

# A Positive Effect of Political Dynasties: the case of France's 1940 enabling act\*

Jean Lacroix<sup>a</sup>, Pierre-Guillaume Méon<sup>a</sup>, Kim Oosterlinck<sup>a,b</sup>

## Abstract

The literature on political dynasties in democracies usually considers dynasties as a homogenous group and points out their negative effects. By contrast, we argue that political dynasties may differ according to their origin and that democratic dynasties - dynasties whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals - show a stronger support for democracy than other dynasties. This conclusion is based on the analysis of the vote by the French parliament on July 10, 1940 of an enabling act that granted full power to Marshall Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third French republic and aligning France with Nazi Germany. Using individual votes and newly-collected data from the biographies of the members of parliament, we observe that members of a democratic dynasty had a 7.6 to 9.0 percentage points higher probability to oppose the act than members of other political dynasties or elected representatives belonging to no political dynasty. Suggestive evidence points to the pro-democracy environment of democratic dynastic politicians as the main driver of this effect.

Keywords: Autocratic reversals, democratic dynasties, voting behavior.

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<sup>a</sup> Centre Emile Bernheim, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), avenue F.D. Roosevelt 21, CP 145/01, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium.

<sup>b</sup> Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 33 Great Sutton St, Clerkenwell, London EC1V 0DX, United-Kingdom

## 1. Introduction

Dynastic politicians, defined specifically as politicians who are related by blood to other individuals formerly holding political office (Dal Bó et al., 2009; Geys and Smith, 2017), have long been suspected to undermine the representative nature of democracies (Pareto, 1901; Michels, 1911). As a group, they are on average less educated (Geys, 2017), conduct poorer public policies (Braganca et al., 2015), put lower effort in politics (Rossi, 2017, Geys and Smith, 2017), and rely on clientelism (Cruz et al., 2017). Those results are obtained by pooling all dynastic politicians together. But should one really consider political dynasties as a monolithic group? or could extreme circumstances lead members of different political dynasties to vote in opposite fashion? In other words: is there ground to expect that political dynasties may be heterogeneous, prompting their members to act in different ways?

We argue that politicians belonging to a democratic dynasty are more likely than their non-dynastic peers to stand-up for democracy, should the necessity arise. A politician is considered as belonging to a democratic dynasty if he/she fulfills two criteria. First, the politician must belong to a dynasty. He/she should therefore be related by blood to other individuals formerly holding political office. Second, his/her dynasty has to qualify as democratic. We consider that a dynasty is democratic if its founder showed explicit support for democracy by either (1) supporting democratic reforms under autocracy or (2) by belonging to a party supporting democracy as political system in a democracy. More specifically, the founders of democratic dynasties must have opposed former autocratic regimes, supported the democratic regime in which they started their political career, or both. Conversely, the following dynastic politicians are considered as non-democratic: descendants of supporters of former autocratic regimes; descendants of politicians opposing the democracy they started their political career in; descendants of politicians showing no explicit support to democratic norms.

The conjecture, that politicians belonging to a democratic dynasty are more likely than their non-dynastic peers to stand-up for democracy, rests on a series of non-mutually exclusive reasons. Firstly, democratic political dynasties have a vested interest in democracy, because they survive thanks to the transmission of an electoral advantage (Camp, 1982, Dal Bó et al., 2009, Fiva and Smith, 2018). That advantage would disappear after an autocratic reversal. Secondly, democratic dynasties may cultivate and transmit a democratic culture resulting in a stronger attachment to democracy (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). Thirdly, democratic dynastic politicians evolve in a pro-democracy environment that may shape their

preferences and serve as a commitment device lengthening their horizon (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2009, Olson, 1993, and Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2017).

To study how dynastic politicians behave when democracy is threatened, we use one of the few historical cases in which a democratic parliament agreed to an autocratic reversal: the enabling act giving full powers to Marshall Pétain in France on July 10, 1940. On that day, the majority of the members of the French Parliament voted to surrender their powers to a dictator. We argue that this historical episode represents an ideal setting to test our hypothesis and this for several reasons.

Despite taking place in the wake of a military defeat, the vote was far from purely formal and was a turning point in many ways. First, the vote resulted in a new regime. The Members of Parliament (MPs) knew it meant the end of the Third French Republic and the advent of an autocratic regime later known as “Etat Français” (Odin, 1946; Ermakoff, 2008).

Second, the new government was no toothless legal fiction. It was the head of the official French State. As such, it was recognized by the US until 1943, when the latter recognized the French Committee of National Liberation as representing France. In early July 1940, newspapers mentioned this new regime as a permanent solution with long-term consequences.<sup>1</sup> Most of all, the new regime implemented the “révolution nationale” (“national revolution”), a radical conservative reform package based on Catholicism, political centralization, large capitalist corporations, and coercion. The most horrifying dimension of the program was the persecution of free masons and Jews by the French State. The infamous “statut des juifs” (“Jewish status”) passed on October 3 1940 banned Jews from elected positions and a series of professions such as the civil service, the army, professors, or teachers.

Third and most importantly, neither the military defeat nor the armistice signed with Germany on June 22 implied a regime change or the national revolution, as Paxton (1972) underlines. Paxton (1972) points out that, at the time of the vote, Hitler’s interest was in France remaining stable to keep financing the German war effort and serve as a stepping stone to invade Great Britain. Conversely, an autocratic transition implementing a series of radical reforms could have jeopardized his plans. France could therefore have maintained its regime

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<sup>1</sup> July 8, 1940, the newspaper “le Matin” states “It (=the enabling Act) will be an actual revolution in French history”. July 9, 1940, the newspaper “Le petit Parisien” states “what existed yesterday should not exist tomorrow”. July 10, 1940, the newspaper “Le Temps” mentions the delegation of power as a way to “provide our country with a new soul” and the newspaper “La Croix” mentions a “new order”.

despite German occupation. It could have appointed a caretaking government to run the country, like Belgium or the Netherlands for instance did. The same applies to the national revolution and even to the Jewish status. Paxton (1972) stresses that he could find no evidence of a German demand about France's policy towards Jews until August 1941. Until then, the regime was responsible for its anti-Semitic policy.

Fourth, the result of the vote was not a foregone conclusion since abstention was minimal (20 votes). Since abstention was a way for presidents of the two chambers and for people with a special role in the Parliament to show their neutrality in the debate<sup>2</sup>, this figure is an upper bound of people willing to abstain because they considered the result as irrelevant. If the vote had been a foregone conclusion, the level of abstention would have, on the contrary, been extremely high. Moreover, one would wonder why MPs bothered making a difficult trip to Vichy in a country devastated by war just to cast a useless ballot.

Furthermore, if the vote had been insubstantial, very few MPs would have opposed the act considering the risks associated to their position. It would indeed have been much easier and less risky to just follow the majority and vote in favor. The case of their German homologues clearly illustrated the risk of opposing an enabling act. A few years earlier, on March 23 1933, the Reichstag had surrendered power to Hitler in a vote that was very similar to the one taking place in Vichy. Otto Wels, the Chairman of the Socialist Democratic Party, was the only one who spoke against the enabling act (Ermakoff, 2008). After the vote, he was forced into exile and stripped from his citizenship. Voting against the enabling act thus entailed risks, of which French MP were aware when they casted their vote.

Finally, contemporaneous witnesses stress the emotional burden created by the vote (Ermakoff, 2008). Some MPs who had supported the act left the room in tears. That is again hard to reconcile with the idea that the vote was trivial.

Despite the practical difficulty to join Vichy, the perceived risk of standing out, and the emotional burden involved, 80 MPs, tallying 12% of those who took part in the vote, opposed the act. We therefore posit that the vote was substantial and opposing the act meaningful. One could argue that the opposition was a way to undermine the new regime and maybe pave the way for another one abroad. Or as we do, it might have reflected the interests of members of democratic political dynasties. It is precisely because the vote was not unanimous that we can

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<sup>2</sup> This is for instance how the chairman of the Chamber of deputies, Edouard Herriot, motivated his abstention (see Wieviorka, 2001).

investigate the determinants of the votes of individual MPs and gauge the effect of being a dynastic politician.

In addition to being an instance of a decision by a democratic parliament to end democracy, the vote has three key features that allow us to study the role of dynasties. First, we know the vote of each single MP. Indeed, the *Journal officiel de la République Française*, the bulletin giving details of laws and official announcements, reports the vote cast by each individual MP. We are therefore able to match the vote of each MP with his individual characteristics using each MP's official biography as displayed in the *Dictionnaire des députés et sénateurs français (1889-1940)*.

Second, the vote took place at a time when the Third French Republic was seventy years old. Democratic dynasties therefore had had time to appear. Thanks to the *Dictionnaire des députés et sénateurs français (1889-1940)*, we can determine whether the father, the grandfather, the uncle or the brother of a MP was an elected politician. Moreover, we can observe whether the forbearers of that MP supported democracy. We can therefore determine whether a MP belonged to a dynasty and whether his dynasty was democratic and compare the votes of dynastic and non-dynastic MPs to determine the effect on the vote of belonging to a dynasty.<sup>3</sup>

Third, as the vote took place in chaotic circumstances, political parties had little control over the votes of individual MPs. MPs were isolated from their traditional networks. Coordination along party lines and access to networks outside of Parliament was difficult. Under these conditions, the decision of MPs to support or oppose the enabling act was to a large extent an individual decision, independent of party lines.

We observe that members of democratic dynasties had a 7.6 to 9.0 percentage points higher probability to oppose the enabling act. Robustness checks show that these results do not emerge because of selection into the vote or of the way we treat abstention. Further propensity score estimates also prove that baseline results still hold after rebalancing our sample on observables. We moreover report additional evidence suggesting that the observed difference was driven by the exposition of democratic dynastic politicians to a pro-democracy environment fostering the cultural transmission of democratic values from democrat fathers to sons. This explanation does not rule out others.

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<sup>3</sup> We use the masculine when referring to MPs in this paper, because all French MPs were male at the time of the vote of the enabling act.

By investigating the behavior of dynastic politicians in the vote on the 1940 enabling act, our paper contributes to four strands of literature. Firstly, it complements the emerging literature on political dynasties (Dal Bó et al., 2009, Geys, 2017) by showing that political dynasties should not be viewed as homogenous. We provide evidence that dynasties that endorsed the democratic ideal from the onset behaved differently from those that did not. Furthermore, while that literature has so far insisted on the negative consequences of dynasties, the present paper reports a positive effect of some of them: democratic dynasties may help consolidate democracy. Secondly, our paper contributes to the general literature on autocratic reversals (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, Svobik 2008, 2015) and on the decision by democratic parliaments to pave the way to an autocratic regime (Ermakoff, 2008), by showing that democratic dynasties may contribute to stabilizing democracy. Thirdly, our paper suggests a dimension of democratic consolidations (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Svobik, 2008, 2015) at least in the long term. Because democratic dynasties take time to emerge and democratic dynastic politicians may be more likely to stand up for democracy, democratic dynasties could be a dimension of what Persson and Tabellini (2009) refer to as “democratic capital”. When a democratic regime has just been established, democratic dynasties simply cannot exist. As time goes by, the offspring of elected officials can eventually start a political career, thereby spawning a dynasty. Finally, because French MPs were subject to pressures (Calef, 1988), our paper indirectly contributes to the literature on behavior under extreme conditions (Frey et al., 2011).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 argues that democratic dynastic politicians should be more likely than their peers to defend democracy and emphasizes key mechanisms. Section 3 depicts the political and institutional context in 1940 France. Section 4 describes our data and the method used. Section 5 reports the baseline results, whereas Section 6 provides some robustness checks. Section 7 offers suggestive evidence on the transmission channels of democratic dynasties to MPs votes. Section 8 concludes.

## **2. Democratic dynasties and the defense of democracy**

In this section, we argue that three mechanisms make democratic dynastic politicians more likely to defend democracy when it is at stake. First, democratic dynastic politicians have a vested interest in the survival of democracy. Second, democratic dynastic politicians may have internalized democratic norms more than their peers. Third, dynastic politicians

were active in the democratic environment of their forbearers; reinforcing the second transmission channel.

