutional change to parliamentarianism (effective 2006). Since then governments, usually coalitions, have been formed either by the PR or by the main centre-right parties.

## UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1994

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
06/1994	Masol, V. (ind.)	35 (35)	(non-partisan technocratic government)
03/1995	Marchuk, Y. (ind.)	37 (37)	(non-partisan technocratic government)
05/1996	Lazarenko, P. (ind.)	44 (44)	(non-partisan technocratic government)
07/1997	Pustovoitenko, V. (ind.)	27 (27)	(non-partisan technocratic government)
12/1999	Yushchenko, V. (ind.)	21 (21)	(non-partisan technocratic government)
05/2001	Kinakh, A. (ind.)	20 (20)	(non-partisan technocratic government)
11/2002	Yanukovych, V. (PR)	22 (21)	(non-partisan technocratic government)
01/2005	Tymoshenko, Y. (BYT)	22 (21)	(non-partisan technocratic government)
09/2005	Yekhanurov, Y. (NU)	21 (20)	(non-partisan technocratic government)

<i>In power date (M/Y)</i>	<i>Prime minister (party)</i>	<i>#M (I)</i>	<i>Parties in Cabinet</i>
08/2006	Yanukovych, V. (PR)	24 (8)	PR KPU SPU
12/2007	Tymoshenko, Y. (BYT)	25 (6)	NU BYT
03/2010	Azarov, M. (PR)	29 (3)	PR Bloc Lytvyn
12/2012	Azarov, M. (PR)	23 (10)	PR
02/2014	Yatsenyuk, A. (Fatherland)	20 (10)	Fatherland Svoboda
12/2014	Yatsenyuk, A. (NF)	21 (2)	Bloc PP NF Fatherland OS PROL
09/2015	Yatsenyuk, A. (NF)	20 (2)	Bloc PP NF Fatherland OS
02/2016	Yatsenyuk, A. (NF)	20 (4)	Bloc PP NF
04/2016	Groysman, V. (BPP)	24 (4)	Bloc PP NF

### Acronyms and party names

APU	Agrarian Party of Ukraine
Bloc PP	Bloc Petro Poroshenko
BYT	Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc
Hromada	Community
KPU	Communist Party of Ukraine
KUN	Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists
NDPU	People's Democratic Party of Ukraine
NF	People's Front
NRU	People's Movement of Ukraine
NU	Our Ukraine
OB	Opposition Bloc
OS	Self Reliance
OSDPU	United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine
PR	Party of Regions
PROL	Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko
PS	Right Sector
PSPU	Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine
PZU	Party of Greens of Ukraine
RP	Radical Party
Rukh	Movement
SePU	Peasants' Party of Ukraine
SNPU	Social-National Party of Ukraine
SPU	Socialist Party of Ukraine
Svoboda	Freedom
UDAR	Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform
UHU	Ukrainian Helsinki Union
ZYU	For a United Ukraine