### ***2.1 A vested interest in democracy***

Dynastic politicians have a direct stake in the survival of democracy, because the benefits of belonging to a democratic dynasty only materialize in that regime. Dal Bó et al. (2009) document the electoral advantage of dynasties by showing that the probability for a member of the US Congress to have a relative entering Congress in the future increases with the time that the member has spent in Congress. They estimate that having served more than one term doubles the probability that a congressperson will have a relative entering Congress. Dal Bó et al. (2009) suggest that the electoral advantage of dynastic politicians is likely due to the fact that they inherit the recognition or contacts of their predecessors. Querubin (2016) reports similar results for the Philippines and Rossi (2017) for Argentina.<sup>4</sup> Another evidence of the advantage of dynastic politicians is that they do not need to invest in as much human capital as other politicians to get elected (Daniele and Geys, 2014, Geys, 2017) and can put less effort in politics (Rossi, 2017).

The advantage of democratic dynasties may moreover be economic in addition to being political. Amore et al. (2015) observe that the offspring of Danish mayors have higher incomes when their parents run a larger municipality or a municipality where the mayor has more power. By the same token, Gagliarducci and Manacorda (2016), Fafchamps and Labonne (2017), and Folke et al. (2017) observe that relatives of politicians have higher incomes, respectively in Italy, the Philippines, and Sweden. In a nutshell, democratic dynasties likely pay off.

The benefits of belonging to a democratic dynasty are conditional on the regime remaining democratic. Consequently, democratic dynastic politicians have a stake in preventing autocratic reversals. They should therefore be more likely than their non-dynastic or non-democratic peers to stand against an autocratic reversal, simply out of self-interest.

### ***2.2 A stronger preference for democracy***

Democratic dynasties likely nurture a culture that fosters the preference of their offspring for democracy. Democratic dynastic politicians may accordingly have an intrinsic stronger attachment to democracy. This mechanism would be in line with Bisin and Verdier's (2001)

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<sup>4</sup> The result is however not universal (Van Coppenolle, 2017, Fiva and Smith, 2018). Fiva and Smith (2018) argue that the advantage is likely stronger in candidate- than in party-centered systems. As we will underline in the next section, parties were weak in 1940 France. The dynastic advantage was therefore likely strong.

model of cultural transmission. Bisin and Verdier (2001) assume that families invest in the transmission of values. Parents transmit norms they consider beneficial to their offspring. As such, politicians who have been democratically elected or even have participated in the establishment of democracy in their country are likely to transmit democratic values to their offspring. In a situation where defending democracy may be costly, democratic dynastic politicians will weigh the cost of standing up for democracy against their intrinsic preference for democracy and will thus be more likely to oppose an autocratic reversal.

A dynasty's democratic culture may not only affect the values of its members but also their beliefs in the benefits of the system. If a dynasty of politicians has been able to emerge in a democracy, those politicians will be more likely to consider the regime as beneficial. Their assessment of the relevance of the regime will be improved by their forbearers' experiences with democracy. This intuition rests on Piketty's (1995) model of dynastic learning. In that model, voters infer the relative role of luck and effort on economic success from their family history. If they observe upward mobility, they will update the role of effort versus luck upward and support less redistribution. Conversely, if their family history displays downward mobility, they will update downward the role of effort, and support more redistribution. The same logic may apply to the belief in the benefits of democracy. A politician's belief in the benefits of democracy would depend on the political career of his forbearers in the regime. Members of dynasties of democratically-elected politicians should therefore more strongly believe that democracy is beneficial. This would not only prompt them to value that regime more, but also to be less permeable to arguments blaming it to motivate a return to autocracy.

### ***2.3 Norms enforcement***

The preference for democratic dynastic politicians may be reinforced by the monitoring of the dynasty itself as Geys and Smith (2017) suggest. The whole family may thus manage the actions of its members to maintain its reputation and its values. The argument is in line with Olson's (1993) argument that hereditary rule lengthens the horizon of leaders. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2017) model and test Olson's intuition. In line with the argument, they find that dynastic leaders perform better in countries with low executive constraints. Dynasties may thus be able to constrain their members where other controls are ineffective.

Along the same lines, Myerson (2008, 2015) demonstrates how sovereign leaders accept to bind their actions to raise support from their court, electorate, or environment. In a similar

manner, forbearers' environment likely binds democratic dynastic politicians' actions in democracy. Indeed the "transmission of political beliefs and attitudes from parents to children will, in general, be higher in more politicized family environments" (Jennings et al., 2009). Similarly, in Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2009), agents have an incentive to conform to the behavior of their peers. Because the peers of the offspring are likely similar to the peers of their parents, the behavior of offspring will be close to the behavior of their parents even if the latter make no attempt at influencing their offspring (Jennings and Niemi, 1968). Empirically, Jennings et al. (2009) find evidence of higher transmission of values when parents are more politicized and provide more consistent cues to their offspring. Accordingly, democratic dynastic politicians have an incentive to value democracy because like their forbearers they are prompted to do so by their social environment. This could prove influential in circumstances where institutions are in danger, like in the vote for an autocratic reversal. Such environments temper MPs acquiescence as the majority converges towards an autocratic reversal (Camerer and Fehr, 2006).

### **3. Historical background**

In this section, we provide the historical background needed to understand the vote of July 1940. We first present the advent of the Third Republic and then the historical and political contexts of the vote.

France's war against Prussia led to the demise of Emperor Napoleon III in 1870 and the end of the French Second Empire. The fall of Napoleon III led to the establishment of the French Third Republic. Its infancy was marked by the defeat in the Franco-Prussian war (1870-1871). After several years of turmoil, the institutions of the republic were defined by the Constitutional Laws of 1875.

The lower chamber, the Chamber of Deputies, was elected by universal suffrage, whereas the upper chamber, the Senate, was elected indirectly. The reunion of both chambers formed the National Assembly. The head of state was the President of the Republic, who was elected by the National Assembly. The system was complemented by the government, referred to as the Council of Ministers and chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers. The President of the Republic had limited powers but appointed the President of the Council of Ministers, who held effective executive power. The constitution created a strictly bicameral parliamentary democracy: both chambers had to vote each law in the same wording. Changing the constitution required a vote of the two chambers.

The Battle of France started on May 10, 1940. In just six weeks, Germany managed to take control of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and was occupying a large portion of France. The speed of the military defeat had direct political repercussions in France. On June 16, 1940, the President of the council of Ministers, Paul Reynaud, resigned because his government was divided about the armistice. To replace him, the President of the Republic, Albert Lebrun, appointed Marshall Philippe Pétain. The 84-years-old Marshall was a popular World War I hero.<sup>5</sup> He had acted as Vice-president of the Council of Ministers since May 18 1940. Even though Paul Reynaud had invited him to join his government, both men disagreed on the desirability of asking for an armistice. Pétain being in favor, less than a week after his appointment, on June 22, 1940, he signed an armistice with Germany officializing the occupation of the northern half of France. The demarcation line between occupied and “free” France was not well-established at the local level yet. It was nevertheless clear that the line would cross some departments (Alary, 1995, p.31).<sup>6</sup>

As new President of the Council of Ministers, Marshall Pétain appointed Pierre Laval as Vice-President of the Council of Ministers on June 23. He later authorized him to speak on his behalf to the chambers. Pierre Laval viewed the military defeat as an opportunity to replace the republic by an authoritarian regime aligned with Germany and Italy.<sup>7</sup> In doing so, he could leverage on his supporters within the Assembly and on a rising anti-parliamentarian sentiment. Anti-parliamentarian movements had existed from the onset of the Third Republic and had gained momentum during the 1930s. More generally, the Third Republic was considered as being to blame for the military defeat, and a consensus on the necessity to renew political institutions had emerged.<sup>8</sup>

Pierre Laval held several information meetings and announced an “alignment with totalitarian states”, as senator Jean Taurines for instance reported (cited in Ermakoff, 2008, p. 121). The members of the parliament could therefore not ignore his intention or that the bill he was planning meant the end of the republic. Pierre Laval’s project for an autocratic reversal was formerly supported by 18 members of the parliament signing the “Bergery

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<sup>5</sup> He was the commander of the allied troops during the battle of Verdun and was often referred to as the “victor of Verdun”. His handling of the 1917 mutinies had been perceived as humane, earning him a reputation for being concerned with the situation of soldiers and avoiding bloodsheds.

<sup>6</sup> Departments, “départements” in French, are the main administrative division in France. They are divided in smaller districts where deputies are elected.

<sup>7</sup> Pierre Laval was an influential politician of the Third Republic. He had been elected as a socialist deputy in 1914, served as minister several times and twice as President of the Council of Ministers. He had also been the French ambassador in Italy, where he befriended Benito Mussolini.

<sup>8</sup> On July 9, 1940, the National Assembly voted on the principle of a constitutional reform. Only three deputies and one senator opposed the principle of a constitutional revision.

declaration” for a “new authoritarian order”.<sup>9</sup> Yet, the majority of the members of the parliament were not a priori in favor of an autocratic regime. In particular, the Chamber of Deputies had been elected in 1936, leading to a left-wing coalition known as the Popular Front.

The vote of the enabling act took place in Vichy exactly eighteen days after the armistice was signed, and sixteen after it came into force (Wieviorka, 2001, p.25). The choice of location had been dictated by the successive retreats the government had been forced to undertake in order to avoid being captured. The government called the parliament at night on July 4.<sup>10</sup> Deputies and senators were scattered all over the country. Some MPs were still in their constituency, other were refugees. Some were still in the army, whereas others were prisoners of war, or had been killed in action (Wieviorka, 2001, p.31). Traveling was made particularly difficult by the disorganization caused by the war. Less than 300 MPs were present in Vichy by July, 8 – representing 45% of MPs voting in July 10, 1940 and around 36% of all MPs (Ermakoff, 2008, p.127). For those who had managed to reach the city, this had been at the cost of an exhausting trip. Not only was it difficult for members of the parliament to get to Vichy, it was also difficult for them to find a place to stay and work. Political parties had collapsed, making it even more difficult to coordinate on an opposition to the bill<sup>11</sup>. In short, debates and coordination before the vote were almost impossible. Even more so because MPs only received a draft of the bill on July 9, the day before the vote.

Two groups of MPs nonetheless explicitly managed to oppose Pierre Laval’s project. Although they agreed on the need for a transition period, they emphasized the necessity to ensure the stability of the republican regime. First, 38 Senators veterans of the First World War signed the “Taurines motion”.<sup>12</sup> The motion suggested to ask Marshal Pétain to draft a new constitution, but stipulated that the writing of the constitution had to be performed under the supervision of the competent commissions of the parliament and formally approved “by the Nation”. This motion did not oppose the delegation of power but wanted to limit the influence of Pierre Laval on future institutions. Second, 27 members of the parliament signed

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<sup>9</sup> The declaration was named after Gaston Bergery, a left-of-center deputy, who drafted it.

<sup>10</sup> Vichy was chosen because its hotels could accommodate the members of the government, of the parliament, and of the administration.

<sup>11</sup> On July 9<sup>th</sup> 1940, Senator Jean-Marie Froget wrote in a letter to his daughter “There is no party anymore” (Calef, 1988, p. 432).

<sup>12</sup> The motion was named after Jean Taurines, a conservative senator and veteran of World War I, who drafted it.

the “Badie declaration”, on July 9, which plainly opposed the dismantlement of the Republic, arguing that the transition had to be political but not constitutional.<sup>13</sup>

MPs were subject to moral pressures. On July 4, journalists were invited to a ceremonial drill of French units, organized in Clermont-Ferrand, only seventy kilometers north of Vichy, and attended by high-rank military officials. At the end of the drill General Maxime Weygand, Supreme Commander of the French army during the last weeks of the battle of France and Minister for defense in Marshal Pétain’s government, declared “we must clean the country of the people who drove it where it is” (Calef 1988, p.253). His statement lent credence to the possibility of a coup d’état and was used by Pierre Laval and his supporters. Rumors of a military coup circulated (Ermakoff, 2008, p.88). On the day of the vote, the casino where the chambers convened was surrounded by the military police.

On July 10, 1940, the French Parliament was asked to vote on a one-paragraph act reading: “The Parliament provides full powers to the Government of the Republic, under the authority and the signature of Marshall Pétain. As a consequence, a new constitution for the French State will be promulgated by one or several Acts. This Constitution will guarantee the notion of Work, Family and Fatherland. It will be ratified by the Nation and applied by the Assemblies it will have created”.<sup>14</sup> Passing the act meant the end of the Third French Republic. This was no trivial matter. The Third Republic was 65 years old in 1940 and it remains to this day the longest-lasting republican regime in French history. MPs voted simultaneously and each individual ballot was public after clerks’ counting.

Under pressure, under circumstances where organizing an opposition was materially difficult, standing out could expose the members of the parliament to retaliations. Moreover, in a context of uncertainty, they could perceive the view of the majority as the better option. The members of the parliament therefore had an incentive to conform to the vote of their peers, which led to the bill being passed (Ermakoff, 2008). Yet, some of them opposed the bill and casted a no vote. Previous section suggests that democratic dynastic politicians could have been more likely to do so, because they had a vested interest in maintaining a democratic regime, because they had stronger democratic norms, and also because their upbringing and

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<sup>13</sup> The motion was led by Vincent Badie, a left-of-center deputy.

<sup>14</sup> « L’Assemblée nationale donne tous pouvoirs au Gouvernement de la République, sous l’autorité et la signature du maréchal Pétain, à l’effet de promulguer par un ou plusieurs actes une nouvelle constitution de l’État français. Cette constitution devra garantir les droits du travail, de la famille et de la patrie. Elle sera ratifiée par la Nation et appliquée par les Assemblées qu’elle aura créées. ».

environment could give them a stronger sense that maintaining democracy was a viable and desirable option. The next section tests that hypothesis.

## 4. Data and method

### 4.1 Data

Our dataset draws upon the *Dictionnaire des parlementaires de 1889 à 1940*, written by Jean Joly. The websites of the French Assembly and Senate retrieve each MP's official biography. It encompasses biographic information (including the genealogy) of the 847 members of Parliament in 1940. Since biographies are written in a standardized way, we are able to retrieve numerous pieces of information from the *Dictionnaire* with a very limited bias.

### Dynasties

The main variable of interest (the dynastic dummy) equals one if a MP belongs to a dynasty. To be part of a dynasty a politician must have at least a forbearer who held a political mandate at the national or the local level. The *Dictionnaire* follows an alphabetical order. If a politician had a forbearer in politics, the first paragraph of his biography systematically mentions it stating where to find his forbearer in the *Dictionnaire*. (i.e. "son of the previous" or "his grand-father is..." when surname were different). If a previous dynastic member is mentioned; so are his political mandates. Hence even if this forbearer is not in the *Dictionnaire* we know which (local) political mandates he held.

*Democratic and Non-Democratic dynasties:* We distinguish between members of democratic dynasties and others. To define the democratic dynasty dummy, we apply, to the French case, the definition of democratic dynasties presented in the introduction. Accordingly, to qualify as democratic, the founders of democratic dynasties must either have opposed former autocratic regimes or supported one of the French republics. In practice founders of political dynasties who opposed the following autocratic regimes: the absolute monarchy, the July Monarchy, or the two Napoleonic empires, started a democratic-dynasty. Additionally, founders of political dynasties who belonged to the parties of the Third Republic in support of the republic also started democratic-dynasties.<sup>15</sup> By contrast, if the

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<sup>15</sup> The Republican Federation had an ambiguous position towards democratic institutions (see Agrikoliansky, 2016) whereas the Catholic of Liberal Action was created as a result of Pope Leo XIII encyclicals "On the Church and State in France" prompting catholic to take part in French institutions to defend catholic values.

founder of the dynasty either (1) supported an autocratic regime, (2) was a member of a party showing no clear support to democratic ideals during the Third Republic (Monarchist, Bonapartists, Conservative and members of the Republican Federation and the Catholic of Liberal Action), or (3) was affiliated to no party, the dynasty he started will not qualify as democratic.

Our definition of democratic dynasties is conservative, as it excludes non-affiliated politicians. This definition ensures that founders of democratic dynasties explicitly stood for democracy. By applying it, we may have underestimated the number of descendants of politicians holding democratic values. Those errors would however induce a downward-bias in our estimations and go against finding an effect of democratic dynasties on the probability to oppose the enabling act.

Using biographies also circumvent a caveat of other papers on dynasties using surname similarities (e.g. Geys, 2017; Cruz et al., 2017): the information on the existence of a politician forbearer is sure. Thanks to biographies we are also able to identify links between a politician and a forbearer on his maternal side. We identify 126 dynasties among the 847 MPs in 1940 (15%). This proportion exceeds the one in other studies on dynasties (Dal Bó et al., 2009) and is in line with evidence on dynasties presented in Fiva and Smith (2018). The higher proportion observed in our case is likely due to the fact that we also capture forebearers with a different surname.

Out of the 847 MPs in activity in 1940, 126 (15%) were dynastic politicians out of which 66 belonged to a democratic dynasty (7.8%). Some aristocratic dynasties from the “July Monarchy” (1830-1848) still persisted. 47 percent of dynastic politicians belonged to dynasties founded by their father. In some cases, they however belonged to dynasties founded by older family members or even by their older brothers. This heterogeneity in dynasties types allows a better understanding of the transmission channels of our effects.

All dynastic politicians and the founder of their dynasties are presented in Appendix C2.

#### *Votes during the Enabling Act*

Data on the vote of the enabling act comes from the *Journal officiel de la République française* of July 11<sup>th</sup> 1940. We identify three groups: opponents to the reform (80 of the 669 voters – 12 percent), 20 out of 669 abstained (3 percent) and 569 of the 669 voters supported the reform (85 percent).

### *Individuals characteristics*

In addition to votes and dynastic status, we also control for a series of characteristics of the members of the parliament. The sources of all variables are described in Appendix C3.

*Age* is a variable equal to the age of the MP at the moment of the vote. The effect of age is ambiguous. On one hand, an old deputy would not suffer much from an autocratic reversal (since his career prospects would be null); whereas it would be the opposite for a young one. This would render the likelihood to support the act higher. On the other hand, an older deputy would also benefit from an extended experience with the regime and probably a sentimental link to it. In his case he would be less likely to vote for the reversal.

*Belonging to the Senate.* We add a dummy variable equaling 1 if the MP belonged to the Senate. Access to the Senate would also be easier with a dynastic advantage and might have influenced the vote if Chamber-specific dynamics existed.<sup>16</sup> Due to the differences in their nomination, Senators (*sénateurs*) and Deputies (*députés*) might also have faced different incentives in the vote. Indeed Senators, older by nature, define themselves as guarantors of the Republic. For his first allocution of the 1936-1940 mandate, the president of the Senate, Jules Jeanneney, states “True to its traditions, the Senate acts as the attentive guardian of the Republican institutions”.<sup>17</sup>

*Département means* are two measures of peer effect measuring the level of abstention and of opposition of MPs from the same *département*. It therefore accounts for any correlation in the vote between MPs of the same *département* either due to local conditions or to their direct interaction.

*Jewish MP* is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the MP was Jewish. We control for the Jewishness of MPs since Pierre Laval, leader of the enabling act project directly stated that the vote would allow an alignment with Nazi Germany (cf. Ermakoff, 2008, p121). Jewish MP could have internalized the risk of being killed or deported in case of such an alignment.

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<sup>16</sup> Deputies were elected in a popular vote using male universal suffrage. Constitutionally, the Senate is composed of older politicians already having a career and elected by local politicians (see Article 4 of the constitutional law of February 24<sup>th</sup> 1875 on the organization of the Senate). This difference in the election of the two Chambers may lead to different usages of the dynastic advantage. In indirect elections, the dynastic advantage would be more decisive thanks to the political networks transmitted by dynasties.

<sup>17</sup> *Journal officiel de la République – Débat au Sénat (21 Janvier 1936).*

*Occupied department.* A dummy variable takes a value of 1 if a MP's *département* is occupied whereas another dummy exists for *départements* crossed by the demarcation line at the time of the vote. Controlling for German occupation allows for reducing a bias which would emerge if dynasties are spatially correlated and occupation impacted the vote.

*Political Orientation:* We also control for political orientations in case democratic values would correlate with political orientation. We add two dummy variables according to Ermakoff (2008, p35) definition of Leftists and Centrists parties. Other politicians represent rightist parties and compose the reference group.

*Professional Occupation.* Dummy variables control for the MPs professional occupation. We distinguish between journalist, law-related, doctor, civil-servant and low-skilled. The reference group is professional politicians. Controlling for occupations allows taking into account differences in the discounting of the advantage of being a politician at the end of the Third Republic. Thanks to the outside options offered by his professional activity, a firm owner would not expect to lose as much as a professional politician if the Third Republic was abolished. Adding occupations as control variables takes also corporation-specific dynamics in the vote into account. Professionals, such as lawyers and doctors, might oppose the reform more since they benefit from local networks protecting them from possible retaliations. Lawyers might as well have a better intuition on the constitutional consequences of the vote, which would lead to higher opposition in that corporation (as hypothesized in Ermakoff, 2008, p230).

*WWI veteran* is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the MP was World War I veteran. We expect these members of parliament to be more willing to approve the reform. We conjecture these veterans were more likely to admire Marshall Pétain, a hero of World War I. They could also have been more inclined to support pacifism (Gelpi and Feaver, 2002; Horowitz and Stam, 2014) leading to the approbation of the Act in order to avoid fueling tensions with Germany.

*Years of study* is a variable equal to the number of years of study of a MP. This information often is mentioned in the *Dictionnaire*. If not, we use the years of study needed to

obtain the highest degree a politician has (or the sum of years of study needed to obtain all the diploma a MP has).<sup>18</sup>

Table 1 separately reports descriptive statistics on observable variables for members of democratic dynasties, members of non-democratic dynasties, and non-dynastic MPs.<sup>19</sup> The left-hand side panel reports averages and standard deviations and the right-hand side one reports differences in those averages.

\*\*\* Insert Table 1 here \*\*\*

The fourth column shows differences between non-dynastic and democratic dynastic politicians. Specifically, democratic dynastic politicians accumulated nearly one and a half more year of education than non-democratic dynastic politicians. The difference is statistically significant at the one-percent level. They also held low-skilled jobs less often and law-related positions more often than non-dynastic politicians, the differences being statistically significant at the five- and one-percent levels.<sup>20</sup> Democratic dynastic politicians were also less likely to have a connection with agricultural unions but more likely to have held a special role in the Assembly, for instance as a Chamber Secretary.

Moreover, democratic dynastic politicians did not only differ from their non-dynastic but also from their non-democratic dynastic peers. They were less frequently Jewish, although the difference is only significant at the ten-percent level. They were less likely to have been decorated than their non-democratic dynastic peers. Conversely, they were more likely to be free-mason, at the five-percent level of significance, and would receive fewer applauses in debates, although only at the ten-percent level. Democratic dynastic politicians had accumulated 1.73 more years of study than their non-democratic homologues, were less likely to have held a low-skill job and more likely a law-related job. Finally, they were also less likely to have a connection with agricultural unions but more likely to have held a special role in the Assembly.

The upshot of Table 1 is that democratic dynastic politicians were different from other politicians. They differed in several dimensions from non-dynastic politicians and in even more dimensions from non-democratic dynastic politicians. One may therefore expect those

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<sup>18</sup> The only exception is for doctoral studies having no predefined curriculum. If a MP obtained a PhD, then we consider 8 years of study, the latter defined typical numbers of years of study to obtain a PhD.

<sup>19</sup> To save on space, we only report variable for which we could observe differences that were statistically significant. By default, the other individual characteristics did not differ between democratic dynastic politicians and non-democratic dynastic politicians.

<sup>20</sup> Several examples show they are land-owners managing agricultural exploitations.

politicians to have cast a different ballot in the vote on the enabling act. Moreover, the observed differences may have affected their vote. The statistical models that we describe in the next section will allow us to measure the extent to which they did.

In a first pass, we can compare the votes of non-dynastic, democratic dynastic and non-democratic dynastic politicians. Figure 1 accordingly displays the share of votes opposing the act cast by each group and the difference in opposition to the act across groups above each bracket.




Figure 1: Mean comparison – Shares of MPs opposing the act  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

While 11.4 percent of non-dynastic politicians and 7.8 percent of politicians from non-democratic dynasties opposed the enabling act, 21.1 percent of democratic dynastic politicians did. The difference between non-dynastic and non-democratic dynastic politicians is not statistically different. By contrast politicians from democratic dynasties showed more opposition to the act than any other group. The difference is moreover always significant beyond the ten-percent level of confidence.

**4.2 Methodology**

In order to further assess the importance of dynasties in the likelihood of opposing the reform, and to distinguish the effect of observable characteristics, we estimate the following model:

$$\text{Prob}(\text{Vote}_i = \text{No}) = f(\alpha + \beta_1 \text{Democratic Dynasty}_i + \Gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i) \quad (1)$$

Where  $\text{Prob}(\text{Vote}_i = \text{No})$  is the probability of opposing the reform.  $\text{DemocraticDynasty}_i$  is equal to one if a MP is from a democratic dynasty.  $X_i$  is a set of control variables.  $\alpha$  and  $\beta_1$  are coefficients.  $\Gamma$  is a vector of coefficients, and  $\varepsilon_i$  the error term. All models are estimated using robust to heteroscedasticity term of errors.<sup>21</sup>

Opposing the reform is defined as having voted “No”. As highlighted in the introduction, abstention in the vote for the enabling act cannot be interpreted as opposition to the reform. We therefore do not take it into account in our baseline model and only contrast “No” and “Yes” votes.<sup>22</sup>

As the dependent variable is a dummy variable, the model is estimated as a binary logit model.

## 5. Baseline results

Table 2 reports the results of our baseline regressions. It contrasts models where all dynastic politicians are pooled together, in odd-numbered columns and models where we distinguish democratic and non-democratic politicians, in even-numbered columns. In all cases, the reference category is the group of non-dynastic politicians.

\*\*\* INSERT TABLE 2 HERE \*\*\*

Column 2.1 reports a bivariate regression controlling for a single dummy variable pooling all dynastic politicians, both dynastic and non-dynastic. The coefficient of that variable fails to be statistically significant at standard levels of significance. By contrast Column 2.2 shows that, when democratic and non-democratic politicians are distinguished, the coefficient of the dummy capturing democratic dynastic politicians is positive and statistically significant, implying that democratic dynastic politicians opposed the enabling act significantly more than their non-dynastic peers. Conversely, the coefficient of the variable capturing non-democratic dynastic politicians is negative and fails to be significant at standard levels, implying that the voting behavior of non-democratic dynastic politicians did not differ from the behavior of non-dynastic politicians. This suggests that the non-result

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<sup>21</sup> Standard errors are not clustered in baseline results. Results remain significant if we cluster standard errors at the *département* or at the party level.

<sup>22</sup> Including the abstentions as votes against the act does not change our results. Furthermore, our results remain robust when using ordered logit or multinomial logit and support this interpretation as well. (See Section 6.2)

obtained for the dynasty dummy variable was driven by the heterogeneity among dynastic politicians. It is most of all evidence in favor of our presumption that democratic and non-democratic dynastic politicians voted differently.

Columns 2.3 and 2.4 report similar regressions controlling for the observable characteristics of politicians. Two of those characteristics exhibit a statistically significant and positive coefficient: being a free mason, at the five-percent level, and having a medical profession, at the ten-percent level. Accordingly, free masons and politicians holding a medical profession were more likely to oppose the enabling act. No other individual characteristic appears significantly in the regressions.

More to the point, the dynastic dummy variable now exhibits a positive coefficient in Regression 2.3, suggesting a general effect of being a dynastic politician, regardless of the type of dynasty. However, when democratic and non-democratic dynasties are distinguished in Regression 2.4, it appears that the effect is entirely driven by democratic dynastic politicians. Specifically, the coefficient of the democratic dynastic dummy variable is positive and significant at the one-percent level while the coefficient of the non-democratic dynastic dummy fails to be significant at any accepted level.

Regressions 2.3 and 2.4 therefore confirm the two key findings of Regressions 2.1 and 2.2. Firstly, democratic dynastic politicians were more likely to oppose the enabling act than their non-dynastic peers. The effect was moreover substantial. Its point estimate corresponds to a 7.6 to 9.0 percentage points higher likelihood to oppose the act. Secondly, non-democratic dynastic politicians did not differ from their non-dynastic peers in the vote. In the next section, we test the robustness of those results.

## **6. Robustness checks**

### ***6.1 Taking selection in the vote into consideration***

In the baseline specification, we consider the votes of MPs present in Vichy and available for the vote. Casting a ballot required to be physically in Vichy. It was not the case of all MPs. First, some of them had already fled the country, were prisoners of war, or had been killed in action. Second, some MPs did not travel or did not make it to Vichy. Our estimates might therefore be driven by a selection in the vote, if dynastic politicians had a different probability to be in Vichy on July 10 1940. Figure 2 illustrates the process leading to opposing the reform.




Figure 2: Opposition in the July 10<sup>th</sup> vote and selection in the vote  
 (<sup>a</sup> Reference group = (1) <sup>b</sup> Reference group = (2) <sup>c</sup> Reference group = Voting “Yes”)

To account for the succession of conditions that had to be met to take part in the vote, we estimated a sequential logit taking as its dependent variable the probability of being in Vichy and the probability to cast a no vote.<sup>23</sup>

The results of the first stage reveal that older MPs, Jewish MPs, and MPs coming from an occupied territory were less likely to be in Vichy. The effect of age and occupation are likely due to the difficulties of travelling to Vichy. The lower propensity of Jewish MPs to be in Vichy might be related to the perceived risk of joining a vote that would eventually empower an anti-Semitic government. Conversely, we observe that WW1 veterans were more likely to go to Vichy. This finding could be related to Marshall Pétain’s image as a WW1 hero. In any case, the key finding of the first stage of the sequential logit model is that the two dynastic dummy variables both exhibit statistically insignificant coefficients. Dynastic MPs were therefore as likely to be in Vichy for the vote as their non-dynastic peers.

<sup>23</sup> The results of the estimation of the sequential logit model are reported in Table A1 in the online appendix.

The results of the second stage of the sequential logit are in line with those of the baseline regression. In particular, we observe that the democratic dynastic dummy variable exhibits a positive coefficient statistically significant at the one-percent level. We moreover again observe that the non-democratic dynastic dummy variable is insignificant. The marginal effect on the likelihood to cast a no vote of being a democratic dynastic MP is moreover of the same as in the baseline regression.

These results suggest that democratic dynastic politicians faced the same material limitations to attend the vote and did not have any extra motivations to participate in the vote. Democratic dynasties therefore only played a role in the vote.

One may interpret this finding as evidence against the hypothesis that the specific behavior of democratic dynastic MPs was driven by their vested interest in the republic. They did not mobilize more than their peers to attend the session in Vichy. If democratic dynastic MPs had had a strong interest in maintaining democracy, they would have made a special effort to attend the session, which would have shown in the first stage of the regression. The effect of democratic dynasties only appears in the vote itself. Historical and sociological analyses of the vote (Wieviorka, 2001; Ermakoff, 2008) point to the lack of coordination as the main explanation of the outcome of the vote. Democratic dynasties only played a role when coordination almost vanished. A pro-democracy environment might have eased coordination or provided democratic dynastic MPs with an ideological anchor prompting their opposition to the reform.

## ***6.2 Taking abstention into account***

We have so far opposed no votes to both yes votes and abstentions, thereby considering MPs casting an abstention ballot as accepting the reform. One could however argue that abstention was a compromise between explicitly opposing and explicitly endorsing the enabling act. The three positions would accordingly follow a natural ordering. We therefore estimated an ordered logit model where the dependent variable is a trichotomous variable coding the decision to cast a yes vote, abstain, or cast a no vote, and the main explanatory variables the two dummy variables coding democratic and non-democratic dynasties.<sup>24</sup> In that regression, the democratic dynasty dummy exhibits a positive coefficient statistically significant at the one-percent level while the coefficient of the non-democratic dynastic dummy is statistically insignificant, confirming our main results.

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<sup>24</sup> The results of that regression are reported in the first column of Table A2 in the online appendix.

As the assumption that casting a yes vote, abstaining, or casting a no vote follow a natural ordering can be questioned, we also estimated a multinomial logit model that does not impose any ordering on the three modalities.<sup>25</sup> When estimating that model, we observe that being a democratic dynastic politician had no effect on the probability to abstain. Conversely, non-democratic dynastic politicians were less likely to abstain than their non-dynastic peers. Dynastic status relates to the decision to cast a no vote the same way as in our baseline model. Specifically, democratic dynastic MPs were more likely to cast a no vote while we could find no effect of being a non-democratic dynastic MP.

Our baseline findings were therefore not driven by the way in which we coded abstention or ranked the three positions that MPs could take in the vote.

### ***6.3 Propensity score estimates***

Since the dynastic dummy is defined with respect to forbearers' characteristics, the dynastic status of MPs cannot be caused by the ballot they casted in the vote on the enabling act. As a result, reverse causality is unlikely in our study. One may still be concerned by the fact that a third factor may have correlated both with the propensity of being a democratic dynastic politician and the propensity to oppose the enabling act. To address those concerns, we have estimated a series of propensity score matching models using baseline controls to balance the "treated" and "non-treated" sample. We therefore compare democratic dynastic MPs to other MPs whose observable characteristics are similar.

Propensity score matching first computes the probability of belonging to a democratic dynasty based on the set of baseline control variables such as:

$$\text{Prob}(\textit{Republican Dynasty}_i) = f(\alpha + \Gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i) \quad (2)$$

From the vector of coefficients ( $\Gamma$ ), it assesses a score for each observation. This score represents the probability of belonging to a democratic dynasty according to observables. In a second step, observations from the treated group (=belonging to a democratic dynasty) and observations from the control group (= not belonging to a democratic dynasty) are matched upon this score. The difference in the outcome variable between these matched samples is comparable to an average treatment effect on the treated.

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<sup>25</sup> The results of that regression are reported in the last two columns of Table A2 in the online appendix.

We consider different numbers of matches for a single treated observation in order to show that even when increasing the control group or the accuracy of the match, our results remain stable.<sup>26</sup> We also alternatively compare democratic dynastic MPs with (1) non-dynastic MPs and with (2) non-dynastic plus non-democratic dynastic MPs. The “democratic dynasty” dummy stays significant at the five-percent level or beyond. Being a member of a democratic dynasty still increases opposition in the vote by 8.8 to 12.7 percentage points. These estimates suggest a causal interpretation of baseline results. Using different estimations methods, we show that members of democratic dynasties did oppose the enabling act more than other MPs.

## **7. Why did democratic dynastic politicians behave differently on July 10<sup>th</sup> 1940?**

Democratic dynastic MPs opposed the enabling act more than their non-dynastic and non-democratic dynastic peers (Sections 5 and 6). This section emphasizes two salient facts shedding more light on the drivers of this difference. Democratic dynastic politicians voted differently only in exceptional circumstances (Section 7.1). This difference is largely explained by their exposure to local democratic networks (Section 7.2).

### ***7.1 Democratic dynasties appear only in exceptional circumstances***

Baseline results emphasize the difference in opposition during the 1940 vote of the enabling act providing Marshall Pétain with full powers. Should this difference arise because of diverging cultures or political opinions, then we would observe a similar difference in previous votes on checks and balances. On the contrary, should democratic dynasties provide resources when the Parliament sways; we would not observe an effect of democratic dynasties in previous votes on power delegations. During the pre-war period (1937-1940), the Parliament voted five times to provide special powers to two different governments: Daladier (right-of-center) and Blum (left).<sup>27</sup>

\*\*\* INSERT TABLE 3 HERE \*\*\*

Table 3 shows the results of a regression estimating the opposition to delegations of power before 1940 including baseline control variables. We use three different measures of opposition to delegations of power. In Columns 3.1, 3.4 and 3.7; the dependent variable is the number of times a MP opposed to the provision of special powers to the government. In

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<sup>26</sup> The results of propensity score estimations are reported in Table A3 in the online appendix.

<sup>27</sup> Appendix C.1 described these votes.

Columns 3.2, 3.5 and 3.8; the dependent variable is the number of times a MP opposed his party line in these votes.<sup>28</sup> In Columns 3.3, 3.6 and 3.9; the dependent variable is the number of times a MP abstained in these votes. We alternatively construct these different scores of opposition to delegations of power on the whole set of votes (Columns 3.1 to 3.3), on votes providing special powers to a Blum government (Columns 3.4 to 3.6) and to a Daladier government (Columns 3.7 to 3.9). The democratic dynasty dummy never turned significant in these regressions. The non-democratic dynastic dummy turns significant when using the number of times a MP opposed delegations of power. As soon as the effect of political parties is taken into account, the coefficient of this dummy turns insignificant (Columns 3.2, 3.5 and 3.8). The difference in opposition to delegations of power between democratic dynastic politicians and other politicians is therefore inexistent before WWII.

\*\*\* INSERT TABLE 4 HERE \*\*\*

Table 4 adds the three measures of opposition to delegations of power in baseline regression. Opposition to party lines and abstention in these votes correlate with opposition in the July 10<sup>th</sup> 1940 vote. Both variables exhibit a positive coefficient significant at least at the ten-percent level. This effect however does not correlate with the higher opposition of democratic dynastic politicians in the July 10<sup>th</sup> 1940 vote. In these estimations, democratic dynastic politicians' opposition rate stays 8.3 (Column 4.2) to 9.0 (Column 4.1) percentage points higher than other politicians'. Democratic dynasties hence played a role beyond their influence on more usual delegations of power. They appeared only in 1940, when party coordination was impossible, uncertainty high and political institutions in danger.

## ***7.2 The local environment of democratic dynasties as a norms' enforcement device 4***

In such circumstances, democratic dynastic politicians may have relied on a specific environment to guide their behavior. Table 5 investigates different dynastic particularities potentially correlating with their democratic specificity to explain this effect. Columns 5.1 and 5.2 focus on offspring of founding fathers of the Third Republic as a subsample of democratic dynastic politicians. The marginal effect of the Third Republic founding fathers dummy in this subsample is slightly higher than the one of democratic dynasties. The difference in environment between offspring of politicians engaged in the onset of democracy in France and other democratic dynastic politicians might explain this difference.

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<sup>28</sup> A faction line exists if 66% or more of a faction's MP voted for (against) a delegation of power.

Columns 5.3 to 5.6 investigate the length and newness of the dynasty as other potential transmission channels. It adds to the baseline regression a dummy variable if there still is an alive member of the dynasty or one if the dynasty has been founded by the generation preceding the MP's one. Both characteristics could impact norms transmission. None of these dummy variables turns however as significant. In these columns, the marginal effect of being a democratic dynastic MP is even higher than in baseline results. The higher opposition of democratic dynastic MPs is not explained by the timing of the creation of their dynasty.

\*\*\* INSERT TABLE 5 HERE \*\*\*

Columns 5.7 to 5.10 investigate the role of unions (both farmers and workers unions) to explain the importance of democratic dynasties. Dynasties whose founder was involved in syndicalism also opposed the enabling act more (Column 5.7). When interacting this dummy with the democratic dynasty dummy, democratic dynasty with no history of syndicalism still opposed the reform 7.3 percentage points more than other politicians (Column 5.10). This difference is significant at the ten-percent level. Offspring of democratic politicians involved in syndicalism however opposed 15 percentage points more than other politicians (Column 5.10). This interaction term is significant at the one-percent level. The environment of MPs hence mitigates the effect of democratic dynasties on the vote of the enabling act.

Table 6 furthermore estimates a series of regressions including baseline control variables within democratic dynasties and within the whole set of dynasties.<sup>29</sup> By comparing the coefficients between within-democratic dynasties regressions and within-all dynasties regressions, we are able to compare the group-specific triggers of opposition.

\*\*\* INSERT TABLE 6 HERE \*\*\*

In the upper panel, we present independent variables significant in the within democratic dynasties subsample and not in the all dynasties subsample. In the bottom panel, we present baseline control variables significant in the within democratic dynasties subsample and not in the all dynasties subsample. These results confirm that MPs' environment mediate the effect of democratic dynasties (and not of other dynasties). Among baseline control variables, democratic dynastic MPs holding a low-skilled occupation have a higher opposition rate than

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<sup>29</sup> We exclude the civil servant dummy since it perfectly predicts non-opposition within democratic dynasties (9 observations).

their democratic dynastic peers. It is not the case in the whole set of dynasties. The wealth of opponents does not correlate with the opposition to the enabling act within democratic dynasties. Democratic dynastic politicians were not likely to oppose the enabling act more because they had received higher outside-of-politics benefits from their dynasties.

Within democratic dynastic MPs, the opposition to the enabling act decreases with the number of interventions in the Chamber<sup>30</sup> and if the MP held a special position in the Chamber (i.e. was a secretary, vice-president of the Chamber). On the contrary, the opposition to the enabling act is positively correlated with the length of a MP local career and with his ancestors' involvement in syndicalism. This is not the case in the whole sub sample of dynasties.

We interpret these results as an illustration of democratic dynasties resorting to democracy-prone environments in exceptional and uncertain circumstances. In July 1940, parties and the Assembly crumbled. Democratic dynastic politicians deeply involved in the Assembly could no longer rely on any frame of reference to oppose the enabling act. Meanwhile democratic dynastic politicians involved in local politics could resort to their local “pro-democracy” environment as a frame of reference to oppose it.

### ***7.3 Eliminating other potential transmission channels***

Appendix B introduces further tests of potential transmission channels. Table B1 first investigates the impact of peer effects by introducing political parties' means in the baseline specification.<sup>31</sup> These means should be significant if coordination existed within political parties. It is not the case: democratic dynastic politicians did not coordinate along party lines. We can however hypothesize that democratic dynastic politicians opposed the enabling act more if they evolved in a democracy-prone local environment. We find that politicians of the same political orientation coming from the same *département* coordinated. The coefficients of *département* x political orientation means are all significant at the one-percent level. Adding these controls, the marginal effect of being a democratic dynastic politician decreases to 3.3 percentage points but remains significant at the five-percent level. The effect of local environments correlates with democratic dynastic MPs' opposition in the act in line with results of Section 7.1 and 7.2. Democratic dynastic politicians' opposition partly hinges on democracy-prone local environments. As national institutions stumbled, coordination failed in the Assembly but persisted locally.

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<sup>30</sup> These measures have been normalized with respect to the chamber a MP belonged to and if he has been a Minister or not.

<sup>31</sup> Parties are described in Appendix C4. These factions means exclude each observation's dependent variable.

Tables B2 and B3 reinforce this conclusion. In both Tables, we control for measures of personal political capital as a proxy of the advantages accumulated over a life-time to proxy a politician's electoral advantage. Table B2 adds controls of political outcomes: medals, length of political mandates and length of the biography in 1940.<sup>32</sup> None of them turn significant. The magnitude and significance of the democratic dynastic MP dummy remain in line with baseline estimates.

Table B3 adds control of fame in the Parliament such as the number of commissions MPs were in or a dummy if they held a special position. On top of this information, we have coded each MP's interventions in the Parliament from 1936 to 1940 and the Parliament reactions' from the parliament minutes published in the *Journal de la République Française*.<sup>33</sup> The number of interventions proxies MPs' implication in the Parliament whereas the number of applause/boos are measures of (group-specific) fame/hate. Among these measures, only the number of applause by the whole Parliament is significant at the five percent level. None of these measures of vested interests in the regime or political advantage correlates with the effect of the democratic dynastic dummy.

Overall, democratic dynastic MP likely opposed the enabling act more than their peers because they had been able to resort to a specific local environment prompting opposition. Vested interest and political attributes do not explain this opposition. When institutions stumbled and coordination inside the Parliament was not possible, these politicians used as reference point the local environments inherited from their ancestors.

## 8. Conclusion

Previous literature mainly emphasizes the negative outcomes of political dynasties in democracies. These negative features have to be weighed against the stability of democratic regimes induced by the mere existence of political dynasties. Democratic dynastic politicians indeed increase the probability of survival of a democracy two ways. Indeed this paper shows that the behavior of dynastic politicians is heterogeneous across the various types of dynasties. Dynastic politicians opposed the enabling act if the founder of their dynasty was himself of a democratic obedience. This heterogeneity is mainly explained by politicians' local environment and political position. This study also identifies an individual determinant of democratic consolidation. It points to the importance of extra-constitutional safeguards to

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<sup>32</sup> Reverse causality with respect to the vote is not an issue here since the biographies end with the end of the Third Republic.

<sup>33</sup> These measures have been normalized with respect to the chamber a MP belonged to and if he has been a Minister or not.

autocratic reversals. Exposed to a democratic environment, politicians adopt stronger democratic norms. In critical situations such as coup attempts or autocratic reversals they refer to these norms even when traditional coordination devices such as political parties disappear.

These results have numerous implications regarding structures of democracies. Political dynasties may undermine representation in democracy but they might reinforce their stability by ensuring outside control of politicians. Hence drawbacks and advantages of political dynasties have to be weighed against each other. To do so, the functioning of political dynasties and particularly the transmission channels of their effects on political regimes have to be better understood. History offers numerous examples of autocratic reversals (i.e. 1930's Spain) or authoritarian backsliding (i.e contemporary Hungary) where the distinction between democratic dynasties and non-democratic dynasties could be applied. This offers perspectives for future research.

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## 10. Tables

Table 1: Democratic dynastic politicians versus Non-democratic dynastic politicians

	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.5)	(1.6)
	Democratic dynastic	Non- dynastic	Non- democratic dynastic	(1.2)-(1.1)	(1.3)-(1.1)	(1.2)-(1.3)
Jew	0.045 (0.026)	0.03 (0.006)	0 (0)	-0.016 (0.022)	-0.045* (0.027)	0.03 (0.02)
Légion d'Honneur	0.33 (0.058)	0.35 (0.018)	0.62 (0.1)	0.015 (0.06)	0.28*** (0.11)	-0.27*** (0.07)
War Medal	0.39 (0.06)	0.33 (0.018)	0.57 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.17* (0.09)	0.23*** (0.06)
Free Mason	0.076 (0.03)	0.058 (0.009)	0 (0)	-0.018 (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	0.058* (0.03)
Applause Left (standardized)	0.016 (0.11)	0.016 (0.04)	-0.21 (-0.08)	0 (0.13)	-0.23* (0.14)	0.23* (0.14)
Years of study	5.17 (0.36)	3.43 (0.11)	3.72 (0.4)	-1.45*** (0.53)	-1.73*** (0.39)	-0.28 (0.41)
Low-skill	0.09 (0.036)	0.22 (0.02)	0.2 (0.052)	0.13** (0.05)	0.11* (0.06)	0.02 (0.01)
Law	0.48 (0.061)	0.28 (0.017)	0.25 (0.056)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.23*** (0.08)	0.027 (0.02)
Agricultural union	0.03 (0.02)	0.09 (0.01)	0.2 (0.05)	0.06* (0.04)	0.17*** (0.05)	-0.11*** (0.04)
Special role in the Assembly	0.21 (0.05)	0.075 (0.01)	0.08 (0.036)	-0.14*** (0.036)	-0.13*** (0.06)	-0.01 (0.04)

Standard deviation in brackets. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 2: Baseline results

	(2.1)	(2.2)	(2.3)	(2.4)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Dependent variable	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No
Political Dynasty	0.301 (0.995)		0.995*** (2.616)	
Democratic dynasty		0.728** (2.072)		1.079*** (2.632)
Non-democratic dynasty		-0.414 (-0.770)		0.808 (1.234)
In <i>Senate</i>			0.705 (1.346)	0.684 (1.310)
Age			0.0194 (1.304)	0.0194 (1.306)
Jewish			0.279 (0.414)	0.262 (0.388)
Free-mason			1.008** (2.001)	0.998** (1.978)
Years of study			0.0478 (0.674)	0.0477 (0.673)
Occupation :	Journalist		-0.398 (-0.830)	-0.405 (-0.847)
	Law-related		0.500 (1.221)	0.493 (1.208)
	Medical profession		0.988* (1.905)	0.977* (1.896)
	Civil Servant		-1.026 (-1.472)	-1.027 (-1.470)
	Low-skilled		0.382 (1.022)	0.385 (1.028)
Occupied territory			-0.231 (-0.662)	-0.236 (-0.679)
Crossed by the demarcation line			0.0889 (0.233)	0.0714 (0.188)
WWI veteran			0.285 (1.005)	0.288 (1.016)
Political Orientation			Yes	Yes
<i>Départements</i> means			Yes	Yes
Constant	-2.050*** (-15.42)	-2.050*** (-15.42)	-6.121*** (-5.491)	-6.084*** (-5.454)
Marginal effect (Dynasty)	0.032		0.0833**	
Marginal effect (Democratic dynasty)		0.076**		0.090***
Marginal effect (Non-democratic dynasty)		-0.043		0.068
Observations	669	669	669	669
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.00194	0.00989	0.227	0.227

Robust z-statistics in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table 3: Dynasties and previous votes on power delegation

	(3.1) OLS	(3.2) OLS	(3.3) OLS	(3.4) OLS	(3.5) OLS	(3.6) OLS	(3.7) OLS	(3.8) OLS	(3.9) OLS
Dependent variable	# Against C&B	% of votes opposed to party line	# Abstained	# Against C&B	% of votes opposed to party line	# Abstained	# Against C&B	% of votes opposed to party line	# Abstained
Government	All			Blum			Daladier		
Democratic Dynasty	-0.00857 (-0.0668)	0.0516 (0.363)	0.0283 (1.193)	-0.0208 (-0.181)	-0.0315 (-0.377)	0.0397 (0.996)	0.0292 (0.459)	0.0901 (0.951)	0.00735 (0.333)
Non-democratic Dynasty	0.172 (1.565)	0.0545 (0.370)	0.00801 (0.371)	0.214** (1.991)	-0.0491 (-0.520)	-0.0159 (-0.623)	-0.0471* (-1.712)	0.101 (1.042)	-0.0105 (-0.904)
Constant	1.118*** (5.291)	0.993*** (3.909)	0.0253 (0.714)	1.035*** (5.265)	0.511*** (3.175)	0.0330 (0.503)	0.196* (1.897)	0.532*** (3.341)	0.0298 (0.920)
Observations	669	669	667	669	669	603	669	669	664
R-squared	0.272	0.091	0.122	0.470	0.131	0.144	0.827	0.201	0.057
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.254	0.0684	0.1000	0.457	0.110	0.121	0.822	0.181	0.0337

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

Table 4: Controlling for previous votes on power delegation. Dynasties and high-stake vote

	(4.1) Logit	(4.2) Logit	(4.3) Logit	(4.4) Logit
Dependent variable	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No
Democratic dynasty	1.096*** (2.757)	0.999** (2.489)	1.079*** (2.615)	1.050*** (2.713)
Non-democratic dynasty	0.770 (1.205)	0.745 (1.224)	0.838 (1.279)	0.660 (1.041)
Abstention at C&B votes	0.367*** (2.602)			0.446** (2.381)
Opposition to party line		2.045** (2.234)		1.668* (1.846)
# Votes against			-0.0926 (-0.458)	0.0615 (0.276)
Constant	-6.726*** (-6.064)	-6.050*** (-5.550)	-5.983*** (-5.096)	-6.966*** (-6.041)
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political orientation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Départements</i> means	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marginal effect (Dem Dyn)	0.090***	0.083**	0.090***	0.085***
Marginal effect (No-Dem Dyn)	0.064	0.062	0.070	0.053
Observations	669	667	669	667
Log-likelihood	-186.0	-186.8	-189.2	-183.1

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

Table 5: Dynasties characteristics and the opposition to autocratic reversals

	(5.1)	(5.2)	(5.3)	(5.4)	(5.5)	(5.6)	(5.7)	(5.8)
	Logit							
Dependent variable	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No							
Dynasty – Founding fathers (IIIrd Republic)	1.099** (2.421)	1.168** (2.519)						
Democratic dynasty				1.084** (2.564)		1.878** (2.514)		
Non-democratic dynasty		0.789 (1.206)		0.814 (1.247)		1.176 (1.605)		0.787 (1.198)
Dynasty with an alive member			0.733 (0.820)	-0.0426 (-0.0453)				
1 generation old dynasty					0.673 (1.644)	-0.955 (-1.282)		
Syndicalist dynasty							1.645** (2.572)	
Democratic & Syndicalist dynasty								1.767*** (2.678)
Democratic & no-Syndicalist dynasty								0.883* (1.863)
Constant	-5.764*** (-5.239)	-5.939*** (-5.353)	-5.769*** (-5.254)	-6.085*** (-5.460)	-5.874*** (-5.261)	-6.153*** (-5.563)	-5.815*** (-5.263)	-6.090*** (-5.444)
Baseline controls	Yes							
Political orientation	Yes							
<i>Départements</i> means	Yes							
Marginal effect (Dem dyn)				0.091***		0.16**		
Marginal effect (Founding fathers)	0.093**	0.098**						
Marginal effect (No-Dem dyn)		0.066		0.068		0.98		0.066
Marginal effect (Syn Dyn)							0.14***	
Marginal effect (Dem+NoSyn Dyn)								0.073*
Marginal effect (Dem+Syn Dyn)								0.15***
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669
Log-likelihood	-190.3	-189.5	-192.5	-189.3	-191.6	-188.5	-190.9	-188.8

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

Table 6: Within dynasties estimates

	(6.1) Logit	(6.2) Logit	(6.3) Logit	(6.4) Logit	(6.5) Logit	(6.6) Logit	(6.7) Logit	(6.8) Logit	(6.9) Logit	(6.10) Logit
Dependent variable	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No
Sample	Democratic dynasties	Democratic dynasties	Democratic dynasties	Democratic dynasties	Democratic dynasties	All dynasties	All dynasties	All dynasties	All dynasties	All dynasties
<i>Significant Characteristics</i>										
		Important role in the Parliament		Local Political environment			Important role in the Parliament		Local Political environment	
Interventions in Chamber (1936-1939)		-19.34*** (-3.292)					-8.636 (-1.405)			
Special role in the Assembly			-6.670*** (-3.099)					0.238 (0.220)		
Length as a <i>conseiller général</i>				0.147** (2.438)					0.0249 (0.837)	
Dynasty with syndicalism					6.036*** (3.136)					1.279 (1.047)
<i>Significant control variables</i>										
Low-skilled	4.038*** (2.907)	8.079** (1.992)	8.084** (2.005)	5.631* (1.721)	7.276*** (3.868)	0.998 (0.847)	1.125 (0.756)	1.019 (0.870)	0.930 (0.775)	1.162 (0.912)
Constant	-19.69*** (-3.412)	-47.29*** (-2.911)	-47.55*** (-3.984)	-26.96*** (-3.738)	-27.83*** (-2.764)	-7.812* (-1.850)	-10.75* (-1.695)	-7.709* (-1.838)	-7.472* (-1.870)	-8.216* (-1.869)
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political orientation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Département</i> means	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	57	57	57	57	57	108	108	108	108	108
Pseudo – R <sup>2</sup>	0.649	0.737	0.722	0.694	0.705	0.430	0.463	0.430	0.436	0.439

Robust z-statistics in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

## ONLINE APPENDICES

### Appendix A: Robustness checks

#### A.1. Taking selection in the vote into consideration

Table A1: Sequential Logit

Dependent variable	(A1.1) Going to Vichy to cast a vote	(A1.2) Vote <sub>i</sub> =No
Democratic dynasty	0.466 (1.194)	1.079*** (2.632)
Non-democratic dynasty	0.333 (0.811)	0.808 (1.235)
In <i>Senate</i>	-0.0216 (-0.0843)	0.684 (1.310)
Age	-0.0179* (-1.920)	0.0194 (1.306)
Jewish	-1.099** (-2.263)	0.262 (0.388)
Free-mason	-0.338 (-0.891)	0.998** (1.978)
Years of study	0.0477 (1.092)	0.0477 (0.673)
Occupation :		
Journalist	-0.408 (-1.609)	-0.405 (-0.847)
Law-related	-0.341 (-1.246)	0.493 (1.208)
Medical profession	-0.155 (-0.382)	0.977* (1.897)
Civil Servant	-0.355 (-1.047)	-1.027 (-1.471)
Low-skilled	-0.342 (-1.441)	0.385 (1.028)
Occupied territory	-1.214*** (-4.790)	-0.236 (-0.679)
Crossed by the demarcation line	-0.470 (-1.371)	0.0714 (0.188)
WWI veteran	0.320* (1.712)	0.288 (1.016)
Constant	3.143*** (4.816)	-6.084*** (-5.455)
Political orientation	Yes	Yes
<i>Départements</i> means	Yes	Yes
Marginal effect (Democratic Dynasty)	0.060	0.090***
Marginal effect (Non-democratic dynasty)	0.014	0.068
Observations	847	847

Robust z-statistics in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## A.2. Taking abstention into account

Table A2: Taking abstention into account

	(A2.1) Ordered logit	(A2.2) Multinomial Logit	(A2.3) Multinomial Logit
Dependent variable	Opposition (=0 if Vote <sub>i</sub> =Yes / =1 if Vote <sub>i</sub> =Abstention / =2 if Vote <sub>i</sub> =No)	Vote <sub>i</sub> =Abstention	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No
Democratic dynasty	0.938** (2.465)	-1.090 (-0.924)	1.061*** (2.594)
Non-Democratic dynasty	0.350 (0.564)	-16.13*** (-32.10)	0.766 (1.179)
Constant		-5.935*** (-3.132)	-6.120*** (-5.458)
Constant cut1	5.169*** (5.489)		
Constant cut2	5.487*** (5.815)		
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political orientation	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Départements</i> means	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	669	669	669
Log-likelihood	-273.7	-248.9	-248.9

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

### A.3. Propensity score estimates

Table A3: Propensity Score Matching

	(A3.1)	(A3.2)	(A3.3)	(A3.4)	(A3.5)
	Matching - 1 match	Matching - 2 matches	Matching - 3 matches	Matching - 4 matches	Matching - 5 matches
Dependent variable	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No
Panel A / Comparison group : Non-dynastic + Non-democratic dynastic politicians					
Democratic dynasty	0.105** (2.038)	0.105** (2.068)	0.111** (2.448)	0.101** (2.310)	0.0982** (2.355)
Panel B / Comparison group : Non-dynastic politicians					
Democratic dynasty	0.0877** (2.229)	0.114*** (3.408)	0.117*** (4.542)	0.127*** (5.016)	0.105*** (4.976)
Observations	669	669	669	669	669

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Matching on political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

## Appendix B: Investigating potential transmission channels

Table B1: Local politics

	(B1.1)	(B1.2)	(B1.3)	(B1.4)	(B1.5)	(B1.6)	(B1.7)	(B1.8)
	Logit							
Dependent variable	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No							
Political dynasty	1.011*** (2.622)		1.010*** (2.631)		0.797* (1.685)		0.709 (1.471)	
Democratic dynasty		1.103*** (2.649)		1.100*** (2.649)		0.933** (2.144)		0.900** (1.998)
Non-democratic dynasty		0.812 (1.238)		0.815 (1.246)		0.501 (0.486)		0.322 (0.308)
Mean abstention –Same Party			-5.260 (-0.486)	-5.619 (-0.516)			-10.54 (-0.795)	-11.38 (-0.859)
Mean opposition –Same Party			-0.909 (-0.450)	-0.954 (-0.473)			1.294 (0.577)	1.099 (0.484)
Mean Abstention – Same orientation + Same <i>département</i>					-2.180 (-0.854)	-2.099 (-0.838)	-3.389 (-1.135)	-3.335 (-1.128)
Mean Opposition – Same orientation + Same <i>département</i>					15.40*** (6.921)	15.35*** (6.913)	15.56*** (7.216)	15.52*** (7.226)
Constant	-6.155*** (-5.508)	-6.117*** (-5.473)	-5.992*** (-5.389)	-5.943*** (-5.338)	-6.961*** (-4.226)	-6.914*** (-4.252)	-6.644*** (-4.065)	-6.588*** (-4.093)
Baseline Controls	Yes							
Political orientation	Yes							
<i>Départments</i> means	Yes							
Marginal effect (Pol Dyn)					0.028*		0.024	
Marginal effect (Dem Dyn)	0.085***	0.092***	0.085***	0.092***		0.032**		0.031**
Marginal effect (Non-Dem Dyn)		0.068		0.068		0.017		0.011
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669
Log-likelihood	-189.1	-189.0	-189.3	-189.2	-86.32	-86.23	-84.73	-84.57

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means.

Table B2: Extensions – controlling for individual political capital

	(B2.1)	(B2.2)	(B2.3)	(B2.4)	(B2.5)	(B2.6)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Dependent variable	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No					
Democratic dynasty	1.113*** (2.756)	1.069*** (2.596)	1.103*** (2.693)	1.070*** (2.618)	1.060*** (2.600)	1.101*** (2.780)
Non-democratic dynasty	0.748 (1.130)	0.807 (1.244)	0.812 (1.236)	0.797 (1.229)	0.748 (1.127)	0.675 (1.011)
War Medal	0.858 (1.610)					0.852 (1.526)
<i>Légion d'Honneur</i>	0.174 (0.454)					0.155 (0.389)
Length Biography		0.000150 (0.462)				0.000315 (0.727)
Length Ministerial cabinet			-0.0636 (-0.598)			-0.126 (-1.092)
Length national mandates				0.00452 (0.219)		0.000666 (0.0227)
Mayor					0.445 (1.423)	0.463 (1.463)
Length – <i>conseiller général</i>					0.00981 (0.710)	0.00726 (0.480)
Constant	-6.207*** (-5.284)	-6.026*** (-5.447)	-6.111*** (-5.488)	-6.020*** (-5.322)	-5.991*** (-5.318)	-6.069*** (-5.080)
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political orientation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Départements</i> means	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marginal effect (Dem Dyn)	0.092***	0.089***	0.092***	0.090***	0.088***	0.090***
Marginal Effect (Non-Dem Dyn)	0.062	0.067	0.068	0.067	0.062	0.055
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669
Log-likelihood	-187.2	-189.2	-189.2	-189.3	-187.5	-185.1

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), *département* crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table B3: Controlling for individual political capital in Chamber

	(B3.1)	(B3.2)	(B3.3)	(B3.4)	(B3.5)	(B3.6)	(B3.7)	(B3.8)	(B3.9)
	Logit								
Dependent variable	Vote <sub>i</sub> =No								
Democratic dynasty	1.059*** (2.619)	1.036** (2.425)	1.079*** (2.635)	1.080*** (2.619)	1.074*** (2.635)	1.154*** (2.779)	1.086*** (2.653)	1.072*** (2.619)	1.057** (2.479)
Non-democratic dynasty	0.785 (1.149)	0.804 (1.244)	0.805 (1.230)	0.897 (1.370)	0.807 (1.234)	0.910 (1.399)	0.824 (1.249)	0.812 (1.238)	0.918 (1.346)
# commissions in	0.129 (1.281)								0.140 (1.368)
Special role Assembly (=1)		0.219 (0.521)							0.215 (0.493)
# interventions (1936-1940)			-0.0360 (-0.479)						-0.255 (-0.974)
# applause Left (1936-1940)				0.259 (1.590)					0.198 (0.802)
# applause Right (1936-1940)					-0.0648 (-0.319)				0.0207 (0.0685)
# applause - chamber (1936-1940)						0.234** (2.477)			0.175 (1.130)
# boos from the right (1936-1940)							0.211 (0.758)		0.0809 (0.340)
# boos from the left (1936-1940)								-0.0754 (-0.476)	-0.118 (-0.445)
Constant	-6.385*** (-5.585)	-6.108*** (-5.432)	-6.112*** (-5.467)	-5.748*** (-5.076)	-6.077*** (-5.437)	-5.919*** (-5.188)	-5.816*** (-5.155)	-6.091*** (-5.442)	-6.088*** (-5.078)
Baseline controls	Yes								
Political orientation	Yes								
Département means	Yes								
Marginal effect (Dem Dyn)	0.088***	0.087**	0.090***	0.089***	0.090***	0.096***	0.090***	0.090***	0.086**
Margin effect (No-dem Dyn)	0.065	0.067	0.067	0.074	0.068	0.075	0.068	0.068	0.075
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669	669
Log-likelihood	-188.5	-189.2	-189.2	-186.7	-189.2	-187.3	-188.3	-189.2	-184.4

Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Political orientation controls: Left (=1), Center (=1), Senate (=1). Demographic controls: Age, jewish (=1), occupation, WWI veteran (=1), In occupied area (=1), département crossed by demarcation line (=1), study years and departmental means. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Appendix C: Technical Appendix

Table C1: Democratic culture – Votes to measure taste for checks and balances

Date / Cabinet	Vote on power delegation	Parliamentary debate
19/03/1939 Daladier	The government is allowed to take any necessary measures to defend the Homeland by decree.	M. Fleurot « What honors and weakens a democracy is debate ; the free examination of law projects by the deliberative assemblies» Journal officiel – Sénat 19/03/1939  M. Bachelet : « The powers you will provide the government with will allow it to take measures of the same kind of a dictator's» Journal officiel – Sénat 19/03/1939
30/11/1939 Daladier	« In case of emergency, the government is allowed to take any measures guaranteeing the defense of the Nation after deliberation by the ministers' cabinet »	M. Rotinat « The commission does not agree on renouncing the Parliament's right to control law projects, which is the mere principle of democracy.» Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 30/11/1939
04/10/1938 Daladier	Grant the government with the necessary powers to « improve the economic and financial situation of the country »	M. Philip “ Be sure that we will not reform our democracy if we do not show the respect we owe each-other to discuss law projects » Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 04/10/1938  M. Grésa « Full-powers, decrees, here is a dangerous path for our democracy.» Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 04/10/1938
06/04/1938 Blum	Grant the government with the necessary powers to face its financial liabilities, especially for its defense expenses.	M. Reynaud « In the present situation, we abuse the concept of popular will » Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 06/04/1938  « We have no right to accept this imperative mandate» Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 06/04/1938
19/06/1937 Blum	Grant the government with the necessary powers to « improve the economic and financial situation of the country »	M. Piétri «Every dictatorship took advantage of the legitimacy of the blank check. It contradicts the necessary critic which is the law of true democracies.» Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 19/06/1937  M. André Albert « I thought and still think that the politics of power delegation might weaken the republican principle itself.» Journal officiel – Chambre des députés 19/06/1937

Table C2: List of dynastic politicians

<u>MP in 1940</u>	<u>Democratic dynasty</u>	<u>Dynasty Founder</u>	<u>Political regime</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Party</u>
Bernard d'Aillières	NO	Augustin, Henry Caillard d'Aillières	July Monarchy	Deputy (1837-1839)	Ministerial majority
André Albert	YES	François Albert	Third Republic	Senator (1920-1927) Deputy (1928-1933)	Radical Party
Gaston Allemane	YES	Jean Allemane	Third Republic	Took part in the Commune (1871) Deputy (1901-1902 /1906-1910)	Republican - Socialist
Hubert d'Andlau de Hombourg	NO	Frédéric-Antoine-Marc d'Andlau	Monarchy	Noble at the General Estate of 1789	Royalist
Joseph Antier	NO	Abbé Antier	Absolute monarchy	Reactionary Abbot during the French Revolution	Monarchist
Paul Antier	NO	Abbé Antier	Absolute monarchy	Reactionary Abbot during the French Revolution	Monarchist
Étienne d'Audiffret-Pasquier	NO	Etienne-Denis Pasquier	Restoration July Monarchy	President of the deputies assembly (1816-1817) President of the Chamber of Pairs (1830-1848)	Monarchist
Léonide Babaud-Lacroze	YES	Antoine Babaud-Lacroze	Third Republic	Deputy (1890-1919)	Republican
Paul Bachelet	YES	Henri Bachelet	Third Republic	Senator (1920-1930)	Republican Union
Emerand Bardoul	NO	Julien-Marie Bardoul	Third Republic	Mayor of Marsac-sur Don Conseiller général of Guéméné Penfao	Republican Federation
Jacques Bardoux	YES	Agénor Bardoux	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1881) Senator (1882-1897)	Republican
Léon Baréty	YES	Alexandre Baréty	Third Republic	Conseiller général Mayor of Puget Théniers Mayor of Lauzerte (1896-1904)	Republican
Étienne Baron	YES	Jean Baron	Third Republic	Conseiller général (1892-1904)	Republican
Comte Jean de Beaumont	NO	Marc-Antoine de Beaumont	Restoration	Pair of France (1814-1830)	Monarchist
Adrien Bels	YES	Gabriel Lamothe-Pradelle	Third Republic	Deputy (1885-1888)	Republican
Paul Bénazet	NO	Louis Marie Joseph Bénazet	Restoration	General of the Empire Mayor of Dunkirk (1826-1846)	Monarchist
Louis de Blois	NO	Eugène Caillaux	Third Republic	Deputy (1871-1876) Senator (1876-1882)	Monarchist

Jean Boivin-Champeaux	YES	Paul Boivin-Champeaux	Third Republic	Senator (1907-1925)	Democratic Left
François Boux de Casson	NO	Charles de Casson	Absolute monarchy	Local Lord	Monarchist
André Breton	YES	Jules-Louis Breton	Third Republic	Deputy (1898-1921) Senator (1921-1930)	Socialist
Auguste Brunet	YES	Louis Brunet	Third Republic	Deputy (1893-1905) Senator(1905)	Republican
Louis Buyat	YES	Etienne Buyat	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1887)	Republican
Joseph Caillaux	NO	Alexandre Eugène Caillaux	Third Republic	Deputy (1871-1876) Senator (1876-1882)	Monarchist
Stanislas de Castellane	NO	Boniface de Castellane	Restoration	Pair of France (1815-1837)	Monarchist
Jean Chaulin-Servinière	YES	Lucien Chaulin-Servinière	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1898)	Progressist Republican
Alphonse Chautemps	YES	Emile Chautemps	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1905) Senator (1905-1918)	Radical Socialist
Camille Chautemps	YES	Emile Chautemps	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1905) Senator (1905-1918)	Radical Socialist
Emery Compayré	NO	Etienne Compayré	Revolution	Legislative body (1798-1903)	Bonapartist
Joseph Coucoureux	YES	Lucien Coucoureux	Third Republic	Conseiller général (1875-1907)	Republican
Charles Delesalle	NO	Charles Delesalle	Third Republic	Mayor of Lille (1904-1919)	No political affiliation (Right conservatism)
Roger Delthil	YES	Camille Delthil	Third Republic	Mayor of Moissac (1894-1895) Senator (1902)	Republican
René Delzangles	NO	Pierre Delzangles	Third Republic	Mayor of Villefranque	No political affiliation
Jean Deschanel	YES	Emile Deschanel	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1881) Senator (1881-1904)	Moderate Republican
Charles Desjardins	YES	Jules Desjardins	Third Republic	Deputy (1893-1914)	Moderate Republican
Louis de Diesbach de Belleruche	NO	Eugène de Belleruche de Diesbach	Third Republic	Deputy (1871-1876)	Bonapartist
Pierre Dignac	NO	Eugène Dignac	July Monarchy	Mayor of Gujan-Mestras	Monarchist
Jacques Duboys-Fresney	YES	Etienne Duboys-Fresney	July Monarchy	Deputy (1842-1846 / 1871-1876)	Republican
Pierre Duchesne-Fournet	YES	Paul Duchesne-Fournet	Third Republic	Deputy (1881-1885) Senator (1894-1906)	Republican
Pierre Dupuy	YES	Jean Dupuy	Third Republic	Senator (1891-1919)	Republican
Henri Elby	YES	Jules Elby	Third Republic	Senator (1923-1933)	Republican Union
Pierre Even	YES	Jacques Even	Third Republic	Deputy (1881-1885)	Republican Left

André Fallières	YES	Armand Fallières	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1889)	Republican Left
Roger Farjon	YES	Pierre Farjon	Third Republic	Deputy (1906-1910)	Republican
Camille Ferrand	YES	Emile Labussière	Third Republic	Deputy (1893-1906)	Socialist
Pierre-Étienne Flandin	YES	Hippolyte Ribière	Third Republic	Senator (1876-1885)	Republican Left
Achille-Armand Fould	NO	Achille Marcus Fould	Second Empire	Minister of State (1852-1860)	Bonapartist
François du Fretay	NO	René Monjaret de Kerjégu	Absolute monarchy	Concellor of the King Mayor of Moncontour	Monarchist
Félix Gadaud	YES	Antoine Gadaud	Third Republic	Deputy (1885-1889) Senator (1891-1897)	Republican Union
André Goirand	YES	Léopold Goirand	Third Republic	Deputy (1887-1898) Senator (1906-1920)	Republican
Georges de Grandmaison	NO	Comte Lobau	Restoration	Deputy (1828-1833)	Monarchist
Charles Robert de Grandmaison	NO	Comte Lobau	Restoration	Deputy (1828-1833)	Monarchist
Edmond Hannotin	NO	Maurice Sabatier	Third Republic	Mayor of Viry-Chatillon	Conservatism
André Join-Lambert	NO	Arthur Join-Lambert	Third Republic	Conseiller général of Brionne	Monarchist
Marquis Jacques de Juigné	NO	Jacques Leclerc de Juigné	Absolute monarchy	Representing nobility at the General Estate of 1789	Monarchist
Edgar de Kergariou	NO	Joseph de Kergariou	Restoration	Deputy (1820-1827)	Monarchist
Guy La Chambre	YES	Charles-Emile La Chambre	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1878 / 1889-1893)	Republican Moderate
Marquis Henri de La Ferronnays	NO	Pierre Léon de la Ferronnays	Restoration	Pair of France	Monarchist
Lucien Lamoureux	YES	Etienne Lamoureux	Third Republic	Deputy (1910-1914)	Republican radical socialist
Fernand Lavergne	YES	Bernard Lavergne	Second Empire	Deputy (1849-1851 / 1876-1889) Senator (1889-1900)	Montagne / Republican
Edmond Leblanc	NO	Edmond Lucien Leblanc	Third Republic	Deputy (1884-1889)	Conservative Union
Jean Le Cour Grandmaison	NO	Adolphe le Cour Grandmaison	Second Republic	Deputy (1849)	Bonapartist
Edmond Lefebvre du Prey	NO	François-Joseph Lefebvre-Cayet	Directory	Member of the "Conseil des Anciens" (1800-1811)	Monarchist
Victor Lourties	YES	Victor Lourties	Third Republic	Senator (1888-1920)	Republican left
Émile Malon	NO	Pascal Malon	Third Republic	Mayor of Saint-Georges de Rouellé	No political affiliation
Augustin Michel	YES	Adrien Michel	Third Republic	Deputy (1902-1906)	Republican moderate

Eugène Milliès-Lacroix	YES	Raphaël Milliès-Lacroix	Third Republic	Senator (1897-1933)	Republican
Joseph Monsservin	YES	Emile Monsservin	Third Republic	Senator (1892-1911)	Republican
Hubert de Montaigu	NO	François de Wendel	Restoration	Deputy (1815-1825)	Monarchist
Geoffroy de Montalembert	NO	Marc René de Montalembert	Restoration	Pair of France (1819-1830)	Monarchist
Jean Montigny	NO	Jean-Joseph de Verneilh-Puyraseau	Restoration	Deputy (1817-1824 / 1827-1830)	Monarchist
Louis Nachon	NO	Missing Name	Third Republic	Mayor of Conliège (1891-1921)	No political affiliation
Henri de Pavin de Lafarge	NO	Joseph Pavin de Lafarge	Third Republic	Mayor of Viviers (1897-1935)	Republican Federation
François Piétri	NO	Francois Piétri	French Revolution	Deputy at the Constituting Assembly	Moderate group
Étienne Pinault	YES	Eugène Pinault	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1889) Senator (1901-1913)	Republican Union
Jean-Pierre Plichon	NO	Ignace Plichon	July Monarchy	Deputy (1846-1848 / 1857-1888)	Monarchist
François Reille-Soult-Dalmatie	NO	Jean-de Dieu Soult	July Monarchy	Chief of government (1832-1834 / 1839-1847)	Monarchist
René Rollin	YES	Henri Rollin	Third Republic	Deputy (1932-1933)	Republican Radical Socialist
Guillaume des Rotours	NO	Eugène des Rotours	Second Empire	Deputy (1868-1889)	Bonapartist
Georges Roulleaux-Dugage	NO	Henri Roulleaux-Dugage	Second Empire	Deputy (1852-1870)	Bonapartist
Édouard Roussel	YES	Edouard Roussel	Third Republic	Conseiller général (1898-1910)	Republican
Henri Salengro	YES	Roger Salengro	Third Republic	Deputy (1928-1936)	Socialist
Albert Sarraut	YES	Omer Sarraut	Third Republic	Mayor of Carcassone (1887)	Radical
Paul Saurin	NO	Paul Saurin	Third Republic	Senator (1927-1933)	Independant
Émile Taudière	NO	Jacques-Paul Taudière	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1893)	Conservatism
René Thorp	YES	Antoine Dubost	Third Republic	Deputy (1880-1897) Senator (1897-1921)	Radical
Pierre Sérandour	YES	Pierre Marie Sérandour	Third Republic	Deputy (1924-1928)	Republican left
Marcel-François Astier	YES	Francois Astier	Third Republic	Deputy (1909-1910)	Radical Socialist
Laurent Bonnevey	YES	Jacques Bonnevey	Third Republic	Conseiller général du Rhône	Republican
Georges Bruguier	YES	Victorien Bruguier	Third Republic	Municipal council of Nice (1888-""")	Republican
Pierre de Chambrun	NO	Joseph Aldebert de Chambrun	Second Empire	Deputy (1857-1871)	Bonapartist

Maurice Delom-Sorbé	YES	Joseph Delom-Sorbé	Third Republic	Deputy (1914-1921)	Republican Left
Marx Dormoy	YES	Jean Dormoy	Third Republic	Mayor of Montluçon (1892-1898)	Socialist
Amédée Guy	YES	Jules Guy	Third Republic	Mayor of Bonneville (1900-1904)	Republican
Jean Hennessy	NO	Jacques Hennessy	Restoration	Deputy(1824-1842)	Monarchist
François Labrousse	YES	Philippe Labrousse	Third Republic	Deputy (1884-1893) Senator (1894-1910)	Radical left
Albert Le Bail	YES	Roland le Bail	Restoration	Mayor of Plozévet (1837-1840)	Anti-Monarchist Republican
Alfred Margaine	YES	Henri Margaine	Third Republic	Deputy (1871-1888) Senator (1888-1893)	Republican Left
Robert Mauger	YES	Pierre Mauger-Violeau	Third Republic	Deputy (1924)	Republican Socialist
Léonel de Moustier	NO	Clément Edouard, de Moustier	July Monarchy	Deputy (1824-1827)	Monarchist
Léon Roche	NO	Marie-Léon Roche	Third Republic	Mayor of Oradour-sur-Vayre	No political affiliation
Isidore Thivrier	YES	Christophe Thivrier	Third Republic	Deputy (1889-1895)	Republican
Théodore Steeg	YES	Jules Steeg	Third Republic	Deputy (1881-1889)	Republican Union
Paul Bastid	YES	Paul Devès	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1885)	Republican Left
Michel Tony-Révillon	YES	Tony Révillon	Third Republic	Deputy (1881-1893)	Socialist
Robert Lassalle	YES	Gustave Lassalle	Third Republic	Conseiller général of Soustons (1901-1913)	Republican
Jean Bouhey	YES	Jean-Baptiste Bouhey-Allex	Third Republic	Deputy (1902-1913)	Socialist
François de Wendel	NO	François de Wendel	Restoration	Deputy (1815-1825)	Monarchist
Jean Chiappe	NO	Ange Chiappe	Convention	Deputy (1792-1797)	Moderate - Conservatism
Bernard de Coral	NO	Jules Labat	Second Empire	Deputy(1869-1893)	Moderate Conservatism
Paul Cuttoli	YES	Jules Cuttoli	Third Republic	Deputy (1928-1936)	Republican radical
Ernest Daraignez	NO	Joseph Daraignez	Third Republic	Mayor of Hagetmau (1904-1908)	No political affiliation
Armand Dupuis	NO	Charles Dupuis	Third Republic	Mayor and Conseiller général	No political affiliation
Paul Faure	YES	M. Faure	Third Republic	Conseiller général de Dordogne	Republican
Michel Geistdoerfer	YES	Michel Geistdoerfer	Third Republic	Municipal Council of Dinan	Republican
François Charles d'Harcourt	NO	François Gabriel d'Harcourt	July Monarchy	Deputy (1827-1837)	Monarchist

James Hennessy	NO	Jacques Hennessy	Restoration	Deputy(1824-1842)	Monarchist
Paul Vasseux	NO	Name missing	Second Empire	Mayor of Golancourt	No political affiliation
Georges Denis	NO	Jean-Henri Merle d'Aubigné	First Empire (Germany)	Chaplain to Wilhem the first	Monarchist - Evangelist
Jean Neyret	NO	Blaise Neyret	Third Republic	Deputy (1914-1924)	Republican Federation
Jacques Poitou-Duplessy	NO	Roger Poitou-Duplessy	Third Republic	Deputy(1910-1914)	Catholic of Liberal Action
François de Saint-Just	NO	Victor de Saint-Just d'Autingues	Third Republic	Deputy (1924-1933)	Republican Federation
Charles Saint-Venant	YES	Charles Saint-Venant	Third Republic	Deputy (1919-1926)	Socialist
Paul Giacobbi	YES	Marius Giacobbi	Third Republic	Deputy (1914-1919) Senator (1903-1912)	Radical
Paul Reynaud	YES	Hippolyte Gassier	Third Republic	Deputy (1876-1885) Senator (1930-1907)	Republican
Maurice Cabart-Danneville	YES	Jean-Baptiste De Beauvais	French Revolution	Representing clergy at the General Estates of 1789	Reformist
Amaury de la Grange	NO	Prosper de Lagrange	Second Empire	Deputy (1852-1857)	Bonapartist

Table C3: Variables description

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Source</u>
<b><u>Dependent variables</u></b>		
Family Rep	1 if family member is or has been a Mayor, a <i>Conseiller général</i> or a national representative in a party of a Republican origin	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Study Years	Number of years needed to achieve the highest degree obtained by the representative	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
<b><u>Control variables</u></b>		
Free-Mason	1 if Free-Mason (0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Study Years	Number of years needed to achieve the highest degree obtained by the representative	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Conseil Général	Time as a <i>Conseiller Général</i> (in years)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Age	Age of the representative	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
<b><u>Constituency:</u></b>		
Mean no-votes per <i>département</i>	For each <i>département</i> the proportion of representatives opposing to the reform (excluding the vote of the observation)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean Abst per <i>département</i>	For each <i>département</i> the proportion of representatives abstaining (excluding the vote of the observation)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
<b><u>Constituency specific</u></b>		
Mean no-votes per party-département	Proportion of no votes on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and the same <i>département</i>	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean Abst per party-département	Proportion of abstention on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and the same <i>département</i>	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean no-votes per party if senator	Proportion of no votes on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and belonging to the <i>Sénat</i> (if the representative is a <i>Sénateur</i> , 0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean Abst per party-if Senator	Proportion of abstention on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same political orientation and belonging to the <i>Sénat</i> (if the representative is a <i>Sénateur</i> , 0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
<b><u>Parliamentary group</u></b>		
Mean no-votes per parliamentary group	Proportion of no votes on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same parliamentary group	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Mean Abst per parliamentary group	Proportion of abstention on July 10, 1940 among the representatives belonging to the same parliamentary group	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
<b><u>Personal</u></b>		
Occupied	1 if the <i>département</i> of the representative is occupied (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website /

Crossed	1 if the <i>département</i> of the representative is crossed by the demarcation line (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Journalist	1 if the representative is or has been a journalist (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Doc	1 if the representative has or has had a medical profession (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Civil_servant	1 if the representative is or has been a civil_servant (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Law	1 if the representative has a law degree (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Low	1 if the representative is a farmer or a worker (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Age	Age of the representative (in years)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Study Years	Number of years needed to achieve the highest degree obtained by the representative	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
<b>Mandate</b>		
Min	Time as a <i>Ministre</i> or a <i>Secrétaire d'Etat</i> (in years)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Conseil Général	Time as a <i>Conseiller Général</i> (in years)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Mayor	1 if the representative is or has been a Mayor (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
National Mandate	Time as a <i>Député</i> or as a <i>Sénateur</i>	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
<b>Social Status</b>		
Free-Mason	1 if Free-Mason (0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Synd	1 if the representative is or has occupied a position in an union (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Jews	1 if the representative declared being jewish or he was victim of antisemitic attacks during parliamentary debates (0 otherwise)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
WWI_veteran	1 if the representative served during WWI (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Legion	1 if the representative has a <i>Légion d'honneur</i> (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
War_Medal	1 if the representative has a <i>Croix de guerre</i> (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Left	1 if the representative belong to a leftist party (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Center	1 if the representative belong to a centrist party (0 otherwise)	Representatives biographies - French Assembly and French Senate website
Occupied	1 if the representative is from an occupied <i>département</i> (0 otherwise)	
Crossed	1 if the representative is from an occupied <i>département</i> (0 otherwise)	
<b>Political behavior</b>		
Total opposition	% of time a representative opposed to its parliamentary group's vote (if more than 66% of a parliamentary group voted along the same line)	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>

Abstention	Number of time a representative abstained during the 5 previous votes dealing with checks and balances during the 1936-1940 legislature.	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Scoreno	Times the representative voted against checks and balance dismantlement during the past five votes on this issue	<i>Journal Officiel de la République Française</i>
Length Bio	Length of the Biography in Joly's dictionary	<i>Dictionnaire des parlementaires français (1889-1940)</i>
Dynasty with syndicalism	= 1 if the founder of the dynasty was active in an union	<i>Dictionnaire des parlementaires français (1889-1940) and Wikipédia page of some politicians</i>

Table C4: List of factions

Alliance démocratique	Parti agraire et paysan français
Fédération républicaine	Parti républicain
Gauche démocratique	Républicains indépendants
Gauche indépendante	Section Française de l'internationale ouvrière
Gauche radicale	Union populaire française
Indépendants d'action populaire	Union républicaine
Indépendants républicains	Union républicaine démocratique
Non Inscrits	Union socialiste républicaine